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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Jennifer Porcello
Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant/Respondent
vs.
Anthony J Porcello, Annie C Porcello, Kalyn
Porcello
Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs/Third Party
Plaintiffs/Appellants
vs.
Mark Porcello
Third-Party Defendant/Respondent

Supreme Court Case No. 46443

CLERK’S RECORD ON APPEAL

Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District,
in and for the County of Kootenai

HONORABLE CYNTHIA K.C. MEYER

William Pooser and Anna Courtney

Terrance Harris and Peter Smith

Attorney at Law

Attorney at Law

Attorney for Appellant

Attorney for Respondent

Boise, Idaho

Coeur d’Alene, Idaho
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KOOTENAI COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CV-2016-7343
Jennifer Porcello
Plaintiff,
vs.
Anthony Porcello, Annie Porcello, Mark Porcello, Kalyn
Porcello
Defendant.

§
§
§
§
§

Location:
Judicial Officer:
Filed on:
Case Number History:
Appellate Case Number:

Kootenai County District Court
Meyer, Cynthia K.C.
10/05/2016
46443

CASE INFORMATION

Bonds
Cash Bond
1/4/2019
Counts: 1

Cash Bond
12/3/2018
Counts: 1

Case Type:

$67.50
Posted Cash

AA- All Initial District Court
Filings (Not E, F, and Ht)

Case 12/19/2018 Reopened - Post
Status: Judgment Reactivation

#918094 $305.60
Posted Cash

Cash Bond $100.00
Posted
I 0/17/2018
Counts: I

CASE ASSIGNMENT

DATE

Current Case Assignment
Case Number
Court
Date Assigned
Judicial Officer

CV-2016-7343
Kootenai County District Court
10/11/2016
Meyer, Cynthia K.C.

PARTY INFORMATION

Lead Attorneys
Plaintiff

Porcello, Jennifer

Harris, Terrance R.

Defendant

Porcello, Annie C

Pooser, William Christopher

Porcello, Anthony J

Pooser, William Christopher

Porcello, Kalyn M

Pooser, William Christopher

Retained
208-664-58 I 8(W)
Retained
208-387-4289(W)
Retained
208-387-4289(W)
Retained
208-387-4289(W)
Smith, Peter John

Porcello, Mark

Counter Claimant

Retained
208-215-241 l(W)
Pooser, William Christopher

Porcello, Annie C

Retained
208-387-4289(W)
Pooser, William Christopher

Porcello, Anthony J

Retained
208-387-4289(W)
Pooser, William Christopher

Porcello, Kalyn M
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KOOTENAI COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CV-2016-7343

Retained
208-387-4289(W)

Counter
Defendant

Porcello, Jennifer

Third Party
Defendant

Porcello, Mark

Third Party
Plaintiff

Porcello, Annie C

Pooser, William Christopher
Retained
208-387-4289(W)

Porcello, Anthony J

Pooser, William Christopher
Retained
208-387-4289(W)

Porcello, Kalyn M

Pooser, William Christopher
Retained
208-387-4289(W)

Harris, Terrance R.
Retained
208-664-5818(W)
Smith, Peter John
Retained
208-215-241 l(W)

EVENTS

DATE

& ORDERS OF THE COllRT

10/05/2016

New Case Filed Other Claims
New Case Filed - Other Claims

10/05/2016

ROA - Converted Event
Filing: AA- All initial civil case filings in District Court ofany type not listed in categories E,
F and H(I) Paid by: Harris, Terrance R. (attorney for Porcello, Jennifer) Receipt number:
0039838 Dated: /01512016 Amount: $221.00 (Check) For: Porcello, Jennifer (plaintiff)

10/05/2016

•

Complaint Filed
For Declaratory Judgment, Injunctive Relief and Damages

10/05/2016

•

Summons Issued
Anthony J Porcello

10/05/2016

'II Summons Issued

INDEX

Annie C Porcello
10/07/2016

•

10/07/2016

.Motion
Plaintiffs Motion/or Preliminary Injunction

10/11/2016

10/11/2016

10/11/2016

Memorandum In Support of Motion
Plaintiffs Memorandum In Support Of Motion for Perliminary Injunction

Change Assigned Judge: Administrative
Administrative assignment ofJudge
.Order
Assigning District Judge
Hearing Scheduled
Hearing Scheduled (Preliminary Injunction /0114/2016 03:00 PM) Harris

10/12/2016

•

Notice of Hearing

10/13/2016

•

Declaration
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KOOTENAI COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CV-2016-7343
of Service -AJP 10/05116

10/13/2016

10/14/2016

•

Affidavit of Service
ACP /0105116

Preliminary Injunction (3:00 PM) (Judicial Officer: Meyer, Cynthia K.C.)
Harris Hearing result/or Preliminary Injunction scheduled on 101/4/2016 03:00 PM: Hearing
Held

10/14/2016

•

Declaration
ofScott Rerucha in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Preliminary Injunction

10/14/2016

•

Declaration
of Terrance R. Harris in Support of Plaintiffs Motion/or Preliminary l,yunction

10/14/2016

•

Hearing Held
Hearing result/or Preliminary Injunction scheduled on /0/14/2016 03:00 PM: Hearing Held
Harris

10/14/2016

DC Hearing Held: Court Reporter: # of Pages:
District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Diane Bolan
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: under I 00 pages

10/14/2016

Hearing Scheduled
Hearing Scheduled (Preliminary Jry·unction //108/20/6 03:00 PM) Harris

10/17/2016

.Order
Postponing Trustee's Sale

10/17/2016

•

10/27/2016

10/27/2016

I

Notice of Hearing

Hearing Vacated
Hearing result/or Preliminary l,yunction scheduled on I /108/2016 03:00 PM: Hearing
Vacated Harris
.Order
Denying Defendant's 12(b} Motion

10/27/2016

Hearing Scheduled
Hearing Scheduled (Preliminary Injunction 12/2012016 03:00 PM)

11/03/2016

Subpoena Issued
Duces Tecum - Comcast Corporation

11/08/2016

CANCELED Preliminary Injunction (3:00 PM) (Judicial Officer: Meyer, Cynthia K.C.)
Vacated
Harris Hearing result/or Preliminary l,yunction scheduled on 11/08/2016 03:00 PM: Hearing
Vacated

11/08/2016

•

Stipulation
To Reschedule Hearing On Motion For Preliminary 1,yunction And Briefing Schedule

11/09/2016

•

Notice of Appearance
Special Appearance and Motion to Quash Summons/or Lack ofJurisdiction and/or lack of
Personal Service (I.R.C.P. 4. I (b)(3);4(c)(2). (d)(l)(i). 7(a). I 2(b}(2), (4). & (5))
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KOOTENAI COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CV-2016-7343
11/09/2016

.Order
To Reschedule Hearing On Motion For Preliminary Injunction And Briefing Schedule

11/10/2016

•

Memorandum In Support of Motion
for Reconsideration (IRCP 4./(b), 7(a), ll.2(b), 12(b)(2), (4), & (5))

11/10/2016

•

Motion for Reconsideration
Order Denying Motion to Quash Summons and Motion to Deny Preliminary lryunctionfor
Lack ofPersonal Jurisdiction

11/14/2016

•

Declaration
Of Henry D Madsen

11/15/2016

Subpoena Issued
Duces Tecum - Comcast Corporation

12/06/2016

•

12/06/2016

11 Declaration

Declaration
of Kalyn Porcello

ofJoseph T Mijich
12/06/2016

12/06/2016

•

Declaration
ofJudge Terrence A. Carroll, Ret.

ROA - Converted Event
************New File Created #2************

12/07/2016

•

12/07/2016

.Affidavit
Of Henry D Madsen

12/09/2016

•

Proof of Service
OfSummons And Complaint-12/61I 6-AJP

12/09/2016

•

Proof of Service
Of Summons And Complaint-12/6/I 6-AJP obo ACP

Memorandum
In Support Of Objection To Stay Of Non-Judicial Foreclosure Sale

12/09/2016

Declaration
Of Diligence-12/6116-Sub Served AJP obo A CP

12/09/2016

Proof of Service
12/7/16

12/13/2016

'II Declaration
of Rob J Crichton in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary lryunction

12/13/2016

.Reply
Plaintiff's Reply in Support ofMotion for Preliminary lryunction
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KOOTENAI COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CV-2016-7343
12/14/2016

.Motion
Plaintifj's Motion To Strike

12/14/2016

•

Stipulation
to Terminate Non Judicial Foreclosure and Dismissal of Motion for Preliminary Injunction

12/19/2016

•

Order of Dismissal
Preliminary Injunction

12/19/2016

Hearing Vacated
Hearing result for Preliminary Injunction scheduled on 12120/2016 03:00 PM: Hearing
Vacated

12/20/2016

CANCELED Preliminary Injunction (3:00 PM) (Judicial Officer: Meyer, Cynthia K.C.)
Vacated
Hearing result for Preliminary Injunction scheduled on 12/20/2016 03:00 PM: Hearing
Vacated

02/13/2017

•

Answer and Counterclaim
and Third Party Complaint

02/14/2017

•

Summons Issued
(Third Party Complaint)

02/14/2017

•

Miscellaneous
Errata [Exhibits To Counterclaim And Third Party Complaint]

02/15/2017

Hearing Scheduled
Hearing Scheduled (Scheduling Conference 03/0712017 03:00 PM)

02/15/2017

.Order
For Pretrial Scheduling Conference

02/24/2017

•

Miscellaneous
Scheduling Form - Madsen

02/27/2017

•

Miscellaneous
Scheduling Form - Jennifer Porcello

02/28/2017

.Notice
Vacating Hearing

02/28/2017

Hearing Vacated
Hearing result for Scheduling Conference scheduled on 03/07/2017 03:00 PM: Hearing
Vacated

03/02/2017

Hearing Scheduled
Hearing Scheduled (Pre-Trial Conference 10113/201701: 30 PM)

03/02/2017

Hearing Scheduled
Hearing Scheduled (Court Trial Scheduled 11/27/2017 09:00 AM) 4 day trial

03/02/2017

.Notice
Of Trial And Pretrial Conference Setting And Pretrial Order
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KOOTENAI COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CV-2016-7343
03/03/2017

.Answer
Counter-Defendant Jennifer Poree/Io's Answer to Counterclaim

03/07/2017

CANCELED Scheduling Conference (3:00 PM) (Judicial Officer: Meyer, Cynthia K.C.)
Vacated
Hearing result for Scheduling Conference scheduled on 03/07/2017 03:00 PM: Hearing
Vacated

04/11/2017

Notice of Taking Deposition
Amended Notice Of Deposition ofAnthony J. Porcello

04/18/2017

11 Affidavit of Service
415/17-MP

05/04/2017

9

05/04/2017

.Affidavit
Of Henry D Madsen In Support Of Motion For Entry Of Default

05/11/2017

•

05/11/2017

.Default
Entry ofDefault

05/16/2017

Motion for Entry of Default

Order for Entry of Default

ROA - Converted Event
Filing: 11 - Initial Appearance by persons other than the plaintiff or petitioner Paid by:
Porcello, Mark (defendant) Receipt number: 0018214 Dated: 5/1712017 Amount: $136.00 (£payment) For: Porcello, Mark (defendant)

05/16/2017

.Answer
to Third Party Complaint

06/08/2017

•

06/09/2017

•

Notice of Appearance
P Smith obo Mark Porcello

06/09/2017

•

Memorandum
of Support of Third Party Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Entry of Default

06/09/2017

.Motion
Third Party Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Entry of Default

06/09/2017

•

06/12/2017

06/13/2017

07/25/2017

Notice of Service

Declaration
of Mark Porcello in Support of Motion to Set Aside Entry of Default

Hearing Scheduled
Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Set Aside Default 07125/20/7 03:00 PM) Smith-30 min
•

Notice of Hearing
Motion to Set Aside Entry of Default

Motion to Set Aside Default (3:00 PM) (Judicial Officer: Meyer, Cynthia K.C.)
Smith-30 min Hearing result for Motion to Set Aside Default scheduled on 07125/2017 03:00

PAGE 6 OF 21
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KOOTENAI COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CV-2016-7343
PM: Motion Granted
07/25/2017

11 Memorandum
OfSupport Of Entry Of Order On Without Hearing On Third Party Defendant's Motion To Set
Aside Entry Of Default

07/25/2017

.Objection
To Motion To Set Aside Default

07/25/2017

•

07/25/2017

07/27/2017

Motion Granted
Hearing result for Motion to Set Aside Default scheduled on 07125/2017 03:00 PM: Motion
Granted Smith-30 min

DC Hearing Held: Court Reporter:# of Pages:
District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Diane Bolan
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: under JOO pages

'II order
Granting Third Party Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Entry of Default

08/02/2017

'II Notice of Service
of Defendants Responses to Plaintiff's First Set ofInterrogatories and Requests for Production
of Documents to Defendants

08/07/2017

'II Witness List
Defendant's Expert Disclosure

08/07/2017

Hearing Scheduled
Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Reconsider I 0/03/2017 03:00 PM) Madsen 30 min-reconsider
order to set aside default

08/07/2017

Hearing Scheduled
Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary Judgment 10/03/2017 03:00 PM) Harris 30 minpartial MSJ

08/08/2017

Hearing Vacated
Hearing result for Motion to Reconsider scheduled on 10/03/2017 03:00 PM: Hearing
Vacated per Madsen- Madsen 30 min-reconsider order to set aside default

08/10/2017

Hearing Scheduled
Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Continue 09119/2017 03:00 PM) Caires 15 min-continue trial

08/25/2017

Hearing Vacated
Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment scheduled on I 0/03/2017 03:00 PM:
Hearing Vacated per Harris- Harris 30 min-partial MSJ

09/05/2017

'II Motion to Continue
Third Party Defendant Mark Porcello's Motion/or Continuance and Extension of Pretrial
Deadlines

09/05/2017

•

09/06/2017

.Notice
of No Objection

Notice of Hearing
Motion for Continuance and Extension of Pretrial Deadlines

PAGE 7 OF 21
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KOOTENAI COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CV-2016-7343
09/07/2017

•

Notice of Service
Of Defendant's Responses To Plaintiff's First Set Of Interrogatories And Requests for
Production Of Documents To Defendants

09/07/2017

•

Notice of Taking Deposition
ofAnthony J. Porcello

09/14/2017

.Notice
Third Party Defendant's Notice of No Objection Motion for Continuance and Extension of
Pretrial Deadlines

09/18/2017

.Notice of Taking Deposition
Second Amended Notice Of Deposition ofAnthony J. Porcello

09/18/2017

.Amended
Notice Of Intent To Appear, Prsent Oral Argument And Witness

09/18/2017

.Notice
of Intent to Appear Present Oral Argument and Witness

09/18/2017

.Objection
to Third Party Defendant's Motion for continuance and Extension of Pretrial Deadlines

09/19/2017

•

09/19/2017

DC Hearing Held: Court Reporter: # of Pages:
District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Diane Bolan
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: under 100 pages

09/19/2017

Continued
Hearing result for Pre-Trial Conference scheduled on 10//3/20/7 01:30 PM: Continued

09/19/2017

Continued
Hearing result for Court Trial Scheduled scheduled on 1/1271201709:00 AM: Continued 4
day trial

09/19/2017

Motion to Continue (3:00 PM) (Judicial Officer: Meyer, Cynthia K.C.)
Caires 15 min-continue trial Hearing result for Motion to Continue scheduled on 09/ I 9/2017
03:00 PM: Motion Granted

09/21/2017

.Order
Granting Third Party Defendant Mark Poree/Io's Motion For Continuance And Extension Of
Pre-Trial Deadlines

09/22/2017

•

09/28/2017

'II Notice

Motion Granted
Hearing result for Motion to Continue scheduled on 09/1912017 03:00 PM: Motion Granted
Caires 15 min-continue trial

Affidavit of Service
09107I17 - Scott R

of Unavailability- Jillian Caires

10/02/2017

.Notice
Of Transcript Delivery Deponent: Jennifer R Porcello

PAGE 80F21
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KOOTENAI COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CV-2016-7343
10/03/2017

10/03/2017

CANCELED Motion for Reconsideration (3:00 PM) (Judicial Officer: Meyer, Cynthia K.C.)
Vacated
Madsen 30 min-reconsider order to set aside default Hearing result for Motion to Reconsider
scheduled on 10/03/20/7 03:00 PM: Hearing Vacated per Madsen- Madsen 30 min-reconsider
order to set aside default
CANCELED Motion for Summary Judgment (3:00 PM) (Judicial Officer: Meyer, Cynthia
K.C.)
Vacated
Harris 30 min-partial MSJ Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment scheduled on
10/03/2017 03:00 PM: Hearing Vacated per Harris- Harris 30 min-partial MSJ

10/13/2017

Pre-trial Conference (I :30 PM) (Judicial Officer: Meyer, Cynthia K.C.)
Hearing result for Pre-Trial Conference scheduled on I 0/13/2017 0 I: 30 PM: Continued

11/01/2017

Hearing Scheduled
Hearing Scheduled (Pre-Trial Conference 03/16/2018 01:30 PM)

11/01/2017

Hearing Scheduled
Hearing Scheduled (Court Trial Scheduled 04/23/20/8 09:00 AM) 4 day trial

11/01/2017

11/27/2017

.Notice
O/Trial And Pretrial Coriference Setting And Pretrial Order
Court Trial (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Meyer, Cynthia K.C.)
4 day trial Hearing result/or Court Trial Scheduled scheduled on 11/27/2017 09:00 AM:
Continued

12/13/2017

.Notice
Of Transcript Delivery Deponent: Jennifer R Porcello

12/27/2017

Hearing Scheduled
Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary Judgment 0 1129/2018 03:00 PM) Madsen-I hour

12/29/2017

ROA - Converted Event
New File Created******** #3

********

12/29/2017

•

12/29/2017

.Affidavit
of Linda Lourey, CPA, in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment

12/29/2017

.Affidavit
of Henry D. Madsen in Support of Defendants' Motion/or Summary Judgment

12/29/2017

.Affidavit
of Robert Jones, CPA, in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment

12/29/2017

•

12/29/2017

'II Notice of Hearing

01/02/2018

.Statement

Memorandum In Support of Motion
Petitioner Defendants' Motion/or Summary Judgment

Motion for Summary Judgment
Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment

PAGE 9 OF 21
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KOOTENAI COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CV-2016-7343
Of Undisputed Facts

01/15/2018

ROA - Converted Event
*************New File Created #4*************

01/16/2018

Hearing Scheduled
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 01/29/2018 03:00 PM) Harris-Motion to Strike the Affidavit of
Linda Lourey and to exclude expert witness testimony

01/16/2018

01/16/2018

•

Notice of Hearing
Notice Of Hearing

Affidavit
Affidavit of Terrance R Harris in Support ofPlaintiffs Motion to Strike Affidavit of Linda
Lourey and to Exclude Expert Witness Testimony

01/16/2018

.Motion
Plaintiffs Motion to Strike Affidavit of Linda Lourey and to Exclude Expert Witness Testimony

01/16/2018

.Answer
Plaintiffs Response to Defendant's Statement of Unidsputed Facts

01/16/2018

.Answer
Plaintiffs Response in Opposition to Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment

01/16/2018

~ Affidavit
of Terrance R Harris in Support of Plaintiffs Response in Opposition to Defendant's Motion
for Summary Judgment

01/16/2018

01/16/2018

01/18/2018

01/22/2018

.Affidavit
ofJennifer R Porcello NIKIA Jennifer R Maggard in Support of Plaintiffs REsponse in
Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment
Affidavit
of Terrance R Harris in Support of Plaintiffs Motion to Strike Affidavit of Linda Lourey and to
Exclude Expert Witness Testimony
•

Declaration
of Mark Porcello In Oppostion To Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment

Hearing Scheduled
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 01/29/2018 03:00 PM) Madsen-strike affidavit ofJennifer
Porcello and declaration ofMark Porcello

01/22/2018

•

01/22/2018

'II Notice of Hearing

01/22/2018

.Objection
to and Motion to Strike Portions of Declaration of Mark Porcello and Affidavit ofJennifer
Porcello

01/22/2018

.Response

Notice of Service
of Defendants Responses to Plaintiff's First Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production
of Documents to Defendants
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KOOTENAI COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CV-2016-7343
Defendants' Response to Plaintiff's Motion to Strike and Exclude Expert Witness Testimony
01/23/2018

'IJ Memorandum In Support of Motion
Reply Memorandum In Support Of Petitioner Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment

01/23/2018

'IJReply
To Statement Of Undisputed Facts

01/29/2018

DC Hearing Held: Court Reporter: # of Pages:
Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment scheduled on O112912018 03:00 PM:
District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Diane Bolan
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: Under 100

01/29/2018

DC Hearing Held: Court Reporter: # of Pages:
Hearing result/or Motion scheduled on 01/29/2018 03:00 PM: District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Diane Bolan
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: Under JOO

01/29/2018

DC Hearing Held: Court Reporter: # of Pages:
Hearing result/or Motion scheduled on 01/29/2018 03:00 PM: District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Diane Bolan
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: Under JOO

01/29/2018

Motion for Summary Judgment (3:00 PM) (Judicial Officer: Meyer, Cynthia K.C.)
Madsen-I hour Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment scheduled on O1129/2018
03:00 PM: District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Diane Bolan
Number a/Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: Under JOO

01/29/2018

Motion Hearing (3:00 PM) (Judicial Officer: Meyer, Cynthia K.C.)
Harris-Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Linda Lourey and to exclude expert witness testimony
Hearing result/or Motion scheduled on 01/29/2018 03:00 PM: District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Diane Bolan
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: Under 100

01/29/2018

Motion Hearing (3:00 PM) (Judicial Officer: Meyer, Cynthia K.C.)
Madsen-strike affidavit ofJennifer Porcello and declaration of Mark Porcello Hearing result
for Motion scheduled on 01/2912018 03:00 PM: District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Diane Bolan
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: Under 100

02/08/2018

•

Notice of Service

02/13/2018

Hearing Vacated
Hearing result for Pre-Trial Conference scheduled on 03/16120 I 8 0 I: 30 PM: Hearing
Vacated

02/13/2018

Hearing Scheduled
Hearing Scheduled (Pre-Trial Conference 03/20/2018 03:00 PM)

02/13/2018

02/22/2018

02/26/2018

.Amended
Notice of Hearing
Hearing Scheduled
Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Withdraw 03/20/2018 03:00 PM) Smith
•

Notice of Service
of Defendants' First Set of Interrogatories and Requests For Production of Documents to
Plaintiff

PAGE II OF21
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KOOTENAI COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CV-2016-7343
03/05/2018

II

•~

Memorandum Decision And Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion To Strike The Affidavit Of Linda
Laurey And To Exclude Expert Testimony

03/05/2018

.Order
Memorandum Decision And Order Granting In Part And Denying In Part Defendants' Motion
To Strike The Affidavits OfJennifer Porcello And Mark Porcello

03/05/2018

'II order
Memorandum Decision And Order Denying Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment

03/09/2018

Hearing Vacated
Hearing result for Motion to Withdraw scheduled on 03/20/20/8 03:00 PM: Hearing Vacated
per Smith- Smith

03/13/2018

•

03/13/2018

.Notice
of Compliance

03/13/2018

•

03/14/2018

.Notice
of Intent To Use Video Deposition Of Witness In Lieu Of Live Testimony

03/16/2018

Miscellaneous
Defendant's Supplemental Expert Witness Disclosure

Notice of Service
of Defendants Second Supplemental Responses To Plaintiff's First Set Of Interrogatories And
Requests For Production Of Documents To Defendants

CANCELED Pre-trial Conference (I :30 PM) (Judicial Officer: Meyer, Cynthia K.C.)
Vacated
Hearing result for Pre-Trial Conference scheduled on 03//6/20/8 01:30 PM: Hearing
Vacated

03/19/2018

.Motion
Defendants Motion to Amend the Pleadings

03/19/2018

.Motion
Defendants Motion for Reconsideration/Clarification

03/19/2018

.Notice
of Deposition Of Mark Porcello

03/20/2018

Hearing Scheduled
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 04/20/2018 0 I: 30 PM) Madsen 30 min-amend pleadings and
motion to reconsider

03/20/2018

•

Memorandum In Support of Motion
Defendants' Memorandum In Support Of Motions: Reconsideration/Clarification; and Motion
to Amend the Pleadings

03/20/2018

•

DC Hearing Held: Court Reporter: # of Pages:
Hearing result for Pre-Trial Conference scheduled on 03/20/20/8 03:00 PM: District Court
Hearing Held
Court Reporter: JULIE FOLAND

PAGE l20F21
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KOOTENAI COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CV-2016-7343
03/20/2018

03/20/2018

Pre-trial Conference (3:00 PM) (Judicial Officer: Meyer, Cynthia K.C.)
Hearing result for Pre-Trial Conference scheduled on 03/20/20/8 03:00 PM: District Court
Hearing Held
Court Reporter: JULIE FOLAND
CANCELED Motion to Withdraw as Attorney (3:00 PM) (Judicial Officer: Meyer, Cynthia
K.C)
Vacated
Smith Hearing result for Motion to Withdraw scheduled on 03/20/20/8 03:00 PM: Hearing
Vacated per Smith- Smith

03/20/2018

•

03/23/2018

.Motion
Plaintiff's Motion to Enlarge Time

Notice of Hearing

03/23/2018

Notice
of Intent to Use Deposition of Witnesses in Lieu of live Testimony

03/26/2018

Declaration
of Henry D. Madsen in Support of Protection Order

03/26/2018

•

Memorandum In Support of Motion
Defendant's Motion for Protection Order

03/27/2018

Hearing Scheduled
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 04/02/2018 03:00 PM) Harris-motion to enlarge time for Pit to
complete discovery

03/27/2018

Notice of Service

03/27/2018

•

Notice of Hearing

03/28/2018

Hearing Vacated
Hearing result for Motion scheduled on 04/20/20/8 01:30 PM: Hearing Vacated Madsen 30
min-amend pleadings and motion to reconsider

03/28/2018

Hearing Scheduled
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 04/0212018 03:00 PM) Madsen 30 min-amend pleadings and
motion to reconsider

03/28/2018

11Affidavit
of Henry D. Madsen RE: Motion to Shorten Time

03/28/2018
03/28/2018
03/28/2018
04/02/2018

04/02/2018

•

Motion to Shorten Time

Notice of Hearing
•

Notice of Hearing

Hearing Held
Hearing result for Motion scheduled on 04/02/20/8 03:00 PM: Hearing Held Madsen 30 minamend pleadings and motion to reconsider
•

Hearing Held
Hearing result for Motion scheduled on 04/02/20/8 03:00 PM: Hearing Held Harris-motion
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to enlarge time for Pit to complete discovery

04/02/2018

DC Hearing Held: Court Reporter: # of Pages:
District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Diane Bolan
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: under J00 pages

04/02/2018

Motion Hearing (3:00 PM) (Judicial Officer: Meyer, Cynthia K.C.)
Harris-motion to enlarge time for Pit to complete discovery Hearing result for Motion
scheduled on 04/02/2018 03:00 PM: Hearing Held

04/02/2018

Motion Hearing (3:00 PM) (Judicial Officer: Meyer, Cynthia K.C.)
Madsen 30 min-amend pleadings and motion to reconsider Hearing result for Motion
scheduled on 04/02/2018 03:00 PM: Hearing Held

04/02/2018

.Affidavit
ofJennifer R Porcello NIKIA Jennifer R Maggard In Support Of Plaintiffs Motion To Enlarge
Time

04/02/2018

.Affidavit
of Terrance R Harris In Support Of Plainitff's Motion To Enlarge Time

04/02/2018

.Notice
Vacating the Deposition of Mark Porcello

04/02/2018

'IA Notice of Service

04/04/2018

•

04/05/2018

Ill order

Notice of Service
of Trial Subpoena on Mark Porcello

Granting Plaintiffs Motion to Enlarge Time

04/06/2018

•

04/09/2018

'II Subpoena Issued

Notice of Service

Anthony Porcello

04/09/2018

•

04/09/2018

'II Subpoena Issued

Subpoena Issued
Kim Parker

Joe Mijich

04/09/2018

11 Subpoena Issued
Kayln Porcello

04/09/2018

11 Subpoena Issued
Scott Rurucha

04/09/2018

11 Subpoena Issued
Candy Inbody

04/09/2018
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'II Subpoena Issued
Robert Jones, CPA
04/09/2018

•

04/09/2018

'II Witness List

Subpoena Issued
Linda lourey, CPA

Plaintiff's
04/09/2018

'II Exhibit List/Log
Plaintiff's

04/09/2018

II Exhibit List/Log
Third Party Defendant's

04/09/2018

S Witness List
Third Party Defendant's

04/09/2018

•

Exhibit List/Log
Stipulated Joint Exhibit list

04/09/2018

•

Notice of Service
Of Trial Subpoena On Anthony Porcello

04/09/2018

•

Notice of Service
Of Trial Subpoena On Kalyn Porcello

04/09/2018

•

Exhibit List/Log
Defendants' Exhibit list For Trial

04/09/2018

•

Witness List
Defendants'

04/10/2018

.Order
Re: April 2, 2018 Hearing

04/16/2018

•

Answer and Counterclaim
and Third Party Complaint

04/16/2018

•

BriefFiled
Defendants' Trial Brief

04/16/2018

•

BriefFiled
Plaintiff's Trial Brief

04/17/2018

•

BriefFiled
Trial Brief of Third Party Defendant Mark Porcello

04/17/2018

•

Exhibit List/Log
Defendants' Amended Exhibit list/or Trial
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04/17/2018

'II Exhibit List/Log
Defendants' Amended Exhibit List for Trial

04/17/2018

•

Notice of Service

04/17/2018

•

Subpoena Issued
To Appear At Trial

04/20/2018

CANCELED Motion Hearing (I :30 PM) (Judicial Officer: Meyer, Cynthia K.C.)
Vacated
Madsen 30 min-amend pleadings and motion to reconsider Hearing result for Motion
scheduled on 04/20/2018 01:30 PM: Hearing Vacated

04/23/2018

Court Trial (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Meyer, Cynthia K.C.)
4 day trial

04/23/2018

'II Court Minutes

04/24/2018

'IJ Court Minutes

04/25/2018

'IJ Court Minutes

04/26/2018

•

04/26/2018

.Reply
Counter-Defendant Jennifer Poree/Io's Reply to Amended Counterclaim

05/02/2018

.Answer
to Amended Third Party Complaint

05/03/2018

•

05/10/2018

'II Response

Court Minutes

Memorandum of Law
Defendants' Memorandum oflaw Re: l.R.E. 408 Issue

Third Party Defendant Mark Poree/Io's Response Re: IRE 408 Issue

05/11/2018

.Motion
for Pro Hae Vice Admission (ck for response from Bar Assoc)

05/11/2018

9

05/17/2018

.Order
Granting Pro Hae Vice Admission

05/17/2018

.Order
Memorandum Decision and Order on Defendant's Motion for Admission ofletter

05/17/2018

•

05/21/2018

•

Proof of Service

Memorandum of Law
Defendants' Memorandum oflaw RE Linda lourey
Court Trial - Civil (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Meyer, Cynthia K.C.)
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3-4 days--continuedfrom April 23

05/21/2018

•

Court Minutes

05/22/2018

•

Court Minutes

05/23/2018

•

Court Minutes

05/24/2018

•

Court Minutes

06/04/2018

•

Brief Filed
Plaintiff's Written Closing Argument - Opening Brief

06/11/2018

•

Closing Arguments
Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs Closing Argument

06/18/2018

•

Closing Arguments
Plaintiff's Written Closing Argument - Response and Reply Brief

06/18/2018

•

Closing Arguments
of Third Party Defendant Mark Porcello

06/25/2018

.Response
Defendant's Response to Closing Argument By Mark Porcello & Jennifer Porcello

08/17/2018

.Order
Memorandum Decision and Order on Court Trial

08/22/2018

•

08/31/2018

•

08/31/2018

.Motion
for Costs and Attorneys Fees

08/31/2018

•

09/06/2018

.Judgment

09/06/2018

.Motion
for Attorney's Fees and Costs

09/06/2018

.Affidavit
of Terrance R. Harris in Support of Plaintiff's Motion/or Attorney's Fees and Costs

09/06/2018

•

Miscellaneous
Suggestion of Death Upon the Record
Memorandum of Costs & Attorney Fees

Declaration
of Peter J. Smith IV in Support of Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees

Memorandum of Costs & Attorney Fees
Plaintiff's

09/13/2018
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•

Notice of Hearing

09/14/2018

.Objection
To M.P. Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs

09/17/2018

•

09/20/2018

.Objection
to Jennifer Poree/Io's Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs

10/12/2018

Notice of Hearing
Notice of Hearing- Motion for Costs and Attorney Fees 10/24118@3:00pm

Appeal Filed in Supreme Court
Notice ofAppeal

10/12/2018

•

10/18/2018

.Reply
in Support of Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs

10/22/2018

.Reply
Mark Poree I/o's Reply In Support of Motion for Costs and Fees

10/23/2018

.Motion
for Leave to File Response to JP Reply Brief

10/24/2018

Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs (3:00 PM) (Judicial Officer: Meyer, Cynthia K.C.)
Harris- I hour

Notice of Appeal
Copy to Marissa to assign Court Reporter

10/24/2018

•

Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs (3:00 PM) (Judicial Officer: Meyer, Cynthia K.C.)
Smith

10/24/2018

•

Court Minutes
/0124118 Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs

10/29/2018

.Order
to Proceed on the Clerk's Record Only

11/16/2018

•

12/03/2018
12/04/2018

Notice of Substitution of Counsel
for Anthony J. Porcello and the Estate ofAnnie C. Porcello

Bond Posted - Cash

11 Original Record(s) on Appeal Served or Transferred
Certified Mailed to attorneys

12/07/2018

'Ill Certified or Registered Mail Return Receipt
1216/18

12/10/2018

•

Certified or Registered Mail Return Receipt
12/6/18 BS oho PS
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12/10/2018

.Order
Memorandum Decision and Order on Plaintiff's Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs

12/10/2018

.Order
Memorandum Decision and Order on Third Party Defendant's Motion for Costs and Attorney
Fees

12/19/2018

•

12/19/2018

•

12/19/2018

Amended Judgment
Certified or Registered Mail Return Receipt
121/7//8 MZ oho WP

Petition Granted (Judicial Officer: Meyer, Cynthia K.C.)
Comment()
Party (Porcello, Jennifer; Porcello, Anthony J; Porcello, Annie C; Porcello, Mark; Porcello, Kalyn
M)

Monetary/Property Award
In Favor Of: Porcello, Jennifer
Against: Porcello, Anthony J; Porcello, Annie C; Porcello, Kalyn M
Entered Date: 12/19/2018
Current Judgment Status:
Status: Active
Status Date: 12/19/2018
Monetary Award:
Amount: $71,526.67
Interest Bearing
12/19/2018

Petition Granted (Judicial Officer: Meyer, Cynthia K.C.)
Comment()
Party (Porcello, Jennifer; Porcello, Anthony J; Porcello, Annie C; Porcello, Mark; Porcello, Kalyn
M)

Monetary/Property Award
In Favor Of: Porcello, Mark
Against: Porcello, Anthony J; Porcello, Annie C; Porcello, Kalyn M
Entered Date: 12/19/2018
Current Judgment Status:
Status: Active
Status Date: 12/19/2018
Monetary Award:
Amount: $37,932.50
Interest Bearing
Comment: Attorney's Fees
12/19/2018

Dismissed With Prejudice (Judicial Officer: Meyer, Cynthia K.C.)
Comment (Third-Party's Claim Against Third Party Defendant)

12/19/2018

Civil Disposition Entered

12/21/2018

•

12/31/2018

•

12/31/2018

.Objection
Appellants' Objection to the Record on Appeal and Request to Add to or Delete From the
Record on Appeal

12/31/2018

•

Amended Judgment
Corrected
Amended Notice of Appeal

Declaration
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of W Christopher Pooser In Support ofAppellants' Objection to the Record on Appeal and
Request to Add to and Delete from the Record on Appeal
01/02/2019

01/04/2019
01/07/2019

01/08/2019

•

Notice of Hearing
on Appellant's Objection to the Record on Appeal and to Add to and Delete From the Record
on Appeal - 01/16/19@3:00pm

Bond Posted - Cash
.Response
Plaintiff/Respondent's Response to Appellant's Objection and Request to Add & Delete from
the Record on Appeal

S Notice of Hearing
Amended

01/16/2019

•

01/30/2019

II Response

CANCELED Motion Hearing (3:00 PM) (Judicial Officer: Meyer, Cynthia K.C.)
Vacated
Pooser 30 min-augment record

to Appellants' Objection to the Record on Appeal and Request to Add and Delete from the
Record on Appeal
02/04/2019

02/06/2019

02/06/2019

02/06/2019

02/13/2019

.Reply
in Support of Objection to the Record on Appeal and Request to Add and Delete From the
Record on Appeal

Motion Hearing (3:00 PM) (Judicial Officer: Meyer, Cynthia K.C.)
Pooser 30 min-augment record--Pooser to apper telephonic--208-387-4289
•

Court Minutes
02/06/20/9 Motion to Augment Record

DC Hearing Held: Court Reporter: # of Pages:
Court Reporter Diane Bolan, Under JOO Pages

Sorder
Granting in Part and Denying in Part Appellants' Request to Add and Delete from the Record
on Appeal
FINANCIAL INFORMATION

DATE

Counter Defendant Porcello, Jennifer
Total Charges
Total Payments and Credits
Balance Due as of 2/27/2019

221.00
221.00
0.00

Defendant Porcello, Mark
Total Charges
Total Payments and Credits
Balance Due as of 2/27/2019

136.00
136.00
0.00

Counter Claimant Porcello, Anthony J
Total Charges
Total Payments and Credits
Balance Due as of 2/27/2019

129.00
129.00
0.00

Attorney of Record Pooser, William Christopher
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Civil Cash Bond Account Type ~ft ~Q, ~'fa,W. 6-7343

305.60

Attorney of Record Pooser, William Christopher
Civil Cash Bond Account Type Balance as of 2/27/2019

67.50

Counter Claimant Porcello, Anthony J
Civil Cash Bond Account Type Balance as of 2/27/2019

100.00

PAGE21 OF21

Printed on 02/27/2019 at 8: I I AM

Page 22

fATE ut 10 ,.'.HO
lss
0, JNT r' OF KOOEHAI/

· r:-: 3'1<63S

RAMSDEN, MARFICE, EALY & HARRIS, LLP
700 Northwest Blvd.
P.O. Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336
Telephone:
(208) 664-5818
Facsimile:
(208) 664-5884
Terrance R. Harri s, ISB #5484

2016 OCT -5 PH 4: 24

Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
JENNIFER PORCELLO,

CASE NO. CV-20 16-

13L/J

VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT,
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF AND
DAMAGES

Plaintiff,
vs.
ANTHONY J. PORCELLO and ANNIE C.
PORCELLO, husband and wife,

Fee Category: A.A
Filing Fee: $22 1.00

Defendants.
COMES NOW Plaintiff, Jennifer Porcello, by and through her counsel of record,
Ramsden, Marfice, Ealy & Harris, LLP, and by way of complaint against Defendants, Anthony
J. Porcello and Annie C. Porcello, states as fo llows:

I.
1.

PARTIES

Plaintiff Jennifer Porcello (''Jennifer'") is an individual residing in Kootenai

County, Idaho.
2.

Defendants Anthony J. Porcello (''Anthony") and Annie C. Porcello ("Annie'')

are husband and wife. Anthony and Annie are residents of King County, Washington.

VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR DECLARf\.T,QRYcd\Wf:;M.Er.-lLT,
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF AND DAMAGES 1-t"\f \J.)11\Jb
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II.
3.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

This is in part an action for declaratory judgment pursuant to the Idaho Uniform

Declaratory Judgment Act, Idaho Code § I 0-120 I et. seq. and Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure

57, for the purposes of determining a question of actual controversy between the parties as
hereinafter more fully set forth.
4.

This action is ripe for adjudication.

5.

The amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional mm1mum of this

6.

This court has personal jurisdiction over the Defendants.

7.

Venue is proper in Kootenai County, Idaho.

Court.

III.
8.

COMMON ALLEGATIONS

Jennifer is married to Mark Porcello ("Mark"). Mark is the son of Anthony

and Annie. Jennifer and Mark have been married twice. The first marriage ended in divorce
in 2007. Jennifer and Mark remarried in November 20 13. They separated in April 2015, and
are currently undergoing a second divorce.
9.

Jennifer and Mark ' s relationship has been marked by periods of ex treme

volatility and host ility, usually as the result of Mark 's ongoing struggles w ith drug addiction.
Jennifer and Mark have three children together, all of whom reside with Jennifer. Jenn ifer
also has two other chi ldren residing with her.
I 0.

In 20 IO while Jennifer and Mark were unmarried, Jenni fer was considering

re locating away from King County, Washington, to Liberty Lake, Washington. Anthony and
Annie encouraged Jennifer to stay in King County so that Mark could stay better connected

VERIFIED COMPLA INT FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT,
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w ith his children and Mark and Jenn ifer could work on reconc iling their relati onship. They
offered to help Jenni fer purchase a home in King County to encourage her to stay.
11.

Jennifer located a bank-owned property in Woodinv ille, WA, that she entered

into a contract to purchase. The home was in a desirable upscale neighborhood but was run
down and suffered from substantia l deferred maintenance. T he purchase price of the home
was $401 ,000.00.
12.

Jenni fer was not able to secure financi ng for the Woodinville home and

requested that Anthony and Annie assist with financing . Jennifer assig ned the purchase
contract to Anthony and Annie and they, w ith Mark ' s financia l assistance, purchased the
Woodinville home in January 20 11.

The agreement between Jenni fer and Anthony and

Annie was that Jennifer would refinance the home at some po int and pay off the underly ing
m ortgage taken out by Anthony and Annie to purchase the home.
13.

Jenni fer immediate ly began renovations on the Woodinv ille home and was

abl e to move in and occupy the home in February 2011. Jenni fer spent considerable funds
on renovations to the home. She and several of her family members a lso contributed a great
deal of time and labor to the renovation effort. Mark resided in the home with Jenni fer for
much of the time between February 2011 , and early 201 3. Jennifer and Mark a lso serviced
the monthly mortgage pay ments on the home.
14.

In early 2013 , Jennifer and Mark ·s re lationship took a sharp turn for the worse.

Jenni fer filed for a do mestic v io lence protection order against Mark. Mark was no longer
able to reside in the Woodinvi lle home. In or around Apri l 2013, Jennifer received a 30-day
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eviction notice from Anthony and Annie to vacate the Woodinville home. In or around
October 2013, Jennifer moved out of the Woodinville home and relocated to Hayden, Idaho.
15.

Jennifer and Mark reconciled and were remarried in November 2013. Jennifer

and Mark wanted to purchase a home in Idaho and located a home at 1663 E. Northwood
Drive, Hayden Lake, Idaho (the "Hayden Lake home").

The plan was to sell the

Woodinville home and use some of the proceeds to purchase the Hayden Lake home.
16.

At Annie's request, Jennifer went back to Woodinville in June 2014, to

prepare the Woodinville home to be listed for sale. This included installing new kitchen
cabinets, granite countertops, a new driveway, refinishing the hardwood floors, and other
items. Jennifer and Mark were paying for all of the work and materials.
17.

Jennifer was unwilling to do this work unless she received some written

assurances from Anthony and Annie that they would receive this money back after the sale
of the Woodinville home to use in purchasing the Hayden Lake home. At Jennifer' s request,
Anthony and Annie both signed a handwritten note dated July I, 2014, acknowledging that
when the Woodinville home sold, Anthony and Annie would transfer $150,000.00 towards
the purchase of the Hayden Lake home.

A true and correct copy of the handwritten

acknowledgement of the $150,000.00 obligation is attached hereto as Exhibit "A."
18.

Jennifer expected that the Woodinville home would sell quickly once it was

repaired and listed on the market. The home was listed on approximately July I, 20 I 4.
When the Woodinville home did not sell quickly, there was pressure on Jennifer and Mark to
close on the Hayden Lake home. Anthony and Annie agreed to assist by refinancing the

VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT,
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Woodinville home and providing to Jennifer and Mark the $3 12,044.32 needed to close on
the Hayden Lake home.
The refinancing of the Woodinvi lle home was completed on September 2,

19.

201 4 through Legacy Group Capital, LLC. Anthony and Annie received a new loan for
$648,500.00. $270,462.56 of the new loan proceeds wert· used to pay off the first mortgage
owing to Wells Fargo. $3 12,044.32 of the new loan proceeds were wired to Pi oneer Title
Company and used by Jenni fer and Mark to close the purchase or the Hayden Lake home. A
balance of $48,577.62 of new loan proceeds were avai lable after the closing and lending
costs were paid and thi s amount was paid to Anthony and Annie. A true and correct copy of
the H UD-1 settlement statement for the refinancing of the Woodinville home is attached
hereto as Exhibit "B."
20.

On September 3, 20 14, Jenni fer and Mark went to Pi oneer Title Company in

Coeur d' Alene to sign the closing paperwork for the Hayden Lake home. The purchase price
of the Hayden Lake home was $360,000.00.

The HUD-1 settlement statement for the

closing reflected that Mark and Jenni fer were paying cash for the $3 12,044.32 balance due at
closing.

The HUD- I settlement statement did not contain any details of a loan used to

finance the purchase. A true and correct copy of the HUD- I settl ement statement is attached
as Exhibit "C."
2 1.

At the closing, Jennifer for the first time was presented w ith a Promissory

Note (the "Note") and Deed of Trust to sign as part of the closing. The Note was in the
principal amount of $648,500.00 and was payable to Anthony and Anni e. A true and correct
copy of the

ote is attached hereto as Exhibit "D." The Deed of Trust securing the Note was
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against the Hayden Lake home for the full amount of the Note (the '·Deed of Trust"). A true
and correct copy of the Deed of Trust is attached hereto as Exhibit "E."

Jennifer was

shocked to see the Note and Deed of Trust and refused to sign them.
22.

After leaving Pioneer Title Company, Jennifer and Mark had a telephone

conference with Joseph Mijich who Jennifer knew was the long-time attorney for Anthony
and Annie, and the attorney w ho she understood had prepared the

ote and Deed of Trust.

In this conversation Mr. Mij ich advised Jennifer and Mark that the reason the Note was for
$648,500.00 was because that was the amount of the new financing that Anthony and Annie
had secured on the Woodinville home. Even though only $312,044.32 of that new financing
was being used to purchase the Hayden Lake home, Mr. M ijich told Jennifer and Mark that
Anthony and Annie wanted the Note for the full amount of the new loan, but that when the
Woodinville home sold, the proceeds from that sale would be used to satisfy the $648,500.00
loan, and then Jennifer and Mark would own the Hayden Lake home free and clear or any
obligation to Anthony and Annie.
23.

Based on these assurances from Mr. Mijich, Jennifer returned to Pioneer Title

Company the next day and sig ned the

ote and Deed of Trust. The c losing on the Hayden

Lake home was completed on September 4, 2014.
24.

The Woodinvi lle home was listed for sale from around July 2014 until

December 2014. The home did not sell during that li sting period. Mark and Jennifer made
all or the debt serv ice payments on the Legacy Group Capital, LLC, loan from the time it
was funded until the time it was paid in ful l.
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25.

Mark and Jennifer were separated in April 2015. Jennifer and her children

continue to occupy the Hayden Lake home.
26.

Upon information and belief, in May 201 5, Anthony and Annie received a

loan from Evergreen Moneysource Mortgage Company using the Woodinvil le home as
collateral. The loan was for $480,000. $472,000 of the new loan proceeds were paid to
Legacy Group Capital, LLC.
27.

Upon information and belief, in July 2015, Anthony and Annie received

another loan from Evergreen Moneysource Mortgage Company using a home in Indian
Wells, CA, as co ll ateral. This Indian Wells home was registered in the names of Anthony
and Annie, but in reality it is a residential property owned and occupied by their son Mark.
The amount of this loan was $4 17,000.00. $3 14,514.42 of the loan proceeds were paid to
Anthony and Annie.
28.

Upon information and belief, all of the debt service payments on both

Evergreen Moneysource Mortgage Company loans were paid by Mark and Jenni fer.
29.

The Woodinville home was again li sted for sale in the summer of 20 15. This

time the home so ld for $690,000.00, with the sale closing on July 30, 20 15.

The sale

proceeds were used to pay off the mortgage to Evergreen Moneysource Mortgage Company
in the balance of $483,057.00. After all of the other closing costs were paid, the remaining
sale proceeds of$157,157.40 were paid to Anthony and Annie.
30.

The actual amount owing on the Note after the Woodinville home sold in July

20 15, if'any, is an unliquidated and disputed amount.
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31.

The $690,000.00 purchase price for the Woodinville home was more than

enough to sati sfy the original $648,500.00 obligation to Legacy Group Capital, LLC, which
was the mirror obligation underp inning the $648,500.00 Note signed by Jennifer and Mark.
Accordingly, based on the representations of Mr. Mijich as the attorney for Anthony and
Annie, the receipt of the sale proceeds from the sale of the Woodinville home satisfied the
Note in full.
32.

Anthony and Annie received total cash proceeds of $48,577.62, $314,5 14.42

and $ 157, 157.40 from the forego ing refinancing and sale transactions, for a total of
$520,249.44. The $520,249.44 should be credited against the amount owing on the Note.
33.

The completion of the sale of the Woodinville home also triggered the

obligation of Anthony and Anni e to pay $150,000.00 towards the purchase price of the
Hayden Lake home. T he $150,000.00 should be credited against the amount owing on the
Note.
34.

The actual loan made to Jennifer and Mark was in the principal amount of

$3 12,044.32. The Note should be reformed to reflect the actual amount of the obligation.
35.

On June 8, 2016, Anthony and Annie, through the trustee Pioneer Title

Company, issued a Notice of Default claiming that the entire principal balance of
$648,500.00, together with interest thereon at 12% per annum from November 20, 20 14,
until paid, was due and owing.
36.

On June 14, 2016, Anthony and Anni e, throug h the trustee Pioneer Title

Company, issued a

otice of T rustee's Sale claiming that the entire principal balance of
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$648,500.00, together with interest thereon at 12% per annum from November 20, 201 4,
until paid, was due and owing.
37.

The Notice of Trustee's Sale provides that the Hayden Lake home will be sold

at a trustee's sale on October 18, 2016 if the principal balance of $648,500.00, together with
interest thereon at 12% per annum from November 20, 2014, until paid, is not paid in full.
38.

The

otice of Default and Notice of Trustee's Sale both contained material

errors because the actual amount owing on the Note after the Woodinvi lle home sold in July
20 15, if any, is an unliquidated and disputed claim.
39.

Because of these material errors, if the trustee's sale is allowed to go forward

Jennifer will be deprived of her statutory right to cure the defau lt under Idaho Code § 451506( 12), because the amount claimed as owing on the obligation is so grossly mi sstated.
40.

Jennifer will suffer irreparable harm and injury if the trustee's sale is all owed

to go forward.
IV.

CAUSES OF ACTION

A.

Declaratory Judgment

41.

Jennifer incorporates all of the previous allegations as though fully set forth

42.

An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between Jenni fer and

herein.

Defendants concerning the actual amount owing on the ote after the Woodinville home sold in
July 201 5. The remaining amount owing on the

ote, if any, is an unliquidated and disputed

obligation.
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43.

Jennifer contends she is not in default under the Note or Deed of Trust and that

Defendants cannot use any claimed default as a basis for pursuing a non-judicial trustee's sale
of the Hayden Lake home.
44.

Jennifer is entitled to set o ff the $ 150,000.00 obligation owed by Defendants to

Jennifer together with pre-judgment interest on said liquidated amount against any obligation
determined to be owing by Jennifer to defendants.
45.

Jennifer seeks a judicial determination of her rights and duties under the

ote

and Deed of Trust and a declaration that Defendants cannot invoke a power of sale pursuant to
the Deed of Trust because Jennifer is not in default of the terms thereunder.
46.

A judicial determination is necessary and appropriate at this time under the

circumstances in order that Jennifer may ascertain her rights and duties.
B.

Injunctive Relief

47.

Jennifer incorporates all of the previous allegations as though fully set forth

48.

The allegations demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that Jennifer will be granted

herein.

declaratory relief as requested herein.
49.

If Defendants are allowed to conclude a non-judicial trustee's sale of the Hayden

Lake home, Jenni fer will be immedi ately and irrevocably harmed, for which pecuniary
compensation would not afford her adequate relie r The power of sale, pursuant to the Deed of
Trust, denies Jennifer any right of redemption of the Hayden Lake home and Jennifer could not
replace the unique character and qualities that are present in the Hayden Lake home.
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50.

Because of the great irreparable injury and harm that would result, Defendants

must be immediately enj oined from pursuing any non-j udicial power of sale of the Hayden
Lake home during the pendency o f this action and must be permanently enjoined thereafter
from invoking the Note and Deed o f T rust as a basis for default should the Court find in favor
o f Jennifer.
C.

Violations of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act

51.

Jennifer incorporates all of the previous allegations as though fully set forth

52.

Defendants engaged in unfair, deceptive and unconscionable methods, acts or

herein.

practices in the conduct of commerce within the State ofldaho.
53.

Defendants uti lized such unfair, deceptive and unconscionable methods, acts or

practices to persuade Jenni fer to sign a Note in the principal amount of $648,500.00, whi ch was
more than 200% of the actual loan amount of $3 12,044.32.
54.

Defendants utilized such unfair, deceptive and unconsc ionable methods, acts or

practices to persuade Jennifer to also sign a Deed of Trust using the Hayden Lake home which
was purchased for $360,000.00 as security for the $648,500.00 obligation.
55.

Jennifer has been damaged by the conduct of Defendants and is entitled to actual

and punitive damages as provided in Idaho Code § 48-608, including her costs and reasonable
attorney's fees .
WHEREFORE, Jenni fer prays for declaration and judgment as follows:
I.

That Jennifer has no remaining obligation owing to Defendants under the Note;
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2.

That Jenni fer is not in default under any of the terms of the

ote or the Deed of

3.

That the Defendants be ordered to reconvey the Deed of Trust to Jennifer.

4.

That Jennifer be awarded injunctive relie f restraining Defendants from selling or

Trust;

attempting to sell the Hayden Lake home pursuant to the power of sale under the Deed of Trust
until resolution of thi s matter and permanently thereafter;
5.

That Jennifer be awarded actua l and punitive damages, includ ing her costs and

reasonable attorney's fees incurred in prosecuting this action, pursuant to the Idaho Consumer
Protection Act;

6.

That Jennifer be awarded her reasonable attorney's fees under Idaho Code§§ 12-

120(3) and 12-121; and
7.

Al l other relief which the Court deems j ust and equitable.

DATED this < day of October, 201 6.

RAMSDEN, MARFICE, EALY & HARRIS, LLP

c:::::::
By:

~

Terrance R. Harris, Of the Firm
Attorneys for Plaintiff
/Nerification on next page
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VERIFICATION

STATE OF IDAHO )
) ss.
County of Kootenai )

Jennifer Porcello, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says:
I am the Plaintiff in the above-entitled action; I have read the foregoing Complaint for
Declaratory Judgment, Injunctive Relief and Damages; I know the contents thereof, and I state
the same to be true to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this ~

day of October, 2016.

NOTARY PUBLIC for the State of Idaho
{;µt_ s:.
Residing at /(;4
Commission Expires /1-flZ.IL fl, ~017

r
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Ticor Title Compa ny

11400 SE 8tl1 St, Ste. 110, Bellevue, WA 98004
Phone: (425)467-9170 I FAX: (866)878-8 970

FINAL BORROWER'S HUD-1, ATTACHMENT

Sefllemcn t Date: August:l7. 201'0isburscm ent Date,: Seper.iber 2, 2014

Esc ro'N no.: CREN-000 $-700095 17
E scrow OffiC2r. Kalhy Dunn

Settlem<>nt Agent: licor Titl" Company

Place of Settlemen t:

(425)467-9170

11400 SE 8th SI.

Ste. 110
Bellevue, WA 98004

Borrower : Annie C. Porcello and Anlhcny J.
Porcello
1817 Jones Ave NE
Renton. WA 90056

Lender: Legacy Group Cnp,tal, LLC
2345 Eastlake Ave E. il201

Borrower :

The Anttiony J . and Annie C.
Porcelo Living
Trust. dated May 18. 2007

Propeny: 20124 166th Place Northeast
Wooor,lliAe, WA 98077

Seattle, WA 98102

King County, wa~hingto n
APN/Parce l IO(s):

935930-02 10-08
T 1Uc Services

Descriptio n

Sorrower

line 1102 De tail Payee: Ticor Trlle Company
Escrow Fee

492.75
Line 1102 Total:

492.75

Lin& 1104 Dotail Payee: licor Tide Company
Lende(s title insurance

951.56
Line 1104 Total:

951. 58

Total Tille Services:

1,444.31

Addlllo nal Disbursem ents

Description

Borrower

Linc 801 Detail Payee: Legacy G roup Capi1al. LLC
Our origination charge
Our origination charge
Loan Admirv't.Jnderwriting feCl

12,970.00
1,125.00

Line 801 Total:

14,095.00

Payoffs
Payee/Des cription

Borrowor

WcUs Fargo Sank. N .A.
Refi Pa)'OH 1st

P rincipal Balance
l nlerest Charged
Additional Interest
Recording Costs

Total Payoff

270,46256
269,182.05

1.606.79 'nterest To: 09/19/14
-398.28 From: 0911911 4 Tnrough: 09/08114 @ 33 19 Per Diem
72.00
270,462.56

The HUD-1 Settlement Stalemenl Which I have prepared is a true and
accurate aa::ouni of 111,s transaction. I haYe
caused o r wil caus e funds to be dishun.ed in accordance with this
statement

T,cor Tille Company
Settlement Agent
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0MB Aooroval No. 2502--0265

A. Settlement Statement (HUD-1)

B. Type of Loan
1. QFHA
4. OVA

C.Note:

2. QRHS
3. O conv. Unins.
5.
Ins.

Oeonv.

8. ~ • Insurance ca,, Number.

7. Loan Number.

6. Fie Number.

550765

This-~ -

l>gi,e,.,., ....of aclJal sel!leltfflcos~. Amounts pall" ard by !!le ..lllemenl agent ... - . Items maited 11>.o.c.r- paidoot,ile 11\e
shownhefeloti'dormatlonalpu,posesrdnrol-~lhetotals.

F.Name&Addrmofl.ende,

0. Nwnt & Adtnss of 8onowef:

E. Name & Addreu of Saler:

MARK PORCELLO AND .ENNIFER PORCELLO
1663 EAST NORTHWOOD DRIVE
HAYDEN LAKE, ID 83835

SCOTT P. PAXTON AND KT E. PAXTON
6619 CRISTINA MARIE DRIVE
ORLANDO, FL 32835

G. Pn,pe,tylocation:

H. s.111emem>.gen1

1663 EAST NORTHWOOO DRIVE
HAYDEN LAKE, ID 83835 (KOOTENAI)
(V550000B003A)

dost,g;,.,.,.,.

PIONEER TtnE COMPANY OF KOOTENAI
COUNTY
100WALIACE AVENUE, COEUR 17ALENE, ID
83814 120lll 664-8254

I.Settlement Do~

9/4/2014

Place Of Settlerrent 100 WALLACE AVENUE, COEUR

D'ALENE, ID 83814 (208) 664-a254

!J. Summary of Borrowe(s Transactlon

it<. Summary of Selle(s Transaction

100. Gross Amount Due From Borrower

101. Contract sales oclce
102. Personal Prooertv
103. Settlement ciumes to BD<rower flille 1400)
104. Hot tub reoa~ oarts
105.
Adjustments for Items paid bv seller in advance
106. Citv/town taxes
107. Countv taxes
108. Solid Wasle lee 9/4/2014 to t/112015 1@$93.00Near
109. Water/sews,9/4/2014 to 10/112014 t<il $44.00/Month
110. =tember rent 9/112014 to 914/2014@ $3,000.00/Mooth
111.
112.

$360,000.00

120. GroH Amount Due From Borrower
200. Amounts raid Bv Or In Behalf Of Borrower
201. Deoosit D< Earnest Monev
202. Princioal amount of re,, loan
203. Existinq loan taken sublec! to
204. Additional Earnest Monev depos~ from Marl< Porceao and
205. Additional Earnest Mooey deposij from Mark Pon:ello and
206.
207. Rents credited towards ourchase orice
208.
209.
Adjustments for items unpaid by seller
21o. r mftaNn taxes
211. Countvtaxes 1/1/2014 to9/4/2014@$2,313.07Near
212. Assessments
213.
214
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.

$361,253.27

220. Total Paid By/For Borrower
300. Cash At Settlement Fronv'To Borrower
301. Gross Amount Due From Booower (line 120)
302. Less Amounts Paid By/For Borrowe, (line 2201
303. Cash

12]From

Previous editions are obsolete

Q ToBorrower

$575.00
$313.00

$30.32
$39.06
$295.89

$20,000.00

$5,000.00
$15,000.00

$7,650.00

400. Gross Amount Due To Seller
401. Contract sales D<lce
402. Personal Prooettv
403.
404. Hol tub r=••r parts
405.
Adlustments for items paid by seller in advance
406. Citv/town taxes
407. County taxes
408. Solid Waste fee 9/4/2014 to 111/2015 (cl) $93.00/Year
409. Water/sev,er 9/412014 to 1011/2014@ $44.00/Month
410. September rent 911/2014 to 91412014 @$3,000.00/Mooth
41 1.
412.
420. Gross Amount Due To Seller
500. Reductions In Amount Due To Seller
501. Excess d~ij (see Instructions)
502. Settlemenl Chomes to Seller fline 14001
503. Existilg loan taken subiect to
504. Pavnfl o1 frst mMnane loan
505. Payoff ol secood mortgage loan
506. Eamest """""' retained bv Marl< POICelto arid Jennifer
507. Renls credited towards Dtichase nm,

508.
509.

$1,558.95

Adiustrnents for ~ems unoaid by seller
510. Citv/town taxes
511 . Countv taxes 111/2014 to 9/4/2014 @$2 313.07Near
512. Assessments
513.
514
515.
516.
517.
518.
519.

$361,253.27
$49,208.95

520. Total Reduction Amount Due Seller
600. Cash At Settlement To/From Seller
601. Gross Amo111t Due To Seller Oine 420)
602. Less Deduction in Aml Due To Seller lline 5201

$312,044.32

603. Cash

$49,208.95

Page
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0 From Seller
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L StttJement Charges
700. Total Real Estate Broker Fees $0
Division ol Commission rnne 700) as follows:
701.
702.
703. Coovnission oaid at Settlement
704.

Paid From
Borrotle(s

Flllds at
Settlement

800. Items Pavable In Connection With Loan
801. Ournrininatioo mome
802. Your credit or chame (points) for the specif,c interest rate chosen
803. Your adiusted orialnatioo charQes
804. Aporaisal Fee
805. Credit Report
806. Tax service to
807. Flood certifcation to

/from GFE #1\
(from GFE #2)
(fromGFEA)
(from GFE #3)
/from GFE #31
(from GFE #3)
(from GFE #3)

900. Items Required By Lender To Be Paid In Advance
901. Interest
902. """"aae Insurance Premium
903. Homeowner's insurance

(from GFE #10)
(from GFE #3)
(from GFE #11)

1000. Reserves De<><>stted Wtth Lender
1001. Initial deposit for your esaON accoont
1002. Homeowner's insurance 12.00 months @ per month
1003. lkvinon,, insurance 12.00 months@ per month
1004. Property taxes 12.00 months@ per month
1007. Aoor""ate Adlustment

(from GFE #91

1100. TWe Chames
(from GFE #4l
1101. Totle services and lender's title insurance
1102. Settlement or closino fee to Pioneer Title Com=nv ol Kootenai Countv $557.50
(from GFE #51
1103. ON!lefs title insurance to Pioneer Title Companv ol Kootenai Countv
$0.00
1104. Lendefs title insurance to Pioneer Title Comoanv of Kootenai County
1105. Lende(s title ,v,Hrv limit
1106. Ownefs title oolicy limit $360,000.00
1107. AQents nnnion of the total title insurance premium lo Pioneer Title Comoanv ol Kootenai Countv $1,206.00
1108. Undeiwrite<'s ....,.,., ol the total title insurance premium to Old Republic National Title Insurance Company $134.00
1111. E-file Fee to Pioneer Trtle Companyol Kootenai Countv $4.50
121l<I. Government Recordina and Transfer Charges
1201. Government recording charoes
1202. Deed $13.00 Mnr1aage S Releases$

(from GFE #71

1300. Add~ional Settlement Cha111es
1301. Required services that vnu can shop for
1302. Survev
1303. Pest Inspection
1304. Home Warranty

- - · --

Page2ol2

- .

$13.00

(from GFE #61

1400. Total Settlement Charges (enter on line 103, Section J and 502, Section K)

- -- - - - --

$562.00

(fromGFEIUI)

1203. Transfl!flaxes
1204. Citv/Countv tax/stamps Deed $ Mortoaoe $
1205. Slate tax/stamps Deed$ Mortgage$

Previous editions are obsolete

Paid From
Sellel's
Foods at
Settlement

$575.00

08/29/2014 12:31 PM HUD-1
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BUYER HUD-1 CERTIFICATION
The settlement Agent does not warrant or represent the accuracy of information provided by third parties
including but not limited to, information provided on the last page of this HUD form or POC items, and
the buyer/borrower holds harmless the settlement agent as to any inaccuracy of such matters.
I have carefully reviewed the HUD-I Settlement Statement and to the best of my knowledge and belief, it
is a true and accurate statement of all receipts and disbursements made on my account or by me in this
transaction. I further certify that I have received a copy of the HUD- I Settlement Statement.
eme t Agent to make expenditures and disbursements as shown above and

The HUD- I Settlement Statement which I have prepared is a true and accurate account of this
transaction. I have caused or will cause the funds to be disbursed in accordance with this statement.

Heidi Simon, Escrow Officer
File No. 550765

WARNING: It is a crime to knowingly make false statements to the United States on this or any other
similar form. Penalties upon conviction can include a fine and imprisonment. For details see Title 18
U.S. Code Section 1001 and Section 10 10.
POC(B) represents paid outside of closing by borrower, POC(S) represents paid outside of closing by the
seller, POC(L) represents paid outside of closing by lender and POC(M} represents paid outside of
closing by mortgage broker.
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PROMIS SORY NOTE

September 3, 2014
For Value received, the undersigned ("Maker"), jointly and severally, promise to pay to the order of
Anthony J. Porcello and Annie C. Porcello, husband and wife ("Holder"), the principal sum of Six
Hundred Forty-Eight Thousand Five Hundred Dollars and No Cents ($648,500.00) in lawful money
of the United States of America with interest thereon at the rate of twelve percent per annum from
August 29, 2014, computed on a 365/360 basis, payable as follows:
Interest only in the amount of $7,133.50, payable on October 1, 2014; $6,701.17, payable on
Novembe r 1, 2014; and $6,052.67, payable on November 29, 2014. The entire balance of
$648,500.00 shall also be payable on November 29, 2014.
If any payment is 15 days or more late, there shall be a late charge of five percent of the amount of
the regularly-scheduled payment.

In case of failure to pay any installment when due, the holder at his option may declare the whole
principal hereof immediately due and payable. In case this Note is collected by an attorney, either
with or without suit, the undersigned hereby agree to pay a reasonable attorney's fee.
This Note is secured by a Deed of Trnst of even date executed by the undersigned on certain real
property described therein.
The undersigned her
ugh

presentment, protest, and notice of non-payment. At holders option,
erior Court of the State of Washington, King County, Washington.

EXHIB IT D
Page 44

DEED OF TRUS T

2469098000
5 P
N
JIM BRA~
KOOTENAI COUNT Y RECOR DER
9/4/2014 2:29 PM
SEH
REQ OF PIONEER TITLE KOOTENAI
COUNTY
MD
RECOR DING FEE: $22.00
Electronica lly Recorded

Porcello and Jennifer
THIS DEED OF TRUST, Made September 3, 2014 between Mark
th
10222 NE 8 Street,
is
Porcello, husband and wife herein called GRANTOR, whose address
called TRUSTEE; and
Bellevue, WA 98004; Pioneer Title Company of Kootenai County, herein
1817 Jones Ave. NE,
is
Anthony J. Porcello and Annie C. Porcello, husband and wife, whose address
Renton, WA 98056, herein called BENEFICIARY;
SELL AND CONVEY
WITNESSETH: That Grantor does hereby irrevocably GRANT, BARGAIN, County of Kootenai,
the
in
y
TO TRUSTEE IN TRUST, WITH POWER OF SALE, that propert
State of Id.aho, described as follows:
ACRES AND IS NOT
THE REAL PROPERTY IS NOT MORE THAN EIGHTY (80) UCTION OF CROPS,
PROD
RAL
ULTU
PRINCIPALLY USED FOR THE AGRIC

THAN FORTY (40)
LIVESTOCK, DAfilY OR AQUATIC GOODS, OR IS NOT MORE
INCORPORATED CITY
ACRES REGARDLESS OF USE, OR IS LOCATED WITHIN AN
OR VILLAGE.

See Exhibit A attached hereto and made a part hereof.
HOWEVER, to the right,
TOGETHER WITH the rents, issues and profits thereof, SUBJECT,
to collect and apply such
power and authority hereinafter given to and conferred upon Beneficiary
dness evidenced by a
indebte
the
of
t
paymen
g
rents, i~sues and profits, for the purpose of securin
Hundred Forty-Eight
Six
of
sum
the
in
r
Granto
by
d
promissory note, of even date herewith, execute
t due November
paymen
final_
with
00.00),
·Thousand Five Hundred Dollars and No Cents ($648,5
or advanced by
loaned
be
er
hereaft
may
as
29, 2014, and to secure paymen t of all such fu1ther sums
owner of
record
while
them,
of
the Beneficiary herein to the Grantor herein, or any or either
such
nting
represe
ents
instrum
other
present interest, for any purpose, and of any notes, drafts or
therein
rate
the
at
sums
such
all
fu1ther loans, advances or expenditures together with interest on
es or expenditures shall
provided. Provided, however, that the making of such further loans, advanc
intention of the pa1ties
be optional with the Beneficiary, and provided, fmther, that it is the express
paid for all such advances
to this Deed of Trust that it shall stand as continuing security until
together with interest thereon.
A. To protec t the security of this Deed of Trust, Granto r agrees:
demolish any building
(I) To keep said prope,ty in good condition and repair; not to remove or
manner any building which
thereon; to complete or restore promptly and in good and workmanlike
due all claims for labor
may be constructed, damaged or destroyed thereon and to pay when
affecting said property or
pe1formed and materials furnished therefor; to comply with all laws
t or permit waste thereon;
requiring any alterations or improvements to be made thereon ; not to commi
of law; to cultivate; irrigate,
· not to commit, suffer or pennit any act upon said property in violation
er or use of said property
fertilize, fumigate, prune and do all other acts which from the charact
ng the general.
may be reasonably necessary, the specific enumerations herein not excludi
and malicious mischief
(2) To provide, maintain and deliver to Beneficiary fire, vandalism
t collected under any
insurance satisfactory to and with loss payable to Beneficiary. The amoun
dness secured hereby
tire or other insurance policy may be applied by Beneficiary upon any indebte
iary the entire an1ount so
and in such order as benefic iary may determine, or at option of Benefic
tion or release shall not
collected or any part thereof may be released to Granter. Such applica
act done pursuant to such
cure or waive any default or notice of default hereunder or invalidate any
pa1ties as below set forth.
notice. The provisions hereof are subject to the mutual agreements of the
1

EXH IBIT E
Page 45

DEED OF TRUST
and Jennifer
TIDS DEED OF TRUST, Made Septemb er 3, 2014 between Mark Porcello
8th Street,
NE
10222
is
address
whose
R,
GRANTO
Porcello, husband and wife herein called
TRUSTE E; and
Bellevue, WA 98004; Pioneer Title Company of Kootenai County, herein called
Jones Ave. NE,
17
18
is
address
whose
wife,
Anthony J. Porcello and Annie C. Porcello, husband and
Renton, WA 98056, herein called BENEFI CIARY;
AND CONVE Y
WITNES SETH: That Granter does hereby irrevocably GRANT , BARGA IN, SELL
of Kootenai ,
County
the
in
property
that
SALE,
OF
TO TRUSTE E IN TRUST, WITH POWER
State of Idaho, described as follows:

NOT
REAL PROPER TY IS NOT MORE THAN EIGHTY (80) ACRES AND IS
CROPS,
OF
CTION
PRODU
L
LTURA
AGRICU
THE
FOR
PRINCIPALLY USED
(40)
LIVESTOCK, DAIRY OR AQUATIC GOODS, OR IS NOT MORE THAN FORTY
CITY
D
ORATE
INCORP
AN
WITHIN
ED
ACRES REGARDLESS OF USE, OR IS LOCAT
OR VILLAGE.

nm

See Exhibit A attached hereto and made a part hereof.
the right,
TOGET HER WITH the rents, issues and profits thereof, SUBJEC T, HOWEV ER, to
such
apply
and
collect
power and authority hereinaft er given to and conferred upon Beneficia ry to
a
by
d
evidence
ess
rents, issues and profits, for the purpose of securing payment of the indebtedn
ht
Forty-Eig
Hundred
promisso ry note, of even date herewith, executed by Granter in the sum of Six
due Novemb er
Thousand Five Hundred Dollars and No Cents ($648,50 0.00), with final payment
advanced by
29, 2014, and to secure payment of all such fu1ther sums as may hereafter be loaned or
owner of
the Beneficia ry herein to the Granter herein, or any or e ither of them, whi le record
ing such
present interest, for any purpose, and of any notes, drafts or other instruments represent
the rate therein
further loans, advances or expenditu res together with interest on all such sums at
ures shall
expendit
or
advances
loans,
further
such
of
making
the
provided . Provided, however, that
patties
the
of
intention
express
the
is
it
that
fuither,
,
be optional with the Beneficiary, and provided
advances
such
all
for
paid
til
un
security
g
continuin
as
stand
to this Deed of Trust that it shall
together with interest thereon.

A. To protect the security of this Deed of Trust, G ran tor agrees:
building
(I) To keep said prope1ty in good condition and repair; not to remove or demolish any
which
building
any
manner
like
workman
and
good
in
and
thereon; to complete or restore promptly
labor
for
claims
all
due
when
pay
to
and
thereon
may be construct ed, damaged or destroyed
or
prope1ty
said
affecting
laws
all
with
comply
to
performe d and materials furnished therefor;
thereon;
waste
permit
or
commit
to
not
thereon;
requiring any alterations or improvem ents to be made
irrigate,
not lo commit, suffer or permit any act upon said property in violation of law; to cultivate;
property
said
of
use
or
character
the
from
fertilize, fumigate, prune and do all other acts which
may be reasonab ly necessary, the specific enumerat ions herein not excludin g the general.
s mischief
(2) To provide, maintai n and deliver to Beneficia ry fire, vanda lism and maliciou
under any
collected
amount
The
ry.
Beneficia
to
insurance satisfacto ry to and with loss payable
hereby
secured
ess
indebtedn
any
upon
ry
Beneficia
by
fire or other insurance policy may be applied
so
amount
entire
the
1y
Beneficia
of
option
at
or
e,
and in such order as beneficia ry may determin
not
shall
release
or
n
applicatio
Such
Granter.
to
collected or any part thereof may be released
pursuant to such
cure or waive any default or notice of default hereunder or invalidate any act done
set forth.
below
as
patties
the
of
ts
agreemen
notice. The provisions hereof are subject to the mutual

E1.EC1f10N1CALLYRECOROED .DONOT

1
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(3) To appear in and defend any action or proceeding purpo1ting to affect the security hereof or
the rights or powers of Beneficiary or Trustee and to pay all costs and expenses, including cost of
evidence of title and attorneys' fees in a reasonable sum, in any such action or proceeding in which
Beneficiary or Trustee may appear, and in any suit brought by Beneficiary to foreclose this Deed of
Trust.
(4) To pay: (a) at least ten days before delinquency all taxes and assessments affecting said
property, including assessments on appuitenant water stock; (b) when due, subject to the mutual
agreements of the parties as below set fo1th, all encumbrances, charges and liens, with interest, on
said property or any part thereof, which appear to be prior or superior hereto; ( c) all allowable
expenses of this Trust.
(5) Should Grantor fail to make any payment or to do any act as herein provided, then Beneficiary or
Trustee, but without obl igation so to do and without notice to or demand upon Trustor and without
releasing Grantor from any obligation hereof, may: make or do the same in such manner and to such
extent as either may deem necessary to protect the security hereof, Beneficiary or Trustee being
authorized to enter upon said property for such purposes; appear in and defend any action or proceeding
purpo1ting to affect the security hereof or the rights or powers of Beneficiary or Trustee; pay, purchase,
contest or compromise any encumbrance, charge or lien which in the judgment of either appears to be
prior or superior hereto; and, in exercising any such power, pay allowable expenses.
(6) To pay immediately and without demand al l sums so expended by Beneficiary or Trustee,
with interest from date of expenditure at the amount allowed by law in effect at the date hereof.
B. It is mutually agreed that:

(I) Any award of damages in connection with any condemnation for public use of or injury to
said property or any part thereof is hereby assigned and shall be paid to Beneficiary who may apply or
release such moneys received by him in the same manner and with the same effect as above provided for
disposition of proceeds of fire or other insurance.
(2) By accepting payment of any sum secured hereby af1er its due date, Beneficiary does not
waive his right either to require prompt payment when due of all other sums so secured or to declare
default for failure so to pay.
(3) At any time or from time to time, without liability therefor and without notice, upon
written request of Beneficiary and presentation of this Deed and said note for endorsement, and without
affecting the personal liability of any person for payment of the indebtedness secured hereby,
Trustee may: reconvey all or any pa1t of said property; consent to the making of any map or plat
thereof; join in granting any easement thereon; or join in any extension agreement or any agreement
subordinating the lien or charge hereof.
(4) Upon written request of Beneficiary stating that all sums secured hereby have been paid,
and upon surrender of this Deed and said note to Trustee for cancellation and retention and upon
payment of its fees, Trustee shall reconvey, without warranty, the property then held hereunder. The
recitals in any reconveyance executed under this deed of trust of any matters or facts shall be conclusive
pro9f of the truthfulness thereof. The grantee in such reconveyance may be described as "the person or
persons legally entitled thereto."

2
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(5) As additional security, Grantor hereby gives to and confers upon Beneficiary the right, power
and authority, during the continuance of these Trusts, to collect the rents, issues and profits of said
property, reserving unto Grantor the right, prior to any default by Grantor in payment of any
indebtedness secured hereby or in pe1fo1mance of any agreement hereunder, to collect and retain such
rents, issues and profits as they become due and payable. Upon any such default, Beneficiary may at
any time without notice, either in person, by agent, or by a receiver to be appointed by a court, and
without regard to the adequacy of any security for the indebtedness hereby secured, enter upon and
take possess ion of said property or any pa1i thereof, in his own name sue for or otherwise collect
such rents, issues and profits, including those past due and unpaid, and apply the same, less costs and
expenses of operation and collection, including reasonable attorney's fees, upon any indebtedness
secured hereby, and in such order as Beneficiary may determine. The entering upon and taking
possession of said property, the collection of such rents, issues and profits and the application thereof as
aforesaid, shall not cure or waive any default or notice of default hereunder or invalidate any act done
pursuant to such notice.
(6) Upon default by Grantor in payment of any indebtedness secured hereby or in performance of any
agreement hereunder, all sums secured hereby shall immediately become due and payable at the option of
the Beneficiary. In the event of default, Beneficiary shall execute or cause the Trustee to execute a written
notice of such default and of his election to cause to be sold the herein described property to satisfy the
obligations hereof, and shall cause such notice to be recorded in the office of the recorder of each county
wherei n said real prope1ty or some pa11 thereof is situated.
Notice of sale having been given as then required by law, and not less than the time then
required by law having elapsed, Trustee, without demand on Grantor, shall sell said property at the time
and place fixed by it in said notice of sale, either as a whole or in separate parcels and in such order
as it may determine, at public auction to the highest bidder for cash in lawful money of the United
States, payable at time of sale. Trustee shall deliver to the purchaser its deed conveying the property so
sold, but without any covenant or warranty express or implied. The recitals in such deed of any matters
or facts shall be conclusive proof of the truthfulness thereof. Any person, including Granter, Trustee, or
Beneficiary, may purchase at such sale.
Arter deducting all costs, fees and expenses of Trustee and of this Trust, including cost of title
evidence of title and reasonable counsel fees in connection with sale, Trustee shall apply the proceeds of
sale to payment of: all sums expended under the terms hereof, not then repaid, with accrued interest at
accrued legal judgment rate per annum; all other sums then secured hereby; and the remainder, if any, to
the person or persons legally entitled thereto.
(7) This Deed applies to, inures to the benefit of, and binds all parties hereto, their heirs, legatees,
devisees, administrators, executors, successors and assigns. The term Beneficiary shall mean the holder
and owner of the note secured hereby; or, if the note has been pledged, the pledgee thereof. In th is Deed,
whenever the context so requ ires, the masculine gender includes the femin ine and/or neuter, and the
singular number includes the plural.
(8) Trustee is not obligated to notify any patty hereto of pending sale under any other Deed of Trust
or of any action or proceeding in which Granter, Beneficiary or Trustee shall be a party unless brought by
Trustee.
(9) In the event of dissolution or resignation of the Trustee, the Beneficiary may substitute a trustee
or trustees to execute the trnst hereby created, and when any such substitution has been filed for record in
the office of the Recorder of the county in which the prope1ty herein described is situated, it shall be
conclusive evidence of the appointment of such trnstee or trustees, and such new trustee or trustees
shall succeed to all of the powers and duties of the trustees named herein.
3
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Request is hereby a e that a copy of any Notice of Default and a copy of any Notice of Sale
hereunder be m led to ti G anto at his address herein before set forth.

-=

State of Idaho, County of Kootenai
On th is ~ y ofSd'rn the year of4l)f/befo re m~, the undersigned , a No~a1y ~ublic in and for said
State, personally appeared Mark Porcello a·1~a JsAA1fer J20Fssll0 known or 1dent1fted to me to be the
person/persons whose name(s) is/are subscribed to the within instrument, and acknowledged to me that
he/she they exec d the same.

State ofldaho
ss.
County of Kootenai

4M

day of September, in the year of 2014, before me, the undersigned, a Notary Public, personally
On this
appeared Jennifer Porcello known or identified to me to be the person/persons whose name is/are subscribed to the
within instrument, and acknowledged to me that he/she/they executed the same.

Residing,
Commission Exp:

~
'9
-=20f

4
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EXHIBIT A

Lot 3, Block B, Fairway Glen, according to the plat thereof, filed in Book "F" of Plats at page(s) 356, 356A
and 356B, records of Kootenai County, Jdaho.
TOGETHER WITH
The South 14 feet of the East 100.5 feet of Lot I, Block A, Fairway Glen, according to the plat thereof filed
in Book "F" of Plats, at page(s) 356, 356A and 356B, records of Kootenai County, Idaho.
Commonly known as 1663 East Northwood Drive, Hayden Lake, Idaho 83835.
Tax Parcel No.

Vf>SDDOO'B003b\.

5
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, 2016 11 :43AM

No. 4775

RAMSDEN, MARFICE, EALY & HARRIS, LLP
700 Nmthwest Blvd.
P.O. Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336
Telephone: (208) 664-5818
Facsimile:
(208) 664-5884
Te1Tance R, Harris, ISB #5484

P. 2/ 3

STATE OF IDAHO

} ss
7 lb
- -

COUNTYOFKOOTENAI /{) /

FILED:

// '. S2J O'CLOCK.!LM

AT

CLE8 w ~OURT
DEP~

Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST nJDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
JENNIFER PORCELLO,
Plaintiff,

CASE NO. CV-2016-7343

ORDER POSTPONING TRUSTEE'S
SALE

vs.
ANTHONY J. PORCELLO and ANNIE C.
PORCELLO, husband and wife,
Defendants.
This matter having come before the Comt on Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminaiy
Injunction, and based on the stipulation by Defendants and for the 1·easons announced in open
cou11;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Trustee's Sale of the real property commonly
knov,m as 1662 E. No1thwood Drive, Hayden Lake, Idaho 83835, which Trustee's Sale is

presently scheduled for Tuesday, October l 8, 20 l 6, at 11 :00 a.rn., is hereby postponed for a
period of 30 days.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the hearing on Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminruy
Injunction is continued until November 8, 2016, at 3:00 pm., to allow Defendants additional

ORDER POSTPONING TRUSTEE'S SALE - I

Rece i ved Tim e Oct . 17. 2016 12:42PM No. 8499
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2016 11 : 43AM

No. 477 5

P. 3/3

time to respond to Plaintiffs Motion for Preliminary Injunction. Defendants 1 response must be
filed by October 28, 2016, ~nd Plaintiffs reply thereto, if any, must be filed by November 4,
2016.
DATED this

/7 ~

y of October, 2016.

orable Cynthia K. C, M
ourt Judge

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the -1...:1. day of October, 20 I6, I served a true and con-ect copy
of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Henry D. Madsen
1044 NW Boulevard, Suite B
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814

US Mail
_ _ Overnight Mail
Hand Delivered
~
acsimile (208) 664-6258

Tenance R. Harris
Ramsden, Marfice, Ealy & Harris, LLP
700 NW Boulevard
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814

US Mail
__ Overnight Mail
Hand Delivered
L...----Facsimile (208) 664-5884

Clerk of the Court

ORDER. POSTPONING TRUSTEE'S SALE - 2

Recei ved Tim e Oct. 17. 2016 12: 42PM No. 8499
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.

;I(

STATEor 11'-~Htl

J

COUNlY Of KOOi[N,\l }ss
FILED:

016 DEC -6 PH ~: 5\J

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
JENNIFER PORCELLO,
Plaintiff,
and

CASE NO. CV-2016-7343

ANTHONY J. PORCELLO and ANNIE C.
PORCELLO, husband and wife,

DECLARATION OF JUDGE
TERRENCE A. CARROLL, RET.

Defendants.

I, Judge Terrence A. Carroll, ret., do hereby state and declare as follows:
1.

I am over eighteen years of age, and have personal knowledge of and am

competent to testify about the matters set forth in this Declaration.
2.

I served as a Superior Court Judge in King County, Washington from 1980 to

1992. After leaving the bench, I have heard more than 2,500 mediations and 500 arbitrations,
and have served as Special Master in dozens of complex cases.
3.

In 2013, I served as Arbitrator in the matter known as In Re: The Arbitration of

Ann Porcello, Claimant, v. Jennifer Maggard, Respondent. The matter was conducted in private
arbitration, therefore there are no filings or orders that are of public record.
4.

Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of the Order of Arbitrator

that I issued on August 15, 2013.
DECLARATION OF JUDGE TERRENCE A. CARROLL, RET. - I
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,.

5.

Attached hereto as Exhibit B is a true and correct copy of the Declaration of Ann

Porcello dated August 7, 2013, with exhibits, which I considered as part of my August 15, 2013
Order.
6.

Attached hereto as Exhibit C is a true and correct copy of an August 7, 2013

letter from Ann Porcello's counsel, which I considered as part of my August 15, 2013 Order.
7.

Attached hereto as Exhibit D is a true and correct copy of the Order on Recusal of

Arbitrator & Referral to Presiding Judge that I issued on October 28, 2013.
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of Washington that the
foregoing is true and correct.
DATED at Seattle, Washington: This 1st day of December, 2016.

Judge Terrence A. Carroll, Arbitrator, ret.

DECLARATION OF JUDGE TERRENCE A. CARROLL, RET. - 2
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EXH IBIT -A
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.

.

4

IN THE PRIVATE ARBITRATIO N BEFORE
JUDGE TERRE CE A. CARROL L. RET .

IN RE: THE ARBITRATIO N OF
8

ORDER OF ARBITRATOR

ANN PORCELLO,
9
Claimant,
10
V.

11

JENNIFER MAGGARD,
12
Re

ndent.

l3
Based upon a review of the documents and evidence provided by the parties to Judge Carroll

14
15

and the telephonic hearing held on August 9, 2013 , the following is hereby Ordered:

16
1.

Ms. Maggard, her children and any other persons., except as designated by Ann Porcello,
shaJI permanently vacate the Woodinville house located at 20124 186"' Place E
Woodinville, WA 98077 (the "house" ), along with their belongings by 6 :00 PM on
August 31, 2013. Ms. Maggard shall leave the house in a 'show ready" condition and
not take any actions that may impact the value of the house and may not take anything
out of the house that are not her personal belongings, such as the refrigerator, ·tove and
any and all other l.ike appliances. Ms. Maggard shall deliver all house keys to Jes e
Jaynes by 6:00 PM on August 31 , 2013

2.

At all times prior to Ms. Maggard vacating the house on August 31 . 2013 , Ms. Maggard
must fully and timely cooperate with the house selling process, including but not limited
to working with Jesse Jaynes regarding open houses, showings, for sale signs, and all
other actions/a ctivi~LJA a~~ to sell the house as determined by Jesse Jaynes.
m any ~ay to cooperate with the house selling process, Ms.
Should Ms_
Maggard must vacate the house immediately.

l7

18
19

20
21

22
23

Maggaraj.Jai'

ORDER OF ARBITRATOR - I

Ashbaug h Beal
701 FIF!H AVE. , SLIITE 44CO
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1
3.

AH equitable lien claims... all claims for reimbur ements. and all other monetary cl.aims of
any nature by M . Maggard are hereby DE JED

4.

All claims for sanctions, attorneys' fees, and costs by the partjes are hereby DENIED,
except that the arbitration fees shall be paid by Mrs. Porcello.

2

4

5
Dated· August 15, 20 I""

6

~-4 -~, a?

Judge Terrence Carroll, Arbitrator 1 ~

IO

11
12

13
14

15
16

I8 I
I
I

19

I

20
21

23
11

II ORDER OF A.RBITRATOR - 2

Ashbaug h Beal
701 FFTH AVE. , SIJ(TE 44CO
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EXH IBIT -B
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2

3
4
5
6

IN THE PRIVATE ARBITRATIO N BEFORE
JUDGE TERRENCE A. CARROLL, RET.

7
IN RE: THE ARBITRATIO N OF

8
ANN PORCELLO,

DECLARATIO N OF ANN PORCELLO

9
Claimant,
10
V.

11
JENNIFER MAGGARD,
12
Res ondent.
13
14

I, Ann Porcello, under penalty of perjury, hereby make the following declaration:

15

I.

I am of legal age and am competent to testify to the matters contained herein. If called

16

to do so, I would testify as to their truthfulness. I have personal knowledge of the facts contained in

17

this declaration.

18

2.

19
20

I am the Claimant in this matter and am the owner of the house located 20124 186th

Place N.E. Woodinville, Washington 98077.
3.

In December 2011, I made a $6,000 earnest money deposit and in January 2012, I

21

made a down payment of $93,394.40 for the purchase of the Woodinville house.

22

Exhibit A is documentation of these payments.

Attached as

23

DECLARATION OF ANN PORCELLO - I

Ashbaugh Beal
701 FIFTH AVE., SUITE 44CXl
SEATTLE, WA 98104
T 203.386.590'.) F. 2C6.344.7400
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4.

I have continuously paid for the mortgage, property taxes, and insurance for the

2

house. I paid $6,974.71 in property tax in 2013and $6,506.58 in 2012. Attached hereto as Exhibit B

3

are my 2013 tax records.

4

5.

The principle balance of the mortgage is $289,185.09, and to date I have made

5

approximately $34,962.03 in mortgage payments, not including interest. Attached hereto as Exhibit

6

C is a recent statement.

7

6.

I incurred vast expenses to improve the property of the house. For example, on June

8

4, 2012, I paid $34,438. IO to JC Enterprises for remodeling services, such as building the deck. The

9

receipt, with descriptions of all of the remodeling services, is attached hereto as Exhibit D. I also

lO

paid $30,654 for plumbing and landscaping services to make the house habitable, as documented by

11

the receipts attached as Exhibit E.

12

7.

I reimbursed Mark Porcello for purchases he made to improve the property. For

13

example, I provided Mark with $30,000.00 on January 15, 20 I 3 and $ I 8,807.62 on April 18, 20 I 3,

14

to account for improvements he made to the house. Attached as Exhibit F is documentation of these

15

payments.

16

8.

Jennifer Maggard has not made any payments to account for the rent or utilities of the

17

Woodinville house since January 2013 .

18

and/or anyone else to live in the Woodinville house free of rent. Since Jennifer Maggard ceased

I9

making payments, I have been responsible for paying the utilities of my Woodinville house.

20

Attached as Exhibit G documents the $2,806.35 that I recently paid on July 12, 2013, to Puget Sound

21

Energy, accounting for outstanding utility bills to the Woodinville house.

22

rental value of the property, at $2,600 per month, I am owed $15,600 to account for the rent since

23

Jennifer ceased making such payments. I never agreed to allow Jennifer, nor anyone else for that

DECLARATION OF ANN PORCELLO - 2

There was never any agreement for Jennifer Maggard

Based on the market

Ashbaugh Beal
70 l FIFll-i AVE , SUITE 44CO
SEATTLE, WA 93104
T 206.386.5900 F 206.344.74(X)
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matter to live in my house rent free. The fact that Jennifer and her boyfriend, two capable working
2

adults, have continued to live in my house without paying for rent or utilities has caused significant

3

financial harm to me.

4

9.

Jennifer, and all else who are living with her, must move out of the house by August

5

15, 2013, as the Arbitration Order mandates. This litigation has been very difficult for me, both

6

financially and emotionally, as l am concerned about the stress I have incurred at my age. Further,

7

the attorneys' fees I have incurred as a result of Jennifer's lies and lack of cooperation have been

8

significant, which is why I have asked to be reimbursed for my legal fees pursuant to Paragraph 12

9

of the CR 2A Agreement.
10.

All I originally tried to do was provide my grandchildren with a stable place to live.

11

never would have thought that my good gesture would have led to all of this turmoil. From the onset

12

of purchasing the house, Jennifer has continuously attempted to manipulate me and make me feel

13

guilty for my actions. For example, as recent as July l, 2013, she sent me a series of text messages

14

in attempt to use the children as leverage over the house. This message is attached hereto as Exhibit

15

H. I have become increasingly concerned about the safety of myself and of my family due to our

16

attempts to resolve this dispute. For example, Ms. Maggard has threatened me that she will ensure

I7

Mark goes to prison for a very long time if I do not give my house to her. I am genuinely frightened

18

of Jennifer and her boyfriend, and all I want is for this ordeal to be over and to sell my house. It will

19

be best for everyone involved to move on in their lives separately.

20
21
22
23

DECLARATION OF ANN PORCELLO - 3

Ashbaugh Beal
701 FlFTH AVE., SUITE 440)
SEATTLE, WA 98104
T 206.386.59CO F. 206.344.7400
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AU(I 07 13 05:42p

Jason

4,.

Under penalty of
2

54-601 !:i

p.1

r.iury, under the laws of the state of Washington. the foregoing is true and

correct to the best of my k owkdge and belic~f.

3
4

Da.ted this

ih day

5

6
7
8

9

ll
12

13
14

15
16
17

18
19

20
21

22
23

DECLARATTON OF ANN PO CELLO·· 4

Ashba1u gh Beal

70L FIFTH AVE., sun-e 44CO

:x:An·LE, WI~ 9EllC<l
T 205.386 5£00 F 2(6.3447400
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EXHIBIT A
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Jason

4_,45 4-601 5
\ I Of\ f \4LJ

Jt

Iii,

p.2
r, \JU I ( VU I

'-.l:J UV

1n orde r to ensu re that all funds to be disburse
d by Serv iceL
mortgage clos ings are accurately appl ied you must inclu ink for
de the:

follo wing refe renc e information: ·

·.

Serv iccL ink Escr ow# aka SL# : 2724303 ·

ii tJ8,7Jtf,'f1

Bor~owerLastName -✓ Entity PoR Ut. -L~ 1)-# N(! ,
.

J

'f

J:

/Jdrl/~/flr ,

. All. fund s to be ·rusburscd by us for.mortgage
closings ar~: to be.
wire d to the follo wing acco unt:
·
Acc oun t Name:

Service Lin ~ a Division of Chicago Title·
.

insurance Co.mpany ·
Main Escrow Acc oun t

Acc oun t Add ress :

4000 Industrial Bou leva rd
Aliq uipp ~ PA 1500 l

Account Number:

4600321631

Bank Name:

PNC Ban k

Ban k Add ress :

2 PNC Plaza
620 Liberty Avenue
Pittsburgh, PA 15265

ABA Routing No:

SWIFT CODE:

041 000 124 (Must use all 9 digits)
PNC CDS 33 (for international wires only )

lr'yo u requ ire further info rma tion or have any
questions rega rdin g
these wiling instructions, please cont act our REO Con
tract Team at
714- 508- 5536
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PAl>FROM
SEU.ER'S

FUNDS AT

Rli'IOSAT
SETTlEMEHl'

SETTLEl!BIT

""• Olill.00

800. ITEMS PAYABLE: IN CONNECTION Wffil l.0,1.111

eo2. ~~~~EDIT OA !':Kil:?t.E (P01Nl$J .OR THE SFEOflC MEREST RATE
603. '(CUR AOJJSTfDO~ IG IN/IT IDN CHAAGES
804. APPRAIW FEi: TO AESPOC SY oORr,c~'l'cP. f:;'/ D.00
1806 CREDIT R,1i>ORT
806. TAX Sial ViCE
M7 FL OOOCERTIFICATION
802. APFl'!AJSA.l. MAl\!.A<;E 1111:NT T:l Ar::S POC SY 6(.'Rf«JWER: «1 lS.00

ooa. ITE ~S REOUREO BV LENDER TO Bl< PAID IN ADVANCE
ll01 . DAILY INlt'AEST OiAAOES FROM ovwno12ro \~1311:-011 ff: $37.060M:IAY lrun CFE 5 101
llm.-n l>FEJ3\
!ID?. MORTGAGF. INSUR••«-..Pf'tEMUM
6ff '" 1I
903 HO~laOWN!,R,S IN SvR,>NCE '10 /\Mf!R IGJ\111 CO~ERCE' Isis. 'POLICY 1S1

.,,m

i•:, ;IAJ.

I
I
I

<$11121:I

I
I

51 .112.lllll

I

1000. RESER'<f!S OEPOSITED 1MTH LENDER

DEPOSIT FOR ~OUR ESCROW ACCOUNT

11rOmGFE'71

i<J\NOo

l'NCE
1007 .-.r,GFI '>A E

.J " MOH

11

IN~t;,,ANtcl' TC>SEnVlc:£1.1NY.
1'.NDLEtllli::R'S>I
CLOSINGS ~EE TO ScR'JICELINK t< 25.0C
S'JP.ANCElO SERVICELINK
8 RANCE TO SERVICfalNI< r.,45_;5
OLICY LIMIT $"300 iSO.r o
LICV LIMIT ~()1 .000.00
11 C11 • ..-.0:EJ.tf'S POR"TION OF THE 1 OT Al. nn E INSIJR..,.,ce: PP.EM 11.JM
CF THETOT>l. TITLE IPJ&JRANCEPREMIUM
al'SPORTIOil
:IT
"
~~~:
_
1100
1
1\ 00 . OOC'Lf.lit:.N1 Ft:€S TO SERVICELIN!-:
1110. Wl'lE ?"EE Tl) :;·aMCErnJK
GOVERNM1=N 'RECORDING AND TRANSFER a4ARl.eS
GOVERNMEN'f RE<:OROING CHARGES

12:JO.
1201.
1202.
1203.
1204.
1205.

iR.oNSfcR ,u,-s
CIT Y/C01.JNT Y TAXl$1 AMPS. DEED: U 1~2.80 • BOAAOWEJ'l: $7 ~42 .80
$TATE TAXr.;TMPS

1300.
1301 .
1302.
13in.

ACDlllONAL SETJ1.EMENT CHARGES'
Rl:OUIREO SE"VI .r~ THl'IT YOU CAIH:lHOP FOR
OOCLMENT fl:!:TO POWER REO IWW.-.:JEMENT
"""" N"-LEESCROWPACTOflEF'JNCII\BlEEGCfcOWPAO

llmmGfF- "- I

1$fJO.OO

it SJ5 .1'1

(hm GFE ISi

ioo.oo
Cl5.00
ln.mME '71

;110.no

lti>,n 6fE f81

ll7 14 7 lill

Ol:fO: ~82.00 IIIORTOAGF:Wl.00•80f'lr.OW-cl?:$HO.O0

130l, WJJE.R INVOICE TO W(JODINVlllE V/,lTER DISTRICT

rn•.n GFES6)

I

I
~WH.•JO I
f15J .OO

I

I
$ 15.016~1

~2.ila
5 24 .1H.1!4UI

S..-.UllnkPrinled 12/30/lllllat09$11-ibt......,..
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.1. J • J L .

COMPA!IISDtl Of' GoOD ~AITH ESTlMI\T& IC 'El ANC HU0-1 ~IIRC&S
CHAR<.ES THI\T CANNOT INCREASE
t'lJl}.1 UNI! NU:.tBeR
~ 801

CUR 0111GlNA1:0N OiAAOE
YQIJR CP.1::0ll OROIAAG£ (P0111 TS)FOR THESPECIF=C
INT~REST PATE l"U.'•~N
YOIJf< PO.JJSTSO OR &N/1,J IJN C:➔ARGES

l RMIE:FEll T;,Jt.f.S

~

6()2

'

-1-54-6015

4

t.000 FA\"rn &STIMA To

HU0-1

"Ul.·11.::io

.s4. ,2'.:a

.... ,

; <:.BO

f0.00

aon

14.:;!l"IMI

S4:M"T.51')

I 120~

H .214.~0

571~2.f:0

TIN TOTAL CANNOT INCRcASE l\lORE THAH10%
P.ECOROING Ct-W<GEc
• tl01

rs rm.i:: 1uSUR.ANce

p.5

.,,

HUD-t

110.00

1101

1611.:!6
:, 0.00
11'5.re
'::J,...l l

.t,.:Ti.l:J.\:i:: ££rn;,;~;1 t;=t ..u w
CHARGES Tl1A T GAN CHANGE
1'11TIAI. DePOSl"1 FOR voun ES.'(";IOW l>CCOUttr

D,I\ILY INTERfS1 Cl!mGEl'
HOIVC:QI/\INEl<'S INSl/AAMCE

Huc,.1

~3tff:5~,

CHl.qc.:;;_E
HUD-1

I 100,
f 001

LOAN TERNS

YO•JR INITl/ll. LOM M4OUIH IS
VOUF'< LOAN !ERM IS
I YOUR INITIAL INTEREST RATE IS

YQIJR IIJITW. MONl'HL Y AMOIJNI OWED FOR PP.1Nc.1PAL.
INTER'ES:T . P.NO>NY MOnTGAGE INSUP..ANCc. G

CAN YOUR 11-.'TEREST f<ATE RIZ€7

$300,750.00
30~

4.50000,W,
$'1 ,52~.ll6 ln<Jud•~

~

Pr1n<'lpOI

11

ln!"""1

r

Mo;fgdG&- !nsu"fln<x~

61. No. L. Ye~. tt cm Me lo r, ;nsxi:n um of __¼ . Tt,., fin;J chan,g:,
nil! b2 on _j_ l _ i;r"' can dlong, eosin <iva;y __ _ _
sflar _J_i_
. E\l&f\l C.00no1rdate. ycur:.1,ursst r:;tac;.:, Lr.ciUsec,rd-.em&!.61
by_%-. Over UM lihr of1,,m. ),v.,ur 4nterO!Sli6':6-1s EJJW"•:mtee~ to nevc-r b9 low•r
!hMl _ ~ t:.fhigl'leirlttan_'NJ.

E.\JEIJ IF VOU WJ<g PA'iMEllrSC,N Tll>.IE , 0/i '{OUR LOAN
6Al-'INC~ RISe?

~

No.

I,

'(es. It~ tl"IR io v rne:ii-m,wn <if$_ _ _ _.

EVEN IF YOU MAl<C P'A~MeNlS 0'1 Tl/\af . O\N YOUR MONTHLY
!11..«lU:-tT (!WED FOR Pfl lNC!>AI.. IN'TEREST.>liDMORTGAGE

~

No.

r:

Yu:. the ~

lJ.lSUAA~C't: RISE:7

(l'!'lUJnt ow, dcenrisf,k, $,_ _ _ Tho~lmum it ein l.'<Wl rri~c,

to s

r

oo;,:; 'rOllR LWl'I HAV<.AfficFA'IMENT PINI\!. TY?

w,

No.

002$ YOUR LO>N HAVE AEW.LOON F-AVMENT?

R

Hc.,.r

'Rt($

fO TAl MONnt. Y1'.\IOl..tlT C,Wl;i) iNC~UDIIIG ESCROW
PCCOIJNT PJl..'!Ma,sJS

r

01"1:

Y'XI

f

Yos,

y""•

incrna&.:> emt.aon _1_1___ andthG-,-.1e1:itiliv

'l'Otrrr'lelQl1\1J!TI

p,wa}'mG11t ;;D.ldtyls $ _ _ _•

::::::_::_r.Jooo

P8','fflOl'll

o1

t,_ _ _ <ll•

I

ct,., Ml Nft'f: ~ tnU111hftti$t:R>W t,~yrn6M f~ liUt~,

SUC11 ,U. i)l\l~trty

!mt-es tmdhomeowm:r't1 irlsur«:r.o. ·,o~rn,st psyth&6e 1'efll!: dln:d 1yy,x;,soll.

~ '(011 hcvo lln zdi:ttionfA monUfy esao\:i' PJJi~~t of $&15.87
thatrJJs tit~ln a101;;1 lritfil m,,,,Ny miou,1 owad 01 i2.169.n. lhis.1nt1u<'.es
Jl"i~f. irterwtst. envmortswga insuraru and~:ir~i.Gtn!. ,,hcu:ktid be:o\..,_

l'3,

>'l'Ollllfl'll""'OS

r.i!

Home1JWnair, i,--.swancc.

r::

F l¼O lr\;it,mJnr,e

[1

----

r --Note: If you hBYo ony qu&S!ions 6lloul th,~ SGlthmv...ntGt;ergws M'1 Loar. Terms li!itttd on ltns bm. plc,esa cnrieitt

Senc:elhk Prnlro 12/.l0/20ll otOll:515 !Mby"""""

r, ---'J()A.K

Cen;je:.

H.C ,l
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EXHIBIT KS-A

OPERA TING PROCEDURES MANUAL

General Wire Transfer R
Renton Main

Branch Name:
D~te
Reo::ivcd:

01/03/12

{425) 227-4710

Phone:

Time
Received:

12:35

Signature of person nccepting instructions:

ANNIE C PORCELLO

Account Titie;

ID# I

Exp:

PORCEAC712KW/ 05/16/2013

Domestic

0

lnlemalional - Select Currency and Amoonl B•low

Amo•nt of Wire:

Does the customer want to convert funds 10 the local currency of the bendliciary
prior to sending wire now'?

ESCROW

Purpose of Wire:

Type of

Relationship to Beneficiary:

Business

□ Yes

'Debiting ACCOlUl! # :

153500661571

Amount ofWi,-,,;
The amount ref;e<:ts:

•lf detitins lbe JNPOC, provide: a rc:asan and DOIC :he C\ISIOmcr·a co oc JOiU'I 11-CctiUnt

number. ODI)' mani.&cmtnl may itutUl1e wires &om the JNPOC.

Name & Address:

ABNSwia:

Currency: ____

smvtee llNK. A DaVIS.ICN Of CMICAGO TITLE 4000 Wu&trlal Boo!■wrd AIQurppa. PA 1500'1

041000124

Further Credi< To/Reference Info:

s 93,394.49

0

D No

Does the bcncficio,y have n USO

account1

0

Yts

O No

D U.S. Dollar O Foreign Curre,,cy

ACCOUfl(

#:

4600321631

PNC BANK, Pittsburgh, PA 15265

Bank,City, Sta11eorCouney:

SERVICE LINK ESCROW ff. 2724303/ PORCELLO, ANN C. & ANTHONY J.

Cuslonte,. Auttio rit.11Cio11: Customer aeScn~wtcdges. \rt~ is a 105s neS11lting; liom i~orrc~• infonm1tion provided by the cu:.tarner, U.S. Bnuk sha,H nol bo liable for any damages.
Addlti01t:il fees may be deducted. rcQQl 1hi: tr~fcc .,nouDt by othet fin&.ntinl institution$ involved In the p:wment process. Custo1™!r v.ckuowlcdgo. Ille applic,iblc fu11ds. :tnrufcr is subject to
lhe rules )Ct fonh ia the Bank's Ym,r /')16po~il 1h;co-un1 A8nJement. Ji,.b tr.tnuctiOM nra subject to pouiblt lim\ttrioni undtt' f~denl IRW .a:id fegulllhon, including possillle restricrions under
the rula issued by the L:.S . Trcas1uy•s Offke ttfForcigR A$ttts ContJol. Foi la1ern1'1io1U1l wire ir.un!en. th~ transfc, may be m.Ue in the oppliatible fon:tin c:urreney, Jn such ~ues, U.S.
Bank orirs de-signet m£y c,on\lert the a.mour1t to ttc tr:aMf'em:d from \J.S.. dolhws IO 11!:c i))etifiedcutreaty at U.S. Daak"s., 01 in Cc:signc:e'1, applicabJera~in c.tToet wh4,;n c:\c ltZ"1$t!Clion ls
proces,cd U. S. Bank provides this t.L"t to the: ,eustomer upon roquest. If customer ,oooses nGi to convert to tocaJ currency at this time. ft still may be converted i.t ,ome poinl io the
processing c!'.ain. By si@Ding below. cuSlomer •s~o:s to chc ccmu oft
u oriulion. and reprtsents tl'8l customer ls: au1borizcd to initiite Ibis wire tnnSfer.

Future dated wire (initinls req ' d):

Costo11ier Siiinatur

Date lo b.: sent:

Th.: account ha., been reviewed fnr the following, □ Reslrnints

O

Coll~ted balan:e

O Aceesslbk balor,ce suffici~nl for wire (scroon print atlacllt:d)

Employee Calling in Wi:-c (signature}:
Wire Transfer Operator Name:

Time:

hymen: Reference Number;
• OPERATOR-ASSISTr:D WIRES OVER $50,000: /i1111udlartly after inilialinc th~ wire h-..nsfcr. fax ahis completed ~orm to Rcmil Risk Management at 866977-1006.

.

.

.

•

Reviewer's Si~tarc:

Dau::

Nemc & T ill$;

Time:

R.eqU(lU vi;:, tdepbonc. fcx. er email m1y ODl)'" be accepted from bUlk cas.tomtra. You 01ust doc,.rnent how lh.f t11.9tomcr·s identify omd nurhority is nri!ied {t.g-.. customer•s ,·o1ce Is
recognip-;d byspocific c.oawrsfltion dc1aili 1 custom.:r it. ~1111: to provide 1ix,;ci6(; a:co•Jnt <kiatils, dolllrnmount of 1pccific ehect.. et~.) ...Known Customer.. is not icccp(ab[e. 7he callbacl
rausl be vufonucd by someone otbctthan .me employee ni::ciernlng We win: inticru;.."tiwn u1J uu,1;1fx appro ved by branch 1nnnngancm prior l<:1 wfo: ini,iAri~.

How customer identified:

D3Leffime:

Collbnck prior 10 wire initiation completed by:

Co nfinned with:

llranch Manaecmcnt Approval- Req1tln...t:
I 2.'201 I

U.S. Bank !n1cmal

Retention: 5 yCJ1Js
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I
SP1CIAIJL IMITED WARRANT Y DEED

This instrument prepared by:
Jay A. Rosenberg, Esq., Ros berg LP A, Attorneys At Law, 7367A E. Kemper Road,
Cincinnati, Ohio 45249 (513) 47-9605 Fax: (866) 611-0170 and Vic J. Devlaem-inck Esq.,
Attorney At Law, Washingto State Bar Number; 16608.
After Recordin Return To:
ANN PORCELLO and AN HONY J. PORCELL O
20124186th PLACE NEW ODINVILLE WA 98077
Commitmen t Number: 27243

SelJer's Loan Number: 003054 067
'

ASsEssoR PARCEL IDEN-hvlc A TIONNUM n:ER!

9359300210

. ABBREVIATED LEGAL

r--

Lot 21 White Oaks
J

•

DEUTSCH E BANK NATIO~AL TRUST COMPANY . AS INDENTUR E.TRUSTE E FOR
AMERICAN HOME MORT~AG E INVESTMENT TRUST 2005-2, whose mailing address
is 4600 Regent Blvd., Ste. 20;,~ Irving, TX 75063, hereinafter grantor, for $401,000.00 (Four
Hwidred and One Thousand ;Dollars and no Cents) in lonsideratio n pflid, GRANTS and
CONVEYS with covenants of limited warranty to ANN PORCELL O and ANTHONY J.
PORCELLO, HUSBAND AND WIFE, hereinafter grantees, whose tax mailing address is
10124 186th PL4,CE ~ WOtD!NVILLE _\YA _98~77, ~e following real property:
·
lfl
. !
l,... .

I·

\
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LEGAL DESCRIPTlO

p,8

i

LOT(S)2l, WHITE OAKS,

CCORDING TO THE PLAT THERE.OF Rt1cORDED
IN
• P.AGE(S) 13 THROUGH 27, IN ·KING COUN
TI.1,

VOW ME 137 OF PLA

WASHINGTON
Assesson Parcel Number. 93 9300210

I!

Property Address iii:-20124 l~th PLAC E NE WOO
DINV ILLE WA 98077 .

I

Seller make s no represeli1;ations or warraoti~s. of
any kind or nature wi~tsoever, other
than tho$i: ~-vul'tlo'oVt:;-whe'l er cxprersed, unplic
d, implied-by:·1aw,·or"ollierwisc, concerning· ...
the condition of the tiltc of the roperty prior to the
date the 11c1lcr iwquired title. I
The real prope ny descri ed above is conveyed subje
ct to flu~ following: All easements,
coven an~, conditions and rei,,~ !ions of record; All
legal highways; Zoning, building and other
laws, ordm1111ccs and regul ~~or; Resl estate taxes
and as~essments not yet du<: and payable;
Ri~l1t1, ul' tcrnmts in possessJon.

TOl
1

•

i

TO HAVE AND
LO the same togt;ther with all and singu lar the appur
tenances
thereunto belonging or in rm
e appcmiitring, and all the estate., right. title interest,
lien equity
and claim whatsoever of the .sa· · grantor. 1:illler in
law er equity, to the only proper use, benefit
and behal f of the grantees fore r.
I

Prior instrumcnl reference: lOJ 1~180QC)991

I
I

-

-··•·.. -·-·
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1111
1111
1111
1111
201201050(~0482

SPL. EXPRESS IN IJD

flS.1110

PRGE-eJ01 OF 004

01/05/201 2 12:33

KDIG COUNTY , UR

Return Address :
ANN PORCELLO and ANT ONY J. PORCELLO

20124 186th PLACE NEW

OINVILLE WA 98077

·· ·· •·

__

,_

__.._ _

-· .

---------- -- -

· ·'.-E 2525 45r
e11es,201 2 22;33
IC:INC COIJNTY , UA

s~e;

1'·442 50

•
$4 l, 08.00

Docum ent Title( s)-- ·- -·-

·-

PAGG'.-801 OF

····-- -

---· - ··--

-·

~ PECIAL/L IMITED WARRA,NTY DEED @
Referenc e l · umber(s ) of Docume nts assigned or released:

Graofo r(s)
»:&VTS<:;HE BANKNA1 IONAL TRUST COMPANY, AS INDENTURE TRUSTEE li'OR
AMERIC AN EIOME MORTGA GE INVESTM ENT TRUST 2005-1.

C·

Grante e(s)

ANrlPOR CELLO and ANTHON Y J . PORCEL LO, HUSBAN D AND WIFE
. ..
. Legal Descriptfo 1i'(ab6reviatec1:· i~e. lot;'bJocJc. plat orsectiori, township, range) , · .

!
;

Lot 21 White Oaks
d<irer (11\i•\\1, wi-\
Assesso r's !Proper ty Tax Parcel/ Accoun t Numbe r

9359300210
The Auditor/Recorder will rely< n the Informatio n prc,vidcd on the form. The sraffwlll not read !he
document to verify the accuracy l>r completen ess of the indexing infonnation provided herein .
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Executed by the undersigned n \ 2

p,10

- '1'20-.. 2011:
:;
i

I

ANY, AS INDE NTUR E

~

I

t- ;

GAGE INVESTMENT TRUS T 2005I

.

BJ:: .:,·~= ~ -.l.~----. --· ·1 ·
Its:

I

---------

STAT E OF
COUN TY or- -¥,"'6 ,-I~.. ,.__~ -

The foregoing instrument

· s acknowledg~d .hefo~ me
~ - - - - • 2011 by
its
AS8l8tlnt ~
on
behalf o DEUTSCHE
BANK NATI ONAL TRUS T. OMPA NY, A$ INDE NTUR
E TRUS TElt FOR AMER ICAN ·
HOM E MOR TGAG E INVE TMENT TRUST 2005-2, who
ig personall lcno to Rl1' or b.113
produced
a identification, !ind furthermore, e aforementioned
per.son has
acknowledged th'at his/her sign ture was his/her:free and volunt
ary act for the pm xises set forth
in this insttumenL

.leontfec GSJ11

J:i / If

!

./

__

Ir.~-

: Notary Public .

.·

.

--

:.

.,--.

tLrT/(57· ~

:

. . - - :·1

-~-~~1~-=~T"7.
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CCOUNT-NUMBER

135930-0210-08

29652 A

,., _..,-454-6015

--

HUl"'l::H I Y I AX

111

CURfiEl','T l~X OCS[flBIJTIOr-1
Skb, .. . .... : . , ..... ...

l.ocru Sch>ol S<,ppoit, •. , .

!!!!!!!!!!!I!!!

Counl)I ... ... ... . ... .. ,

Cay. ... . .. . ..... . .... .
Unnoo,pon,100/Road .. .. .
· POii .. ..... . . . . . . .. . . .
Finl .. . . : .... . .. . . . ..

HQOl>IW. , .. . . .. . . . .. . .

Land Vakle..... . ...... ..
lmpKrVements . . • . • • . • . • .

1,017.00
105.42
452.00

levy Ratti....... . ... ..

F1ocxt Control, .. . . .. " ••

PORCE LLO ANN+ANTHONV J
1817 JONES AVE NE
RENTO N WA
98056

FIRE FEE

VOTERAPPROV'ED

294.42

KINGCD

NOXWEED

~

2.25
151.00

SWM

5.18

INTERJ;ST
PEMIILTY

FULLAMOUNTMAYSE
PAID APRIL 30th

·

PRINCIPAL

OELIHCUE'Nr TOTAL

E

6,.974-.71
2013 REAL ESTAT E TAX

DaJICQUEl (l' l'AYMENT& REQ;JVEI) YlffllOlST
lmatl::ST NCI PllNAL'IT WILL BE RETIJIINED.
VIEW AMOUNT DUE AT Alff 11IIE VISff

ttp://www.kiingco·unty.g ov/prop artytax

ro

half payment musr be paid or poslmarl<ad i,y OclolNlr 31st

)

2,827.9:

I tm .haU paid by Apll! 30
""""'1d hal niust be palll t,y October
91 or ~ becarla dolnq.>ont and
accl\lGS inlerMt and penalty

.

( 935930 -0210- 08

452.8

\~974;7

•OTHER CHARGES:

.

PflOPERl Y TAX ACCOUNT NUMBER

6,521'.8

VWW.C/lorgo.s.. .. . .. .. .
TOTAl CURRBII' Bil.UNG :,~-,~ -•· • . ·.,
Omitted Tams. , ... .. . . ..

Fillthall muslbo paid or po,stmert<ed
by April :)(), OT
AIU. AMOUNT
!IECOMe:1 llEUHalll!NT' ard #)CIU8S
/m,11151 -,I penel!y U - - by
law.

A.IL WITH 2ND HALF PAYM ENT

452,Q(

14.428€

GonetalTax. ... .. ... ... .

256.48
7.36
135.60
1.71
59.71

.

'148,0(
304,0C

l..e$:i: El<empl VOlu&.•• • •• •
TAXA!llE VALU E . . • • . . . •

234.56

Emergency Ued Svc• . , ••
Feny . .. . . .. , .. . .... ..

nr,v ''<J

CUAAEtIT BlllJNG IN~ORIMTIO'I

1,160.37
2,395.33
696.32

L\bnuy.. . .. . ..... . .. ..
Other. .... . . .. .. ... , . •

ING THIS STATEM ENT WHEN PAYING IN PERSON

PROPE RTY AODRES~?()124186THPL

p.11

MMOVU - OUUt-UU HIHAVI:: SEATTlE WA98104 -2340

wwwJdnACvll .... ffO'UP'Pl'!'!YI

es de•r,quont and accrues annual inte~ 1111d penally

*
NAME

3,487.35

:ffl
~~t:;~? ~

NEW MAILING ADOOr:SS

HALF AMOUNT

CITY/STATE/ZIP

PORCELLO ANN+ANTHONY J
1817 JONES AVE NE

RENTON WA

98056

PAY T HIS . . . .
AMOUN7 .....

DUE OCTOBER 31

$3,487.35

□ aaaaooo□ n □oooaaoaa□ aoaooaotioooaoaoooaaoo □ oaooo

ooaaaaooo93s930021a □ ea□ a348735 □ 2

UL WITH 1 ST HALF PAYM ENT
( 935930-0210-08

)

2013 REAL ESTAT E TAX

://wwwJdngcounty..gov/propertytu

PROPERTY TAX ACCOUNT NUMBER
i=Jrvt half p
altur this

ment mu:st be pald or poetmarked by AfNII 30th. Palffl9nl
will accrue dellnquent dta,ges ba$tel en lhe lull year amount.

PENALTY

COMPLl!TJ! ONLY IF MAILING ADOAESS AAS CtlANt.i.D

Ol!I.JN(IUB '" PI\VME!flll RECB\'eO WlllfOln
INTIIRl:ST AND Pl!NIILlY W11.L 1111 RETUIINED.
T'O VIEW AIIOUN1' DUE AT ANY 11UE 111!:r'I'

\INIW.l dnfe:ow !!Y.~

[SEI!. REVERSE)

PRINCIPAL AMO\,ffl

f'.'.' ·}\ ef't\

NAME

NEW MAILING ADDRESS

3,487.36

CITVJSTA n,aip

PORCELLO ANN+ANTHONY J

1817 JONES AVE NE

RENTON WA

202208

98056

P/\Y7HIS . . . .

AMOUNT . . . .

□ a □ oo □ o □□ ooa □ ooaaaa □ o □ oooaa □ ~o □ ooao □ a □

DUE APRIL30

$3,487.36

ooo □ o □ oa □□ oo □ aa □ oa935930021a □ e.aoa34813b

□□
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EXHIBIT C
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Relvrtl Mail Oi16ralkm,:
PO Bo~ ·1-1411
O.,s Mo/r,es, IA 50300<14 f I

St.o.tement date

0'//0 9/l3
0409 80-4, ,!l

l.oa!l r.umb er

Prop erty addre:so
2012~ 186T H l>L NE
WOO DlNV lLLE WA !}807 7

kt

Cus tom er Ser vice

, ... 11I

1AT

'/8'/

1'el
1-800 -2\

l-86i;- 278-1 179

1... m,1,,,,s,1 rl:.,i., 11 11•1' J.•1° 1•111·n 1•i 1•1 1n1•1m1

~rr_e~·ponde-nce

Ho~irs o:

PO ilc.x.- 10335

064441054444f006444 0166 1 AGQ
G86 936

M«i- .F~
Sat 80.m

·Dr<s Molr.oc;.IA 5030 6

ANN C ?OR CE.L O
ANT HON Y J POR CEU .O
181i ' JON E:SA \1E NE
REN TON , WA 93056-2663

--,:J[l~~,;;;,;;n:rn
PO :i!0>< 51965 ·
Los

t>w-obnc,

Ar.gc)e; CA 9005 1_

!·8€6-E:6;

Iirip\'.irtaii.t irti!'.iisages

Sum mar y
· ·1pa j
F ayme Ttt (p rJ:'.lc
ano,,' /

•
_o, _
mter
r
e_st)

'I otal puym e:l\t due, 013/ 01/1 3

R:ea dfic

.
"''5,?.3.8'',

,,_..
•
---------·

$1,5 23.8 6

Uupa id priJ:i,,;,,aJ 1,ala

-·,

e

.

buy;,;,,.;_,. rtexi_h,om~

..

i-··
~ - We'reheretohelpyou
lUl&~~i.nd.;

(C'onr ,,•tCu ,,,,,.,,5 .,..-1,. .1, _ro,rpy
'cJT

lntu1 1it nlillO
Jnu,r not po;d .1...-r• to•,la e

1) ,

w..ll•fat1

~Fa x

-. $269, 185.0 9

·.•

4.soo:;;
S7,&i4.61

fina:n
, _: · cin,g
'! · op~i
· ,·.,oiis,s
-~-, ••oy<i
·. u~n niali:e
· ·. ·

. ·.. ··· b
i-.'1ancin_g:uec1s1on:;. 1·eani
II I
·•• ciow npa~ en• pro-g-i-ams, Einanc[rig-

....

..._ DOUllf

-·,ho'>'r·we ciu:.'-ne)pUl,\ike:l:iuyiitg .:irour:
. rewardi~g experience:Call H!Ei6,4:

·by }'Dilr focal biani:h, qr v:ish

well
irtargo.co
home: Meatio:
l)MR'JABi . .'il/n~
.
. .

---·--~--------------,--_.,,_____,.,.________
Act ivit y sinc e you r last stat eme

0.1 te

D,,seriptio-n

~~ l'"" "''
(ll/09

Pl:incipal po.:,ment

Total
$1.523.86
$7.S."14

.

to,l,uy--;;,,~

Rllillay
nexdiomei
: •i--f'e'.re:heretohd.pyo~understa11_dy,
-~cing-'.0ptfon,-,5e·yqi,..i,anmikl! i:

nt

Principal

$437. 49
$76.1 4

$1.086.3'7

'hcmifinillicingdecisi0ns:.Leam aho
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EXHIBIT D

Page 77

Sound l.:amlDevelopment, Inc dba JC Enterprises Construction

14~91S0ih Ave. NE. BeUevue; WA 9.8005
425.~643~7986

T & M SUMMARY INVOICE #
RECORD RANGE: 693015 - 716740
PORCELLO, ANN
20124 -186TH PL NE
WOODINVILLE, WA 98077

DATE OF ISSUE:
INVOICE#:

JOB# 3442 - PORCELLO J_M-MAINT 11-11

DESCRIPTION OF RESOURCE TYPE
MATERIALS
LABOR
EQUIPMENT ANO RENTALS
SUBCONTRACTOR
OTHER RESOURCES

$
$
$
$
$

2,128.91
15,541.42
242.73
5,258.75
2,698.18

10.0%

SUBTOTAL - ALL RESOURCE TYPES
GENERAL OVERHEAD

$
$

25,869.99
2,587.31

10.0%

SUBTOTAL
CONTRACTOR'S FEE

$
$

28,457.30
2,845.78

0.47%

PERIOD SUBTOTAL
WA STATE B&O TAX

$
$

31,303.08
147.24

SUBTOTAL
WA STATE SALES TAX

$

$

31,450.32
2,987.78

INVOICE TOTAL

$

34,438.10

9.5%

8/6/2013

SUBTOTALS

Page4
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J

JC Enterprises Construction Services,

L:L.c.

Materials, Supplies, and Fixtures Breakdown
RECORD RANGE: 699456 - 716740

JOB# 3442 - PORCELLO J_M-MAINT 11-11

REC#

DES CRIPTION

NOTES

AMOUNT

INVENTORY FROM STOCK

699456 ROT FIX.BUILDING PAPER
706571 PLYWOOD,DRYWALL,3/4" WALNUT

J/E MAT'L 01-13 01/13/12
J/E MAT'L 03-27 03/27/12

82.00
28 .11

Billing Total for INVENTORY FROM STOCK:

110.11

21145979
21146037

427.79
250.27

BETTER BATH & KITCHEN

703630 TOILET
703627 TOILET, SEAT

02/08/12
02/14/12

Billing Total for BETTER BATH & KITCHEN:

678.06

DUNN LUMBER COMPANY

701246
701256
702039
703628

SIDING
CDX, PLASTERBOARD
SPLIT DRIVE ANCHORS
DOOR HARDWARE.TRAP ADPTR

1025280
1031136
1033422
1062361

01/06/12
01/11/12
01/13/12
02/08/12

Billing Total for DUNN LUMBER COMPANY:

35.28
27.76
6.84
35,76
105.64

FERGUSON ENTERPRISES, INC. #3007

702088

Bl-VALVE

2250965

01/31 /12

Billing Total for FERGUSON ENTERPRISES, INC. #3007:

28.01
28.01

NORTH COAST ELECTRIC COMPANY

715747 PVC COND&FTTNGS,CEMENT,STRAPS

S4608026.001

06/19/12

Billing Total for NORTH COAST ELECTRIC COMPANY:
8/6/2013

122.52
122.52
Page 1
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::..1

JOB# 3442 • PORCELLO J_M-MAINT 11-11

REC#

DESCRIPTION

TRANS#

DATE

53435

02/08/12

NOTES

AMOUNT

EASTS/DE HEATING & AIR COND.

703626 3/4 ROD

Billing Total for EASTS/DE HEATING & AIR COND.:

13.00
13.00

HOME DEPOT

705254
705255
705256
705259
703629

SHKBT ADP,PIPE,TAPE,SHINGLES
PVC CEMENT & PLUG
PRIMER.FITTINGS
SHOVEL.VALVE BOX.PVC CPLG
P-TRAPS,SHTG,SUPPLY LINES,PIPE

7101701
9570059
9570079
8590769
13541

01/23/12
01/31/12
01/31/12
02/01/12
02/09/12

Billing Total for HOME DEPOT:

82.84
4.24
10.76
26.70
58.45
182.99

LOWES CONSUMER/P ROJECT ACCOUNTS

702778
702782
702786
705799
702914
715760
716740

WALLBOARD,OSB,2x4'S,SIDING,MUD
2x4'S,SCREWS,TUBE CAP,MUD,TAPE
ADHESIVE,2x8'S ,CRNR BEAD
ANGLE VALVE,FITTINGS
TOILET FILL VALVE
PVC CONDUIT
WIRE, FISHTAPE

02046
02593
02963
02656
02972
02541
02951

01/05/12
01/09/12
01/11/12
01/31/12
02/02/12
06/20/12
06/22/12

Billing Total for LOWES CONSUMER/P ROJECT ACCOUNTS:

50.12
128.72
14.77
38.28
7.11
3.72

181.45
424.17

PMG MECHANICAL , INC.

700561

INDUCER ASSY,FILTER

56228

01/05/12

Billing Total for PMG MECHANICAL , INC.:

430.15
430.15

PACIFIC PLUMBING SUPPLY CO LLC

705102 WAX RINGS,CONN ,ANGLE STOP.NUTS

02222248

02/08/12

Billing Total for PACIFIC PLUMBING SUPPLY CO LLC:
Billing Total for: Material

34.26
34.26
2,128.91

Page2
8/6/2013

Page 80

8/6/2013

Page 3

Page 81

PORCELLO J_M-MAINT 11-11 LABOR SUMMARY T&M #
RATE

TOTAL

2.50
2.50

69.96

174 . 90
174.90

2.25
2.25

69.96

157.41
157.41

0.75
0.75

69.96

52.47
52.47

AYERS, MATT

6.75

69.96

472 .23

ELLIS.KERRY

15.50

68.96

1,068 .88

RICHARDS, DAVID

1.25
23.50

58.96

73 .70
1,614.81

AYERS, MATT

11 .00

69.96

769 .56

ELLIS, KERRY

38.00

68.96

2,620.48

RICHARDS, DAVID

2.50
51 .50

49 .96

124.90
3,514.94

1.00
1.00

69.96

69.96
69.96

LABOR

HOURS

10/30/2011 - 11/5/2011
AYERS, MATT

11/6/2011 -11/12/2011
AYERS, MATT

1.2/11/2011 - 12/17/2011
AYERS, MATT

1/1/2012 - 1/7/2012

1/8/2012 - 1/14/2012

1/15/2012 - 1/21/2012
AYERS , MATT

8/6/2013

Page 1

Page 82

LABOR

HOURS

, RATE

TOTAL

1/22/2012 - 1/28/2012
AYERS, MATT

4.50

69.96

314.82

ELL,IS, KERRY

24.00
28 .50

68.96

1,655.04
1,969.86

AYERS, MATT

2.75

69.96

192.39

ELLIS, KERRY

32.50

68.96

2,241.20

HARDING, JAKE

14.00
49 .25

39.96

559.44
2,993.03

1.00

69.96

69.96

1/29/2012 - 2/4/2012

2/5/2012 - 2/11/2012
AYERS, MATT

0.50

69.96

34.98

ELLIS, KERRY

35.50

68.96

2,448.08

HARDING, JAKE

4.00
41 .00

39.96

159.84
2,712.86

6.50
6.50

68.96

448.24
448.24

1.25
1.25

69.96

87.45
87.45

1.25
1.25

69.96

87.45
87.45

1.00
1.00

69.96

69.96
69.96

CRONIN, BRENDAN

2/12/2012 - 2/18/2012
ELLIS, KERRY

3/11/2012 - 3/17/2012
AYERS, MATT

3/18/2012 - 3/24/2012
AYERS , MATT

3/25/2012 - 3/31/2012
AYERS, MATT

4/1/2012 - 4/7/2012
8/6/2013
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RATE

TOTAL

4.00
4.00

68 .96

275.84
275 .84

1.75
1.75

69.96

122.43
122.43

0.25
0.25

69.96

17.49
17.49

ELLIS, KERRY

17.00

68 .96

1,172.32

HURTT, NICHOLAS

0.00
17.00

0.00

0.00
1,172.32

LABOR
ELLIS , KERRY

HOURS

4/8/2012 - 4/14/2012
AYERS , MATT

4/15/2012- 4/21/2012
AYERS, MATT

6/17/2012 - 6/23/2012

233.25

8/6/2013

15,541.42

Page 3
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I JC Enterprises Construction Services, L.L.C.
Labor Breakdown
RECORD RANGE: 693015 - 715328

JOB# 3442 - PORCELLO J_M-MAINT 11-11

REC#

DESCRIPTION

TRANS#

DATE

813

11/03/11

HOURS

MATT AYERS

693015 PS IS IS/PLANNING/COORDINATION

693016

EEEW EXT WINDOWS & GLAZING

813

11/03/11

693019

PSIS IS/PLANNING/COORDINATION

813

11/04/11

693020

EEGD GUTTER/DOWNSPOU TS

813

11/04/11

827

11/07/11

827

11/08/11

693720 EERV ROOFNNTS/SEALED DECKS

827

11/09/11

697193 PSIS IS/PLANNING/COORDINATION

920

12/14/11

699033 MUHD HEATNG/DUCTNG/FURNC/A.C.

22

01/05/12

699034 DCTD TEAROUT/DEMOLIT/DISMANTL
699035 EERV ROOFNNTS/SEALED DECKS

22
22

01/05/12
01/05/12

22

01/05/12

699037 EEGD GUTTER/DOWNSPOU TS
699046 SCFW FRAMING/ WOOD L&M
699047 EEST SIDING/TRIM/FASCIA/SOFFIT

22
22
22

01/05/12
01/06/12
01/06/12

699048 EESR SKYLIGHT & ROOF WINDOWS

22

01/06/12

699049 EERV ROOFNNTS/SEALED DECKS

22

01/06/12

693689 PSPA PERMITS/APPROVALS/SAFETY
693708

699036

8/6/2013

PSIS IS/PLANNING/COORDINATION

PSIS IS/PLANNING/COORDINATION

CONTACTED GUTTER SUB REGARDING BID. CONTACTED SEPTIC
COMPANY AND SCHEDULED INSPECTION. RESEARCHED AS BUILT
ACCESS.
CONTACTED SUPPLIERS AND VENDORS. REVIEWED ESTIMATES AND
PRICING FORCARL.
(PORCELLO-HOUSE JCBD??) CONTACTED CLIENT AND REVIEWED
PARTICULARS NEEDED FOR SEPTIC APPROVAL. SCHEDULE.
(PORCELLO-HOUSE JCBD??) CONTACTED GUTTER SUB AND
DISCUSSED ESTIMATE.
COMMUNICATED WITH CLIENT/ DROVE TO COUNTY OFFICE/ APPLIED
FOR ND PICK UP AS-BUILT/ SCANNED AND E-MAILED TO CLIENT
CONTACTED CLIENT AND SEPTIC SUB REGARDING MEETING TIME/
CARPET SUB/ GUTTER SUB RE BID/
CONTACTED CLIENT AND GUTTER SUB COMMUNICATED PRICING TO
CLIENT
CONTACTED CLIENT ABOUT SCHEDULE FOR WORK AND TIMING OF
GLASS WORK/ CONTACTED BIDDERS
CONTACTED BRENT. ISSUED PURCHASE ORDER FOR PMG TO
SERVICE/REPAIR FURNACE.
REVIEWED SCOPE OF REPAIRS WITH KERRY AND CARL. SCHEDULE.
CONTACTED ROOFERS. SCHEDULED BIDS ON SITE. DIRECTED ON
LOCATIONS OF LEAKS. OPTIONS FOR ROOFING REPAIR. REPLACEMENT
BIDS .
CALLED/SCHEDULED SEWER INSPECTION. FORWARDED
DOCUMENTS/SITE PLAN.
CONTACTED GUTTER SUB. DIRECTED ON BID DETAILS.
GATHERED MATERIALS. REVIEWED SCOPE OF ROT REPAIR. GIT ROT.
ORDERED SIDING AND MATERIALS. ASSISTED AND DIRECTED DAVE ON
DELIVERY TO SITE.
REVJEWED DIMENSIONS AND DETAILS WITH KERRY. CONTACTED
CRYSTALITE ABOUT SCHEDULE FOR SERVICE/REPAIR.
CONTACTED ROOFER. REVIEWED DETAILS OF ESTIMATE FOR REPAIRS
VS. REPLACEMENT.

1.00

0.75
0.50
0.25
1.25
0.50
0.50
0.75
0.75
0.50
1.00

0.75
0.50
0.50
0.75
0.50
1.00
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JOB '# 3442 - PORCELLO J_M-MAINT 11-11

.

TRANS#

DATE

699050 DCDH DUMPSTR/HAULING DEBRIS
699643 PSIS IS/PLANNING/COORDINATION

22
41

699644 EERV ROOFNNTS/SEALED DECKS
699645 DCTD TEAROUT/DEMOLIT/DISMANTL

41
41

699646

SCFW FRAMING/ WOOD L&M

41

699658

SCFW FRAMING/ WOOD L&M

41

699659 MUPR PLUMB ROUGH-N/FIRE SPRINK

41

699660 SFPV PLUMBINGNALVES/FIXTURES
699661 EERV ROOFNNTS/SEALED DECKS
699662 DCDH DUMPSTR/HAULING DEBRIS

41
41
41

699672 MUPR PLUMB ROUGH-N/FIRE SPRINK

41

01/06/12 CALLED AND DIRECTED BOOKER ON LOAD OUT/ACCESS.
01/09/12 CONTACTED SEPTIC SUB. CONFIRMED SCHEDULE. INSPECTION. KERRY
TO PROVIDE ASSISTANCE.
01/09/12 CONTACTED CSR/ A-ROOFING AND SET UP ADDITIONAL REPAIR ITEMS.
01/09/12 DISCUSSED SCOPE OF WORK, REVIEWED PLAN, AND DIRECTED
KERRY.
01/09/12 DISCUSSED MATERIALS AND TOOLS NEEDED FOR WORK ON SITE.
DIRECTED DAVE ON DELIVERY.
01/10/12 REVIEWED CHANGES/ ADDITIONAL FRAMING FOR SHOWER/ TILE SUB/
MATERIALS AND DIRECTED KERRY.
01/10/12 DISCUSSED SCOPE OF WORK WITH CLIENT. PICTURES AND
DIMENSIONS FROM KERRY. FORWARD DETAILS. ISSUED PO FOR FX.
01/10/12 LAYOUT - FIXTURES SELECTIONS/ DETAILS .
01/10/12 REVIEWED ROOFING OPTIONS/ REPAIR PRICING DETAILED.
01/10/12 CALLED AND SCHEDULED BOOKER FOR HAUL OUT. CONFIRMED
DETAILS WITH KERRY AND CLIENT.
01 /11/12 CONTACTED PLUMBER AND DISCUSSED CHANGES . CONFIRMED SCOPE
OF WORK/ MATERIALS REQUIRED.
01/11/12 CONTACTED CLIENT REGARDING VALVES, DRAINS, AND FINISHES OF
FIXTURES AND WHO TO SUPPLY.
01/11/12 NEGOTIATED PRICING ON ROOFING AND ADDED SCOPE OF POTENTIAL
REPAIRS.
01/12/12 CONTACTED PLUMBER AND CONFIRMED DRAINS AND ROUGH IN
DETAILS. RESCHEDULED FOR SHOWER VALVES.
01/12/12 REVIEWED AND FORWARDED DETAILS OF ROOFING BIDS.
01/12/12 DIRECTED AND ASSISTED DAVE LOADING MATERIALS AND TOOLS.
01/12/12 CONTACTED BOOKER AND SET UP GARBAGE HAUL OFF.
01/13/12 CONTACTED JJS ABOUT CARPET INSTALL/ TACK STRIP INSTALL.
01/16/12 CONTACTED CLIENT REGARDING THE NECESSARY ITEMS FOR
PLUMBING TRIM OUT/ SCHEDULE
01/17/12 CONTACTED CLIENT AND PLUMBER/ RESCHEDULE OF INSTALL OF
FIXTURES
01/23/12 CONTACTED CLIENT/ DIRECTED KERRY ON FIXES TO FIXTURES/
ADDITIONAU SWITCHED FIXTURES/ CALLED AND SCHEDULED
PLUMBER
01/23/12 CONFIRMED SCHEDULE AND PRICING FOR POWER VACI DIRECTED
KERRY ON ADDITIONAL ITEMS REGARDING LEAK IN GARAGE WALL
01/23/12 DISCUSSED ISSUE WITH CLIENT/CONTACTED INNOVAC/ POWER VAC
AND DETERMINED PRICING SCOPE
01/24/12 CONTACTED PLUMBER/ KERRY REGARDING ROUGH IN OF VALVES AND
REPAIR INSTALL FO FIXTURES
01/24/12 CONTACTED HAULERS AND SET UP TIME FOR WORK ON SITE

REC#

DESCRIPTION

699673

SFPV PLUMBINGNALVES/FIXTURES

41

699675

EERV ROOFNNTS/SEALED DECKS

41

699687

MUPR PLUMB ROUGH-N/FIRE SPRINK

41

699688 EERV ROOFNNTS/SEALED DECKS
699689 SCFW FRAMING/ WOOD L&M
699690 DCDH DUMPSTR/HAULING DEBRIS
699702 ISFV FLOORNINL/CARPET/COVERNG
700184 SFPV PLUMBINGNALVES/FIXTURES

41
41
41
41
58

700193 MUPR PLUMB ROUGH-N/FIRE SPRINK

58

700585 MUPR PLUMB ROUGH-N/FIRE SPRINK

77

700586

SFMI MISC . MAINTENANCE ITEMS

700587 MUHD HEATNG/DUCTNG/FURNC/A.C.

77
77

700598

MUPR PLUMB ROU GH-N/FIRE SPRINK

77

700599

DCDH DUMPSTR/HAULING DEBR IS

77

8/6/2013

NOTES

HOURS

0:50
0.50
0.50
0.50
0.50
0.75
1.00
1.00
0.75
0.50
1.00
0.75
0.50
1.00
0.50
0.75
0.25
0.25
0.25
0.75
1.00

1.00
0.50
0.75
0.25
Page 2
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JOB# 3442 - PORCELLO J_M~MAINT 11-11 ·

REC#

DESCRIPTION

700615 MUHD HEATNG/DUCTNG/FURNC/A.C.
7006 16 DCDH DUMPSTR/HAULING DEBRIS
700636
701528

MUHD HEATNG/DUCTNG/FURNC/A.C.
MUPR PLUMB ROUGH-N/FIRE SPRINK

701545 MUPR PLUMB ROUGH-N/FIRE SPRINK

DATE

77

01/25/12 CALLED AND SCHEDULED INNOVAC TO SITE
01/25/12 CALLED AND SET UP JUNK BE GONE TO HAUL OFF MATERIALS FROM
SITE
01/26/12 CONTACTED CLIENT AND INNOVAC AND SET UP MEETING TIME ON SITE
01 /31/12 CONTACTED JAKE. ORDERED MATERIALS AT FERGUSON AND DIRECTED
TO TAKE TO SITE FOR REPAIR .
02/01/12 CONTACTED KERRY/CARL ABOUT WATER LEAK, TRACING , TESTING
RATE, AND LOCATION .
02/02/12 CONTACTED CLIENT AND KERRY/ TOILET PARTS/ ADDITIONAL FIXTURES
FOR INSTALL.
02/02/12 CONTACTED BOOKER AND SET UP WORK ON SITE. SCHEDULE.
02/02/12 CONTACTED HVAC SUB . PRESENTED PICTURES AND ISSUES WITH
WORK ON SITE. SET UP RETURN WARRANTY VISIT.
02/03/12 CONTACTED LEAK DETECTION COMPANY. CANCELLED. CONFIRMED
PLAN FOR DIGGING . ACCESS FIXING LEAK.
02/08/12 CONFIRMED DETAILS AND ASS ISTED DAVE AND JAKE WITH LOADING
SAFE. DELIVERED TO SITE.
02/08/12 CALLED AND SCHEDULED MEASURE AND MEETING ON SITE FOR
SHOWER DOORS.
03/12/12 (PORCELLO-W OOD) CONTACTED CLIENT AND GUTTER SUB ABOUT
WORK ON SITE.
03/15/12 (PORCELLO-WOOD) CONTACTED GUTTER SUB AND DISCUSSED
SCHEDULE FOR WORK. DISCUSSED NEED FOR PAINT WITH CLIENT.
03/15/12 (PORCELLO-WOOD) CONTACTED AIR QUALITY SUB . DISCUSSED
DETAILS OF PLAN WITH JEN.
03/19/12 CONTACTED CLIENT AND CONFIRMED SCHEDULE FOR PAINT AND
GUTTERS.
03/21/12 CONTACTED CLIENT AND GUTTER SUB . SCHEDULED WORK ON SITE.
ISSUED PO.
03/22/12 DIRECTED GUTTER SUB ON WORK ON SITE.
03/23/12 CONTACTED SUB AND CONFIRMED INSTALL COMPLETE.
03/29/12 CONTACTED BOD INE CONSTRUCTION AND SET UP SCHEDULE FOR SITE
VISIT TO BID WORK. CONTACTED CLIENT.
03/30/12 CONTACTED JEN AND MARK ABOUT FUTURE OF WORK AND STATUS OF
WORK. NOTIFIED BODINE.
04/09/12 CONTACTED BODINE AND CLIENT. CONFIRMED SITE INSPECTION. PLAN
FOR COUNTY GRANT.
04/12/12 CONTACTED BODINE AND CLIENT. NEGOTIATED DETAILS OF
INSPECTION AND PRICING .
04/13/1 2 REVIEWED/N EGOTIATED FREE CAMERA INSPECTION AND PRICING .
FORWARDED TO MARK, AND DETAILS COSTS/ EXCLUSIONS.
04/19/1 2 DISCUSSED WITH JEN AND CARL WORK AND PROPOSAL.

77
77
112
112 .

701559

SFPV PLUMBINGNALVES/FIXTURES

112

701560
701561

DCDH DUMPSTR/HAULING DEBRIS
MUHD HEATNG/DUCTNG/FURNC/A.C.

112
112

701579 MUPR PLUMB ROUGH-N/FIRE SPRINK

112

702240 SFMI MISC. MAINTENANCE ITEMS

132

702241 SFMG INT. MIRROR/GLA SSWORK

132

705903

EEGD GUTTER/DOWNSPOUTS

239

705968

EEGD GUTTER/DOWNSPOUTS

239

705969 MUEV EXHAUST VNTNG/FANS NACUUM

239

706605

EEGD GUTTER/DOWNSPOUTS

257

706653

EEGD GUTTER/DOWNSPOUTS

257

706669 EEGD GUTTER/DOW NSPOUTS
706675 EEGD GUTTER/DOW NSPOUTS
707400 SISD S DRAIN/STORM/UTILITY WRK

257
257
280

SISD S DRAIN/STORM/UTILITY WRK

280

708607 SISD S DRAIN/STORM/UTILITY WRK

322

SISD S DRAIN/STORM/UTILITY WRK

322

708684 SI SD S DRAIN/STORM/UTILITY WRK

322

SISD S DRAIN/STORM/UTILITY W RK

339

707414

708661

709268
8/6/20 13

NOTES

TRANS#

HOURS

0.50
0.25
0.25
0.50
0.50
0.50
0.25
0.50
0.50
0.75
0.25
0.25
0.50
0.50
0.25
0.50
0.25
0.25
0.50
0.50
0.50
0.50
0.75
0.25
Page 3
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REC#

DESCRIPTION

TRANS#

DATE

NOTES

Total Hours for MATT AYERS:

HOURS

38.00

KERRY ELLIS

699105
699106
699107
699108
699109
699110
699112
699114
699115
699116
699118
699119
699121
699123
699124
699762
699764
699765
699767
699768
699769
699771
699772
699774
699776
699777
699779
699780
699782
699783
699785
699786
699788
699790

DCTD TEAROUT/DEMOLIT/DISMANTL
DCTD TEAROUT/DEMOLIT/DISMANTL
MUPF PLUMB FINISH/HO OK UP
MUPR PLUMB ROUGH-N/FIRE SPRINK
DCRC ROUGH CLEAN/HANDLE DEBRIS
SCFW FRAMING / WOOD L&M
DCTD TEAROUT/DEMOLIT/DISMANTL
MUPF PLUMB FINISH/HOOK UP
SCFW FRAMING / WOOD L&M
SCFW FRAMING / WOOD L&M
IEIV INSULATN NAPOR BARRIER
EEST SIDING/TR IM/FASCIN SOFFIT
IESW S-RCK WALLBOA RD HANGING
IEDT DRYWAL TP/TXT/PLASTERING
DCRC ROUGH CLEAN/HANDLE DEBRIS
SCFW FRAMING / WOOD L&M
DCTD TEAROUT/DEMOLIT/DISMANTL
SCFW FRAMING / WOOD L&M
DCTD TEAROUT/DEMOLIT/DISMANTL
DCRC ROUGH CLEAN/HANDLE DEBRIS
ELER ELECT ROUGH-IN/LAYOUT
MUPR PLUMB ROUGH-N/FIRE SPRINK
SCFW FRAMING / WOOD l&M
IESW S-RCK WALLBOA RD HANGING
DCRC ROUGH CLEAN/HANDLE DEBRIS
SCFW FRAMING/ WOOD L&M
IESW S-RCK WALLBOA RD HANGING
SCFW FRAMING / WOOD L&M
IEDT DRYWAL TP/TXT/PLASTERING
DCRC ROUGH CLEAN/HANDLE DEBRIS
!EDT DRYWAL TPITXT/PLASTERING
MUPR PLUMB ROUGH-N/FIRE SPRINK
IESW S-RCK WALLBOA RD HANGING
SCFW FRAMING/ WOOD L&M

25
25
25
25
25

25
25
25
25
25
25
25
25
25
25
44
44
44
44
44
44
44
44
44
44
44
44
44
44
44
44
44
44
44

01/05/12
01/05/12
01/05/12
01/05/12
01/05/12
01/05/12
01/06/12
01/06/12
01/06/12
01/06/12
01/06/12
01/06/12
01/06/12
01/06/12
01/06/12
01/09/12
01/09/12
01/09/12
01/09/12
01/09/12
01/10/12
01/10/12
01/10/12
01/10/12
01/10/12
01/11/12
01/11/12
01/11/12
01/11/12
01111/12
01/12/12
01/12/12
01/12/12
01/12/12

DEMO GUTTER
DEMO WALLS
WORK ON FAUCET ANO SHUT OFFS
CHECK FOR WATER LEAKS
CLEAN UP
PICK UP LUMBER
DEMO ROTTED CORNER
FIX FAUCET IN LAUNDRY ROOM
PUT GET ROT ON
FRAMING ON CORNER
PAPER WALL
INSTALL SIDING
HANG SHEET ROCK
TAPE SHEET ROCK
CLEAN UP
PICK UP LUMBER
DEMO WATER LINE TO TUB
FRAMING
DEMO FLOOR FOR PLUMBER
CLEAN UP
RUN ELECTRICAL WIRING
CAP OFF SINK DRAINS
SHEETROCK BACKING
SHEETROCK BACKING
CLEAN UP
FRAMING
FINISH HANGING SHEETROCK
INSTALL PLYWOOD DECK TO TUB FRAME
TAPE AND MUD MASTER BATH
CLEAN UP
MUD DING WALLS AND CORNERS .
HELP OUT PLUMBER
HANG SHEET ROCK
SCREW OFF FLOOR

0.25
2.00
1.50
1.50
0.50
1.25
2.00
0.50
0.25
1.50
0.25
1.50
1.00
1.00
0.50
1.00
0.50
6.00
1.00
0.50
2.50
0.50
1.50
2.50
1.00
3.00
1.00
2.00
1.50
0.50
4.00
1.00
0.50
3.50
Page4
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REC#

699792
699797
699800
700747
700748
700750
700751
700752
700753
700754
700759
700761
700762
700763
700764
700765
700766
700768
700780
700781
700782
700784
700785
700786
701696
701699
701700
701701
701702
701704
701707
701709
701710
701711
701712
701714
701715
701716
8/6/2013

DESCRIPTION

DCRC ROUGH CLEAN/HANDLE DEBRIS
SCFW FRAMING/ WOOD L&M
DCRC ROUGH CLEAN/HANDLE DEBRIS
EERV ROOFNNTS/SEALED DECKS
EERV ROOFNNTS/SEALED DECKS
EEST SIDINGrrRIM/FASCINSOFFIT
EERV ROOFNNTS/SEALED DECKS
SFHL HARDWARE/LOCKS/KNOBS
EEGD GUTTER/DOWNSPOUTS
MUPF PLUMB FINISH/HOOK UP
MUPF PLUMB FINISH/HOOK UP
MUPF PLUMB FINISH/HOOK UP
DCTD TEAROUT/DEMOLIT/DISMANTL
MUPF PLUMB FINISH/HOOK UP
MUPF PLUMB FINISH/HOOK UP
SFAH APPLIANCE/HKUP PWR EQU IP
ELEF ELECT FINISH SET & TRIM
DCRC ROUGH CLEAN/HANDLE DEBRIS
DCTD TEAROUT/DEMOLIT/DISMANTL
ELEF ELECT FINISH SET & TRIM
MUPF PLUMB FINISH/HOOK UP
ELEF ELECT FINISH SET & TRIM
ELEF ELECT FINISH SET & TRIM
DCRC ROUGH CLEAN/HANDLE DEBRIS
FCCC CABINETS/CASE/MOULDING
ELEF ELECT FINISH SET & TRIM
ELEF ELECT FIN ISH SET & TRIM
DCRC ROUGH CLEAN/HANDLE DEBRIS
MUHD HEATNG/DUCTNG/FURNC/A.C.
DCRC ROUGH CLEAN/HANDLE DEBRIS
SILS LNDSCP/SPRINK/FINE GRADE
DCTD TEAROUT/DEMOLIT/DISMANTL
MUPF PLUMB FINISH/HOOK UP
ELEF ELECT FINISH SET & TRIM
SFHL HARDWARE/LOCKS/KNOBS
DCRC ROUGH CLEAN/HANDLE DEBRIS
MUPF PLUMB FINISH/HOOK UP
SILS LNDSCP/SPRINK/FINE GRADE

TRANS#

44
44
44
80
80
80
80
80
80
80
80
80
80
80
80
80
80
80
80
80
80
80
80
80
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115

DATE

01/12/12
01/13/12
01/13/12
01/23/12
01/23/12
01/23/12
01/23/12
01/23/12
01/23/12
01/23/12
01/24/12
01/24/12
01/24/12
01/24/12
01/24/12
01/24/12
01/24/12
01/24/12
01/26/12
01/26/12
01/26/12
01/26/12
01/26/12
01/26/12
01/30/12
01/30/12
01/30/12
01/30/12
01/31/12
01/31/12
02/01/12
02/01/12
02/01/12
02/01/12
02/01/12
02/01/12
02/02/12
02/02/12

NOTES

CLEAN UP
INSTALL CURB AND BACKING
CLEAN UP
CHECK OUT ROOF LEAD
PICK UP PARTS TO FIX LEAD ON ROOF
CAULK AROUND BRICK AND SIDING
DIVERT WATER WITH FLASHING ROOF
INSTALL CABINET KNOBS
MOVE OUT DRAIN SPOUT
TRY TO INSTALL BATH FAUCET
HELP PLUMBER INSTALL TUB
INSTALL BATH FAUCET
DEMO KITCHEN FAUCET
INSTALL KITCHEN FAUCET
GARBAGE DISPOSAL
CHECK OUT DISHWASHER
INSTALL LIGHT FIXTURES
CLEAN UP
DEMO 2 CEILING FANS
PUT TOGETHER AND INSTALL CEILING FAN
TEMP INSTALL BATH FAUCET AND BOWL
INSTALL SWITCHES AND OUTLETS
INSTALL LIGHTS
CLEAN UP
SET CABINETS IN BATH DOWNSTAIRS
MOVE LIGHT IN BATH
CHANGE OUT SWITCHES
CLEAN UP
WORK ON MAIN WATER LINE AT METER
CLEAN UP
FINISH LANDSCAPE SPRINKLER LINE
DEMO 2 CHANDELIERS
INSTALL SHOWER TRIM
INSTALL CEILING LIGHT
INSTALL BATH HARDWARE
CLEAN UP
CHANGE OUT TOILET VALVE
TEST OUT WATER SPRINKLER LINE. ADD FIX A 90 FITTING

HOURS

1.00
2.50
0.50
0.50
1.00
0.50
0.50
0.50
0.50
1.00
3.00
1.00
0.50
1.00
0.50
0.50
2.00
0.50
1.00
1.50
1.50
3.50
2.00
1.00
1.50
1.00
2.00
0.50
8.50
0.50
2.00
1.00
1.00
0.50
2.00
0.50
0.50
2.00
Page 5
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REC#

701717
701718
701719
701721
701723
701732
702348
702349
702350
702352
702354
702355
702361
702363
702364
702365
702367
702368
702370
702371
702373
702375
702377
702379
702381
702382
702384
703187
703188
703189
703191
703193
703195
708121
715186
715188
715189
715190
8/6/2013

DESCRIPTION

ELEF ELECT FINISH SET & TRIM
ELEF ELECT FINISH SET & TRIM
SFMG INT. MIRROR/GLASSWORK
FCCC CABINETS/CASE/MOU LDING
DCRC ROUGH CLEAN/HANDLE DEBRIS
SIDU DITCH/UTILITY RUNS/PIPING
ELEF ELECT FINISH SET & TRIM
MUPF PLUMB FINISH/HOOK UP
FCCC CABINETS/CASE/MOU LDING
FCCC CABINETS/CASE/MOU LDING
MUPF PLUMB FINISH/HOOK UP
DCRC ROUGH CLEAN/HANDLE DEBRIS
MUPF PLUMB FINISH/HOOK UP
DCTD TEAROUT/DEMOLIT/D ISMANTL
MUPF PLUMB FINISH/HOOK UP
FCMT INT. MILLWRK/TRIM/DRS
DCTD TEAROUT/DEMOLIT/D ISMANTL
ELEF ELECT FINISH SET & TRIM
DCRC ROUGH CLEAN/HANDLE DEBRIS
ISCS CNTR-TOPS/SUBDECK S
ISCS CNTR-TOPS/SUBDECK S
SFHL HARDWARE/LOCKS/K NOBS
SFHL HARDWARE/LOCKS/K NOBS
ELEF ELECT FINISH SET & TRIM
DCRC ROUGH CLEAN/HANDLE DEBRIS
ELEF ELECT FINISH SET & TRIM
DCRC ROUGH CLEAN/HANDLE DEBRIS
MUPF PLUMB FINISH/HOOK UP
ELEF ELECT FINISH SET & TRIM
FCCC CABINETS/CASE/MOU LDING
SFHL HARDWARE/LOCKS/K NOBS
SFMG INT. MIRROR/GLASSWORK
DCRC ROUGH CLEAN/HANDLE DEBRIS
ELER ELECT ROUGH-IN/LAYOUT
ELEF ELECT FINISH SET & TRIM
DCTD TEAROUT/DEMOLIT/D ISMANTL
ELEF ELECT FINISH SET & TRIM
ELEF ELECT FINISH SET & TRIM

TRANS#

115
115
115
115
115
115
135
135
135
135
135
135
135
135
135
135
135
135
135
135

135
135
135
135
135
135
135
156
156
156
156
156
156
307
518
518
518
518

DATE

02/02/12
02/02/12
02/02/12
02/02/12
02/02/12
02/03/12
02/06/12
02/06/12
02/06/12
02/06/12
02/06/12
02/06/12
02/08/12
02/08/12
02/08/12
02/08/12
02/08/12
02/08/12
02/08/12
02/09/12
02/09/12
02/09/12
02/09/12
02/09/12
02/09/12
02/10/12
02/10/12
02/17/12
02/17/12
02/17/12
02/17/12
02/17/12
02/17/12
04/07/12
06/19/12
06/19/12
06/19/12
06/19/12

NOTES

CHANGE OUT CEILING FAN IN BATHROOM
CHANGE OUT OUTLET AND SWITCHES
HANG MIRROR IN MASTER BATHROOM
PUT TOGETHER AND SET CABINETS IN MASTER BATHROOM
CLEAN UP
SHOW LABOR GUY WHERE TO DIG
INSTALL OUTLETS AND SWITCHES
INSTALL SHOWER TRIM IN MASTER BATH
INSTALL END PANELS ON CABINETS
INSTALL TOE KICK ON CABINET IN MASTER
FIX DRAIN ON DISHWASHER
CLEAN UP
PICK UP TOILETS AND SUPPLIES
DEMO 2 TOILETS
INSTALL 3 TOILETS
INSTALL BY PASS TRACK AND HARDWARE
DEMO FAN IN BATHROOM
INSTALL NEW FAN IN BATHROOM
CLEAN UP
PICK UP PLYWOOD COUNTER
TEMP INSTALL PLYWOOD COUNTERTOP
INSTALL CABINETS KNOBS
INSTALL BATH HARDWARE
INSTALL OUTLETS AND PLATES
CLEAN UP
ELECTRICAL TRIM.
CLEAN UP.
HOOK WATER SUPPLY LINE TO REFER
CHANGE OUT 2 SWITCHES
INSTALL PANELS ON UPPER CABINETS
DRILL HOLES KNOBS
HANG ONE MIRROR
CLEAN UP
RAN WIRE SWITCHES FOR LIGHTS .
PICK UP LATTER TO HANG CHANDELIER.
DEMO OLD CHANDELIER.
INSTALL NEW CHANDELIER .
RAISE THE CHANDELIER UP THE KIT.

HOURS

2.00
1.00
0.50
3.00
0.50
2.00
4.50
1.00
1.50
1.00
1.00
0.50
1.00
0.50
3.50
1.00
1.00
1.00
0.50
0.50
0.50
1.50
0.50
5.50
0.50
8.00
0.50
1.00
0.50
3.00
0.50
1.00
0.50
4.00
0.50
0.50
1.50

1.00
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REC#

DESCRIPTION

TRANS#

DATE

NOTES

715191
715193
715194
715196
715197
715199
715213
715215
715216
715217

DCDH DUMPSTR/HAULING DEBRIS
DCRC ROUGH CLEAN/HANDLE DEBRIS
ELER ELECT ROUGH-IN/LAYOUT
ELER ELECT ROUGH-IN/LAYOUT
ELER ELECT ROUGH-IN/LAYOUT
DCDH DUMPSTR/HAULING DEBRIS
ELER ELECT ROUGH-IN/LAYOUT
ELER ELECT ROUGH-IN/LAYOUT
DCRC ROUGH CLEAN/HANDLE DEBRIS
DCDH DUMPSTR/HAULING DEBRIS

518
518
518
518
518
518
518
518
518
518

06/19/12
06/19/12
06/19/12
06/20/12
06/20/12
06/20/12
06/22/12
06/22/12
06/22/12
06/22/12

HAUL BACK LATTER TO THE RENTAL.
CLEAN UP.
RAN GRAY PIPE FOR ELECT.
PICK UP GRAY PIPE.
FINISH LAYING PIPE.
HAUL BACK PARTS TO SHOP .
PICK UP WIRE AND FISH TAPE.
INSTALL ELECTRICAL WIRE.
CLEAN UP.
HAUL OFF TOOLS AND TRASH BACK TO SHOP.

Total Hours for KERRY ELLIS:

HOURS

0.50
0.50
7.00
0.50
0.50
0.50
0.50
2.50
0.50
0.50
173.00

BRENDAN CRONIN

702439

SFPV PLUMBINGNALVES/FIXTURES

137

02/07/12 SPEC AND ORDER 3 TOILETS

Total Hours for BRENDAN CRONIN:

0.50

0.50

NICHOLAS HURTT

715328 ADJUSTED FOR CLIENT SUMMARY

521

06/22/12 WORKED/CHECKED ON POOL EQUIPMENT

Total Hours for NICHOLAS HURTT:

0.00

0.00

JAKE HARDING

701968 SFPV PLUMBINGNALVES/FIXTURES
701969 SFPV PLUMBINGNALVES/FIXTURES
701971 SFPV PLUMBINGNALVES/FIXTURES
701972 SFPV PLUMBINGNALVES/FIXTURES

124
124
124
124

702647 SFMI MISC . MAINTENANCE ITEMS

146

01/31/12
01/31/12
01/31/12
02/01 /12

DIG UP AND DOWN SIDE OF DRIVEWAY TO FIND WATER LEAK.
FIX WATER LEAK AND GET NEW VALVE
GOING TO HOME DEPOT FOR MATERIALS
FIX MAIN WATER LINE. PUT PIPE TOGETHER AND FITTINGS. BACK FILL
OF WATER LINE AND CLEAN UP.
02/08/12 PICK UP SAFE AND DELIVER TO HOME FROM STORAGE

Total Hours for JAKE HARDING:

5.00
3.00
1.00
5.00
4.00

18.00

"DAVID RICHARDS

699396

8/6/2013

EEST SIDING/TRIM/FASCIA/SOFFIT

36

01/06/12 PUT TOGETHER MATERIALS FOR PROCELLO . PICKED UP SIDING AT
DUNN, DROVE FROM WOLFF TO PORCELLO, DELIVERED MATERIALS
CAME BACK TO SHOP.

1.25

Page7
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REC#

DESCRIPTION

NOTES ·

HOURS

'
700044

ISFV FLOORNINUCARPET/COVERNG

700077 SCFW FRAMING/ WOOD L&M

54

54

01/09/12 PREP ORDER FOR PORCELLO, PLACED AND PICKED UP WILL CALL AT
DUNN LUMBER(SHEET ROCK AND PLYWOOD) HEADED TO DROP OFF AT
SITE. RETURN DRIVE BACK TO SHOP.
01/12/12 WENT TO HOME DEPOT/DUNN FOR MATERIALS FOR PORCELLO FOR
KERRY, FILLED TOOL ORDER FOR JOB. PICKED UP BIT, AND SPLIT
PINS.
.

Total Hours for DAVID RICHARDS:
Total Hours: Labor

8/6/2013

2.00

0.50

3.75
233.25
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j JC Enterprise's Construction Services, L.L.C.

Equipment and Rentals Breakdown
RECORD RANGE: 699113 - 716294

JOB# 3442 - PORCELLO J_M-MAINT 11 -1 1

REC#

DESCRIPTION

TRANS#

DATE

25

01/06/12 POWER TOOLS

NOTES

AMOUNT

DCTD-03 TEAROUTIDEMOLTIDJSMANT

6991 13

1

Billing Total for DCTD-03 TEAROUTIDEMOLTIDISMANT:

0.68
0.68

DCRC ROUGH CLEAN/HANDLE DEBRIS

699563
700469
701183
701388
702725
703537
707853

WDV11
WDV11
WDV11
WDV11
WDV11
WDV11
WDV11

VACUUM, WET-DRY VAC
VACUUM , WET-DRY VAC
VACUUM, WET-DRY VAC
VACUUM, WET-DRY VAC
VACUUM, WET-DRY VAC
VACUUM, WET-DRY VAC
VACUUM, WET-DRY VAC

EquipAlloc
EquipAlloc
EquipAlloc
EquipAlloc
EquipAlloc
EquipAlloc
EquipAlloc

01/13/12
01/20/12
01/27/12
02/03/12
02/10/12
02/17/12
03/30/12

13.50
13.50
13.50
13.50
13.50
13.50
13.50

Billing Total for DCRC ROUGH CLEAN/HANDLE DEBRIS:

94.50

EquipAlloc
EquipAlloc
EquipAlloc

11 .25
33 .75
6.75

SCFW FRAMING/ WOOD L&M

699562 RH7 ROTOHAMMER,
700468 RH7 ROTOHAMMER,
707852 P4 PLANER

01/13/12
01/20/12
03/30/12

Billing Total for SCFW FRAMING/ WOOD L&M:

51 .75

SCFW-03 FRAMING I WOOD L&M

699117
699766
699773
699778
699781
8/6/201 3

2
5
1
2
2

25
44
44
44

44

01/06/12
01/09/12
01/10/12
01/11/12
01/11/12

POWER TOOLS
POWER TOOLS
POWER TOOLS
POWER TOOLS
POWER TOOLS

1.34
3.34
0.67
1.33
1.33
Page 1
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REC#

DESCRIPTION

69979 1 2
699798 2

DATE

44
44

NOTES

01/12/12 POWER TOOLS
01/13/12 POWER TOOLS

Billing Total for SCFW-03 FRAMING I WOOD L&M:

AMOUNT

1.3 1
1.31
10.63

ELER-03 ELECT ROUGH-IN/LAYOUT
699770 1
708122 2
715195 3

44
307
518

01/10/12 POWER TOOLS
04/07/12 POWER TOOLS
06/19/12 POWER TOOLS

Billing Total for ELER-03 ELECT ROUGH-IN/LAYOUT:

0.67
1.63

2.46
4.76

ELEF ELECT FINISH SET & TRIM
716294 EXTENSION LADDER

35237407-001

06/19/12

40.30

Billing Total for ELEF ELECT FINISH SET & TRIM:

40.30

ELEF-03 ELECT FINISH SET
700767 1
702369 2
702380
702383

80
135
135
135

01/24/12
02/08/12
02/09/12
02/10/12

POWER TOOLS
POWER TOOLS
POWER TOOLS
POWER TOOLS

0.83
1.64
0.83
0.83

Billing Total for ELEF-03 ELECT FINISH SET:

4.13

44

0.67

MUPR-03 PLUMB ROUGHINIFJRE SPR

699787

1

01/12/12 POWER TOOLS

Billing Total for MUPR-03 PLUMB ROUGHINIFIRE SPR:

0.67

115

1.64

MUHD-03 HEATNGIDUCTNGIFUR NC/A

701703 2

01/31/12 POWER TOOLS

Billing Total for MUHD-03 HEATNGIDUCTNG/FURNCIA :

1.64

MUPF-03 PLUMB FINISH/HOOK UP

8/6/2013
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JOB# 3442 - PORCELLO·J...:.M~MAINT 11-11

REC#

. DESCRIPTION

TRANS#

DATE

NOTES
;

700760 2
700783

80
80

01/24/12 POWER TOOLS
01/26/12 POWER TOOLS

Billing Total for MUPF-03 PLUMB FINISH/HO OK UP:

AMOUNT

1.62
0.83
2.45

EEEW-03 EXT WINDOWS & GLAZING

706702

10

258

03/24/12 POWER TOOLS

Billing Total for EEEW-03 EXT WINDOWS & GLAZING:

8.10
8.10

EEST-03 S/DGITRIM IFASCIAIS OFT

699120 1

25

01/06/12 POWER TOOLS

Billing Total for EEST-03 SIDG/TRIMIFASCJAISOFT:

0.68

0.68

IESW-03 S-RCK WALLBRD HANGING

699122
699775
699784
699789

25
44
44
44

01/06/12
01/10/12
01/11/12
01/12/12

POWER TOOLS
POWER TOOLS
POWER TOOLS
POWER TOOLS

Bi/Jing Total for JESW-03 S-RCK WALLBRD HANGING:

0.68
0.67
0.67
0.67

2.69

JSCS-03 CNTR-TOPS/SUBDECKS

702374 2

135

02/09/12 POWER TOOLS

Billing Total for ISCS-03 CNTR-TOPS/SUBDECKS:

1.64
1.64

FCCC-03 CABINETS/CASE/MOULD/NG

701698
701722
702351
702353
703190

2
2
3
3
3

115
115
135
135
156

01/30/12
02/02/12
02/06/12
02/06/12
02/17/12

POWER TOOLS
POWER TOOLS
POWER TOOLS
POWER TOOLS
POWER TOOLS

Billing Total for FCCC-03 CABINETS/CASE/MOULDING:
8/6/2013

1.64
1.64
2.47
2.47
2.47

10.69
Page 3
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•JOB# 3442 - PORCELLO J_M-MAINT 11 -11

REC#

DESCRIPTION

TRANS#

DATE

135

02/08/12 POWER TOOLS

NOTES

AMOUNT

FCMT-03 INT. MILLWRKJTRJMIDRS

702366 2

1.64

BJ/ling Total for FCMT-03 INT. MILLWRKJTR/M/DRS:

1.64

115
135
135
156

1.64
0.83
0.83
0.83

SFHL-03 HARDWARE/ LOCKS/KNOB S

701713 2
702376
702378
703192 1

02/01/12
02/09/12
02/09/12
02/17/12

POWER TOOLS
POWER TOOLS
POWER TOOLS
POWER TOOLS

Billing Total for SFHL-03 HARDWARE/L OCKS/KNOBS :

4.13

115
156

0.82
0.83

SFMG-03 INT. MIRRORIGLA SSWORK

701720
703194

02/02/12 POWER TOOLS
02/17/12 POWER TOOLS

Billing Total for SFMG-03 INT. MIRRORIGLA SSWORK:
Billing Total for: Equipment

8/6/2013

1.65
242.73
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I JC Enterprises Construction Services, L.L.C.
Subcontractor Charges Breakdown
RECORD RANGE: 700560 - 709118

JOB# 3442- PORCELLO J_M-MAINT 11 -11

REC#

DESCRIPTION

DATE

NOTES

AMOUNT

BODINE CONSTRUCT ION CO., INC

709118

VIDEO INSPECTION

24952-1

04/11/12

Billing Total for BODINE CONSTRUCT ION CO., INC:

0.00
0.00

PMG MECHANICAL , INC.

700560 REPAIR HEATING SYSTEM

56228

01/05/12

458.75

Billing Total for PMG MECHANICAL , INC.:

458.75

166593

630.00

HOWIE'S POWER-VAC

702837 AIR DUCT CLEANING

01/30/12

Billing Total for HOWIE'S POWER-VAC:

630.00

FXPLUMBING

702832

DRAINS,TUB,SHOWER VALVE

1447

02/16/12 LABOR & MATERIAL

1,830.00

Billing Total for FX PLUMBING:

1,830.00

1188

2,340.00

GUTTER SOLUTIONS

707909

8/6/2013

GUTTERS & DOWNSPOUTS

03/26/12

Billing Total for GUTTER SOLUTIONS:

2,340.00

Billing Total for: Subcontract

5,258.75

Page 1
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I JC Ent~rprises Construction Services, L.L.C.
Other and Misc. Resources Breakdown

lncluping: Hauling, Dumping, Freight and Deliveries

·

RECORD RANGE : 693690 - 715329

JOB# 3442 - PORCELLO J_M-MAINT 11-11

REC#

DESCRIPTION

TRANS#

DATE

827

11/07/11

AMOUNT

PSPA-05 PERMTS/APPROVALS/AS-BL

693690 8

4.00

Billing Total for PSPA-05 PERMTSIAPPROVALS/AS-BL:

4.00

322

2.00

SISD-05 S DRAIN/STORM UTILITY

708685 4

04/13/12

Billing Total for SISD-05 S DRAIN/STORM UTILITY:

2.00

115

3.00

SILS-05 LANDSCPISPRINKIFINE-G
701708 6

02/01/12

Billing Total for SILS-05 LANDSCPISPRINK!FINE-G:

3.00

115

5.00

SIDU-05 DITCHIUTLITY RUNSIPIPN

701733 10

02/03/12

Billing Total for SIDU-05 DITCHIUTLITY RUNSIPIPN:

5.00

DCDH DUMPSTRIHAULfNG DEBRIS

700554
708534
701468
702841
702918
707204

JUNK BE GONE,LLC
JUNK BE GONE,LLC
JUNK BE GONE,LLC
JUNK BE GONE,LLC
JUNK BE GONE,LLC
JUNK BE GONE,LLC

01-07 JUNK
01-10 JUNK
01 -13 JUNK
01-26 JUNK
02-02 JUNK
03-14 JUNK

01i07/12
01/10/12
01/13/12
01/26/12
02/02/12
03/14/12

Billing Total for DCDH DUMPSTRIHAULING DEBRIS:
8/6/2013

485 .00
508.00
185.00
795.00
285.00
285.00
2,543.00
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JOB# 3442 - PORCELLO J_M-MAINT 11-11 •

REC#

DESCRIPTION

AMOUNT

DCDH-05 DUMPSTRIHAULING DEBRIS

715192 4
715200 15.5

518
518

06/19/12
06/20/12

Billing Total for DCDH-05 DUMPSTRIHAULING DEBRIS:

2.00
7.75
9.75

SCFW-05 FRAMING I WOOD L&M

699111
699763
700078
700079
699799

12
12
4
.01
10

25
44
54
54

44

01/05/12
01/09/12
01/12/12
01/12/12 TRUCKING
01/13/12

Billing Total for SCFW-05 FRAMING I WOOD L&M:

6.00
6.00
2.00
12.38
5.00
31.38

ELER-05 ELECT ROUGH-IN/LAYOUT
715198
715214

11.4
10.7

518
518

06/20/12
06/22/12

Billing Total for ELER-05 ELECT ROUGH-IN/LAYOUT:

5.70
5.35
11.05

ELEF-05 ELECT FINISH SET
715187 4

518

06/19/12

2.00

Billing Total for ELEF-05 ELECT FINISH SET:

2.00

135

7.00

MUPF-05 PLUMB FINISH/HOOK UP
702362

14

02/08/12

Billing Total for MUPF-05 PLUMB FINISH/HOOK UP:

7.00

80

8.00

EERV-05 ROOFNNTSISEALED DECKS
700749

16

01/23/12

Billing Total for EERV-05 ROOFNNTSISEALED DECKS:
8/6/2013

8.00
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JOB# 3442 - P0RCELLO J_M-MAINT 11 -11

. REC#

DESCRIPTION

TRANS# .

~

AMOUNT

EEEW-05 EXT WINDOWS & GLAZING

706703 5
706704 .01

03/24/12
03/24/12 TRUCKING

2.50
13.50

Billing Total for EEEW-05 EXf WINDOWS & GLAZING:

16.00

258
258

EEST-05 S/DGITRIMIFASCIAISOFT

699397 30

36

01/06/12

Billing Total for EEST-05 S/DGITRIM/FASCIAISOFT:

15.00
15.00

ISCS-05 CNTR-TOPS/SUBDECKS

702372 8

135

02/09/12

Billing Total for ISCS-05 CNTR-TOPS/SUBDECKS:

4.00
4.00

FCCC-05 CABINETS/CASE/MOULDING

701697 6

115

01/30/12

Billing Total for FCCC-05 CABINETS/CASE/MOULDING:

3.00
3.00

SFPV-05 PLUMBINGNALVEIFIXTURE

701970 28
701973 15

124
124

01/31/12
02/01/12

Billing Total for SFPV-05 PLUMBINGNALVEIFIXTURE:

14.00
7.50
21.50

SFOB-05 OTHR BLDG SYS & SP ASS

715329 25

521

06/22/12

Billing Total for SFOB-05 OTHR BLDG SYS & SP ASS:
Billing Total for: Other

8/6/2013

12.50
12.50
2,698.18
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EXHIBIT E
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STATEMENT & DRAW REQUEST
DA TE OF ISSUE:

ANN & MARK PORCELLO

6/412012

20124 -186TH PLACE NE
WOODINVILLE, WA 98077

RE:. JOB # 3442. '.. MAINTENANCE_11-11 - ····-·····- - - -·-·-···--· ··

- - ---······-- ··-········ - - -- ------- - - --·-·············-····-·········

T&M SUMMARIES :
01/13/12

T&M SUMMARY #1 #693015 • 699397

$

2,699.71

02/10/12

T&M SUMMARY #2 #699456 • 702039

$

13,996.TT

~

02/10/1 2

CREDIT PER CARL

$

02/16/12

T&M SUMMARY #3 #702088 - 702832

$

02/16/12

CREDIT PER CARL

$

~~Qk·;

02/16/12

CREDIT PER CARL

$

/~ I

3,951 .27

02/23/12

T&M SUMMARY #4 #702837 - 703630

$

03/29/12

T&M SUMMARY #5 #705102 • 707204

s

"9~4.07

05/18/12

T&M SUMMARY #6 #707400 • 709268

s

4.4~9.59
J

$

10,363.98

PAYMENTS :
$
$

BALANCE DUE

PLEASE REMIT TO;
Jc Enterprises Construction Services, L.L.C.
13500 Bel-Red Rd., Suite 14

Bellevue, WA 98005
Attention: Accounts Recelvable

I

JC ENTER PRISES 13500 Be,-Red Rd. Suito 14, Bellevue. WA 98005
Pnone: (425) 54 3•i986 • Fax: (425) 56:e-o904
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4J;; Andrew rvlaggard Sr.
July 28, 2012

Labor Hours

Invoice 6
We are charging you according to our Tenns and for Conditions:

~J!iJ1~1~~1m~w1:
n ! 7 06/24/12 Machine and Operator
.l

4

®-rs
8

f3

-i~-

~

~

n(

455.00 $ !

06/24/12

Labor Andrew Maggard

30.00 $

120.00 $ i

06i24/12

Labor Employees

10.00 $

80.00 $ j

06/25/12

Machine and Operator

65.00 $

520.00$ !

06/25/12

Labor Andrew Maggard

30.00 $

150.00 $.1

06/25/12

Labor Employee

10.00 $

100.00 $
I

10

06/26/12

Machine and Operator

65.00 $ 1

650.00 $

4

06/26/12

Labor Andrew Maggard

30.00 $

120.00 $

9

07/07/if·

Machine and Operator

65.00 $

585.00 $

9

07/07/12

Labor Employee

10

90.00 $

10

07/09/12

Machine and Operator

65.00 $

650.00_~

2

07/0.\f'l2

Labor Andrew Maggard

30.00 $

60.00 $

12

07/ffi/12

Labor Employee

10.00$

120.00 $

1

07/0C//1 2

Mark paid $100 on Labor

- 100.00$

-100.00 $

I

Labor Hours for the Woodinville home of Mark Porcello

.,. /1.ndrew 1•.1aggard

- - - --

-

- - · ···· · - -·- -·

.

- - --

0

425-308-1750 .,.

·· -- -·····- - - -
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-f l Andrew rAaggard Sr.
July 28, 2012

Invoice 5
We are charging you according to our Terms and for Conclitions:

•~~~~;h~
fr!f~ ,·,,":
· :.,;(~ .....
-~r;.~~-·ffi
'f:ffeW;i! fW~~~~~&'~~;~?~t@~~~t~ij
i~~--µ... ~~
~ -·
tJ"m . ~

,., .._ .~· ,··51.i~~~~~
~·l$~~

~ ~ w ~g_,~~~~,'i!.~~-~..tt..~ra:J~~t~~\![;!;J;J,_•~-~

1

CP270036

Ferguson Enterprises

98.37 $

98.37 $

I

CP270438'

Ferguson 'Enterprises

54.80 $

54.80 $

1

CW642118

Ferguson Enterprises

163.74 $

163.74 $

1

1277372

Dunn Lumber

46.89 $

46.89 $
0.00$
0.00$
0.00 $
0.00 $
0.00$
0.00 $

Misc Materials for the Woodinville home of Mark Porcello

------------ --···..···- - - - --
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.:;~\>

Andrew Maggard Sr.
July 28, 2012

cAw.n. Po1r.c.elln-a.nJ. 1lt..ah.k Ya-fr.CIJ.lo-

Invoice 4
We are charging you according to our Terms and for Conditions:

19'~,;,,1"'l'f~~~~~~:r~"11~w~~-~'~*~~~i;;l'~~~~~~~1lliitp/

ijillii~~i!~~~~i,M."~ ,~ ·· -~~~~~-~~~~~ir--~Jl~t~~~~
1

47120001040344

Home Depot- 6/15/12

6.96 $

6.96 $

l

4 7120000102210

Home Depot-6/15/12

99.00 $

99.00 $

1

47120000130195

Home Depot-6/26/12

158.45 $

158.45 $

l

1707000673129

Home Depot-7/6/12

l0.38 $

l0.38 $

47120005703202

Home Depot-6/25/12

2.31 $

2.31 $

47120003448198

Home Depot-6/26/12

33.92 $

33.92 $

l

47120000130252

Home Depot-6/26/12

7.44$

7.44 $

I

4712000930404

Home Depot~6/25/12

83.96 $

83.96 $

47260005719943

Home Depot-5/05/12

61.87 $

61.87 $

$

0.00$
0.00$

Plumbing and Drain Materials for the Woodinville ho~e of Mark Porcello

~ And rew Maggard ·•4,25·308-1750 °
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More saving.
More doingt
9310 QOIL CEUA

BLVD MARYSVILLE, WA 98271
360 657 S76:.!

4726

00097

CASHIER

06631

01/04/12

05 : 2~ PM

- SPOSOl

CUSTOMER AGREEMENT# 183371

RECALL AMOUNT
2927 . 00
· ----MasterBath Buy More, Save More-----

CUSTOMER AGREEMENT#

163371

RECALL AMOUNT
-250 . 02
MUST RBTURN ALL J'T'EMS FOR A FULL P..EFUND
SllBTOTAL

2 , 676.98
230 . 22
$2,907 . 20
2,90'1 . 20
TA

SALES TAX

TOTAL
XXXXXXXXXXXX0879 VISA
AUTH CODE 035890/6971636

111111111111 Ill llll

llllllllll

4726 97 06631 01/04/2012 6931

Tl"..E HOME DEPOT RESSRVES THE RIGHT TO
r.JMIT /

DENY RETURUS . PLllASE SEli THB

RETIJRN POLICY SIGN IN STORBS FOR
DETAILS .
BUY ONLINE PICK-UP I~ STORE
AVAILABLE NOW ON HOMEDEPOT.COM .
CONVENIENT, EASY AND MOS~ ORD2RS

READY IN LESS THAN l liOURS !

············~--·•t•~·--~--~•-·*••··••**
ENTER FOR A CHANCE
TO WIN A $5,000
ROME DBPOT GIFT
CARDI

Share ?our Opinion With Ue 1 compl~te
the brief survey about your store visit
ana enter for a chance to wi~ at :
www.nomedepot.com/opinion

COMPARTA SU OPINION ZN tJNA BREVE
ENCUESTA PARA LA OPORTUNIDAD DE
GAN.AR.

tJser ID:
18277 13648

Password:

12054 13551
ll:nr.riE!II m\1st be entered by 0?./0J/7.0,l?,,
encra.~ts must be 18 or older to enter.
See complete rulofl on website . No
pu.i:·chai,.., n.,c;.,i,eary ,

« 92L1

S3:lIA}l3$WI:l3dS92l, 9L :ro +,O- L0-2L02
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SPECIAL SERVICES CUSTOMER INVOICE - Continued

Last Name: MAGGARD

Page 2 of 2

No. 4726-183371

"
C

"-

'

C

,------------------------------------ ----------~"1
TOTAL CHARGES OF ALL MERCHANDISE & SERVICES
ORDER TOTAL

----------l

C

~

SALES TAXt------<-=-.z..;..;:c= ~
TOTAl

.....

$2 907.20 o-

BALANCE DUE
$0.00 ~
.....__ _ _ __ _ _ __ _ _~_ _ _ _ _ _
EN~D~OF_OR-D_E-R-No~·~472~&-~183~'Sl~1~- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - , , - - - - - _ _ . . , ~
<fl
~

m

0

J;>

r

<fl

m
;;,g

<

0

m

(I)

Page2of2

No. 4726-183371

Customer Copy
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Page 1 of 2

SPECIAL SERVI.CE$ CUSTOMER INVOICE
Store 4726 TULALIP

Phone: (360) 657-5762

9310 QUIL CEDA BLVD
MARYSVILLE, WA 98271

Salesperson: AVA95A
Reviewer:

MAGGARD JENNIFER

"C

I'\

'

C

I

C

""
Ha~F'ttPnO

Mchm

No. 4726-183371

(425) 263-0555

C

u

REPRINT

V

20124 186TH Pl NE

(425) 263-0555

--""

I'\.

er.,
-

0-

AUBURN

(/)

, , b ~ MASTEABATH VANITY
98071

WA

KING

Cou~

"ll

m

2012--01 -0417:41

0

~=======================~===
===================::::::i:================= ~
MERCHANDISE AND SERVICE SUMMARY

:t>

CUSTOMER PICKUP #1

We reserve ltie right ID nmit 1he quanlilfes of merchandise
sold to eustomer.i

REF I W02
SKU I 515~4
Customer Plcku / Will CaJI
S.O. MERCHANDISE TO BE PICKED UP:
S/0 RSUMASTERBATH
REF# S01
ESTIMATED ARRIVAL DATE: 01.125/2012
REF#
SKU
QTY
UM
DESCRIPTION
783-151
S0101
2.00 EA SCCL80 / SCCL.80 80" LINEN CROWN MOLDING (USED ON I SCCL80 MODS:
W=SO•W2-:.B0" H=2" 0.:11/2"
S0102
783-151
1.00 EA SCTK61 J SCTK61 TOE KICK (NO COST ITEM, INCLUDED/ SCTK61 MOOS:
W-=96" W2~6• H=513/16" D:::(J 5/8"
S0103
783-151
2.00 EA ME12D / ME12D 12• DRAWER BANK f ME120
S0104
y
783-151
2 .00
y
S0105
783-151
1.00
y
S0106
783-151
f.00
70.00
y
S0107
783-151
2.00
52.00
50108
783-151
y
2.00
$341.69

t----- - --------'--"==---=-==---==..::-=-e-=-..==-=...___;===....:....:.::=c:..,_='--"'-==-- -- - - - - ------::;~~lc--- ---1

$81 .00

m
:;:o

<
n
~

$114.00

$0.00
653.28"
$563.68"
$326.64.
$70.00
104.00
683.38"
$162.00

-I"......

"'
°'
V
V

2676.98

-"
N

V1

~~~
WIU..•CALL M E R C ~ ~ p

-"
V1
~

,___ _ _ _ _ _ _
F_O_A_W_IL_L_C_A_L_L_ _ _ _ _ ____

0-

0
......

V1

WUI-Call ltema

MERCHANDISE PICK-UP

n the stare for 7 deya only.

Check you, current order staiu. online al
www.homedepot.com/ordetetm:,

PROCEED TO WILL CALL OR
_

SERVICE DESK AREA

(Pro Customers. Proceed To The Pro Desk)

Page 1 ot2

No. 4726-183371

n ,ca es I em mar

own

--0

....

'

'()

Customer Copy
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Page 1 of l

Gmail - Approved Transaction

Mark P < markporcello@gmail.com>

Approved Transaction
1 message

Transactlons@eprocessingnetwork.com <
Transactions@eprocessingnetwork.com>
To: Markporcello@gmail.com

Fri, Sep 28, 2012 at 9:05

AM

This message is to confirm that a transaction has been successfully processed by PRICELESS GRANITE
INC ..
PRICELESS GRANITE INC. may be contacted at:
Address: 10515 Mountain Loop Hwy
PO Box 538
Granite Falls, WA 98252
Phone: 800-261-7735
Email: sales@pricelessgranite.com
Web: www.pricelessgranite.com
Please do not reply to this message. This is simply a courtesy confirmation for your records and security.
Order information is as follows:
Invoice: 1032
Transact ID: 20120928110542-0911483-1032
Date: 09/28/2012 11 :05:42 AM
Description: SO#46199 60% deposit
Amount: $1023.01
Name: Mark Porcello
Address: 20124
Woodinville, 98077
E-Mail: Markporcello@gmail.com
Approval Code: APPROVED 220482
AVS Response: Address and Zip Code Do Not Match (N)
CW2 Response: CW2 Match (M)
Card Type: AMEX
Card Number: X3009
Placed From: 70.89.127. 172

httos://mai I. Q'OOQ le.com/mail/u/0/?ui=2&ik=3 l 1cceab02& vi ew=ot&search=in hnx&lfr"" 11a...

9/7.~/?.01 ?
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KNK Hauling LLC.
25311145th ST SE
Monroe WA. 98272
206-240-3433
KN KHauling@yahoo .com

INVOICE
Invoice Number: 1019
Invoice Date: 2-27-12

Customer Information:
Billina Address:

Job Address:

Company:

Company:

Address:

Mark porcello
20124 186m NE

Address:

City/State/Zip

Woodinville WA. 98077

City/State/Zip

Name:

Name:

same
same

Shipping Method: !L . :_T:..::
ru:.=c.:.::
c ki.:.c
ng..___ _ _ __ _ _ _ ____
Order Information:
Qty

Product Description

Amount

Concrete disposal
Haulino concrete blocks
Diesel fuel for excavator

$150
$125

$158.40

Tax:

$433.40
$41.17

Grand Total:

$474.57

Subtotal:
- -•-

Notes:

Additional Information: Sales, Events, Conditions of Sale, or other policies can be mentioned here.
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l
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Mot e S!a!Ving .
More doing;··'
18333 120TH AVE NE BOTHELL
MANAGER JASON PELLOW

42~;-!JQ6-9300

4712 00025 89455
07/ 15/12 l)<l:5il PM
CASHIER PATRICK - PAM3143
0322478,15007 2CF NS A'JV "'A-'
2 CU FT SCOTTS NATSCPS ADV RED MULCH
3@4, 97
1'1. 91
0322478\i5006 2CF NS AOVBL A>
2 CU FT SCOTTS NATSCPS ADV BLK MULCH
3@4. 97
14 .91
CUSTOMEH AGREEMENT# 499237
RECALL AMOUNT
153. 00
0

SUBTOTAL
SALES TAX
TOTAL
xxxxx~:X)(X)(XX0879 VISA
AUTH CODE 055560/3253107

I

182 .82

17 .37
$200 .19
200 _19
TA

Ii111111111111111 i IIIIIII Ill lllll IIliillllll lI!lll

47:.2 25 89455 07/15/2012 925{)

A

il

RETl~N POUCY DEFINITIONS
POLICY ID
DAYS
POLICY EXPIRES ON
l
90
10/ 13/2012

THE HOME DEPOT RESERVES THE RI<iHT iO

LIMIT / DENY RETURNS _ PLEASE

SEE THE

RETURN POLICY SIGN IN STORES FOR
DETAILS .

BUY ONLINE PICK-UP IN STORE
AVAILABLE NOW ON HOMEDEPOT .COM.
CONVENIENT. EASY AND MOST ORDERS
READY IN LESS THAN 2 HOURS!

Page 122

M,ore saving.

More doing:-'
32!:: 120TH AVE NE, BELLEVUE, WA 98005
~-r MGI< D1\LE M:\~:KEY (425)<-151-7'.351

4711 001)12 8580f
09/09/12
CASHTEH .\MANDA - ANT'.1416

1L36 AM

648!::41305-3899 REC(F• SAW <A>
99. 97
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Key Private Bank

investments I trust I banking

Mail Code: WA-31-18-0238
601 108th Avenue N.E. STE 260
Bellevue. WA 98004

August 7, 2013

RE: Mark Porcello Inc
Checking acct. ending in 4004

To Whom it may concern:
The purpose of this letter is to confirm that on January 15, 2013, Ann Porcello deposited
$30,000.00 into the above mentioned account for the purpose of repayment of expenses
incurred from the Woodinville house.
Please feel free to contact me should you have any questions at (425) 468-3306.

Sincerely,

Karen Anderson
Key Bank
Relationship Associate - Team Lead

Key Private Bank is part of KeyBa11k National Association (KeyBank}. Bank and trust products are provided by KeyBank, Member FDIC and Equal Housing
Lender. Credit products are subject to credit approval. Investment and insurance products are:
NOT FDIC INSURED • NOT BANK GUARANTEED • MAY LOSE VALUE • NOT A DEPOSIT
• NOT INSURED BY ANY FEDERAL OR STATE AGENCY

Key Private Bank does not give legal advice.

AJLJft-l.li
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https://mail.googie.com/mail/? ni=2&ik=4 ...

Pagel of l

Abby Trifeletti <abby@porcelloestatebuyers.com>

PSE
1 message

Abby Trifeletti <abby@porcelloestatebuyers.co m>
To: Kalyn Porcello <Kalyn@porcelloestatebuyers.com>

Fri, Jul 12, 2013 at i 2:36 PM

A/C # !5 /b1002;.22
20124 186th Place NE
Balance Paid $ 2806.35
Payments made today to PSE via Bill Matrix:
$1100.00 Confinnation # 193924
$1100.00 Confinnation # 193924
$ 606.35 Confirmation# 193624

nps:i/mail google .comlmail/?ui==2&ik=48300327 l 4&view=pt&scarch=sent&th= l 3fd4627b4 7ab5f5

7112/2013
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.,111 Sprint

3G

4:17 PM

92% liiiJi

Jul i, 2013, 9:58 PM

You are breaking my girls
hearts. It not our fault you
failed to get mark help .
Ann I tried to get support
from all of you~You.don't
have to ruin the future of
my girls. Why would you
sell my house off like that I
could finish it in a week
being you are actually
following through with
your threats ... l have
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.1111 Sprint 3G

'

4:17 PM

'

92% ~

your threats ... I have
worked so hard on my
house and you are taking
money from my girls by
not letting me finish .. They
want to ask you why we
have to move and why
dad is not home.. You
should let them ask you.
They deserve an answer
Jul 2, 2Ci3, 4:i3 PM

Hello
I realize that this is a very
emotional situation for
everyone involved. I
wanted to tell you that I
am not trying to delay the
sale of the house. I have
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Ashbaugh Beal

440 0 C olumbia C en ter
'70 I Fifth Avenue
Seattle, WA 9ll104
'.20 (3 / '.3fl() - 5900

JOSEPH A STOCKTON
JSTOCKTON@LAWASRESULTS.COM

August 7, 2013

VIA EMAIL
Judge Terrance A Carroll
2212 Queen Anne Avenue North #341
Seattle, WA 98109

RE :

Claimant Ann Porcello v. Respondent Jennifer Maggard

Dear Judge Carroll :
Jennifer Maggard 's submissions relating to her alleged "claims" only demonstrate her
continued pattern of not telling the truth, furthering her attempts to mislead the Arbitration .
Her "claims" are completely unsupported, contradictory, confusing, and unsupported by law.
We are especially troubled by her claims that she is owed $100,000 for the down payment of
the house and an additional $10,000 for a w ire transfer relating to the house, as from the
onset of this litigation, Ann Porcello has provided the Arbitrator and the parties conclusive
evidence of her earnest money and down payment for the Woodinville house, all directly from
her banking records. Ms. Maggard's claims therefo re defy logic, facts, the rule of law, and
good faith . Moreover, in Ms. Maggard 's previous emails to the tribunal, she has even admitted
that Ann is rightful owner of the house. As a result, Judge Carroll should not continue to
accept her blatant disrespect for the judicial process. Ms. Maggard's fraudulent claims
should be dismissed with prejudice.
Nevertheless, this letter addresses the following issues: ( 1) Ms. Maggard's lack of
cooperation with the sale of the house, along w ith the prospects of sale in the near future ; (2)
a reiteration of Ann 's position that the house must be vacant by August 15, 2013 ; (3) a
breakdown of the mortgage, anticipated selling costs, and expenses that Ann has incurred as
a resu lt of the purchase and improvements of the house ; (4) a response to Ms. Maggard 's
alleged "claims"; and (5) a re iteration of Ann 's demand for attorneys' fees pursuant to
Paragraph 12 of the CR 2A Agreement dated May 14, 2013, demand for rent and utilities,
and demand for sanctions due to Ms. Maggard's continued fraudulent behavior.

1.

Ms. Maggard has not complied with the CR 2A Agreement or the Arbitration
Order, and has not cooperated to sell the house with Jesse Jaynes.

Paragraph 8 of the Arbitration Order dated July 12, 2013, requires Ms. Maggard to "fully and
tim ely cooperate with the sales process including but not limited to working with Jesse Jaynes

ashbaughbeal.com
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regarding open houses, showings, for sale signs, and all other actions/activities that are
necessary to sell the house as determined by Jesse Jaynes." And Paragraph 9 of that Order
requires Ms. Maggard to "maintain the house in a 'show ready' condition." As Mr. Jaynes'
attached declaration demonstrates, Ms. Maggard has continuously failed to comply with
Judge Carroll's Order. Her unwillingness to cooperate with the selling process, combined
with the unauthorized changes she made to the house, have negatively impacted the selling
price of the house and have prohibited Mr. Jaynes from working effectively.
The house has been on the market for 18 days, and there have been only two showings, none
of which produced a viable interest to purchase the house. Ms. Maggard has not been
cooperative with the attempts to sell the house. For example, she has not allowed Mr. Jaynes
to place an MLS Keybox on the home that provides access to the house to other agents.
Using an MLS Keybox is the industry standard for agents showing a house and provides the
listing agent with all of the real time contact information for every agent who shows the house,
thereby allowing the listing agent to follow-up after each showing. Without the MLS Keybox,
it is difficult for Mr. Jaynes to do his job because he is forced to rely on Ms. Maggard, who has
shown that she is not dependable for various reasons, for the contact information of each
agent.
There have been extensive commun ication issues with Ms. Maggard during the selling
process. First, she has not provided a reliable contact number. An agent attempted to reach
Ms. Maggard on the initial number she provided, but a young woman answered the phone and
claimed that no one was there named Jennifer. Ms. Maggard then provided a different contact
number, but she rarely answers calls and the voicemail is not activated so agents cannot leave
messages. Mr. Jaynes therefore contacts Ms. Maggard via email on behalf of the agent to
arrange a showing with at least 24 hours of notice, but Ms. Maggard does not respond until
usually two hours before the desired showing time. This process is cumbersome for agents
wishing to show the house, and Mr. Jaynes believes that as a result many agents are
foregoing attempts to show the house all together.
Mr. Jaynes has emailed his concerns to Ms. Maggard on multiple occasions, but Ms. Maggard
refuses to accommodate his requests . (Ex. A, Jaynes Dec)
To date, there are only two recorded house showings. Ms. Maggard has not provided any
evidence of additional showings, despite Mr. Jaynes' repeated requests for the contact
information for any other showing agent. The only agent to provide feedback of the showing
(a Windermere agent) maintained that the house was dirty and filled with too many people.
This agent considered the house to be a "project", requiring too much work for the buyer, and
claimed that the changes made to the downstairs layout was awkward and unappealing to
buyers. The patched downstairs carpet, the maze of connected rooms downstairs, the
elevated washer and dryer, and the odd design of the soaking tub and walkthrough shower
(not to mentioned the unfinished driveway and landscaping) have negatively impacted the
price of the house and has made it difficult for Mr. Jaynes to sell the house for its maximum
potential value. The changes that Ms. Maggard alleges to have made, therefore, have
negatively impacted the value of the house.
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Based on the problems with the house conditions and the restrictions of showings, both
being the fault of Ms. Maggard, there has been a negative impact on the selling price. Mr.
Jaynes believes the house is overpriced, but may sell for $550,000, although it may not even
sell at all. However, Mr. Jaynes believes that the house will sell for its highest potential once
the house is vacant and no one is present during showings, so he can market the house in
clean manner and with an MLS Keybox as is the industry standard. If, on the other hand, Mr.
Jaynes attempts to sell the house under the status quo, the pricing wi ll undoubtedly suffer.

2.

The House must be vacant by August 15, 2013.

Ann maintains her position that Ms. Maggard, and everyone else living there, must vacate the
house by August 15, 2013 . Considering Ann's age and condition, the stress that she has
incurred as a result of this litigation cannot be healthy. Ann is also in fear of her and her
family's lives based on the threats made by Ms. Maggard. It is clearly in everyone 's best
interest for Ms. Maggard to vacate the house so that it can be sold, and that the parties
separately move on from this ordeal.
Further, as previously discussed above, Ms. Maggard must vacate the house so that Mr.
Jaynes can have the opportunity to sell it at its maximum potential value. The house simply will
not sell with Ms. Maggard still living there, obstructing the entire selling process.

3.

Ann will have contributed an estimated $300,000 in the purchase,
improvement, maintenance and sale of the house, while a principal
mortgage remains of $287,660.09.

Notwithstanding the mortgage principal balance, Ann has contributed close to $300,000 in
value to the house. First, it is undisputed that Ann paid $6,000 for the earnest money deposit
and $93,394.49 for the down payment. (Ex. A, Ann Dec.) Currently, the mortgage principal
balance is approximately $287,660.09. (Ex. C, Ann Dec.) Because the mortgage was initially
$322,622.12, Ann has already paid $34,962.03, not including interest.
Ann has also incurred significant expenses to improve and renovate the property. For
example, on June 4, 2012, she paid $34,438.10 to JC Enterprises for remodeling services,
such as building the deck. (Ex. D, Ann Dec.). She also paid $30,654 for plumbing and
landscaping services so that the house could be habitable for the ch ildren. (Ex. E, Ann Dec.)
Additionally, Ann has reimbursed Mr. Porcello for expenses he incurred to improve the
property. For example, Ann paid him $30,000 on January 15, 2013, and $18,807 .62 on April
18, 2013, to account for improvements he made to the house. (Ex. F, Ann Dec.)
Ann has solely been responsible for the property tax too, which has amounted to $13,481 .29,
as she paid $6,974.71 in property tax in 2013 and $6,506.58 in 2012. (Ex. B, Ann Dec.).
She also recently paid $2,806.35 to account for the outstanding utilities invoices to the
house. (Ex. G, Ann Dec.) And, as is discussed below, Ann has not received rental payments
from Ms. Maggard since January 2013. Based on the market rent of the house ($2,600 per
month), Ann is owed $15,600 in rent.
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Finally, there will be significant out-of-pocket closing costs associated with the sale of the
house. As Mr. Jaynes' declaration indicated, the estimated seller's cost is approximately 8%
of the selling price. (Jaynes Dec.) Thus, if the house actually sells, the seller's cost may range
from $45,010.60 to $51,061.86, depending of course on the final selling price. (Jaynes Deel.)
Based on all of these factors, Ann will have contributed close to $300,000 in connection with
the purchase, repairs, maintenance , and sale of the house. This figure also does not consider
the principal mortgage to be paid, nor the rent and sanctions Ann is owed, as discussed
below.

4.

Ms. Maggard has not proven she is entitled to a single reimbursement.

Ms. Maggard has not produced an iota of evidence that entitles her to a reimbursement under
Paragraph 8 of the CR 2A Agreement provides reimbursement
the CR 2A Agreement.
based on Ms. Maggard's "contributions of money and labor toward the purchase and
improvement of the house in an amount that she can prove, as determined by Judge Carroll."
Further, under the Washington lien statute, one can only apply a lien for the labor or
equipment used for the "improvement of real property". RCW 60.04.021. Thus, pursuant to
both the CR 2A Agreement and the RCW, Ms. Maggard must prove that she actually
improved the property.
Here , Ms. Maggard has provided no evidence that she improved the property. To the
contrary, the evidence shows that any changed she did make, actually damaged the property
value-not an improvement.
Ms. Maggard, did however, produce a spreadsheet with no supporting documentation.
Within the spreadsheet, there is no way to respond to her claim that she is owed $100,000
for the mortgage down payment and $10,000 for a money transfer other than that she is
being untruthful towards the tribunal. Ms. Maggard has not provided any evidence to support
these alleged claims. On the other hand, Ann has continuously provided the documentation
proving her purchase of the house.
Along with the spreadsheets, Ms. Maggard, for an unknown reason , included summaries and
documentation of purchases made by Mr. Porcello, an amount around $12, 393.67. But Ms.
Maggard is not entitled to reimbursements for any Mr. Porcello 's purchases. He made those
purchases on behalf of Ann, and Ann has been reimbursing Mr. Porcello accordingly. For
example, on January 15, 2013, Ann reimbursed Mr. Porcello $30,000 and on April 17, 2013,
Ann reimbursed Mr. Porcello $18 ,807.62 for improvements made to the property. (Ex. F, Ann
Dec).
Finally, Ms. Maggard submitted around hundred pages of random receipts. These receipts
cannot entitle Ms. Maggard to any claim though because (1) they do not prove that she made
the purchase ; (2) they do not prove that the receipts are related to the property; and (3) they
do not prove that the purchases actually improved the property. In reality , many of the
receipts are irrelevant to the entire matter as they were for the purchase of snacks, beverages,
or disposable household items-none of which qualify as a reimbursement. The following list
demonstrates the just some of the irrelevant purchases from the receipts that Ms. Maggard
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seeks reimbursement: Charmin; Mtn Blast ; Meat Snack; Powerade; Reese's ; Glowstick; Beef
Jerky; Mints; Cornuts; Coke; Wonder Mop; Bath Squeegee ; Gloves; Fries; Chex Mex ; Tide
Liquid; Fabric Softener; Soap; Mirror ; Dust Pan; Area Rug; Rug Gripper; Air Freshener; Mini
Blind ; Fuel; Spa Accessories; and a Camera.
There is also no evidence that Ms. Maggard actually made any of the purchases documented
by the receipts. Judge Carroll should be aware of three important points in this regard. First,
several of the receipts are made with store credit. This suggests that Ms. Maggard was likely
making significant returns of products that were not used to improve the house, and which
she may not even had initially purchased, and then exchanging them to make an additional
purchase. With that in mind, it is impossible to determine what, if any products were actually
used to improve the house or purchased by Ms. Maggard. Second, many of the receipts Ms.
Maggard claims were paid with Mr. Porcello's credit card (numbers 0879 and 0803), which is
confirmed by Mr. Porcello's credit card statement. (See Ex A, Mr. Porcello Dec.) Third, there
are additional receipts made by payments from credit card number 9069 . Ms. Maggard has
not provided any evidence that this cred it card was hers or that she was making any such
payments for the incurred charges.
And to address Ms. Maggard 's claim to travel expenses. She has not provided any evidence
that she actually drove the miles she claimed with her vehicle. Her claim is completely
arbitrary and she bases the amount of claim on the invoice of a contractor hired for a series of
projects that did not bill for "travel expenses". Further, her assertion that $3.45 per mile is
"lower than today's industry standard" lacks any type of support, especially considering that
IRS defined standard mileage rates for 2013 is 56.5 cents per mile. (Ex. 8, Stockton Dep.)
Accordingly, Ms. Maggard's claim for travel expenses lacks merit, support, and is made in bad
faith, and should therefore be ignored.
Simply stated, Ms. Maggard has provided no evidence, such as bank records or credit card
statements, that she made a single payment to improve the house. Without itemizing her
direct expenses to actual permanent improvements of the house, Ms. Maggard cannot be
entitled to a reimbursement.

5.

Ann reiterates her previous demands for rent, attorneys' fees, and
sanctions.

At this time, Ann makes the following demands: (1) all rent owed to date for allowing Ms.
Maggard to live in the house ; (2) her attorneys' fees for enforcing the CR 2A Agreement and
defending Ms. Maggards baseless claims; (3) that Ms. Maggard be sanctioned for cont inued
bad faith throughout this entire process.
First, Ann reiterates her request for rent payments from her letter dated June 27, 2013, which
is hereby incorporated by reference. The amount of rent owed has now increased to
$15,600. Ann never agreed to allow Ms. Maggard, nor anyone else, live in the house free of
rent. To hold otherwise results in a grave financial injustice to Ann.
Second, pursuant to Paragraph 12 of the CR 2A Agreement, Judge Carroll has the authority
to issue attorneys' fees for disputes arising out of the Agreement. As the evidence
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demonstrates, nearly all of the disputes contained herein are the result of Ms. Maggard's
failure to comply with the CR 2A Agreement and the Arbitration Order. Her lack of
cooperation with Mr. Jaynes, along with her completely fraudulent claims to reimbursements
has caused vast legal expenses. It is unfair to Ann to have to incur these legal expenses
simply to enforce the Agreements and to defend against Ms. Maggard's frivolous claims.
Accordingly, Judge Carroll should award Ann her attorneys' fees . Ann requests that she be
allowed to submit documents reflecting her attorneys' fees after the Arbitrator rules .
Third, Judge Carroll should sanction Ms. Maggard for her continued attempts to deceive the
tribunal. As the evidence demonstrates, Ms. Maggard has made completely false claims
relating to the down payment and mortgage of the house, relating to purchases that she could
not have made, and relating to purchases that could not have been used for the improvement
of the house. Such disrespect for the judicial process should not go without consequence.
Ms. Maggard also attempted to deceive the Arbitrator on July 17, 2013, when claimed in a
series of emails that Greg Butler had "not one but two buyers waiting with offers beginning at
$645,000" to purchase the Woodinville house. This statement was completely false , as Greg
Butler has never conveyed to Ms. Maggard that he has a specific buyer, let alone multiple
buyers, waiting to purchase the house for any price. Further, despite Ms. Maggard's claims,
Mr. Butler has not inspected the premises in over 60 days, and is therefore unaware of the
present condition of the house to provide listing price recommendations. Mr. Butler confirmed
all of these facts in a conversation on July 18, 2013. (Ex A, Stockton Dec.)
Finally, Ms. Maggard should be sanctioned for her harassment and manipulation of Ann.
Notwithstanding orders to the contrary, Ms. Maggard has continued to contact Ann, and has
even threatened Ann. For example, Ms. Maggard sent Ann a series of text messages as
recent as July 1, 2013, in which Ms. Maggard made the following accusations :
"You are breaking my girls hearts."
"It [is] not our fault you failed to get [M]ark help."
"You don't have to ruin the future of my girls."
"[The children] want to ask you why we have to move and why dad is not home .. You
should let them ask you." (Ex. H, Ann Porcello Dec.)
Then, around the time of the June 12, 2013, arbitration hearing , Ms. Maggard contacted Ann
and threatened to put Mark in jail if Ann did not give the house to Ms. Maggard. (Ann Dec.) It
is clear that Ms. Maggard has consistently attempted to take advantage of Ann, while
neglecting Judge Carroll's orders, to leverage any alleged claims to the house.
Based on the previous five sections of this letter, we request that Judge Carroll finally resolve
th is dispute so that Ann can achieve justice she deserves.
Thank you for your assistance in resolving this matter.
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Sincerely,

Joseph A. Stockton
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2
3

4

5
SUPERIOR COURT Of WASHINGTON FOR KING COL~T'{

6

7

IN RE : THE ARB1TRA.110 - OF
8
JENJ',;,lfER MAGGAR D.

Petitioner.

9

-◊ .

13-"' -07562-1, E

ORDER O RECU AL OF ARBITRATOR
& REFERRAI, TO PRESIDING JUDGE

10
1l

MARK PORCEU .0
Respondent.

12

13

This matter, having come on for revie-..v folJowing entry of the arbitrator" s mo t recent order

14

of October 16, 2013, and having considered ongoing requirements of the case and comments of

15

counsel.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

16
17
18

The below arbitrator. in light of the ongoing litigation in this matter and the arbitrator's
absenc.e from the country for four months starting Januar., 2014. recuse.· himself from

19

further participation in this matter effective the date or this Order.

L

20
21

The matter is referred forthwith to the Pre. iding Judge of the above court for
consideration of the appointment of sub~Litut' arbitr..ilor (pursuant to those CR2A

22

Agreements benveen the parties dared March

2.

23

n

& 27. 2013. respectively). or assignrnt'nt

of the case to a sitting judge. It is the stnmg preferem:e of the undersigne d arbitrator that.
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given paragraph (3) below and the hi. tory of allegations of violence and ahu:,;e

or process,

the matter be assigned to a sitting j udge. Further. il has been brought to the attention of

2

the undersigned that the petitioner bas again traveled to Idaho with the children in direct

3

violation of the arbitrator\; earlier orders. Therefore. the resources available

a private

arbitrator may be inadequate to protect the best interests of lhe children. as well as to

4

coordinate the various court proce dings. if necessary.

5
6

IO

,

.J.

The t\vo pnmary rema1mng

1SSLlCS

involve a hearing on the pctitioner·s request for

relocation an<l t:mry of a final paren1ing plan following a recenll y arranged parenting

7

eva.luati · n. The undersigned further suggests immediate appointment of a guardian ad

8

litem (GAL ) for the children due to a concern whether the children of the parties are
9

cu.rrendy at risk.

If the partie. cannot ag:ree to a GAL , the arbitrator requests an

appointment by the presiding judge. Further, if the children remain out of school. the
Coun should consider a referral to Children ·s ProteCli e Servic-es (CPS).

11

RCW 26.12. 170.
12

13

4.

Any fees of a GAL. as well as those of the undersigned, are to be paid in full by the

respondent as per the parties' agreement.

14

15
16

Datt'd thiel~da. of October. 20 13

2e:~n-~ d - c~--cr1
Judge Terrence Carroll. ret. Arbitrator

17
56'-? v r.:.

19

/t: /t o4~u>--u c .,. / Lq ~

Raegan Rasnic.
Attorney for Respondent

/

c,/i,_k.3

fe

,?

v~ JJ eje__Jg_.e..~ ·c.L/&;

Greg Esau.
Attorney for Petitioner

20
21

22
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HENRY D. MADSEN
MADSEN LAW OFFICES, P.C.
l 044 Northwest Blvd., Suite B
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83 814
Telephone: (208) 664-8080
Facsimile: (208) 664-6258
ISBN 4428
Attorney for Defendants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
JENNIFER J. PORCELLO,
Case No. CV16-7343
Plaintiff,

ORDER OF DISMISSAL
vs.
ANTHONY J. PORCELLO and ANNIE
C. PORCELLO, husband and wife,
Defendant.
The Court having before it the Stipulation of the parties, having considered the matter and
the pleadings on file herein, now therefore:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion for Preliminary Injunction is hereby dismissed
and the hearing dated December 20, 2016 vacated.
IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED that attorney fees and costs associated herewith
shal1 be reserved by the Comt upon final judgment in the above matter and further argument by
the parties.
DATED this

ORDER

$

yoft.O~
0ctobct, 2016
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the J!'j;_ day of December, 2016, I caused to be served a
true and conect copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the
following:
Terrance R. Harris
RAMSDEN, MARFICE, EALY
& HARRIS, LLP

[x] Facsjmile To: (208) 664-5884

Henry D. Madsen
MADSEN LAW OFFICES, PC

[x] Facsimile To: (208) 664-6258

Clerk of tlie Court

ORDER
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HENRY D. MADSEN
MADSEN LAW OFFICESJ P.C.
1044 Northwest Blvd., Suite B
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814
Off: (208) 664-8080
Facsimile: (208) 664-6258
ISB #4428
.
.

Attorney for Defendants/Counter-claimants/fhird Patty Plaintiffs
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
JENNIFER PORCELLO,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV-16-7343
ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM
AND TffiRD PARTY COMPLAINT

vs.

ANTHONY J. PORCELLO and ANNIE
C. PORCELLO, husband and wife,
Defendants.
ANTHONY J. PORCELLO and ANNIE
C. PORCELLO, hu_sbnnd and wife,
Counter-Plnintiffs,
vs.

JENNIFER PORCELLOJ
Counte1'-Defendant.

ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM AND
THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT
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ANTHONY J. PORCELLO and ANNIE
C. PORCELLO, husband and wife,
Third Party Plaintiffs,

VS ,

MARK PORCELLO,
Third Part Defendant.
COMES NOW Defendants, Petitioner ANTHONY J. PORCELLO and ANNIE C.
PORCELLO, by and through their attornoy of record, Henry D. Madsen of Madsen Luw
Offices, P.C., and In answer to Plaintiff's Complaint filed on October 5, 2016 herein admit,
deny and allege as follows:

ADMISSIONS AND DENIALS
1.

Defendant, ANTHONY PORCELLO states that ANNIE PROCBLLO is no

longer competent to make answers to Plaintifrs allegations therefore all answers hereinafter
are made by ANTHONY PORCELLO.
2.

Defendants admit the allegations contained in Pruagraphs, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7,

8, 9, 26, 36, nncl 37 of Plaintiff's Complaint.
3.

Defendant denies the allegations contained in Paragraphs 31, 32, 33, 34, 38

39, 40, 48, 49, 50, 52, 53, 54, 55, of Plaintiffs Complaint.
4.

Defendants lack sufficient information and belief to admit or deny

Pai-agraphs 20, 22, 23, 28, and 30.
5.

As to the allegations 41, 47, and 51 to the extent they require an answer,

defendant answers co11sistent with Defendanl's answers above.
6.

As to the allegations commonly referred to as ''Prayer for Relief', to the

ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM AND
THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT
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extent said allegations require an answer) Defendant denies.
7.

As to Paragraph 10 of the Complaint, Defendant denies that they encouraged

JENNIFER to stay admit that JENNIFER was allowed to stay at a prope1ty Respondent's
owned in King County but deny the remainder of the allegations therein.
8.

As to Paragraph 11 of the Complaint, Defendant admits that JENNIFER

located the Woodenville home and affirmatively a1leges that she tried to pmchase the same
but could not qualify so Defendant purchased the home and does not have sufficient
information to form a belief as to the remaining allegations therein.
9.

As to Paragtaph 12 of Plaintiff's Complaint, Defendant admits that Jennifer

was not able to secure financing, and the purchase contract was in AM and Tony's name, but
deny that Mark contributed in the purchase, and affirmatively allege that the agreement was
that the Plaiutiffs, Mark and Jennifer would pay rent while living in the home and that if they
wished to keep the home after a few years that they needed to l'efmance into their name and
reimburse the Defendants all of their investment.
8.

As to Paragraph 13 of Plaintifrs Complaint Defendants admit that Jennifer

spent time making the home appear in better condition, hllt affirmatively allege that there fa
no proof of any financial investment and that all claims were denied by Judge Carroll.
Fu1ther, the l'enovntions were paid by Ann and Mark and tho.t most of what Mark paid out
was later reimbursed by Ann, including payment to any family members. Once Mark
moved out Jennifer failed to make rent payments. Defendant doesn't not have sufficient
information to foim o. belief as to the remaining allegations thel'efote denies the 1rnme,
9.

As for Parngrnph 14, Defendant admits that JENNIFER was evjcted from the

Woodenville home os the arbitrator found tbat JENNIFER hnd no right or interest in and to

ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM AND
THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT
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said prope1ty and further admit JENNIFER and MARK were having problems with their
relationship but ha9 insufficient information to form a belief as to the remaining allegations
therefor denies the same.

IO.

As to Paragl'aph 15 of Plaintiff's Complaint Defendant admits jn pint that

Jennifer and Mark remarried in November 2013 and later wanted to purchase the Hayden
home, but denies in pait that they would be allowed to use the Woodinville house proceeds
but lacks sufficient information to admit or deny the remaining allegations therefore denies.

11.

As to Paragraph 16 of Plainti:trs Complaint Defendant denies in part that

Annie requested Jennifer to return to Woodinville in June 2014, but admits that Mark and
Jennifer paid for work and materials for renovations, and affirmatively alleges that most of
all these costs for materials were reimbursed by Defendants.
12.

As for Paragraph 17, Defendant admits to signing Exhibit A which is a true

and correct copy as to the bandw1itten note but denies the remainder of the allegations
there1n.
13.

As fol· paragrnph 18, Defendant admits that they assisted JENNIFER and

MARK in purchasing the Hayden Home by refinancing their other properties to not only
provide the purchase money but to addxess other financial assistance to JENNIFER and

MARK culminating Jn JENNIFER and MARK signing the Noto and Deed of Trust givjng
Defendant a security interest in and to said Hayden Home to insure the repayment thereof
but does not have sufficient information to admit or deny the remaining allegations therefore
denies the same.

14.

As to Paragraph 19, Defendant admits that the WoodenviJle home was

financed by the Legacy loan and denies that the $48,577.62 went to Defendant but

ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM AND
TffiRD PARTY COMPLAINT
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afthmatively alleges that said proceeds went to MARK and does not havo sufficient
jnformation to for an opinion as to the remaining allegations therefore denies the same.
15.

Defendant admits the allegations as to Exhibit D and E being a true and

co1Tect copy of the Note and Deed of Trust with regard the Haydon home and that MARK
and JENNIFER signed the s11me but does not have sufficient information to form an opinion
M

to the remaining allegations therefore denies the same.
16.

As to Paragraph 24 of Plaintiff's Complaint Defendants admit in part that the

Woodinville home was listed for sale and did not sell during the period of July 2014 through
December 2014; admits MARK and JENNIFER made all interest only payments on the
Legacy Group Capital, LLC loan but denies that MARK or JENNIFER paid of the loan.
17.

As to Paragraph 27 of Plaintiff's Complaint Defendant admits in part that

they received another loan to pay off Legacy Group and for the amounts as stated therein,
but denies that the Indinn Wells home jg owned by MARK.
18.

As to Paragraph 29 of Plaintiff's Complaint Defendants admit in part that the

Woodinville home sold, but denies_in part that they received the proceeds from the sale, a11d
affirmatively alleges that the proceeds were paid to MARK.

AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
Jn asserting the following defenses, Defendant does not assume the bmden of
provjng any element thereof which any applicable case law, common Jaw, statute, ntle,
regulation or other authority places upon Plaintiff.
l.

Each and every clnim for relief in the Complaint fails to state a claim u_pon

whlch relief may be granted ago inst Defendants.
2.

Plaintiffs Complaint fails, in whole or in port, to allege a basis for the relief

ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM AND
TIDRD PARTY COMPLAINT
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claimed.

3.

Plaintiff's claims are barred, in whole or jn patt, by the applicable statutes of

limitation.

4.

Plaintiffs claims are baned, in whole or in part, by the doctrine of equitable

estoppel, judicial estoppel, and/or promissory estoppel.
S.

Plaintiff's claims are barred, in whole or in patt, by the doctrine of unclean

hands, and in pari delicto.
6.

Plaintiff's claims are b1med, in whole or in part, by the doctrine of waiver.

7.

Plaintiff's claims are baned, in whole or in pa1t, by the docufoe of consent.

8.

Plaintiff's claims are baned by the terms of the contracts at issue.

9,

Plaintiff is not entitled to and are otherwise ban:ed frotn recovery beyond

actual damages, if any.

11.

PlAintiff has suffered no damages.

12.

Plaintiffs claims foil fol' a lack of consideration.

13.

Plaintiff's claim for recovery of her damages, in any, are baned, in whole or

in part, by failing to mitigate said damages.
14.

Plaintiff hAs failed to join necessary and indispensable parties.

15.

Plaintiff's alleged dAmages, if MY, were caused solely by Plaintiff's own

negligence, or by her comparative

01·

conttibutory negligence or wrongful acts and said

claims should be bimed.
16.

Plaintiff's allegations as denied by Defendru1ts are without legal grounds and

justification as to be proven in further proceedings accordingly hernwith.

ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM AND
THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT
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COUNTERCLAIM/I'HIRD PARTY COMPLAINT
Counterclaimants/Third Party Plaintiffs, ANTHONY J. PORCELLO and ANNIE C.
PORCELLO, by ANTHONY J. PORCELLO (''Defendants", or "ANTHONY and ANNIE")
e-0unterclaims against Plaintiff JENNIFER PORCELLO ("Plaintiff', "Counterdefondant" or

"JENNIPERn) and against Third Party Defendant MARK PORCELLO ("MARK") in this
matter and complains as follows:

GENERAL ALLEGATIONS
1.

Plaintiffs incorpornte all of the previous allegations as previously admitted as

though set forth herein.
2.

Counte1-claimantffhird Party Plaintiff ANTHONY PORCELLO is an

individual residing in the State of Washington, King County.
3,

Counterclaimantffhird Party Plaintiff ANNIE PORCELLO is an individual

residing in the State of Washington, Ki11g County.
4.

Counterdefendant JENNIFER PORCELLO is an individual residing in the

State ofldaho, County of Kootenai.
5.

Third Party Defendant MARK PORCELLO is an individual residing in the

State of California.
6.

This Court has jurisdiction and venue is propor in this Court because the Real

Property, a single family residence located at 1663 E. Northwood Drive, Hayden Lake,
Idaho (hereirn1fter the Real Propel1y), is located in Kootenai County, Idaho. Said Real
Property is legaliy described as:
Lot J, Block B, Fl\itway Glen, occording to the plat thereof, filed ln Book "F" of
Plats 11t page(s) 356, 356A and 35613, recoi-ds ofKooteni,i County, Idaho.
TOGETHER WITH

ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM AND
THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT
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The South 14 feet of the East 100.5 feet of Lot I, Block A, Fairway Glen, according
to the plat thereoffiled In Book "F" of Plats, at page(s) 356, 356A 1rnd 3568, records
of Kootenai County, Ideho.

Commonly known as 1663 East North.wood Drive, H11yden Lake, Idaho 83 835.
'fax Parcel No. V550000B003A

7.

ANTHONY and ANNIE are and at all times mentioned herein have been

husband and wife and the parents of MARK.
8.

JENNIFER and MARK first married in 2003, were divorced in 2007,

remarried in 2013 and divorced in 2016. At all pertinent times mentioned heroin MARK and
JENNIFER were either married or co-habitating.
9.

That ANNIE and ANTHONY assisted MARK and JENNIFER financially

th!'ough the refinance of various propo1ties ANNIE and ANTHONY owned.
10.

That ANNIE and ANTHONY incuned many costs associated with the

refinancing of their properties when financially assisting MARK and JENNIFER.
11.

That sAid financial assistance became substantial and culminated i11 the Note

and Deed of Trust as to the Hayden home.
12.

On or about September 3, 2014, JENNIFER and MARK signed a Promissory

Note in the principal sum of Six Hundred Forty Eight Thousand Five Hundred Dollars imd
No Cents ($648,500.00) in favor of ANTHONY and ANNIE. A true and correct copy of
said Promissory Note is attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and incorporated by this reference as
thot1gh set fol'tll in full hereat.
13.

On

01·

about September 3, 2014, to secure the Promissory Note referred to

herein, JENNIFER and MARK signed a Deed of Trust concerning the Real Property. A true
and correct copy of said Deed of Trust is nltached hereto as Exhibit "B" and incorporated by

ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM AND
THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT
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this reference as though set forth in full hereat.
14.

MARK and JENNIFER has failed to pay the interest payments as required by

said Note no1· any payment at all and said Note is past due and owing in the full amount of
$648,500.00 plus interest and attomey fees and costs.

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
Against Plaintiff/Counterdefendnnt JENNIFER PORCELLO,
and ag11iost Third Party Defendant MARK PORCELLO
Foreclosure of Real Propcrfl'.
15.

The prior allegations of this Counterclaim and Third Party Co1nplaint are

incorpornted here as though set forth in full hereat.

16.

The claimed interests in the Real Property by JENNIFER and/ot MARK are

all subsequent to and inferior to the interest of ANTHONY and ANNIE under the Deed of
Trust.
17.

The fair rniu-ket value of the Real Property is llnknowu. nt present and will be

established at trial.
18.

ANTHONY and ANNIE have incurred costs and attorneys' fees related to

this action and for the enforcement of the secured obligations, which they are entitled to
recover, both under law i1nd pursuant to the terms of the Deed of Trust and Note.
19.

No other suit or action is cunently instituted to foreclose the Deed of Trust

and ANTHONY and ANNIE have no other plain, speedy or adequate l'emecty at law.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF
FOR THE REASONS STATED ABOVE, ANTHONY and ANNIE pray the Collrt

for judgment and decree as folJows:
1.

That JENNIFER'S Complaint be dismissed and she take nothing thereby;
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That ANlHONY and ANNIE are the holder of Note and Deed of Trnst

which are valid and enforceable, and they ere entitled to enforce the same as the real party

in

interest;
3.

That the usual decree may be made for the sale of the Real Prope1ty

according to law and the practice of this Court and that the proceeds of said sale shall
be
applied in payment of amounts found due to ANTHONY ruid ANN1E and the co9ts
and
expenses of this action;
4.

That the Counterdefendant and Third Pa1ty Defendant be required to properly

plead the nature of their claims in and to the Real Property or any part thereof;
5.

For au adjudication that the rights, claims, ownersh.ip, liens, titles and

demands of Counterdefendant and Third Party Defendant in the Real Property
are
subsequent to and subject to the Deed of Trnst;
6.

That ANTHONY and ANNIE recovel' their costs, disbursements and

expenses incurred in this action;
7.

For post-judgment interest as allowed by law; and

8.

For such other relief as the Coult deems just nnd equitable.

SIGNED this

/ff;; of January, 2017.
MADSEN LAW OFFICES, P.C.

By: _ _~~~~ -----' ~'4-f J~

H

for ,
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VERIFICATION
)

) ss.

Couhty of King

)

I, ANTHONY PORCELLO, being fast duly swom on oath, deposos and says:
I am a Defendant/Counterclaimant/fhird Party Claimant in the above-captioned
matter; I have rnad the foregoing Answer, Counterclaim, and Third-Patty Complaint, know

to,
:
Imo;!.,
.~Y~

the contents thereof, and believe the same to be true
Dated this at. dayofJanuary, 2017.

my

ANTHONY PORCELLO
SUBSCRlDED AND SWORN to before me this~ day of January, 2017.

C'fll

1to1111,-.•Cllflo.lllt
R•,mleet-y

,......,\IOII' '''""
11

NOTAR.Y PUBLIC in and for the State
of~~~~~' rosidihg nt:_ _ __

CERTIFICATE OF SERV I~E
o/h
f.
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the _j.Q_ day of-~ , 017, I caused to be served
a true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indkated below, and addressed to the
following:
TERRANCE R. HARRIS
RAMSDEN, MARFICE, EALY
&HARRIS
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HENRY D. MADSEN
MADSEN LAW OFFICES, P.C.
1044 Northwest Blvd., Suite B
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814
Off: (208) 664-8080
Facsimile: (208) 664-6258
ISB #4428
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANTS
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
Case No. CV-16-7343

JENNIFER PORCELLO,

ERRATA
[EXHIBITS TO COUNTERCLAIM AND
THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT]

Plaintiff,
vs.

ANTHONY J. PORCELLO and ANNIE
C. PORCELLO, husband and wife,
Defendants.
ANTHONY J. PORCELLO and ANNIE
C. PORCELLO, husband and wife,
Counter-Plaintiffs,
vs.

JENNIFER PORCELLO,
Counter-Defendant.
ANTHONY J. PORCELLO and ANNIE
C. PORCELLO, husband and wife,
Third Party Plaintiffs,
vs,

MARK PORCELLO,
Third Pa

Defendant.

COMES NOW Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs and Third Party Plaintiffs, ANTHONY

ERRATA [EXHIBITS TO COUNTERCLAIM
AND TIDRD PARTY COMPLAINT]
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J. PORCELLO and ANNIE C. PORCELLO, by and through their attorney of record, Henry
D. Madsen of Madsen Law Offices, P.C., pursuant to I.R.C.P. Rule 7(b) and does hereby
submit the attached Exhibits A and B to their Counter-claim and Third Party Complaint which
were inadvertently not submitted with the filing of the Counter-claim/Third Party complaint.
DATED this _l_f day of February, 2017.
MADSEN LAW OFFICES, P.C.

By:

~Y-. MAD
2~
~EN,

H

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the _l!j_ day of February, 2017, I caused to be served
a true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the
following:
TERRANCE R HARRIS
RAMSDEN, MARFICE, EALY
&HARRIS

ERRATA [EXHIBITS TO COUNTERCLAIM
AND THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT]

[x]

Facsimile to: (208) 664-5884
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PROMISSORY NOTE
September 3, 2014

For Value received, the undersigned ("Maker"), jointly and severally, promise to pay to the order of
Anthony J. Porcello and Annie C. Porcello, husband and wife ("Holder"), the principal sum of Six
Hundred forty-Bight Thousand Five Hundred Dollars and No Cents ($648,~00.00) in lawful money
of the United States of America with interest thereon at the rate of twelve percent per annum from
August 29, 2014, computed on a 365/360 basis, payable as _follows:
interest only in the amount or ~-,,i:n.,u, payao1e on uctot>er 1, 1u14; lio,"/UJ.U, payable on
November 1, 2014; and $6,052.67, payable 011 November 29, 2014. The entlre balanc;e of
$648,500.00·sha)l also be payable on November 29, 2014,

If any payment is 15 days or more late, there shall be a late charge of five percent of the amollnt of
· the regularly-scheduled payment.

In onac of failure to pay a.ny lnatallmcnt when due, the holder at his option may dcclorc the whole
principal hereof immediately due aod payable. In case this Note ls collected by an attorney, either
with or without suit, the undersigned hereby 11gree to pay a reasonable attorney's fee.
, This Note is secured by a Deed of Trust of even date executed by the undersigned 011 certain real
property described therein.
The undersig11ed her
ght

presentment, protest, and notice of non-payment. At holders option,
erior Court of the State of Washington, King CO\lnty, Washington.
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DEED OF TRUST
TIDS DEED OF TRUST, Made September 3, 2014 betwc,en Mark Porcello and Jennifer
Porcello, husband end wife herein called GRANTOR, whose address is 10222 NB 8th Street,
Bellevue, WA 98004; Pioneer Title Company of Kootenai County, horeln called TRUSTEE; and
Anthony J. Porcello and Annie C. Porcello, husband and wife, whose address ls 18 17 Jones Ave. NE,
Renton, WA 98056, herein called BENEFJCJARY;
wmJC!J□GTII: Thi,t 0l'AlltO,' do65 hei·6by imYMAbly CR.Alff, DAllCAIN, CDLL A}JD cmivnv
TO TRUSTEB fN lllUST, WITH POWER OF SALE, that property in the County of Kootenei,
State of ld.aho, described as follows:

nm

REAL PROPERTY IS NOT MORE THAN IllGHTY (80) ACRES AND IS NOT
PRINCIPALLY USED FOR Tirn AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION OF CROPS,
LIVESTOCK, DAIRY OR AQUATIC GOODS, OR IS NOT MORE IBAN FORTY (40)
ACRES REGARDLESS OF USE, OR IS LOCATED WITHIN AN INCORPORATED CITY
OR VILLAGE.

See Exhibit A attached hereto and inade a part ht1reof.
TOGETIIER WITH the rents, issues and profits thereof, SUBJECT, HOWEVER, to the right,

power and authority hel"einafter given to and conferred upon Beneficiary to colleot ond apply such
rents, issuos and profits, for the purpose of securing payment of the indebtedness evidenced by a
promissory noto, of even date herewith, executed by Grontor i11 the sum of Six Hundred Forty-Eight
Thn11RRnd Flvo H11nrlrnri Doll11rs l\nd No Cent.<. ($64R,.~OO.OO), with fina.l_ p11ymenr. 1il1r. Novnmhcr
29, 2014, Md to secure paymont of all s11ch further sums as may he,-eafter be los11e-0 or advanced by
the Beneficiary herein to tho Orantor horein, or any or either of them, while record ownar of
prMent interest, for any purposo, and of any ,,ates, drafts or other instruments ropresentlng such
fllfther loans, advances or C1Cpenditures togothor with Interest on all such sums at the rate thereln
provided. Pro'11doo, however, that the making of such further loans, advancos or expendittitos shall
be optional with the Beneficiary, and provided, fu1thor, that ft is the exprMs intention of tho parties
to this Deed of Trust that it shall stand as continuing security until paid for all such advances
togcrherwlih interest thereon.

-i

I

A, To Jlrotect the security of this Deed of Trust, Grnlltor agrees:
(I) To keep s11id property in good condition a11d repair; not to remove or demolish any building
thereon; to complete or restore promptly and in good and workmanliko mannor any building which
.rnay be constructed, damaged or destroyed thereon and to pay when doe all claims for labor
performed And materials furnished therefor; to C-Omply with all laws affecting said property or
requiring any alteratlons or improvements to be made thereon; not to commit or permit waste thereon;
not to corninlt, suffor or permit any act upon said property i,1 violation of law; to cultivate; irrigate,
fe1tilizo, fumigate, pruno and do all other ects which from the character or use of said property
may be reasonably necessary, tho specific enumerations herein not excluding the general,
(2) To provide, maintain and deliver to Beneficial)' tire, vandalism and malicious mischief
insuranco satisfactory to and with loss payable to Beneficiary. The amount collected under any
fire or other insurance policy may be applied by Beneficiary upon any indebtedness secured he1-eby
ond in such order as beneficiary may dctormino, or At option of Beneficiary the entire amount so
collected or any part thereof may be released lo Grantor. Such sppliCAtion or releue shall not
cu1t or waive an)' default or notice of dc,falllt hereunder or liwalldate any act done pursuant to such
notice. The provisions hereof are subject to the mutual agreements of the parties as bolow set fo11h.
1
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(3) To appear in and defend any action or proceeding purporting to affect the security hereof or
the rights or powers of Beneficiary or Trustee end to pay all costs a11d expenses, including cost of
evidence of title and attomoys' fees ln a reasonable sum, in any such action or proceeding in which
Beneficiary or Trustee may appear, and in any suit brought by Beneficiary to foreclose this Deed of
Trust.

(4) To pey: (a) at least ten days before delinquency all taxes 11nd assessmentnffecting said
property, including assessments on appLlrte11ant water stock; (b) whon due, stibjeot to the mutual
agreements of the parties as below set fo11h, all encumbrances, charges and liens, with interest, on
said property or any pa,t thereof, which appear to b6 pdor or superior hereto; (c) all allowable
expenses of this Trust.
(5) Should Grantor fail to make 11ny payment or to do any act ns heroin provided, then Benoficiary or
Tnistee, bul without obligation so to do and without notice to or demand upon Trustor and without
rele1aslng Granter from any obligation hereof, may: make or do the same in such manner and to s11oh
extent as either may docm necessary to prorect the security hereof, Beneficiary or Trustee being
authorized to enter upon said proporty for such purposes; appear in and defend any action or proc.eeding
p11rporting to aff~t the security hereof or the rights or powers of Beneficiary or Trustee; pay, purchase,
contest or compromise any cmcumbrance, charge or lien which in the judgment of either appears to be
prior or 9uperior horc:to; end, in exercising any such power, pay allowable expenses.

(6) To pay Immediately and without demand all sums so expended by Beneficiary or Trusree,
with Interest from date of expendirnre at tho amount allowod b)' law in effect at the dato hereof.

n.

Jt Is mutually agne,1 that:

(I) Any award of damages in connection with any condemnation for public use of or injury to
said property or any part thereof is hereby assigned and shall be paid to BeneticiP1y who may apply or
releaso such moneys received by him in the same manner and with the same effect es above provided for
disposition of proceeds oftire or other h,sursnce.
(2) By accepting payment of any sum secured hereby after its due dare, Beneficisry does not
waive his right either to require prompt payment when due of all other sun,s so secured or to declare
default for failure so to pay,
(3) At any time or from time to time, without liability thorefor and without notice, upon
written request of Beneficiary and presentition of this Deed and said 1101\l for endorsement, and without
11fTecting the personal liability of an)' person for payment of the Indebtedness secured hereby,
Trustee 111ay: reconvey all or any pert of said property; consent to the making of any map or plat
thereof; join in granting any oRSomont thereon; or Join in any ex.te11sion agreement or any agreement
subordinating the lien or charge he1·eof.
(4) Upon written request of Beneficiary stating that all sums sccnred hereby havo boen paid,
And 11pon surrender of this Deed and scid note to Trustoe1 for cancellation and retention and \lpon
pa)'ment of its fees, Trustee shall reconvey, without warranty, the property then held hereunder. The
recitals in a11y reconveyance executed under this deed oftn1st of any matters or facts shall be conclusive
propf of the 1ruthi\.1lness thereof. The grantee in such reconveyance may be described as "the person or
persons legally ontitled thereto."

2
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(3) To appear in and defend a.ny action or proceeding purporting to affect the security hereof or
the rights or powers of Beneficiary or Trustee end to pay all costs a11d expenses, incl11ding cost of
evidence of title and attorneys' fees In a reasonable sum, i11 any suoh action or proceeding In which
Beneficiary or Trustee may appear, and in eny suit brought by Beneficiary to foreclose this Deed of
Trust.
(4) To pey: (a) at least ten do.ys before delinquency all taxes And assessments ·affecting 9aid
property, including 11ssessments on 11ppL1rteno.nt water stock; (b) whon due, s11bject to the mutual
agreements of the pa11ies as below set fo11h, all encumbranC(IS, charges and liens, with interest, on
said property or any p111t thereof, which appear to bB prior or superior hereto; (c) all allowable
expenses of this Trust.
(5) Should Grantor fail to make any payment or to do any act ns heroin provided, then Benoffoiary or
Trustee, bul without obligation so to do and without notice to or demand upon Trustor and without
reloaslng Grantor from any obligation hereof, may: make or do the sa111e in such manner and to s11oh
e11tent as either may doom neeessary to protect the security hereof, Beneficiary or Trustee being
authorized to enter upon said property for such purposes; appear in and defend any action or proceeding
purporting to affe<:t the 9ecurity hereof or the rights or powers of Beneficiary or Trustee; poy, purchase,
contest or cornproml9e any encumb111nce, charge or lien which in the judgment of either appears to be
prior or superior horcto; and, in exertising any such power, pay allowable expenses.

(6) To pay immediately and without den111nd all 9ums so expended by Beneficiary or Trustee,
with Interest from date of expenditure at tho amount allowed by law in effect at the date hereof.

n.

It ls mutually agree,l that:

(I) Any award of damages in connec.tion with any condemnation for public use of or injury to
said properly or any part thereof is hereby assigned and shall be paid to Benefici11ry who may apply or
rele.aso such moneys received by him in the same manner and with the same effect es above pro11ided for
disposition of proceeds of fire or other i11surance.

(2) By accepting payment of any sum secur«l hereby after its due dete, Beneficiory does not
waive his right either to require prompt payment when due of all other 9ums so secured or to declare
default for failure so to pay,
(3) At any time or from time to time, without liability therefor and without notice, upon
wr11ten request ot t:,enet1c1ary e.no presenllltton or t111s ueea ana sa10 not\l tor enaorsement, ano w1tnollt
Affecting the personal liability of any person for payment of the Indebtedness secureo hereby,
Trustee niay: reconvey all or any part of said property; consent to th~ making of any map or plat
thereof; join in granting any oRSomont thereon; or join in any exte11sion agreement or any egreernent
subordinating the lien or chargt1 he1·eof.
(4) Upon written request of Beneficiary stating that all sums scctlred hereby he.vo boen paid,
And 11pon surrender of this Deed and said note to Tn1stoo for cance llation and retention and \1po11
payment of its fees, Trustee shall reconvey, without warranty, the property then held hereunder. The
recitals in any reconveyance executed under this d~d oftn1st of any matters or fa(;ts shall be conclusive
propf of the truthfulness thereof. 11,e grantee in such reconveyance may be described as "the person or
persons legally ontitleo thereto."
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(5) As additional security, Grantor hereby gives to and confers upon Beneficiary tho right, power
1111d authmity, during the contlnuanca of these Trusts, to collect the rents, Issues and profits of se.id
property, rosorvlng unto Orantor the right, prior to any default by GrAntor in payment of any
Indebtedness secured horeby or In performance of any agreement hereunder, to collect ond retain such
rents, issues and profits as they become due e.nd payable. Upon any such default, Beneficiary ,nay 111
any time without notice, either in person, by agent, or by II receiver to be appointed by II court, and
without regard to the adequacy of any security for the indebtedness hereby secured, enter upon 1111d
take possession of said prope1ty or any part thereof, in hls own name s11e for or otherwise collect
such rents, issues and profits, including those past due and unpaid, and apply 1he same, less costs and
expenses of operation and collection, including reasonable attorney's fees, upon any indcbtednes9
secured hereby, and in such order as Beneficiary may detem,ine. The entering upon and taking
possession of said property, the collection of such rents, issues end profits end tho application thereof as
aforesaid, shall not cure or waive any default or notice of default hereunder or invalidate any act done
pl1rsua11t to suoh notice.
(6) Upon dofoult by Gran tor In payment of any indebtedness secured horeby or in perfo1Tlla11ce of 11ny
Agreement heroundor, all sums scoured hereby shall immediately become due and payable at the option of
the 13eneficlary. In the event of dofault, Beneficiary shall execute or cause lhe Trustee to execute a written
notice of such default and of his election to cause to be sold the heroin dosc1ibed property to satisfy the
obligations hereof, and she I! cause such notice to bo recorded In the office of the recorder of each COlllllY
wherein said real property or some part thereof is sit\111ted.

Notice of sale having ooen givon as then required by law, and not less than the time then
required by law having elapsed, Trustee, without do111and on Granror, shall sefl said property at the ti1ne
11nd plAce fixed by it in said notico of sale, oithor as a whole or in separate parcels and in such order
As it may d11tor01lne, at public auction to the highest bidder for cash in lawful
money of tho United
States, payable at time of sale. Trustee shll deliver to the purchaser its d~ convoying tho property so
sold, but without any covenant or warranty express or i1nplied. Tho rociblls in such dee<! of 1111y matters
or facts sh11II be ronclusivo proof of the truthfulness thereof. Any person, includi11g Grantor, Trustee, or
Dcnef'iciary, may purchase at such sale.
After deducting all costs, fees and expenses of Trustee And of this Tr\lst, inclt1ding cost of title
evidence of title and reasonable counsel fees in con,,ectio11 with sale, Tn.1stco shall apply the proceeds of
s11le to payment of: all sums expended under the terms hereof, not then rt1paid, with 11ton1ed Interest at
acon.,ed logt1I judgment reto per annum; all other sums then secured horoby; and th6 rmainder, if any, to
the person or persons legally entitled thereto.
(7) This Deed appllcs to, inures to the bencflt of, and bind9 all parties hereto, their heirs, legatees,
doviseos, ad min lstrators, executors, s11ccessots and assigns. The term Benoticla1y shall mean the holder
and owner of the note secured hereby; or, if the note has boon pledged, tho plodgee thereof. In this Deed,
whenever the contoxt so requires, tho mascullne gender Includes the feminine and/or neuter, nnd the
singular number lncludas tho plural.
(8) Tnistce Is not obligated to notify any party herrito of pending sale under 11ny other Dee<! of Trust
or of any aotfon or proceeding in which Granter, Beneficiary 9r Tnistee shall be a par[)' unless brought by
Trustoo.
(9) In the event of dlssolution or ~igru1tion of the Trustee, the Beneficiary may substitute e tn1stee
or trustees to execute the (111st hereby created, and when any such subsliMion has been filed for record in
the office of the Recorder of the county in which the property herein described i9 situated, it shall be
conclusive evidence of the appointment of such trustee or trustees, and such new tru9tee or trustees
shall succeed to all oftlie powers and duties of the trustees nnmed herein.
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a e that a copy of any Notice of Default &11d a copy of MY Notice of Sale
ant at his address herein before set forth.

State ofldaho, County of Kootenai

_g_1ay

011 this
ofSdrn the year of!Jl¥before me, the undersigned, ll Nota1y Public in and for said
Seate, person~lly appeared Mark Porcello a°Ae JeAAlitt ~eHJelle known or identified to me to be the
person/persons whose namc(s) is/are subsoribod to the within instr\1mo11t, and acknowledged to me that
he/sh· hey exec
the sBme.

State ofldaho
ss,

County of Kootenai

4./fi

On this
day of September, In tho yeor of 2014, boforo me, the undersigned, a Notary Public, porsonally
appeared Jennifer Porcello known or Identified lo me lo bo tho person/persons whoso name 19/aro submibcd to the
within inscrument, and acknowledged ro mo 1h01 hc/sho/lhoy executed rhe same.
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Lot 3, Block B, Fai,way Glen, according to the plat thereof, flied in Book "F" of Plats at page(s) JS6, 356A
And 356B, records of Kootenai County, Jdaho.

TOGETHER WITH
The South 14 feet of the East 100.S feet of Lot 1, Blook A, F,11rway Olen, 11uording to the plat thereoffifed
in Book "P'' of Plats, at page(s) 356, 356A and J56B, records of Kootenai County, Idaho.
Commonly known as 1663 East Northwood Drive, Hayden Lake, Idaho 83835.

T11x P0rcel No.

Y f>SDOOO'BOD3~
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COUNTY OF l<OOTEWJ

Al.ED·

RAMSDEN, MARFICE, EALY & HARRIS, LLP
700 N01thwest BJvd.
P.O. Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336
Telephone: (208) 664-5818
FacsimiJe:
(208) 664-5884
Tenance R. Harris, ISB #5484

~

~)gq6l
2011 HAR -3 PH 2: 1,

Atforneys for PlaintifjlCounter-Defendant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
JENNIFER PORCELLO,
Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant,
vs.

CASE NO. CV-2016-7343
COUNTER-DEFENDANT JENNIFER
PORCELLO'S ANSWER TO
COUNTERCLAIM

ANTHONY J. PORCELLO and ANNIE C.
PORCELLO, husband and wife,
Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs.
ANTHONY J. PORCELLO and ANNIE C.
PORCELLO, husband and wife,
Third Party Plaintiffs,
vs.
MARK PORCELLO,
Third Party Defendant
COMES NOW Counter-Defendant Jennifer Porcello, by and through her counsel of
record, Ramsden, Marfice, Ealy & Han·is, LLP, and responds to Counter-Plaintiffs'
Counterclaim as follows:
Counter-Defendant reaffirms the averments made in her original complaint, and denies
COUNTER-DEf£NDANT JENNIFER PORCELLO'S ANSWER TO COUNTERCLAfM • I
Page 166
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D
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each and eve1y averment of the Counter-Plaintiffs' Counterclaim not herein specifically
and
expressly admitted.

GENERAL ALLEGATIONS
1.

No responsive pleading required.

2.

Admit.

3.

Admit.

4.

Admit.

5.

Admit.

6.

Admit.

7.

Admit.

8.

Admit that Jennifer is mruried to Mark Porcello. Jennifer and Mark have been

married twice. The first marriage ended in divorce in 2007. They remanied in Novem
ber,
2013, and sepru·ated in April 2015 . They are cunently undergoing a second divorce.

9.

Admit only that Counter-Plaintiffs assisted financially with the purchase of a

home in Woodinville, WA, and the purchase of the home in Hayden, ID. Counter-Defen
dant
denies the remainder of the allegations.
10.

Counte r-Defendant lacks information sufficient to fo1m a belief about the truth of

these allegations and, therefore, denies the same.
11 .

Deny.

12.

Deny that Counter-Defendant signed the Note on September 3, 2014, and

affirn,atively states that Counter-Defendant signed the Note on September 4, 2014,
after
receiving assurances from Counter-Plaintiffs' lawyer that the Note would be deemed satisfie
d
once the Woodinville home was sold.
COUNTER-DEFENDANT JENNIFER PORCELLO'S ANSWER TO COUNTERCLAIM
-2
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Deny that Counter-Defendant signed the Deed of Trust on September 3, 2014,

and affirmatively states that Counter-Defendant signed the Deed of Trust on September 4, 2014,
after receiving assurances from Counter-Plaintiffs' lawyer that the Note and Deed of Trust
would be deemed satisfi~d once the Woodinville home was sold.
14.

Deny.

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
15.

No responsive pleading required.

16.

Deny.

17.

No responsive pleading required.

18.

Deny.

19.

Deny and affomatively state that Counter-Plaintiffs' commenced a trnstee sale to

non-judicially foreclose the Deed of Trust and to Counter-Defendant's knowledge and
understanding, said trustee's sale has been postponed by the title company with no future sale
date set but the trustee's sale has not been completely vacated by the title company.

AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
1.

The Counterclaim fails to state a claim against Counter-Defendant upon which

relief can be granted.
2.

Counter-Defendant reasserts and realleges all of the allegations and claims raised

in her Verified Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, Injunctive Relief and Damages as an
affirmative defense to the Counterclaim.
3.

Counter-Plaintiffs' claims are baned, in whole or in part, by the doctrine of

unclean hands, and in pan delicro.

COUNTER-DEFENDANT JENNIFER PORCELLO'S ANSWER TO COUNTERCLAIM - 3
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Counter-Plaintiffs' claims are barred, in whole or in part, by the doctrines of

equitable estoppeJ, judicial estoppel, and/or promissory estoppel.
5.

Counter-Plaintiffs' claims are baned, in whole or in part, by the doctrine of

accord and satisfaction.
6.

Counter-Plaintiffs' claims are ba1Ted, in whole or in part, by the doctrines of

waiver and/or consent.
7.

Counter-Plaintiffs' claims fail for a lack of consideration.

8.

Counter-Defendant is entitled to a set-off against any money found owing to

Counter-Plaintiffs' based on the $150,000.00 obligation set forth in the Verified Complaint.
9.

Counter-Defendant is entitled to a set-off against any money found owing to

Counter-Plaintiffs based on monies that were received by Counter-Plaintiffs that should have
been applied towards payment of the Note at issue, but were instead loaned by CounterPlaintiffs to their son Mark Porcello and/or to other unknown parties for the benefit of Mark
Porcello without the knowledge or consent of Counter-Defendant.

WHEREFORE, Jennifer Porcello prays for judgment as follows:
1.

That the counterclaim be dismissed and that Counter-Plaintiffs take nothing

thereby and that Counter-Defendant recover her costs of suit and attorney's fees pursuant to
Idaho Code§ 12-120 and 12-121.
2.

For such further relief the Court deems just and equitable.

/Ill ....

COUNTER-DEFENDANT JENN!f'ER PORCELLO'S ANSWER TO COUNTERCLAIM - 4
Page 169

Ma.r. 3. 201 7 1:57PM

DATED this
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3 day of March, 2017.
RAMSDEN, MARFICE, EALY & HARRIS, LLP

~
By:

~P=:==:

Terrance R. Hanis, Of the Firm
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

,L

I hereby certify that on the
day of March, 2017, I served a true and conect copy of
the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Henry D. Madsen
Madsen Law Offices, P.C.
I 044 Nmthwest Blvd., Suite B
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814

✓ US Mail
__ Overnight Mail
Hand Delivered
_
Facsimile (208) 664-6258

c:::::::::::.:
C

-

:dri--

Te1rnnce R. Harris
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HENRYD. MADSEN
MADSEN LAW OFFICES, P.C.
1859 N. Lakewood Drivel Suite 201
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814
Off: (208) 664-8080
Facsimile: (208) 664-6258
ISB #4428

AK ~!STRICT C ~
/'

Attorneys for Petitioner
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
JENNIFER PORCELLO,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV-16-7343

ORDER OF ENTRY OF DEFAULT

vs.

ANTHONY J. PORCELLO and ANNIE
C. PORCELLO) husband and wife,
Defendants.

ANTHONY J. PORCELLO and ANNIE
C. PORCELLO, husband and wife,
Counter-Plaintiffs,

vs.
JENNIFER PORCELLO,
Counter-Defendant.
ANTHONY J. PORCELLO and ANNIE
C. PORCELLO, husband and wife,
Third Paity Plaintiffs,

vs.
MARK PORCELLO,
Third Par Defendant.

ORDER AND ENTRY OF DEFAULT

-1
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The Court, having examined the files in the above-entitled action, finds Third Party
Defendant, MARK PORCELLO, was duly and regularly served with the Summons and Third
Party Complaint on the 5th Day of April, 2017 and the CoU1t further finds that the time allowed
by law for Third Party Defendant to answer or otherwise plead to said Third Party Complaint
has passed, and based on Defendants' Motion and Affidavit for Enny of Default and the Third
Party Defendant is mentally competent, is over the age of eighteen (18) years, and is not in the
military service of the United States of America;

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Default of Third Paity
Defendant, MARK PORCELLO, be and it is hereby entered according to law for failure and or
refusal to answer or plead in said cause.
DATED this

q f\--day of May, 2017.

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the _j}_ day of May, 2017, I caused to be served a true
and con:ect copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:

Terrance R. Hanis
RAMSDEN, MARFICE, EALY
&HARRIS
Henry D. Madsen
MADSEN LAW OFFICES, P.C.
Mark Porcello
74933 Hwy 111
Indian Wells, CA 92210

ORDER AND ENTRY OF DEFAULT

(x] Facsimile to: (208) 664-5884

~l/ lfll~ ~ iJ'b

[X] Facsimile to: 664-6258 ~l{if)
[x] US Mail
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M:ark Porcello, Pro Se
74-933 Hwy 111
Indian Wells, CA 92210
Telephone: (425) 766-5900
Third Party Respondent

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL

DISTRICT OF THE

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF
KOOTENAI

JENNIFER PORCELLO,

CASE NO. CV-16-7343

Plaintiff,
vs.

ANTHONY J. PORCELLO and ANNIE C.
PORCELLO, husband and deceased wife,
Defendants.
ANTHONY J. PORCELLO and ANNIE C.
PORCELLO, husband and deceased wife,
vs.

Counter-Plaintiffs,

ANSWER TO TlllRD PARTY
COMPLAINT
C~tegory: I(l)
Fee: $ 136.00
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JENNIFER PORCELLO,
Counter-Defendant.
ANTHONY J. PORCELLO and ANNIE C.
PORCELLO, husband and deceased wife,
Third Party Plaintiffs,
vs.

MARK PORCELLO,
Third Part Defendant.
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COMES NOW, the Third Party Defendant, Mark Porcello, appearing Pro Se, and in
response to the Defendants/Counter-claimants/Third Party Plaintiff's Third Party Complaint,
admits, denies and alleges as follows:
1.
That the Third Party Defendant herein specifically denies each and every allegation in
the Third Party Plaintiffs, Third Party Complaint herein unless specifically admitted

subsequent hereto.
2.

That as to Paragraph 1 of Third Party Plaintiffs Complaint, Third Party Defendant is
unable to admit or deny and therefore denies.

3.
That Third Party Defendant admits Paragraph 2 of Third Party Plaintiffs Complaint.
4.

That Third Party Defendant denies Paragraph 3 of Third Party Plaintiffs Complaint as
Counterclaimant/Third Party Plaintiff Annie Porcello is deceased.

5.
That Third Party Defendant admits Paragraph 4 of Third Party Plaintiffs Complaint.

6.
That Third Party Defendant admits Paragraph 5 of Third Party Plaintiffs Complaint
and avers he also partially resides in the State of Washington.
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7.
That Third Party Defendant admits Paragraph 6 of Third Party Plaintifrs Complaint
with the exception of the legal description which he can neither admit nor deny and therefore
denies.

8.
That Third Party Defendant denies Paragraph 7 of Third Party Plaintiffs Complaint
contending that at all times mentioned ''husband and wife," Annie (wife) is deceased. Third
Party Defendant admits Anthony is his father and Annie is his deceased mother.

9.

That Third Party Defendant denies Paragraph 8 of Third Party Plaintiffs Complaint.
10.
That as to Paragraphs 9 and 10 of Third Party Plaintiff's Complaint, Third Party
Defendant is unable to admit nor deny and therefore denies.
11 .

That Third Party Defendant admits Paragraphs 11 , 12 and 13 of Third Party Plaintiffs
Complaint.
12.
That Third Party Defendant denies Paragraph 14 of Third Party Plaintiffs Complaint.
13.

That Third Party Defendant denies Paragraphs 15, 16, 17, 18 and 19 of Third Party
Plaintiffs Complaint and maintains that "ANNIE" is deceased.
WHEREFORE, having answered, Third Party Defendant prays for judgment as
follows:
ANSWER 10 THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT· 3
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That a Judgment be entered herein in accordance with the admissions, denials

1.

and allegations set forth herein.
2.

That Third Party Defendant be awarded his costs and attorneys' fees for

defending this action.
For such other and further relief as the Court may deem fair and just.

3.

DATEDthis

/Jq

dayof~017.

Third Party Defendant
l{C Ci, I·, ,-ct,,
" •,et

STATE OF ID.r\ffO

)
) ss.

County of :K:eetenai

)

"(C

•I
/..·, l/4f$ ,d<

I, MARK PORCELLO, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

That I am the Third Party Defendant in the foregoing action, that I have read the
to
true to the best
foregoing instrument, know the contents thereof, and believe the
of my knowledge, information and belief.

szme
,.- ~

PORCELLO, Third Party Defendant

.(Cf1~y

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this _lL day of~' 2017.
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TIMOTHY CORDOVA
CommJsslon ii 2065991
Noury Public • California
Riverside County
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Residing at:T"'d;u.,, V-f{fs
Comm. Expires: Apt; I '2-J lO/ Tr
I

1
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the

/

b

day o f ~ ' I caused to be served a

true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the

following:

Henry D. Madsen
MADSEN LAW OFFICES, P.C.
1044 Northwest Blvd., Ste. B
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814

[] U.S. Mail
[ ] Hand Delivered
[ ] Facsimile to: (208) 664-6258

Terrance R. Harris

[) U.S. Mail
[ ] Hand Delivered
[) Facsimile to: (208) 664-5884

RAMSDEN, MARFACE, EALY &
HARRIS
700 Northwest Blvd.
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814
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M a le k, PLLC

STAT£ Of IOAHO
}
COUNTY OF KOOTENAI SS

FILED:

Peter J. Smich IV , ISBN 6997
Jillian H. Caires, ISBN 9130

2017 JUL 27 PH 2: 57

SMITH + MALEK. PLLC
60 1 £ . Fronc Ave . . Ste. 304
Coeur d ' Alene , ID 83814
T el:
208-215-2411
F ax : 208-215-2416
Email: peter@sm ithmalek.co m

jilliaa@smichma)ek com
Attorne)'s for M ark P orcello

TN THE DTSTRTCT C OURT OF THE FTRST JUD TCTAL DTSTRTCT OF THE
STATE OF [DAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

JE

TFER PO RCELLO,
CASE NO. CV-2016-7343

Plaintiff,
ORDER G RANTING THlRD
PARTY D EFEN DANT' S
MOTIO~ T O SET ASIDE EN TRY

VS.

A NT HONY J. PORCELLO and ANNI£ C .
PORC ELLO, hus band and wife,

OF DEFAULT

D efendants .

ANTHOl\Y J. PORCELLO and ANNIE C.
PORC ELLO, husband and wife,
Counter-Plai n ti fT5 ,
vs.

JENNlFER PORCELLO,

ORDE R GR ANTI N G THIRD PARTY DEFE D AN T' S MOTJON T O S ET ASID E ENTRY OF
D EFAULT: I
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S mith

+

M alek F rom: Smith

+

Malek, P L LC

CoLmtcr-Defendant.

ANTHO ·y J. PORCELLO and ANNIE C
PORCELLO, husb a nd and wife,

Third Party Plaintiffs,
vs .

MARK PORCELLO,

Third Party Defendant.

TH1S MATTER HAVTNG COME BEFORE THE COURT ON THJRD PARTY
DEFENDANT M ark Porcello 's motion to set aside the En try of Default, the Court's reasoning
having been staled on Lhe record, and good cause appearing. it is h ereby Ordered that lhe Enl.ty

of Default cnlcred against Thi.rd Party Defendant Mark Porcello on May 11, 201 7 is set aside and

the matter sha.11 proceed on the merits.
DATED

iliis2.U ~ o f July, 2017.

ORDER (,RANTING THIRD PARTY DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SET AS IDE ENTRY OF
D EFAULT: 2

Page 179

.drk

Page 3 of 3

2017-07-25 23:08:21 (GMT)

Smith + Malek From: Smith • M a lek, PLLC

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

c!J7 ,

On July
2017, I caused copies of the foregoing document to be served by the
following methods on the parties listed below as follows, which is the last know11 address for the
listed party: .

TERRA "CER. HARRIS
RAMSDEN, MARFICE, EALY & HARRIS
750 Northwest Blvd
Coeur d'Alene, ID 8381 4
Facsimil e: (208) 664-5884
Allurneys for Plaintiffs
HENRY D . MADSEN
YIADSEN LA\\:' OFFICES, P.C.
1859 K Lakewood Drive, Suite 20 l
Coeur d'Alene, TD 83814
Facsimile : (208) 664-6258
Artorneysfur Defendunts/ Third-Pur(F
Plaintiffs
PETER J. Sl\,IlTH IV
JlLUAN H . CAJRES
SMITH+ MALEK, PLLC
60 I E . Front Ave., Ste. 304
Coeur d'Alene, JD 83814
Facsimile: (208) 215-2416

□

By Hand Deli very
□ By U.S. Mail
0
D Bv
. Ovemi e ht Mail
D Bv Facsimile Transmission

~: 'fii

iYrn@ J).,rr1LhlcuJ. Clni 1

□ By 1laud Delivery
0 By US. Mail
□ By Overnight M ail
□ By facsimile Transmission

U/YY1at I:

lVYlfv @mt~nlciw 1tIc1t0, C:ff'rn

D By Hand Delivery
□ By U.S. Mail
□ By Overnight Mail
□ Bv Facsimile Transmi ssion

L-0m0,i I: ~~a,11,---@, 0h'li-+h maitJL . C!.t1n

Attomeysfor Third-Party Defendant

D EPCTY CLERK

ORDER GRANTING THIRD PARTY DEF ENDAN T'S MOTIO
DEFAULT: 3

1
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Smith + Malek From: Smith + Malek, PLLC

Peter l Smith IV, ISBN 6997
J illian H. Caires, ISBN 9130
SMITH + MALEK, PLLC
601 E. Front Ave., Ste. 304
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814
Tel:
208-215-2411
fax: 208-215-2416
Email: peter@smithmalek.com

ii!lianr@smithma]ek com
Attornersfor Mark Porcello

TN IBE DTSTRTCT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDTCTAL DTSTRTCT Of THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR TlIE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

JENNIFER PORCELLO,
CASE NO. CV-2016-7343

Plaintiff,

vs.
ANTHONY J. PORCELLO and ANNIE C.
PORCELLO, husband and w1fe,

ORDER GRANTING THIRD
PARTY DEFENDANT MARK
PORCELLO'S MOTION FOR
CONTINUANCE AND
EXTENSJ01' OF PRE-TRIAL
DEADLINES

Defendants.

ANTHONY J. PORCELLO and ANNIE C.
PORCELLO, husband and wife,
Counter-Plaintiffs,

vs .
JENNIFER PORCELLO,
Counter-Defendant.

ANTHONY J . PORCELLO and ANNTE C .
PORCELLO, husband and wife,
ORDE R GRANTJNG THTRD PARTY DEFENDANT' S MOTION FOR CONTINUANCE
AND EXTENSION OF PRE-TRIAL DEADLINES: 1
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Smith

+

Malek From: Smith

+

Malek, PLLC

Third Party Plainliff._,

vs.
MARK PORCELLO ,
Third Pany Defendant.

TTTTS :MATTER TTAVTNG CO\ifE TIEFORE TTTE CO1.JRT

011

September 19 , 20 l 7 at

3:00 pm by Thi.rd Pa.rly Defen dant Mark Porcello ·s Mo lion for Continuance and Extension of
Pre-Trial Deadlines, it is hereby Ordered that the previously scheduled trial set for November 27.
2017 is hereby vacated and shall be continued to the next available date.
TT IS fCRTTJER ORDERED that the pre-trial deadlines contained in the Notice of Trial
and Pretrial Conference Setting and Pretrial Order dated March 2, 2017 shall be exte nded
according to the forthcoming amended Notice of T rial.
IT JS FURTHER ORDE RED that counsel for each respective party shall submi t to the
Court lhci.r unavailable dates within seven days of the date oJ this order.
DATED this ~ a y of September, 2017.

EYER

ORDER GRANTING TH fRD l'AlffY DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR CONTINUJ\NCE
AND EXTENSIO N OF PRE-TRIAL DEADLINES: 2
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Smith

+

Malek From: Smith

+

Malek, PLLC

CERTlflCATE OF SERVICE
On September __JJ_, 2017, I caused copies of the foregoing document to be served by
the following methods on the parties listed below as follows, which is the last known address for
the listed party:

TERRANCE R . HARRIS
RAMSDEN, M ARfJCE, EALY & HARRJS
750 Northwest Blvd
Coeur d'Alene, TD 83814
Facsimile: (208) 664-5884

□

By Hand Delivery
□ By lJ .S. Mail
□ Ry Overnight Mail
Q-By Facsi1nile Transmission

Allurneys.for Pluint1ffs
HENRY D . MADSEN
MADSEN LAW OFFICES, P.C.
1859 N. Lakewood Drive, Suite 201
Coeur d'Alene. ID 83814
Facsimile: (208) 664-6258

By Hand Delivery
By US. Mail
1•ht Mail
□ Rv
• Ovcmi e,
GJ..By Facsimile Transmission

A llorneys fur Defendunts/ Third-Party
Plaintifjs
PETER J. SMITH IV
JILLI AN H. CAIRES
SMJTH + MALEK, PLLC
60 I E. Front Ave., Ste. 304
Coeur d'Alene, TD 83814
Facsimile: (208) 215-2416

D By Hand Delivery
□ By US. Mail
D By Overnight Mail
[;J.-By Facsimile Transmission

□
□

Attorneys for Third-Party Defendant

D EPCTY CLERK

ORDER GRANTING THJRD PARTY DEFEJ\TDANT'S MOTION FOR CONTINUANCE
AND EXTENSION OF PRE-TRIAL DEADLINES: 3
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
324 W. Garden Avenue
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814

Jennifer Porcello,
CASE NO. CV 2016-7343

Plaintiff,
NOTICE OF TRIAL AND PRETRIAL
CONFERENCE SETTING AND
PRETRIAL ORDER

vs.
Anthony J Porcello, et al,

(Complex or Ordinary Case)

Defendants.

The parties will please take notice that this Order is in a new format
with different scheduling and requirements.

1. TRIAL SETTING:

a. This matter is set for a four ( 4) day court trial on April 23, 2018 at 9:00 a.m. Counsel and
self-represented litigants ("SLR") will meet with the court at 8:30 a.m. in chambers on
the first day of trial. Your case may proceed to trial on any day from April 23, 2018 to
April 27, 20 I 8. The Court will not grant trial continuances absent a showing of good
cause.
b. Note that the Court typically has law and motion calendars on Tuesdays, Wednesdays,

and Thursdays at 3:00 p.m. and on Fridays at 8:00 a.m., which reduces the amount of
time available for trial during those days by at least two hours. Check with the Court 's
clerk for any other times that are not available for trial during your trial setting, or a
change in the Court 's normal law and motion calendars.
c. Notice is hereby given, pursuant to I.R.C.P. 40(a)(6) that an alternate judge may be
assigned to preside in this case. The following is a list of potential alternate judges: Hon.
NOTICE OF TRIAL AND PRETRIAL CONFERENCE SETTING AND PRETRIAL ORDER
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John P. Luster, Hon. Benjamin R. Simpson, Hon. Fred Gibler, Hon. Steve Yerby, Hon.
Charles W. Hosack, Hon. John T. Mitchell, Hon. Lansing L. Haynes, Hon. Rich
Christensen, Hon. Scott Wayman, Hon. Barbara Buchanan.

Each party may file one

motion for disqualification without cause as to any alternate judge not later than fourteen
(14) days after service of this notice, provided that if a party has previously exercised its
right to disqualification without cause under Rule 40(a), that party has no right to
disqualify an alternate judge.

2. PRETRIAL CONFERENCE SETTING: A pretrial conference will be held on March 16, 2018
at O1:30 p.m. Pacific Time. Firm trial dates and priority of trial settings will be designated at the
pretrial conference or earlier on request in special cases.

3. PRETRIAL DEADLINES:
The deadlines set forth below do not excuse the parties from timely responding to
and timely supplementing discovery requests seeking the same information.
a.

Deadline for filing Motions to Amend Pleadings (including motions to add pleadings):
Ninety (90) days from the date of this Pretrial Order.

b.

Deadline for hearing Motions for Summary Judgment: Twelve ( 12) weeks or eightyfour (84) days prior to trial.

c.

Deadline for plaintiff(s) to disclose retained expert witnesses in accordance with

I.R.C.P. 26(b)(4)(A)(i): twenty-two (22) weeks or one hundred fifty-four ( 154) days
prior to trial.
d.

Deadline for defendant(s) to disclose retained expert witnesses in accordance with

I.R.C.P. 26(b)(4)(A)(i): Sixteen (16) weeks or one hundred twelve (112) days before
trial.
e.

Deadline for plaintiff(s) to disclose rebuttal expert witnesses in accordance with

I.R.C.P. 26(b)(4)(A)(i): Twelve ( 12) weeks or eighty-four (84) days before trial.
f.

Deadline for hearing Motions (other than summary judgment and witness/exhibit

motions in limine): Two (2) weeks before trial.
g.

Deadline for filing Motions in Limine regarding designated trial witnesses/exhibits:
One ( I ) week before trial.

h.

Deadline for completing discovery including depositions: Thirty (30) days before trial.

1.

Deadline for disclosure of witnesses including non-retained experts (the latter in

accordance with I.R.C.P. 26(b)(4)(A)(ii)): Two (2) weeks before trial.

J.

Deadline for disclosure of exhibits and exhibit lists: Two (2) weeks before trial.

k.

Deadline for submission of proposed jury instructions: One (I) week before trial.

NOTICE OF TRIAL AND PRETRIAL CONFERENCE SETTING AND PRETRIAL ORDER
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I.

Deadline for filing of trial brief (optional for jury trials): One (1) week before trial.

m. Deadline for filing of proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (court trial

only): One (I) week before trial.
4. ORDERS REGARDING PRETRIAL PRACTICE
a.

General motion practice: The court expects compliance with the provisions of Rule
7(b) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.

b. Motions for Summary Judgment:
1.

Motions for summaiy judgment must be timely filed so as to be heard no later
than the date set forth in section 3 above.

11.

Undisputed Facts: The moving party must set forth in separately numbered
paragraphs the undisputed facts on which that party relies, with accompanying
citations to admissible evidence such as affidavit or declaration statements,
admissible documents, or depositions. The admissible evidence must be attached
to an affidavit of counsel or a party or person who can authenticate the evidence.

111.

Response to Undisputed Facts: The responding party must respond to each
separately numbered statement of undisputed fact set forth by the moving party
with accompanying citations to admissible evidence such as affidavit or
declaration statements, admissible documents, or depositions. The admissible
evidence must be attached to an affidavit of counsel or a party or person who can
authenticate the evidence.

1v. The responding party may also set forth in separately numbered paragraphs facts
(disputed or undisputed) on which the responding party relies in opposition to the
motion. Any facts set forth by the responding party must be accompanied by
citations to admissible evidence such as affidavit or declaration statements,
admissible documents, or depositions. The admissible evidence must be attached
to an affidavit of counsel or a party or person who can authenticate the evidence.
v. Argument: Argument in memoranda in support of or opposition to a motion for
summaiy judgment is limited to twenty (20) pages of double-spaced text. The
argument section of the moving party's reply memorandum is limited to twelve

( 12) pages of double-spaced text. The court may grant permission to exceed the
page limitation in exceptional cases. Any citations to materials outside the Idaho
Reports must be copied and attached to the memorandum. Courtesy copies of the
motion, memoranda supporting and opposing the motion, and affidavits or
declarations must be provided to the court.

Courtesy copies may be hand-

NOTICE OF TRIAL AND PRETRIAL CONFERENCE SETTING AND PRETRIAL ORDER
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delivered, faxed, or emailed directly to chambers, (208) 446-1 138 or
dlarsen@ kcgov.us, or to the judge's staff attorney by email.
v1. Hearings on Motions for Summary Judgment:

The moving party 1s

responsible for obtaining a date for hearing the motion by contacting the court's
clerk. When making that request, an estimate of the time needed for hearing
must be given. The moving party must file and serve the notice of hearing,
motion, affidavits, and memorandum in support in compliance with I.R.C.P.
56(b).

Once a hearing date and time has been obtained, no party may add

additional hearings to the hearing setting without obtaining the prior approval of
the court's clerk.
c.

Motions to Compel and for Discovery Sanctions:
1. Meet and Confer: The court expects that the parties will comply with I.R.C.P.
3 7 regarding motions to compel and for discovery sanctions. The "meet and
confer" requirement of Rule 3 7(a)( I) must consist of a telephonic or face-toface conference which may be followed by confirming correspondence. Please
note that the rule requires that the moving party in good faith confer or attempt
to confer with the responding party before taking court action. Certification of
the "meet and confer" requirement should be made by affidavit or declaration
with any supporting documents attached.
11. Attachment of Discovery Requests:

Discovery requests and responses at

issue must be attached or incorporated verbatim in the moving papers.
d.

Expert Witnesses:
1. Deadline: The dates set forth above for disclosure of retained and non-retained
expert witnesses are deadlines. These deadlines set by the court DO NOT excuse
parties from timely responding to prior discovery concerning expert witnesses or
from timely supplementing such discovery.
11. Retained Expert Witnesses: Retained expert witness disclosures shall consist
of, at a minimum, the information listed in I.R.C.P. 26(b)(4)(A)(i). Absent a
showing of good cause, a retained expert may not testify to matters not included
in the disclosure. A party may reference and incorporate deposition testimony
and thereby comply with the disclosure requirement without restating the
deposition testimony.
111. Non-retained Expert Witnesses: Some witnesses, such as treating phys icians
or other treating medical providers, may provide expert testimony but are not

NOTICE OF TRIAL AND PRETRIAL CONFERENCE SETTING AND PRETRIAL ORDER
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retained expert witnesses. Parties are not required to disclose these witnesses as
retained expert witnesses. They must, however, be disclosed as regular trial
witnesses if they will be testifying at trial and such disclosure must include, at a
minimum, the information listed in I.R.C.P. 26(b)(4)(A)(ii). Absent a showing of
good cause, a non-retained expert may not testify to matters not included in the
disclosure.

A party may reference and incorporate deposition testimony and

thereby comply with the disclosure requirement without restating the deposition
testimony.
e.

Disclosure of Witnesses: By the deadline set forth above, each party shall prepare and
exchange between the parties and file with the Clerk a list of witnesses with current
addresses and telephone numbers, setting forth a brief statement identifying the general
subject matter about which the witness may be asked to testify. Witnesses called solely
for impeachment purposes whose testimony cannot reasonably be anticipated prior to
trial need not be disclosed. See paragraph 4.d.iii regarding non-retained expert witnesses.

f.

Exhibits and Exhibit Lists: By the deadline set forth above, exhibit lists and copies of
exhibits shall be exchanged between the parties, and exhibit lists shall be filed with the
Clerk. Each party shall prepare a list of exhibits it expects to offer at trial, using the Trial
Exhibit List form available at http://www.kcgov.us/departments/districtcourt/forms.asp
(or by calling the court' s clerk). Exhibits should be listed in the order that the party
anticipates they will be offered. Each party shall affix labels to their exhibits before trial.
After the labels are marked and attached to the original exhibit, copies should be made.
Plaintiffs exhibits shall be marked in numerical sequence. Defendant's exhibits shall be
marked in alphabetical sequence. The civil action number of the case and the date of the
trial shall also be placed on each exhibit label. The original exhibits and a judge's copy
of the exhibits should be should be brought to trial.

g. Jury Instructions (jury trials only):
1.

Jury Instructions: By the deadline set forth above, jury instructions shall be
filed and exchanged between the parties with courtesy copies of the clean and
cited versions delivered to chambers by email to the court's staff attorney. The
court has prepared stock jury instructions from the Idaho Jury Instructions. A
sample of stock jury instructions in civil cases is on the district court website at
http://www.kcgov.us/departments/ districtcourt/forms.asp.

The parties may

include stock jury instructions in their proposed jury instructions but are only
required to submit proposed jury instructions specific to the issues in the case.
NOTICE OF TRIAL AND PRETRIAL CONFERENCE SETTING AND PRETRIAL ORDER
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The parties are encouraged to confer and submit joint proposed jury instructions.
The parties are expected to comply with I.R.C.P. 51 (a).
11.

Statement of Claims:

The parties are required to confer regarding a joint

statement of claims instruction prior to the jury instruction submission deadline.
If the parties cannot agree to a joint proposed statement of claims, they are to
submit a short statement of their own claims.
h. Trial Briefs:

By the deadline set forth above, the parties are required to file and

exchange trial briefs in cases tried to the court.

Trial briefs should contain a brief

recitation of the facts in narrative form that are expected to be proven at trial. Trials
briefs should contain argument with citations to legal authority and copies of out-ofjurisdiction cases on legal issues. Courtesy copies of the trial briefs must be delivered to
chambers by email to the court's staff attorney. Trial briefs are welcome in cases tried to
a jury if the parties believe that they would be helpful to the court in conducting the trial.
1.

Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law: By the deadline set forth above,
the parties are required to file and exchange proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of law in cases tried to the court.

Courtesy copies of the proposed findings and

conclusions in Word format must be delivered to chambers by email to the court's staff
attorney.

5. ORDERS REGARDING TRIAL PRACTICE:
a.

Trial Stipulations: During the month before trial, the parties shall meet together or
through counsel and confer regarding stipulations that can be made at the beginning of
trial regarding facts, exhibits, jury instructions and any other matters. The parties shall
promptly notify the court regarding matters that need to be taken up before trial.

b. Hearings before trial: Jury orientation and selection will take place in the courtroom in
which the trial will be conducted. The courtroom will not be available for motions in
limine or other matters that must be taken up with the court. Notify the court' s clerk as
soon as possible regarding hearings that must be taken up before trial so that a courtroom
can be reserved.

6. ADDITIONAL ORDERS
a.

Modification of this Order: This Order may be modified by stipulation of the parties
upon entry of an order approving such stipulation. Any party may, upon motion and for
good cause shown, seek leave to modify the terms of this order.

b. Vacations or Continuances of Trial: Any orders vacating or continuing the trial date
will not change or alter the times and deadlines set forth in this Order unless expressly so
NOTICE OF TRIAL AND PRETRIAL CONFERENCE SETTING AND PRETRIAL ORDER
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ordered by the Court.
c. Alternative Dispute Resolution: Lawyers are expected to educate their clients early in
the proceedings about the various methods of resolving their dispute without trial
including mediation, arbitration, settlement conference/negotiation, neutral case
evaluation, and small lawsuit resolution under Idaho Code§ 7-1501 et seq., if applicable.
The parties are expected to engage in ADR as early as it is practical to do so. The Court
will facilitate ADR if requested.
d. Reporting to the Court on the Resolution of Case: If the all or part of the claims of
any party are resolved before trial, the parties, jointly or individually, must promptly
report the same to the Court.
e. Any party who joins an additional party shall serve a copy of this "NOTICE OF TRIAL
AND PRETRIAL CONFERENCE SETTING AND PRETRIAL ORDER" upon that added party
at the time the pleading adding the party is served on the added party, and proof of such service
shall be filed with the Court.

/~r

DATED this_ day of November, 2017.
BY THE COURT:

dge #005

NOTICE OF TRIAL AND PRETRIAL CONFERENCE SETTING AND PRETRIAL ORDER
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

_j_

day of November, 2017, I caused to be served a
I hereby certify that on the
true and correct copy of the foregoing to the following in the manner indicated:

Terrance R. Harris
P. 0. Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene ID 83816-1336
Fax (208) 664-5884
Henry D. Madsen
I 044 Northwest Blvd, Ste B
Coeur d'Alene ID 83814
Fax (208) 664-6258
Peter John Smith IV
60 I E Front Ave., Ste. 304
Coeur d'Alene ID 83814
Fax (208) 2 I 5-2416

First Class Mail
ax

-

~

First Class Mail
.......,,:::Fax

-

-

J

First Class Mail
ax

JIM BRANNON
CLERK

Deputy Clerk

NOTICE OF TRIAL AND PRETRIAL CONFERENCE SETTING AND PRETRIAL ORDER
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

CASE NO. CV-16-7343

JENNIFER PORCELLO,
Plai ntiff/Counter-Defendant,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER D ENYING
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION
TO STRIKE TH E AFFIDAVIT OF
LINDA LOUREY AND TO
EXCLUDE EXPERT TESTfMONY

vs.
ANTHONY J. PORCELLO and ANNIE C.
PORCELLO, husband and wife,
Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs.
ANTHONY J. PORCELLO and ANNIE C.
PORCELLO, husband and wife,
Third Party Plaintiffs,
vs.
MARK PORC ELLO,
Third Party Defendant.

Plaintiffs Motion for Strike came on for hearing before Cynthia K .C. Meyer, District
Judge, on the 29

th

day of January, 201 8.

P laintiff was represented by Terrance Harris.

Defendants were represented by Henry Madsen.

Plaintiffs Motion to Strike and Exclude is

DENIED.
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The Court agrees with Plaintiff that Defendants' expert witness disclosure is inadequately
vague and does not meet the requirements of I.R.C.P. 26 because Defendants never actually
disclosed any of the substance of Lourey's opinion and failed to supplement that disclosure.
However, the Court, in its discretion, does not find that Defendants' inadequate disclosures and
failure to supplement have unfairly prejudiced Plaintiff in the context of this Motion for
Summary Judgment and therefore denies the Motion to Strike.
Laurey was disclosed as an expert witness on August 7, 2017. Lourey' s Affidavit in
Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment was filed one month prior to the
summary judgment hearing. Although Defendant's expert witness disclosure was inadequate
and not supplemented, and although Plaintiff was not and should not be required to do so to
obtain the information required by l.R.C.P. 26, Plaintiff could have deposed Laurey at some
point after the August 2017 disclosure. Plaintiff still can depose Laurey pursuant to the Court's
Pre-Trial Order.
However, the Court will order Defendants to supplement their expert witness disclosure
with a complete statement of Lourey's opinions and the reasons therefor as required by I.R.C.P.
26(b)(4) within ten (10) days of the date of this Memorandum deci sion. Failure to do so may
result in the exclusion of Lourey's opinions at trial.

Dated March ~

18.
ynthia K.C. Meyer
istrict Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on this
S::: day of [Yurc.h , 2018, I caused a true and correct copy of
this document to be served, with all required charges prepaid, by the method(s) indicated below,
to the following person(s):

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Via Fax: (208) 664-6258
E-mail:

Henry Madsen
l 044 Northwest Blvd;, Ste. B.
Coeur d'Alene, ID
83814

Terrance Harris
P.O. Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene, ID
83816-1336

□
□

Bv
□

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Via Fax: (208) 664-5884
E-mail:
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FlRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

JENNIFER PORCELLO,

CASE NO. CV-16-7343

Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant,
vs.
ANTHONY J. PORCELLO and ANNIE C.
PORCELLO, husband and wife,
Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART
AND DENYING IN PART
DEFENDANTS ' MOTION
TO STRIKE THE AFFIDAVITS
OF JENNIFER PORCELLO AND
MARK PORCELLO

ANTHONY J. PORCELLO and ANNIE C.
PORCELLO, husband and wife,
Third Party Plaintiffs,
vs.
MARK PORCELLO,
Third Party Defendant.

Defendants' Motion for Strike came on for hearing before Cynthia K.C. Meyer, District
Judge, on the 29

th

day of January, 2018.

Plaintiff was represented by Terrance Harris.

Defendants were represented by Henry Madsen.
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Declaration of Mark Porcello
Paragraph 5 is not prohibited by the best evidence rule. The best evidence rule states:
" [t]o prove the content of a writing, recording, or photograph, the original writing, recording, or
photograph is required, except as otherwise provided in these rules or by statute." l.R.E. 1002.
Mark is not attempting to prove the content of any writing by stating that he paid his mother
some money and that there was a loan to purchase the Woodinville house. Mark may testify
generally about payments and loans without providing copies of checks, bank records, receipts,
ATM withdrawal receipts, tax filings, promissory notes, or any other type of evidence
documenting such a payment or loan because he is not attempting to prove the contents of a
writing without that writing.
Paragraph 6 is not prohibited by the best evidence rule for the reasons discussed above.
Paragraph 7 is not prohibited by the best evidence rule for the reasons discussed above.
Paragraph 9 is not hearsay because Annie and Anthony Porcello are named parties and
party opponents of Mark. I.R.E. 801 (d)(2). The statement that Mark approached a lender about
a loan for a home is not based on speculation and does not lack foundation. The Court is
bewildered at these objections that Mark is being speculative by testifying that he contacted a
lender, and that there is no foundation that that lender is Legacy Group when Defendants
reference the same loan and lender in ,i 30 of their Statement of Undisputed Facts. These
objections are meritless, do not have a good basis in fact or law, and are a waste of the Court's
time.
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Paragraph 10 is not hearsay, speculative, and does not lack foundation; it is Mark's
testimo ny about his limited understanding of the reason a loan application was denied based on
his experience in applying for that loan.
Paragraph 11 is not speculative and does not lack foundation ; it is also consistent w ith

~

15 of the December 29, 2017 Affidavit of Linda Lourey and ~ 3 of Defendants' Reply to
Statement of Undisputed Facts.

It is a statement based on hearsay and perhaps should be

stricken for that reason, but the Court finds it confusing that Defendants have taken the Court's
time by objecting to Mark making statements in the record which are already in the record via
Defendants' witness Lourey and the facts contained are not disputed by Defendants. For that
reason, this objection is moot.
Paragraph 12 is not speculative, does not lack foundation, and is not hearsay.
Paragraph 15 does not appear to be based on speculation. It appears to be based on the
HUD- I document, and it is also consistent with Lourey' s Affidavit at Ex. B. p. 1.
Paragraph 16 is not necessarily based on hearsay or speculation and does not lack
foundation.

At the beginning of Mark Porcello's Declaration, he states that he made the

declaration based upon his personal knowledge.

I.R.E. 901(b) gives an example of

authentication to provide foundation and states that " [t]estimony of a witness with knowledge
that a matter is what it is claimed to be" is one manner of authenticating a matter. The Court is
sati sfied for the purposes of his Declaration that Mark Porcello was testifying based on his
personal knowledge. Further, the Court notes that Mark's statement is consistent with Lo urey's
Declaration at Ex. B, pp. 4 and 2 and does not understand why Defendants are again objecting to
Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Defendants' Motion to Strike
Affidavits of Jennifer and Mark Porcello
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information their expert already put into the record ; that the purchase price of the Hayden home
was $360,000 and that Defendants received approximately $48,000 in cash from the Legacy
Group mortgage on the Woodinville house. The Court will give the statement the weight it
deems appropriate regarding this fact as it relates to deciding this Motion.
Paragraph 17 is not barred by the best evidence rule because Mark Porcello was not
attempting to prove the contents of a writing w ith his statements. The Court does not understand
why Defendants argue at ,r 8 in their January 23, 2018 Reply to Statement of Undisputed Facts
that there is no evidence that Plaintiff or Mark paid a down payment or rent that was credited
toward the purchase of the Hayden house, yet then point to Lourey's December 29, 2017
Declaration to show "that Mark received reimbursement for said payments" in the process of
objecting to Mark's statement that he paid a down payment or rent that was credited toward the
purchase of the Hayden house. When Defendants argue that Lourey's Declaration evidences
reimbursement for said payments, Laurey' s Declaration necessarily evidences said payments as
well. Therefore; there was evidence in the record that Mark and Jennifer made those payments
on January 23, 2018 when Defendants stated that there was no evidence in the record of those
payments because Defendants' own expert put this information into the record on December 29,
20 I 7. This is not a matter of making alternative claims or defenses in a pleading; it is a matter of
candor before the Courts and obstructionism which serves no purpose other than to waste the
Court and the other parties' time in sorting out the many disputed facts in this matter.
Paragraph 18 is not based on hearsay and does not lack foundation and is not irrelevant.
Again, the parties do not dispute that both the Via Yenito and Woodinville houses were
mortgaged to fund the purchase of the Hayden house, and the Court does not understand
Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Defendants' Motion to Strike
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Defendants' objection to this statement. Whether Mark has an interest in the Via Venito house
as a trust beneficiary and the fact that the parties would dispute this may be relevant to the extent
that these facts demonstrate the complexity of the financial relationship between Mark and
Defendants as well as potential factual misunderstandings between the parties. By objecting to
Mark' s assertion based on an allegation that it is false only bolsters the Court's finding that there
are genuine issues of material fact. Mark's assertion that he has an interest in the Via Venito
house as a trust beneficiary could in no way be reasonably construed as speculative or lacking
foundation because it is allegedly based on Mark' s personal knowledge. The Court will give the
statement the weight it deems appropriate regarding this disputed fact as it relates to deciding
this Motion.
The Court denies Defendants' objection to paragraph 22 because the document referred
to is already in the record and there is no reason to produce it, although the Court notes
Defendants' objection to the claimed $50,000 down payment amount and that this is a disputed
fact.
The Court denies Defendants' objection to paragraph 23 because it is the statement of a
party opponent' s agent. I.R.E. 80l(d)(2)(D). Further, the Defendant have already admitted the
alleged conversation by failing to deny Plaintiffs allegations in her Complaint at ,r,r 22-23.
The Court denies Defendants' objections to paragraphs 24 - 26. Mark was testifying that
he had a conversation on the telephone; not about contents of the conversation to prove the truth
of the matter asserted. The Court does not understand how a statement in a declaration could be
argumentative. The statement in paragraph 26 is not hearsay because it is the statement of a
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party opponent's agent, and further, Mark's statement ts consistent with Joseph Mijich 's
December 6, 2016 Declaration. I.R.E. 80l(d)(2)(D).
Paragraph 40 is not barred by the best evidence rule because Mark was not attempting to
prove the contents of any writing. Paragraph 40 is not speculative to the extent it is based upon
Mark's personal knowledge. The Court will give the statement the weight it deems appropriate
regarding this fact as it relates to deciding this Motion.
Paragraph 42 is not barred by the best evidence rule because Mark was not attempting
to prove the contents of any writing.
There is no suggestion that paragraph 44 is hearsay or based upon hearsay. The check
referred to is described and produced in Lourey's Declaration at ,rt3 and Ex. B p. 23, although
the Court notes that Mark testified that $417,000.00 of the proceeds from the sale of the
Woodinville house went to pay off the Evergreen Mortgage and Lourey testified that
$483,057.00 of these proceeds went to pay off the Legacy Group mortgage. It appears that
neither is completely correct. Ex. B at p. 18 suggests that approximately $483 ,257.00 of the
proceeds of the sale of the Woodinville house went to pay off the Evergreen Mortgage. Ex.Bat
p. 38 suggests the same, and that the approximately $483,257.00 Evergreen mortgage was
against the Woodinville house. Ex. B at p. 2 1 shows a payoff of $483,Q57.00 payoff of the
Evergreen mortgage from the sale of the Woodinville house.

Ex. B at p. 17 shows that

Defendants borrowed $417,000.00 against the Via Venito house from Evergreen, and the Court
assumes that the parties made accidental misstatements in these paragraphs.
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Paragraph 46 asks a leading question to illustrate a point, but it is not argumentative or
based on speculation. In substance, it is a statement of Mark ' s belief that Defendants paid him
$157,157.40 to fulfill some agreement he had with them. However, the Court does not know
what was included in that alleged agreement. T he Court will give the statement the weight it
deems appropriate regarding these facts as they relate to deciding this Motion.

The Court

addressed the parol evidence rule in its Memorandum Decision and Order Denying Defendants'
Motion for Summary Judgment.
The Court denies Defendants' objection to paragraph 47. This is a statement of Mark's
understand ing of an alleged agreement with Defendants, and is not speculative, is not hearsay,
and is not barred by the best evidence rule because Mark is not attempting to prove the contents
of any writing. The Court addressed the parol evidence rule in its Memorandum Decision and
Order Denying Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.
Defendants objection to paragraph 48 is denied. Mark is allegedly testifying based on
personal knowledge. There is no statement or information that Mark is attributing to another
person or which would be beyond his personal experience as a borrower from Defendants for the
Hayden house. The Court addressed the parol evidence rule in its Memorandum Decision and
Order Denying Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.
The Court addressed the parol evidence rule in its Memorandum Decision and Order
Denying Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and will not address it as it relates to
paragraph 49.
Defendants' objection to paragraph 50 is denied for similar reasons as those stated above.
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Defendants' objection to paragraph 51 is denied for similar reasons as those stated above.
Defendants' objection to paragraph 52 is denied for similar reasons as those stated above.
Defendants' objection to paragraph 53 is denied for similar reasons as those stated above.
Defendants' objection to paragraph 62 is denied for similar reasons as those stated above.
Exhibit Six is ostensibly Mark's telephone records for the period of August 6 September 5, 2014. These records allegedly show that Mark called Joseph Mijich three times on
September 3, 2014. These records do not lack foundation as they were provided by a witness
with knowledge about them and are also telephone records authenticated by a caller.

I.R.E.

90 I (b)(l ), (b)(6). The phone records are not being used to prove the contents of any other
writing, and are therefore not barred by the best evidence rule. The telephone records are not
argumentative. The Court denies Defendants' objection. However, the Court notes that in its
faxed copy, the log of the actual calls is not legible due to the quality of the copy and the size of
the font.
Affidavit of Jennifer Porcello
Paragraph 6 and the exhibits referenced are marginally relevant to the extent that the
Porcellos seem to frequently document what are either gifts or memorializations of agreements
to assist Plaintiff in purchasing houses. Defendants' objections are denied.
The statements allegedly made by Mark in paragraph 7 are hearsay and Plaintiffs
objection is granted to that extent. The statement allegedly made by Defendants where they
agreed to finance the Woodinville house is not hearsay because it is the statement of a party
Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Defendants' Motion to Strike
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opponent. I.R.E. 601 (b) does not apply to this matter because it is not a claim against an estate
where no estate is a named party. The Court addressed the statute of frauds in its Memorandum
Decision and Order Denying Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.

The statement

regarding Plaintiff allegedly assigning her purchase contract for the Woodinville home to
Defendants may have been offered to prove the contents of a writing: that Plaintiff had such a
contract and assigned it to Defendants. Defendants' objection is granted to that extent.
The last sentence in paragraph 8 could be based on hearsay if the information was learned
from Mark, but if the information was learned from Defendants, any statements would be made
by a party opponent and not hearsay. The statement does not lack foundation as Plaintiff stated
she was testifying based on her personal knowledge. Although the statement could be more
specific and is only marginally relevant, the Court does not find that this statement is necessarily
hearsay.
The last sentence in paragraph 9 does not lack foundation as Plaintiff stated she was
testifying based on her personal knowledge, and where Plaintiff lived with Mark in the
Woodinville house. The statement that Mark paid the mortgage and bills is not hearsay; Plaintiff
and Mark lived together at the time. The best evidence rule does not apply because Plaintiff was
not attempting to prove the contents of a writing.
The statement in the second to the last sentence in paragraph 13 regarding Mark' s belief
is hearsay. The rest of the statement was based on Plaintiff s personal knowledge and the Court
will give the statement the weight it deems appropriate regarding this fact as it relates to deciding
this Motion.
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The second and third sentences of paragraph 14 are not hearsay because Annie Porcello is
a party opponent. These sentences are not prohibited by the dead man's statute because no estate
is a named party. The last sentence of paragraph 14 does not lack foundation because Plaintiff
was testifying based on her personal knowledge, is not hearsay, and does not attempt to prove the
contents of any writing. This objection is denied.
Paragraph 15 is not hearsay because Defendants are party opponents.
Exhibit l appears to be an offer or a memorialization of an agreement between Plaintiff
and Mark, as Plaintiff claims. It does not lack foundation as Plaintiff is a person with knowledge
of this document. lt is not argumentative. The Court will give the exhibit the weight it deems
appropriate regarding this fact as it relates to deciding this Motion. Exhibit 2 is allegedly a copy
of a letter Defendants had their bank draft for Plaintiff's use in purchasing a house. Plaintiff
authenticated this document as a person with personal knowledge.
Defendants generally object to Mark Porcello's Declaration and Plaintiff's affidavit
because Mark's Declaration did not state that he was competent to testify, and because Plaintiff's
Affidavit did not state that she was competent to testify or that her statements were made under
the penalty of perjury. Defendants cite no authority for these requirements.
Black' s Law Dictionary defines an affidavit as "[a] voluntary declaration of facts written
down and sworn to by a declarant, usu. before an officer authorized to administer oaths."
AFFIDAVIT, Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).

Black's Law Dictionary defines

declaration as "[a] formal statement, proclamation, or announcement, esp. one embodied in an
instrument. Cf. affidavit." DECLARATION, Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).

Mark's
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Declaration is not sworn before a notary, although this is not required as it is sworn under the
penalty of perjury as true and correct. 1.C. § 9-1406. Plaintiff s Affidavit was sworn before a
notary public and was not required to state it was sworn under the penalty of perjury. Neither an
affidavit nor a declaration requires a statement that person is competent to testify.

Rather,

l.R.C.P. 56 requires that competence be shown.
(4) Affidavits. An affidavit used to support or oppose a motion must be made on
personal knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show
that the affiant or declarant is competent to testify on the matters stated. Sworn or
certified copies of all papers or parts of papers referred to in an affidavit must be
attached to or served with the affidavit. The court may permit affidavits to be
supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further
affidavits.
l.R.C.P. 56(c)(4)

Neither Mark nor Plaintiff were testifying on matters necessitating an expert witness
competent in any specialized area of knowledge. Rather, they were testifying based on personal
knowledge. Mark and Plaintiff have shown that they are competent to testify based on their
personal experiences .

.,-n-Dated March ~ , 20 18.

. .
ict Judge

\
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on this
) day of /Ylc1. ,-Jr, , 2018, I caused a true and correct copy of
this document to be served, with all required charges prepaid, by the method(s) indicated below,
to the following person(s):

Henry Madsen
1044 Northwest Blvd;, Ste. B.
Coeur d'Alene, ID
83814

□
□
□
Q--

U. S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Via Fax: (208) 664-6258
E-mail:

□
□
□
GI/
□

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Via Fax: (208) 664-5884
E-mail:

□

Terrance Harris
P.O. Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene, ID
83816-1336
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STATE OF IOAHO
COUNTY OF KOOTE

~~ED: q- -CLERK, DI

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

JENNIFER PORCELLO,

CASE NO. CV-16-7343

Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant,

vs.
ANTHONY J. PORCELLO and ANNIE C.
PORCELLO, husband and wife,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER DENYING
DEFENDANTS ' MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs.
ANTHONY J. PORCELLO and ANNIE C.
PORCELLO, husband and wife,
Third Party Plaintiffs,

vs.
MARK PORCELLO,
Third Party Defendant.

Defendants ' Motion for Summary Judgment came on for hearing before Cynthia K.C.
th

Meyer, District Judge, on the 29 day of January, 2018. Plaintiff was represented by Terrance
Harris. Defendants were represented by Henry Madsen.

Defendants' Motion for Summary

Judgment is DENIED.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs Complaint seeks declaratory judgment related to the purchase of a Hayden
house financed by Plaintiffs ex-husband Mark Porcello's parents, Defendants Anthony and
Annie Porcello, via a complex and disputed series of transactions.

Defendants move for

summary judgment and argue Plaintiff s claim for declaratory judgment should be dismissed,
largely based on an argument that the Note and Deed of Trust are complete agreements and that
parol evidence cannot be considered to alter the terms of unambiguous agreements.
Defendants further argue that the collateral agreements alleged by Plaintiff are barred by
the statute of frauds, and characterizes those alleged agreements as interests in land.
Plaintiff responds and argues that there are many disputed issues of material fact, that
there are many exceptions to the parol evidence rule, and that the statute of frauds does not apply
to the alleged agreement between Plaintiff and Defendants for $150,000.
In their Reply Memorandum, Defendants also argue that summary judgment should be
granted against Mark based on an argument that Mark lacks standing.

11.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is appropriate " if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Idaho Rule of
Civil Procedure 56(a). The nonmoving party may not merely rest upon the pleadings, but must
support the assertion that a genuine issue of material fact exists by citing "to particular parts of
materials in the record" or "showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence ... of a

Memorandum Decision and Order Denying Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment
2

Page 208

genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the
fact." Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c).
A motion for summary j udgment will not be granted where there are unresolved issues of
material fact. McKinley v. Fanning, 100 Idaho 189, 190, 595 P.2d l 084, l 086 (1979). Where
reasonable people could reach different conclusions when presented with the evidence then the
motion must be denied. Finholt v. Cresto, 143 Idaho 894, 896-97, 155 P.3d 695, 697-98 (2007).
In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the "Court liberally construes all disputed facts
in favor of the nonmoving party and draws all reasonable inferences and conclusions suppo rted
by the record in favor of the party opposing the motion." Chandler v. Hayden, 147 Idaho 765 ,
768, 2 15 P.3d 485, 488 (2009).

III.

ANALYSIS

Plaintiff and Third-Party Defendant Mark Porcello (Mark) lived in another house
financed by Defendants in Woodinville, Washington. There is a dispute regarding whether this
was merely a rental arrangement or whether Plaintiff and Mark had obtained an equitable interest
in the Woodinville house by paying the mortgage and improving the property, and whether Mark
contributed to the purchase of the Woodinville house. There is a dispute about whether Plaintiff
and/or Mark paid the mortgage, and for improvements to the property. Complaint

iii 3; Answer

second ,i 8 (there are multiple paragraphs 8 and 9), ,i11. There is a dispute whether Mark
contri buted to the purchase of the Woodinville house. Complaint ,i12; Answer first ,i 9. Plaintiff
and Mark's marriage deteriorated, Mark moved from the Woodinville house, Plaintiff obtained a
no-contact order against Mark, Plaintiff and Mark filed for divorce, and Defendants allege that
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Plaintiff stopped paying rent and therefore had no right of possession in the Woodinville house.
The parties entered into arbitration in their divorce proceeding, and Defendants interpled in that
proceeding, a noteworthy fact given the tangled financial relationship between Plaintiff, Mark,
and Mark's parents the Defendants, and potentially shifting loyalties. However, the evidence is
contradictory regarding whether there was a judgment of divorce in 2013 and Plaintiff and Mark
remarried in 2013 or whether the parties resolved their differences and the divorce action was
dismissed.

Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, p.2;

January I 6 Affidavit of Jennifer Porcello, ,r2; Complaint, ,r,r 14, 15; Counter-Defendant Jennifer
Porcello's Answer to Counterclaim

,r

8. 1 The arbitration order ordered Plaintiff from the

Woodinville house and noted that the house would be sold, and that "[a]ll equitable lien claims,
all claims for reimbursements, and all other monetary claims of any nature of' Plaintiff were
denied. December 29, 2017 Affidavit of Lourey, Ex. B p. 62.
Plaintiff and Mark resolved their differences sometime in 2013, and wanted to buy a
house in Hayden Lake. Neither could obtain financing, and the parties agreed that Defendants
would help finance the Hayden house.
Defendants decided to sell the Woodinville house.

In 2014, Plaintiff returned to the

Woodinville house to complete renovations in preparation for its sale. Plaintiff claims she would
not agree to do the work without assurances she would be repaid for the renovations, although
1

This is relevant to whether the private arbitration order is supported by a judgment or decree necessary t o
support Defendant's argument the arbitration order has the effect of res judicata. See W. Indus. & Envtl. Servs.,
Inc. v. Kaldveer Assocs., Inc., 126 Idaho 541, 544, 887 P.2d 1048, 1051 (1994). There is no evidence in t he record to
support any court taking action on an arbitration order which may or may not have led to a judgment of divorce,
and it appears that perhaps Plaintiff and Mark were not even married at t he t ime of the August 2013 arbitration
order. Additionally, events subsequent to that arbitration order may bear on its conclusions being true today, and
therefore in acting as res judicata on the issues it addressed at the time it was issued.
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Defendants deny this. See Complaint, ,i 16, 17, Answer ,i,i 11, 12. Plaintiff allegedly insisted
that Defendants sign a document granting Plaintiff $ 150,000 after the Woodinv ille house sold to
be used in purchasing the Hayden house.

Defendants admit signing this document, but

characterize it as an incomplete gift addressed to no specific person. Id. ; Complaint, Ex. A;
Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment, pp. 4, 11-12.
The Woodinville house did not sell quickly.

Defendants refinanced the Woodinville

house via Legacy Group to assist Plaintiff and Mark with the purchase of the Hayden house.
Defendants borrowed $648,500 against the Woodinville house.

Per p. l of Exhibit B to the

December 29, 2017 Affidavit of Linda Lourey, CPA, the proceeds of the $648,500 Legacy
Group mortgage on the Woodinville house went to the following: $312,044 for the purchase of
the Hayden house; $17,316 for settlement charges related to the Legacy Group mortgage on the
Woodinville house; $48,678 to reimburse Mark for the down payment on the Hayden house 2;
and $270,000 for paying off Defendants' first mortgage on the Woodinville house. Defendants
also allegedly mortgaged a Indian Wells house owned by Defendant Ann in trust for Mark in
order to pay down the Legacy Group mortgage on the Woodinville house with another mortgage
for $417,000; $ 198,020.17 of which went to the Legacy Group mortgage on the Woodinville
house, $31,468.51 in closing costs for the mortgage on the Indian Wells house, $71,0 I 7.70 for
payoffs to First Savings Bank and Bank of America, and $116,494 to Mark, who allegedly
invested that money into Legacy Group. The Court does not find the mortgage of the [ndian
Wells house to be relevant to the purchase of the Hayden house or Plaintiffs liabilities, although

2

Although Defendants' own expert, Lourey, noted that Defendants reimbursed Mark for the down payment,
Defendants simultaneously dispute t hat Mark paid any money toward the Hayden house. December 29, 2017
Affidavit of Lourey, Ex. 8 p. 1; Defendants' Reply to Statement of Undisputed Facts, 118.
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obtaining a mortgage on the Indian Wells house to pay down the mortgage on the Woodinville
house which was obtained to fund the purchase of the Hayden house certainly added to the
Defendants' costs. The purchase price of the Hayden house was $360,000. Mark and Plaintiff
seemingly paid approximately $48,000 toward the purchase of the Hayden house between
Mark's down payment (for which he was allegedly reimbursed) and rent paid at the Hayden
house prior to closing which was applied toward the purchase, but Defendants dispute this.
The Woodinville house subsequently sold for $690,000. Defendants claim $157,157.40
of the proceeds were given to Mark, and that Mark invested this money back into Legacy Group.
Defendants' Statement of Undisputed Facts, ,r,r 20, 21. However, Defendants deny the $150,000
"gift" Defendant Ann agreed to give an unnamed person was delivered, although Defendants
simultaneously claim that the same $150,000 was delivered to Mark when Mark and Plaintiff
were married. Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, p.12.
At the closing for the Hayden house, Plaintiff and Mark were presented w ith a Note and a
Deed of Trust from Defendants in the amount of $648,500 for purchase of the $360,000 Hayden
house. Plaintiff claims that at first she refused to sign these documents and claims the principal
amount borrowed was actually $3 I 2,044.32. Complaint ,r,r21 -22. Defendants denied this in
their Answer based on lack of knowledge. Plaintiff claims she then called Defendants' counsel
w ho prepared the Note and Deed of Trust between the parties, Joe Mijich. Complaint ,r 22.
Defendants do not deny this allegation in their Answer and it is therefore deemed admitted
pursuant to l.R.C.P. 8(b)(6).

This is not hearsay pursuant to I.R.E. 80l(d)(2)(D).
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Plaintiff claims that Joseph Mijich to ld her that the Note was for $648,500 because that
was the amount borrowed against the Woodinville house, and that when the Woodinville house
sold, the proceeds of the sale would be applied toward "the loan," and that Plaintiff and Mark
would then own the Hayden house free of any obligation to Defendants. Id. Defendants do not
deny this allegation in their Answer and it is therefore deemed admitted pursuant to I.R.C.P.
8(b)(6). This is not hearsay pursuant to I.R.E. 801(d)(2)(D).

Plaintiff claims she relied on

Mijich's representations in deciding to sign the Note and Deed of Trust. Complaint, ,r 23.
Joseph Mijich,

at the time, denies this conversation occurred . December 6,

2016 Declaration of Joseph Mijich. However, Mijich testified in his deposition that he made the
amount of the Note the same as the Legacy Group mortgage against the Woodinville house
knowing that adjustments might take place. Depo . Joseph Mijich, 110:15 - 114:18 (September
29, 20 17). The Note was dated September 3, 2014, and states that the entire $648,500 balance
plus interest was due by November 29, 20 I 4, ninety days later, and was ultimately signed by
both Plaintiff and Mark by September 4, 2014. December 29, 2017 Affidavit of Linda Lourey,
CPA, Exhibit B, p. 9.
The Court finds that these transactions and the circumstances surrounding them are rife
with genuine issues of material fact. This is shown simply by the fact that Plaintiff disputed
Defendants' Statement of Undisputed Facts, then Defendants further disputed the facts Plaintiff
put forth with Defendants' Reply to Plaintiff s Response to Defendants' statement of undisputed
facts.

This is further shown by Defendants' statements regarding Plaintiff's and Mark' s

credibility throughout their January 23, 2018 Reply Memorandum, where Defendants implicitly
acknowledge that Plaintiff and Mark dispute much of what Defendants are arguing, but
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encourage the Court to ignore these factual disputes because, Defendants argue, Plaintiff and
Mark are not credible. " [I]t is not proper for the trial judge to assess the credibility of an affiant
at the summary judgment stage when credibility can be tested in court before the trier of
fact." Baxter v. Craney, 135 Idaho 166, 172, 16 P .3d 263, 269 (2000).
There are many factual disputes in this case regarding the nature of the transactions
between the parties, which transactions and payments occurred, and the existence and content of
conversations and agreements related to those transactions.
For example, Plaintiff argues that Mark made a $100,000 down payment on the
Woodinville house that Defendants financed, that Mark made all the mortgage payments
directly, and that Mark paid $220,000 toward remodeling the Woodinville house. Plaintiffs
Response to Defendants' Statement of Undisputed Facts,
Jennifer Porcello,

~~

~

1; January 16, 2018 Affidavit of

7 - 9. Defendants deny all of this and claim that Plaintiff and Mark rented

the property. Defendants' Reply to Statement of Undisputed Facts,

~

I. Defendants argue that

they actually made all the mortgage payments and paid to renovate the Woodinville house, and
that they reimbursed Plaintiff and Mark for renovation-related expenses.

Defendants'

Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment, p. 9. Defendants cite to their tax records to
prove that they claimed rental income, and cite to the Arbitration Order to prove that Plaintiff
had no interest in the Woodinville house. However, what Defendants claimed on their taxes is
not d ispositive of whether P laintiff rented or whether there was an understanding that Plaintiff
was in a rent-to-own situation with her then-husband' s parents, where those parents evicted her
after her relationship soured with their son (and perhaps their son ceased making the mortgage
payments, if he was making them, which Defendants deny).
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Although Defendants cite to the arbitration order as evidence that Plaintiff had no interest
in the Woodinville house, the arbitration order is not dispositive of Plaintiffs interest in the
Woodinville house because there is no evidence it was given a court's imprimatur, which is
necessary to give it the effect of resjudicata. See I.C. § 7-911; 7-914; W Indus. & Envtl. Servs.,

Inc. v. Kaldveer Assocs., Inc., 126 Idaho 541, 544, 887 P.2d 1048, 105 1 ( 1994). Further, this
Court does not know the extent these issues were argued in the arbitration, or whether events
subsequent to the arbitration order (such as renovation and sale of the Woodinville house) have
voided the conclusions the arbitrator made at that time. The arbitration order standing alone is
merely further evidence of d isputed facts.
To further comp licate this dispute, for some reason Defendants paid Mark $ 157, 157 out
3

of the proceeds of the sale of or refinancing of the Woodinville house.

December 29, 20 17

Affidavit of Lourey, Ex. B p. I. This is despite Defendants' denial that Mark paid a down
payment, mortgage payments, or $220,000 toward remodeling the Woodinville house.
Defendants' Reply to Statement of Undisputed Facts, ,i I. While it is possible that the $157, I 57
payment to Mark was to reimburse him for paying to renovate the Woodinville house,
Defendants have claimed that they prov ided the funds to renovate the Woodinville house, but
denied that there was an agreement to reimburse Mark and Jennifer for the renovation work out
of the proceeds of the sale of the Woodinville house, and argued that the hand-written document
Plaintiff argues was an agreement was mere ly an incomplete gift. Answer, ,i 12; Defendants'
Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment, pp. 11-12. The Court sees no reason why
3

Defendants contradict their expert in their Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment when they state
Mark was paid from the proceeds from refinancing the Woodinville and Indian Wells properties but Lourey's
Affidavit states that Mark was paid out of the proceeds of the sale of t he Woodinville house. See Memorandum in
Support of Summary Judgment, p.12; December 29, 2017 Affidavit of Lourey, Ex. B p. l.
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Defendants would pay Mark $157,157 out of the proceeds of the sale of the Woodinville house
when they argue Mark made no down payment, did not pay the mortgage, and that there was no
agreement to do so.
For the purposes of deciding this motion the Court "liberally construes all disputed facts
in favor of the nonmoving party and draws all reasonable inferences and conclusions supported
by the record in favor of the party opposing the motion." Chandler v. Hayden, 147 Idaho 765,
768,215 P.3d 485,488 (2009). In doing so, because there are so many disputed facts, the Court
construes the evidence for purposes of deciding this motion such that Plaintiff obtained some
equitable interest in the Woodinville house via a down payment, mortgage payments, or that the
document that Plaintiff characterizes as memorializing an agreement does memorialize an
agreement, and that because Defendants deny the $157,157 paid to Mark was pursuant to an
agreement to reimburse Plaintiff and Mark for renovation costs, Defendants still owe Plaintiff
$150,000 toward the purchase of the Hayden house, and the Court therefore denies Defendants'
Motion for Summary Judgment.
Because it may aid the parties in resolving this declaratory judgment action, the Court
will address other arguments and points of law made by the parties. However, the parties should
recognize that the following does not constitute the Court's analysis in denying summary
judgment.
Paro! Evidence
Under the parol evidence rule, if the written agreement is complete on its face and
unambiguous, no fraud or mistake being alleged, extrinsic evidence of prior
contemporaneous negotiations or conversations is not admissible to contradict,
vary, alter, add to or detract from the terms of the written contract.
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Lindberg v. Roseth, 137 Idaho 222, 228, 46 P.3d 518, 524 (2002).
The parol evidence rule does not apply in every circumstance.

" Parol evidence is

permitted to establish a party's right to an equitable interest in land." Thomas v. Campbell, l 07
Idaho 398, 403, 690 P.2d 333, 338 (1984). "Fraud in the inducement is always admissible to
show that representations by one party were a material part of the bargain." Id. at 402, 337.
" The parol evidence rule ... does not apply to averments of fraud, misrepresentation, mutual
mistake o r other matters which render a contract void or voidable." Tusch Enterprises v. Coffin,
113 Idaho 37, 45 n.5 , 740 P.2d I 022, I 030 n.5 (1987). " Where a written agreement is integrated,
questions of the parties' intent regarding the subject matter of the agreement may only be
resolved by reference to the agreement's language. . . . A written contact containing a merger
clause is integrated for purposes of the parol evidence rule." Steel Farms, Inc. v. Croft & Reed,
Inc. , 154 Idaho 259, 267, 297 P.3d 222, 230 (20 12). Here, there is not a merger clause in the
Note or the Deed of Trust.
Parol evidence . . . is allowed to clarify that a term of the contract was a
mistake. Beard v. George, 135 Idaho 685, 689, 23 P.3d 147, 151 (2001) (citing Tu
sch Enterprises v. Coffin, 113 Idaho 37, 45 n. 5, 740 P.2d 1022, 1030 n. 5
(1987); Moore v. Mullen, 123 Idaho 985, 987, 855 P.2d 70, 72 (Ct.App.1993)).
Parol evidence is also admissible to prove that by reason of mutual mistake the
written agreement does not express the parties' true intent. Bailey v. Ewing, I 05
Idaho 636, 641, 671 P.2d I 099, 1104 (Ct.App.1983). Preliminary negotiations
are presumed to merge into the contract and are not allowed to contradict the plain
terms of the contract; however this on ly applies to complete, integrated
contracts. Valley Bank, l 19 Idaho at 498, 808 P.2d at 41 7. " Whether a particular
subject of negotiations is embodied in the writing depends on the intent of the
parties, revealed by their conduct and language, and by the surrounding
circumstances." Id.
Belk v. Martin, 136 Idaho 652, 657-58, 39 P.3d 592, 597- 98 (200 I).
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"A mutual mistake occurs when both parties, at the time of contracting, share a
misconception regarding a basic assumption or vital fact upon which the bargain
is based." Hines v. Hines, 129 Idaho 847, 853 , 934 P.2d 20, 26 (1997). " What the
parties actually intended is a question of fact. " Hughes v. Fisher, 142 Idaho 474,
482, 129 P.3d 1223, 123 1 (2006). " Whether a mutualmistakeoffact exists is a
finding of fact and will not be overturned unless it 1s clearl y
erroneous." O'Connor v. Harger Const., Inc. , 145 Idaho 904, 909, 188 P.3d 846,
851 (2008). "The mistake must be common to both parties, and must be proven by
clear and convincing evidence." Id. " Mutual mistake permits a party to rescind or
modify a contract as long as the mistake is so substantial and fundamental as to
defeat the object of that party." Id.

Mickelsen v. Broadway Ford, Inc. , 153 Idaho 149, 154-55, 280 P .3d 176, 181- 82 (2012).
Here, Plaintiff alleges fraudulent inducement, misrepresentation, or mutual mistake in her
Complaint in that she only signed the Note and Deed of Trust after speaking to Defendants'
agent Mijich who drafted the Note and Deed of Trust, and Mijich allegedly told Plaintiff that the
note would be paid off when the Woodinville house sold. Complaint ,i,i 22, 23. This is not
hearsay pursuant to I.R.E. 801 (d)(2)(D).
Mijich 's de position testimony suggests that perhaps there was not a meeting of the minds
on the price, which is a material term of the contract.

For example, Mijich testified that "I

wanted the Porcello note to be identical in amount as the Legacy note, and figured that at the end
all of these would be - adjustments would take place if they were justified." Depo. Joseph
Mijich 110: 17 - 20 (September 29, 2017).

Q. So you drafted a note in the Porcello transaction in the amount of $648,500
because that' s what the amount of the Legacy Group Capital loan was?
A. Yes.

Memorandum Decision and Order Denying Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment
12

Page 218

Q. And you understood at the time you were drafting that, that there may have
been less money than that, that was actually disbursed for the benefit of Jennifer
Porcello a nd Mark Porcello?
[Objections denied. The question does not call for speculation but is based on the
w itness's prior testimony regarding adj ustments and seeks the witness's
understanding. The question does not lack foundation; the witness is competent
to testify about the Note and Deed of Trust he drafted. The question is not
compound. The question is leading, but the witness is Defendants' agent and is
therefore a witness identified with an adverse party such that leading questions are
appropriate. I.R.E. 611 (c).]
A. I know that that money was - part of the money, that 3 12 - is going to be used
for the payment of the that - of the - for - of the home in Hayden lake. With
respect to the balance, what that - how that would be adjusted after it was paid
off. ... If Tony and Ann had to pay off their note within a certain period of time,
under the circumstances. And then if anything had to be deducted or adj usted at
the time of payoff, I figured that's when it would take place, is that adjustment.

Q. Did you discuss with your c lients .. . the fact that there should be adjustments
made to the balance of the Porcello note?
A. I don 't- I don't remember.

Id. at 11 2:5 - 114:8.
"It is essentia l to an enforceable contract that it be sufficiently definite and certain
in its terms and requirements so that it can be determined what acts are to be
performed and when performance is complete." Dale's Service Co. , Inc. v.
Jones, 96 Idaho 662, 664, 534 P.2d I 102, I I 04 (1975). "No enforceable contract
comes into being when parties leave a material term for future negotiations,
creating a mere agreement to agree."

Syringa Networks, LLC v. Idaho Dep't ofAdmin. , 155 Idaho 55, 63, 305 P.3d 499, 507(20 13).

Memorandum Decision and Order Denying Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment
13

Page 219

Ambiguity
There may also be latent ambiguities in the contract, to the extent there is a contract,
which would allow the use of parol evidence in interpreting the contract.
A latent ambiguity exists where an instrument is clear on its face, but loses that
clarity when applied to the facts as they exist. Cool, 139 Idaho at 773, 86 P.3d at
487. Although parol evidence generally cannot be submitted to contradict, vary,
add or subtract from the terms of a written agreement that is deemed
unambiguous on its face, there is an exception to this general rule where a latent
ambiguity appears.

Knipe Land Co. v. Robertson, 15 1 Idaho 449, 455, 259 P.3d 595, 601 (20 11 ).
For example, it seems absurd that Plaintiff and Mark would be unable to obtain financing
on a $360,000 house or purchase the Hayden house on their own, but they would instead borrow
$648,500 from Mark's famil y to purchase the $360,000 home, possibly after making a $40,000
down payment (of which they were possibly repaid by Defendants only to pay interest on later),
only to have to pay back $648,500 principal a nd $19,887.24 in interest within 90 days.

If

Plaintiff and Mark could afford to pay $668,387.24 in 90 days, it seems likely they could have
either obtained financing or they would have just purchased the property outright for $390,000.
Statute of Frauds
Defendants argue that Plaintiff's allegations of collateral agreements are barred by the
statute of frauds because, Defendants argue, these alleged collateral agreements convey interests
in land. Idaho's codification of the statute of frauds states in relevant part:
9-505. CERTAIN AGREEMENTS TO BE IN WRJTING. In the fo llowing cases
the agreement is invalid, unless the same or some note or memorandum thereof,
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be in writing and subscribed by the party charged, or by his agent. Evidence,
therefore, of the agreement cannot be received without the writing or secondary
evidence of its contents:

4. An agreement ... for the sale, of real property, or of an interest therein, and
such agreement, if made by an agent of the party sought to be charged, is
invalid, unless the authority of the agent be in writing, subscribed by the party
sought to be charged.
I.C. § 9-505.
The on ly potential agreement addressed is the hand-written document from Defendants
a nd addressed to an unknown person, which states:

To whom it may concern:

I, Ann Porcello, agree to the following: When the house in Woodinville sells at
20124 186th PL N.E. I will have $150,000.00 transferred for the purchase of the
home at 1663 Northwood Dr., Hayden, ldaho 83835. Please advise me if there is
any special way that this needs to be handled.
The document is signed by both Defendants and dated July 1, 2014. Plaintiff claims that
thi s was an agreement made to reimburse her and Mark for the work and materials in renovating
the Woodinville house for sale. Defendants argue that this is an incomplete, undelivered gift to
an undisclosed person, but that argument is not persuasive given that the document states "I, Ann
Porcello, agree" and because the context of this matter involves Plaintiff and Mark purchasing a
house financed by Defendants at 1663 Northwood Dr., Hayden, Ida ho 83835.

While this

document is not a facially complete memorialization of an agreement because it lacks the name
of the contracting party and their consideration, Plaintiffs construction of this document and the
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alleged consideration 1s plausible and it appears to memorialize an agreement between the
parties.
It does not appear that this document, if it is an agreement between the parties supported
by consideration, conveys an interest in land that would bring it within the ambit of the statute of
frauds.

It appears to convey money to be used to purchase land upon the occurrence of a

condition precedent. However, it does not convey any interest in land.

Additionally, Plaintiff correctly argues that because she allegedly performed her part of
the agreement in reliance on the complete oral agreement, the statute of frauds would not prevent
enforcing this agreement. Int'/ Bus. Machines Corp. v. Lawhorn, I 06 Idaho 194, 198, 677 P .2d
507,511 (Ct. App. 1984).
Mark's Standing
Defendants argue the Court should not consider Mark's June 9, 2017 Affidavit in
Opposition to Defendant' s Motion for Summary Judgment because his divorce to Plaintiff was
finalized on December 5, 2017 and Plaintiff was awarded the Hayden house. However, per the
Divorce Decree, Mark is responsible for paying all community debts. The Note to Defendants is
a community debt. The amount of that debt is what is primarily at issue in this matter.
Standing is the requirement that each party to the suit has such a personal stake in
the outcome as to assure the court that a justiciable controversy exists. In other
words, it must be shown that the parties to the lawsuit have a tangible and legally
protectable interest in the subject matter of the litigation.

Van Valkenburgh v. Citizens for Term Limits, 135 Idaho 121, 131 , 15 P.3d 1129, 1139 (2000)
(internal citation omitted). Mark has standing because he has a personal stake in the outcome of
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this judiciable controversy: the outcome of this litigation wi ll determine the amount of
community debt he owes to Defendants.

Defendants also argue in their Reply Memo randum that the Court should grant summary
judgment against Mark because he lacks standing. However, Mark has standing a nd Defendants
have not moved for summary judgment aga inst Mark. T herefore, this request is invalid and
therefore denied.

IV.

CONCLUSION

Because the Court finds genuine issues of material fact, Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment is denied.

Dated March c:;-~

018.
ynthia K.C. Meyer
istrict Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

S--

I certify that on this
day of t21J(d1 , 2018, I caused a true and correct copy of
this document to be served, with all required charges prepaid, by the method(s) indicated below,
to the following person(s):

Henry Madsen
l 044 Northwest Blvd;, Ste. B.
Coeur d ' A lene, ID
838 14

Terrance Harris
P.O. Box 1336
Coeur d ' Alene, ID
838 16-1 336

□
□
□
0-□

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Via Fax: (208) 664-6258
E-mail:

U.S. Mai l
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Via Fax: (208) 664-5884
E-mail:

Memorandum Decision and Order Denying Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment
18

Page 224
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RAMSDEN, MARFICE, EALY & HARRIS, LLP
700 No1thwest Blvd.

P.O. Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336
Telephone: (208) 664-5818
Facsimile:
(208) 664-5884
Ten·ance R Harris, ISB #5484
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counter Defendant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST ruDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
JENNIFER PORCELLO,
Plaintiff/Counter Defendant.

CASE NO. CV-2016-7343
PLAINTIFF'S WITNESS LIST

vs.
ANTHONY J. PORCELLO and ANNIE C.

PORCELLO, husband and wife,
Defendants/Counter Plaintiffs.

ANTHONY J. PORCELLO and ANNIE C.
PORCELLO, husband and wife,
Third Party Plaintiffs,
vs.

MARK PORCELLO.
Third Party Defendant.

CO:MES NOW, the above-named Plaintiff, by and through her counsel of record, and
hereby discloses witnesses who may be called to testify at the trial of this matter.

PLAfNTIFF'S WITNESS LIST- 1
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Jennifer R. Maggard
c/o Terrance R. Hanis
Ramsden, Marfice, Ealy & Harris, LLP
PO Box 1336
Coeur d 1Alene, Idaho 83816
(208) 664-5818

Jennifer Maggard is expected to testify about what is set forth in hei- verified complaint,
the affidavits she has filed in this matter as well as what was stated in her deposition snd related
matters .

2.

Anthony Porcello
c/o Henry Madsen
1044 Northwest Blvd., Ste. B
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814

(208) 664-8080
Anthony Porcello is expected to testify about what is set forth in his answer,

counterclaim and third-party complaint, the affidavits he has filed in this matter as well as what
was stated in his deposition and related matters.

3.

Mark Porcello
c/o Peter J. Smith

601 E. Front Avenue
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814
(208) 215-2411
Mark Porcello is expected to testify about what is set forth in his declarations filed in
this matter and in his Answer. Mark may also testify about other information related to the
various transactions.

4.

Scott Remcha
Legacy Group Capital, LLC
400 I 12th Ave NE, Suite 300

Bellvue, WA 98004
(425) 372-1606
Mr. Rerucha is expected to testify about what is set forth in his declaration filed in this
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matter as well as what is set forth in his depo3ition and the exhibits thereto.
5.

Joseph Mijich
Address unknown
(206) 412-9400

Mr. Mijich has the infonnation contained in his declaration filed in this matter as well as
what is set forth in his deposition and the exhibits thereto.
6.

Kalyn Porcello
c/o Henry Madsen
1044 Northwest Blvd., Ste. B
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814
(208) 664-8080

Kalyn Porcello is expected to testify about what is set forth in her declaration filed in
this matter and in the Defendants' Answer, Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint. Kalyn
may also testify about other information related to the vatious transactions .
7.

Kimi Dennison
Alliance Title Co.
2157 N . Main St.
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814
(208) 667-3402

Kimi Dennison is expected to testify about her interactions with Jennifer, Mark and
Joseph Mijich at closing and documents from the closing file.

8.

Heidi Smith, Heather Wichman
Pioneer Title Company
100 E Wallace Ave,
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814
(208) 664-8254

Heidi Smith and/or Heather Wichman are expected to testify about their interactions
with Jennifer, Mark and Joseph Mijich at dosing and documents from the closing file.
9.

Custodians of records for the various title companies that have provided HUD

settlement statements as needed to authenticate the records .
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The Plaintiff reserves the tight to call any witnesses called by Defendant in this matter.
The Plaintiff also reserves the right to call the witnesses listed above out of the anticipated
order. Plaintiff further reserves the right to amend and supplement this list prior to the hearing.

DATED this .:1._ day of April, 2018.

RAMSDEN, MARFICE, EALY & HARRIS, LLP

~~
By:

---=

--_)Y:=::--=

Terrance R. Harris

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the y'hday of April, 2018 I served a true and correct copy of
the foregoing by the method jndicated below, and addressed to the following :
Henry D . Madsen
Madsen Law Offices, P .C.
1044 Northwest Blvd., Suite B
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814

US Mail
~ - Overnight Mail
Hand Delivered
_±_ Facsimile (208) 664-6258

Peter J. Smith IV
SMITH+ MALEK, PLLC
601 E. FrontAvenue
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814

US Mail
_ _ Overnight Mail
Hand Delivered
_L_ Facsimile (208) 2 lf-2416

-

l'l W

d ½'J I

Nicole Vigil
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RAMSDEN, MARFICE, EALY & HARRIS, LLP
700 No11hwest Blvd.
P.O. Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336
Telephone: (208) 664-5818
Facsimile:
(208) 664-5884
Terrance R. Harris, ISB #5484

Attorneys for Plaintiff!Counter Defendant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF TIIE
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

JENNIFER PORCELLO,
Plainti ff/Counter Defendant.

CASE NO. CV-2016-7343

PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT LIST

vs.
ANTHONY J. PORCELLO and ANNIE C.

PORCELLO, husband and wife,
Defendants/Counter Plaintifl's.
ANTHONY J. PORCELLO and ANNIE C.
PORCELLO, husband and wife,

Third Party Plaintiffs,
vs.

MARK PORCELLO,

Third Palty Defendant.

The Plaintiff submits the attached Exhibit List identifying her proposed exhibits for the
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Cou1t Trial on April 23, 2018. The Plaintiff reserves the right to fu11her supplement and amend
this Exhibit List prior to the Cou1t Trial and rese1ves the right to offer additional Exhibits at the
trial.
DATED this

I

day of April, 2018.

RAMSDEN, :MARFJCE, EALY & HARRIS, LLP
~

By:

~

.,-,c;:::::::--4=:-----

Tenance R. Hanis

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the Cffl'lday of April, 2018 I served a true and correct copy of
the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:

Henry D, Madsen
Madsen Law Offices, P.C.
1044 Northwest Blvd., Suite B

US Mail
_ _ Overnight Mail
Hand Delivered

Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814

____JL Facsimile (208) 664-6258

Peter J. Smiih IV
SMITH+ MALEK, PLLC
601 E. Front Avenue
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814

US Mail

Overnight Mai I
Hand Delivered
____i_ Facsimile (208) 21J.24 I 6
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

Exhibit List
Name:
JENNIFER PORCELLO,
Plaintiff/Counter Defendant
vs.
ANTHONY J. PORCELLO and ANNIE C.
PORCELLO ,
Third Party Plaintiffs,
Case

Plalnliff s Allorney:
Terrance R . Harris (Jennifer Porcello)
Defendant's AtlornBy:

Henry Madsen (Anthony
Peter

& Annie Porcello)

J, Smith (Mark Porcello)

VS.

MARK PORCELLO,
Third Party Defendant.

OOCJ<el No.:

CV 2016-7343

Trial Dales:
April 23, 2018

Courtroom Depu ty:

Presiding Judge:

Court Reporter:

Judge Meyer
Party Offering E><hibile:

Joint Exhibit List
Instructions
o Plaintiffs Exnioits are to oe numoered and listed numerically, oerendanrs are to oe by alphabet and listed
alphabetically. Place the d3te of tri3I 3l'ld caze number on each exhibit leibol on 00ch exhibit.
o Complete only the Exhibit Number. Stipulation. Objection. and Description Columns ..
o A stipulation to the admission of the exhibit. should be indicated by marking the Stip11lation column with "ADM". A partia l
stipulation should be indicated by an abbreviation indicating the nature of the stipulation, e.g. authenticity (AUTH),
foundation (FND), relevance (REL). ousiness record exception (BRE). If no stlpuIa1Ion nas been reached then leave
blank.
o Objections should be noted by abbreviation or by reference to Idaho Rules of Evidence, e.g . Relevance (REL or 402).
o More detailed instructions may be obtained from the Deputy Clerk and are provided with the accompanying materials.

Exhibit
Numoe

Date
orrerea

Stipulati
on

r

Objectio
n

Ruling
(for

Description

Notes
(for use
by
Court)

use
by
Court)

1.

2.

Note - Dated 04/18/2011
Bank Verification of Available Funds -

Dated
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Exhibit
Numbe

Date
Offered

3:39PM
Stipulati
on

r
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Objectio

Ruling

n

(for
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Description

uee
by
Court)

Notes
(for use
by
Court)

10/17/2011
3.

Settlement Statement (HUD-1) Woodinville
Home

4,

Real Estate Purchase and Sale Agreement

5.

RE-11 Addendum - Dated 08/15/14

6.

Note - Dated 07101 /2014

7.

Settlement Statement {HUD-1) Hayden Lake
Home

8.

Emails - Dated 09/03/2014

9.

Earnest Money Payments & Ledger

10.

Warranty Deed - Recorded 09/04/2017
Hayden Lake Home

11 .

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and
Order - Dated 08/02/2016 (Kootenai County
Case No. CV 2015-3570)

12.

Decree of Divorce - Dated 12/05/2017
(Kootenai County Case No. CV 2015-3570)

13.

Final Settlement Statement (HUD-1)
Legacy Group Loan

14.

Settlement Statement (HU D-1) - First
Refinance

15.

Settlement Statement (HUD-1) - Second
Refinance

16.

Estimated Settlement Statement (HUD-1)
Sell of Woodinville Home

17.

Mark Porcello, Inc. Vendor QuickReport
(January 2001 through June 2016)

18.

Mark Porcello, Inc. Vendor QuickReport
(January 1 2001 through July 1, 2015)

19.

Mark Porcello. Inc. Transaction Detail by
Account (January 2005 through December
2015)

20.

Mark Porcello Cell Phone Records

21 .

Page A14 of 27 Re : Mark Porcello Phone
Records (Dated 08/06/14-09/05/14)
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Description
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Court)

Notes
(for use
by
Court)

22.

Page A15 of 27 Re: Mark Procello Phone
Records (Dated 08/06/14-09/05/14)

23.

Verified First Amended Complaint - Dated
12/07/2017 (Riverside County, CA Case No.
PSC 1700796)

24.

Answer to First Amended Complaint-Dated
01/10/2018 (Riverside County, CA Case No.
PSC 1700796)

25.

Amended Complaint -- Dated 03/30/2016
(King County, WA Case No. 16-2-07206-2
SEA

26.

Complaint for Damages and Injunctive
Relief-Dated 09/23/2016 (King County, WA)

27.
28.

Deposition of Joe Mijich - Dated 09/29/17

29.

Deposition of Anthony Porcello - Dated
09/29/17

30.

Deposition of Jennifer Porcello - pated
09/21/17

Deposition of Scott Rerucha - Dated 09/29/17
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To: Kootenai County C lerk

P age 1 of 8

2018-04-09 22:44: 13 (GMT)

Smith

Malek From: Smith

+

sr.n::: OF IJ t,ltO
CCU'i i :'

> :C J f [ ~A i

}

+

Male k, P LLC

ss

fLil,~

Peter J. Smith IV, ISBN 6997
Jillian H. Caires, ISBN 9130
SMITH + MALEK, PLLC
601 E. Front Ave., Ste. 304
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814
Tel :
208-215-2411
Fax: 208-215-2416
Email: peter@smithmalek.com
jillian@smithmalek.com

2lfl8'APff-9
1

PM ~: 4 I

Attorneys for Mark Porcello

lN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, fN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

JENNlFER PORCELLO.
CASE NO. CY-2016-7343
Plaintiff,
THIRD PARTY DEFENDANT'S

EXHIBIT LIST

vs.
ANTHONY J. PORCELLO and ANNIE C.
PORCELLO, husband and wife.
Defendants.

ANTHONY J. PORCELLO and ANNIE C.
PORCELLO, husband and wife,
Counter-Plaintiffs,

vs.
JENNIFER PORCELLO,
Counter-Defendant.
ANTHONY J. PORCELLO and ANNIE C.
PORCELLO, husband and wife,
Third Part Plaintiffs,
THfRD PARTY DEFENDANT'S EXHIBIT LIST: Page 1

Page 234

To: Kootenai County Clerk

P age 2 of 8

Smith + Malek From: Smit h + M a lek, PLLC

2018-04-09 22:44:13 (GMT)

vs.
MARK PORCELLO,
Third Party Defendant.

THIRD PARTY DEFENDANT MARK PORCELLO submits his Exhibit List.

Exhibit
Number

Date
Offered

Stipulation

Objection

Ruling
(for

Description

use by

Notes
(for use by
Court)

Cour1)

Settlement Statement (HUD- I) - Purchase of
Woodinville Property

P-A

P-B

Mark Porcello, Inc. - Quickbooks Record of Wells
Fargo Loan Payments
i
;

P-C

..

Final Settlement Statement (HUD- I) - Legacy
Group Capital, LLC Loan on Woodinville Property

P-D

Final Borrower's HUD- I - Showing Balance Paid
to Wells Fargo to pay off Woodinville Property

P-E

Mark Porcello, Inc. - Quickbooks Record of
Payments to Legacy Group Capital, LLC

P-F

Settlement Statement (H U D-1) - Purchase of
Hayden Property

P-G

Promissory Note and Deed of Trust - Prepared by
Joe Mijich

P-H

Sprint Cell Phone Records

THIRD PARTY DEFENDANT'S EXHIBIT LIST: Page 2

Page 235

To: Kootenai C o u nty Cl erk

Exhibit

Date

Number

Offcrc<l

Page 3 of 8

Stipulatio11

2018-04-09 22:44:13 (GMT)

Objt:Clillll

Smith + Malek From: Smith

Ruling
(fo r
u,;c by

Dt:scription

+

Ma lek, PLL C

Nore:(for u,c by
Court)

Cour1)

P-1

Settlement Statement (HUD- I ) - Everg reen
Moneysource Mongage Comp,my Loan to partially
pay off Legacy Group Capital , Ll.C

P-J

Legacy Group Capital, LLC - Payoff Statement
Showi ng Balance Owed after proceeds paid from
Evergreen Moncysource Mortgage Company Loan

P-K

Settlement Statement< HUD- I l - r-~vergreen
Moneysource Mongage Company Loan to pay off
Legacv Group Capital, LLC

P-L

Reconveyance of Deed of Trust - Legacy Group
Capital, LLC - Paid off 2m1 Deed of T rust

P-M

Estimated Settlement Statement (HUD-l) - Sale of
\.Voodinville, WA House

DAT ED this 9th day or April. 2018.
SMITH + MALEK, PLLC

---:._.------

,,,.-

.

________.

·-~ ::::,

~ :::=----.

..,.....

.

.

R J . S J ' i ~ ~Attorneyfor D~ntla.nt Mark Porce llo

THI RD PARTY DEFE!',;DANT'S EXHJBTT UST: Page 3

Page 236

To: Kootenai County Clerk

Page 4 of 8

2018-04-09 22: 44: 13 (GMT)

Smith + Malek From: Smith + M a lek, PLLC

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
On April 9, 2018 , I caused copies of tl1c foregoing document to be served by the following methods
on the pruties listed below as follows. which is the last known address fo r the listed party:

JR By Hand Delivery

TERRANCE R. HARRIS
RAMSDEN , MAR.FICE, EALY &
HARRIS

0 By U..S. Mail
□ By Overnight Mail
□By facsimile Transmission

750 Northwest Blvd
Cocurd 'Alcne, ID 83814
Facsin,ile: (208) 664-5884
A.uornevs (or pfoinri/fs
HENRY D. MADSEN
MADSEI'-i LAW OFFICES. P.C.
I 044 Northwest B lvd., Suite B
Coeur d 'Alene, ID 8 38 14
Facsimile: (208) 664-6258

A rtorneys.f<>r Defendant:;,Third-Party
Pluinrijfs

I

I

~By Hand Delivery
0 By lJ.S. Mail
0 By Overnight Mai l
O By Facsimile Transmi ssion

I

THIRD PARTY DEFENDANT'S EXH IBIT LIST: Page 4
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To: Koote n a i County C lerk

P age 5 of 8

2018-04-09 2 2:44:13 (G MT)

Smith • Malek F rom: Smith • M a le k, PLLC

Peter J. Smith IV, ISBN 6997
Jillian H . Caires, ISBN 9130
SMITH+ MALEK, PLLC
601 E. Front Ave., Ste. 304
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814
Tel: 208-215-2411
Fax: 208-215-2416
Email: peterc'aismithmnlek .com
jillian@smithmalek.com

Allorneys for Mark Porcello
1N THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE

ST ATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

JENNIFER PORCELLO,
CASE NO. CY-2016-7343
Plaintiff,

THIRD PARTY DEFEN DANT'S
WITNESS LIST

vs.

ANTHONY J. PORCELLO and ANNIE C.
PORCELLO, husband and wife,
Defendants.

ANTHONY J. PORCELLO and ANNIE C.
PORCELLO, husband and wife,
Counter-Plaintiffs,
vs.

JENNIFER PORCELLO,
Counter-Defendant.
ANTHONY J. PORCELLO and ANNIE C.
PORCELLO, husband and wife,

Third Party Plaintiffs.
vs.

THIRD PARTY DEFENDANT'S WITNESS LIST: I

Page 238

To: Kootenai County Clerk

Page 6 of 8

2018-04-09 22:44:13 (GMT)

Smith + Malek From: Smith + Ma lek, PLLC

MARK PORCELLO,
Third Party Defendant.

Third Party Defendant MARK PORCELLO submits this list of witnesses be intends to
call at trial on this matter. This witness list is filed to comply with the COURT'S NOTICE OF TRIAL
AND PRETRIAL CONFERENCE SETTING AND PRETRIAL ORDER filed on November I, 2017. Mark
Porcello intends to call as a witness:

I.

Mark Porcello
c/o Peter J. Smith JV
601 E. Front Avenue, Suite 304
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814
(208) 215-241 l

Mark Porcello will testify that the loan that Counter-Plaintiffffhird Party Plaintiffs are
seeking to foreclose was paid in full.

2.

Scott Rerucha
400 I 12th Avenue NE, Suite 300
Bellevue, WA 98004
(425) 681-3400

Scott Rerucha will testify as to how the proceeds from the sale of the Woodinville, WA
house and loans were used to pay the Counter-Plaintiffffhird Pany Plaintiffs.

3.

Jennifer Maggard as known as Jennifer Porcello
c/o Rick Harris, Esq.
750 Northwest Blvd.
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814
(208) 664-5818

Jennifer Maggard is expected to testify about what is set forth in her verified complaint,
the affidavits she has filed in this matter, as well as what was stated in her depos it ion and related
matters.

THIRD PARTY DEFENDANT'S WITNESS LIST: 2

Page 239

To: Kootena i Cou nty C lerk

4.

Page 7 of 8

2018-04-09 22:44:13 (GMT)

Smit h + Ma le k From: Smith + Mal e k, P LLC

Anthony Porcel.lo
c/o Henry Madsen, Esq.
1044 Northwest Blvd. Suite B
Coeur d' Alene, Idaho 838 l 4
(208) 664-8080

Anthony Porcel lo is expected to tes tify about what is sl!t forth i.n his answer,
counterclaim, and third-party compl aint. the affidavi ts he has fikd

in

this matter, as wel l as what

was srared in his deposition and related matters.
5.

Josep h :vfij ich, Esq.
600 Universi ty Street # 1928
Seattle, \VA 93101

(206) 223-2500
Jo.'icph Mijich is expectc-d to tes tify as to the Promissory ;s.; ote and Deed of Trust, as well
as how the principal amount was to be ··adjusted '' post-c losing

Third Party Defen dant also n:serves the right to call any of the wimesse.s identified by the

Plaintiff or Defendants/ Th ird-Party Pla intiffs. Third-Party Defe ndant reserves the right to amend
or supplement this list.
DA TED this 9 th day of Ap ril , 2018.

THIRD PART Y DEFENDANT'S WITNESS U ST: 3
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To: Kootenai County Clerk

Page 8 of 8

2018-04-09 22:44 :13 (GMT)

Smith + Malek From: Smith + Malek, PLLC

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
On April 9 , 2018, J caused copies of the foregoing document to be served by t he
:follo.,,ving methods on the parties listed below as follows, which is the last known address
for the 1isted party:

TERRANCE R. HJ\RRlS
RAMSDEN , MARFICE, EALY&
HARRIS

750 Northwest Blvd
Coeurd'Alene, rp 83814
Facsimile: (208) 664-5884

HENRY D_ MADSEN
MADSEN LAW OFFICES, P.C.
1044 Nl1Ith,vest Blvd., Suite B
C\ieurd'Alt:me, ID 83814
facsimi.lc: (208} 664-6258

D By Hand Dehvery
D By U-5 Mail
0 By Overnight Mad
Facsimile Transmission

r.(By

D By Hand Delivery
D By U.S. f\.fail

D By Overnight Mail
~By Facsimile Traiismissi.on

Attorneys for Defendants/ Third-Party

P/aintdJ.;•

THIRD PARTY DEFENDANT'S WITNESS LIST: 4
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No. 01 92
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RAMSDEN, MARFICE, EALY & HARRIS, LLP
700 No1thwest Blvd.
P.O. Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336
Telephone:
(208) 664-5818
Facsimile:
(208) 664-5884
Terrance R. Harris, ISB #5484

Afforneys for Plaintiff/Counter Defendanr

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE

STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
JENNIFER PORCELLO,
Plaintiff/Counter Defendant.

CASE NO. CV-2016-7343

STIPULATED JOINT EXHIBIT

LIST
vs.
ANTHONY J. PORCELLO and ANNIE C.
PORCELLO, husband and wife,
Defendants/Counter Plaintiffs.
ANTHONY J. PORCELLO and ANNTE C.
PORCELLO, husband and wife,
Third Party Plaintiffs,

vs.
MARK PORCELLO,
Third Party Defendant.

The Pa11ies submit to the attached Joint Exhibit List identifying the proposed exhibits for
the Court Trial on April 23, 2018. The parties reserve the right to further supplement and amend
this Exhibit List prior to the Court Trial and fu11her reserves che right to offer additional

STlPULAn:o JOINT £.XHTBIT LIST- I
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No. 01 92
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Exhibits, if any at the trial.
DATEDthis

I

dayofApril,2018 .

DATED this _ _ day of April, 2018.

MADSEN LAW OFFICE, P.C.

By:

~ AfheNol
Henry. Madsen

DATED this _ _ day of April, 2018.

SMITH + MALEK

By:

$.ta

frctcJ.,k~

Peter J. Smith

STTPVLAT£D JOfNT EXHIBIT UST- 2

Page 243

Apr.

9. 2018 3:49 PM

No. 0192

P. 4/ 5

Exhibils, if fln)' Ill !he lrlctl.

DATl::'.D 1his

1 _ ci11r or /\pril, 2018.
RAMSDEN, lvtARf.TCE, EALY & HARRJS, LLP

DA TED this_ clAy of April, 20 18.

MADSEN LAW OFflCE, P.C.
By:

_.,5Q~"

ft4:tat..kvzcL

Henry D. Madsen

DATED this

cii1y of April, 2018.

::ITH

<f'_::s-_ $

Peter J. Smith

SllPULATCD JOINT r.x1 IIBIT usr. 2
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No. 0192

3:5 0PM
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Exhlhits, if nny 11111,c lrh1I.
DATED lhis .:}__ (fay of AprH, 2018,

RAMSDEN, MARFTCE, EALY & (-)ARTUS, LLP

-=-~

Ry:

~7--------

Terrnnce R. Harris
~·

DATBO this£ dny or April, 2018.

DATED this _ <111)' or April, 2018.

SMlTH ·I· MALilK

By:

SPP

Peter J. Smith

A±ta111 a I_

STIPULATED JOINT J;XMflll'f LIST· 2
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

Exhibit List
case Neme:
JENNIFER PORCELLO,

Plainliffs .Allornoy:

Terrance

Plaintiff/Counter Defendant

(Jennifer Porcello)

Defendant's Attorney:

vs .
ANTHONY J . PORCELLO and ANNIE
PORCELLO.
Third

R. Harris

C.

Henry Madsen (Anthony & Annie Porcello)
Peter J. Smith (Mark Porcello)

Party Plaintiffs.

vs.

MARK PORCELLO,
Third Party Defendant.
Dockel No.:

Courtroom Dopv11:

Tr11>I Dote~:

CV 2016-7343

April 23, 2018

Presiding Judge:

Court Reporter:

Judge Meyer
Party Offering Exhibilg:

Joint Exhibit List
instructions
o Plaintiff5 Exhibit5 are to be numbored and listed numerically, Defendant's are to baby alphabet and listed alphabetically.
Plac~ the date of trial and case number on each exhibit label on each exhibit.
□ Complete only the Exhibit Number, Stipulation, Objection , and Description Columns.
□ A stipulation to the admission of the exhibit, should be ind icated by marking the Stipulation column with " ADM". A partial
stipulation should be indicated by an abbreviation Indicating the nature of !he stipulation. e.g. authenticity (AUTH), foundation
(FND), rolovance (REL), buolne:i9 record oxception (BRE). If no etipulslion has bean reachad than leav.i blank.
o Objections should be noted by abbreviation or by reference to Idaho Rules of Evidence. e.Q. Relevance {REL or 402).
a More detailed instructions may be obtained from the Deputy Clerk and are provided with the accompanying materials.
Exhibit
Numbs
r

Date
Offerea

Stipulati

on

Objectio
n

Ruling

Description

(tor
use

Notes
(for u5e by
Court}

by
Court)

A

B

JTM T ime for August

2014

Declaration of Joseph

T. Mijich

STIPULATED JOfNT EXHIBIT LIST- 3
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Apr .
Exhibit
Numbe

9. 201 8 4:40PM
Date
Offered

Stipulati
on

No. 0202
Objectio
n

r

Ruling
(for

P. 7/ 7

Description

use

Notes
(for use by

Court)

by

Court)
C

Excerpt of 09/21/2017 Deposition of Jennifer
Porcello

D

HU0-1 Settlement Statement

E

Third Party Escrow Instructions

F

09/03/14 Promissory Note

G

Deed of Trust

H

Declaration

I

Photocopied Chicago Title Company of
Washington ChecK for $175,175.40

J

Estimated Settlement Statement (HUD-1)

K

Settlement Statement (HUD-1)

L

Legacy Group Capital, LLC Chain of Events

M

Settlement Statement (HUD-1) Final

N

Legacy Group Capital, LLC Payoff Statement

0

08/03/15 Letter to Anthony emd Annie Porcello

from Scott Rerucha

p

Photocopied First Financial Northwest Bank
Check for $52,382 07

Q

10/06/16 Letter to Whom It May Concern from
Scott Rerucha

··-

ST!PVLATED JO TNT EXHI 8 IT LI ST- 4
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Ma. d~e n La.w Off i cn, PC

No. 5187

P. 1/1 1

HENRY D. MADSEN
MADSEN LAW OFFICES, P.C.
1044 NW Blvd. Suite B
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814
Telephone: (208) 664-8080
Facsimile: (208) 664-6258 .
ISBN 4428
Attorney for Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

JENNIFER PORCELLO,

CASE NO. CV-2016-7343

Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant,
vs.

DEFENDANTS' EXHIBIT LIST FOR
TRIAL

ANTHONY J. PORCELLO and ANNIE C.
PORCELLO, husband and wife,
Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs.
ANTHONY J. PORCELLO and ANNIE C.
PORCELLO, husband and wife,
Third Party Plaintiffs,
vs.

MARK PORCELLO,
Third Party Defendant.
COMES NOW the above-named Defendants, Anthony J. Porcello and Annie C. Porcello,

by and through their attorney of record, HENRY D . MADSEN of MADSEN LAW OFFICES,
PC. and submits the attached exhibits to be used at the trial of this matter
DATED tbis _ day of April, 2018.
LAW OFFICES, PC

DEFENDANTS' EXlllBIT LIST FOR TRIAL - 1

Page 248

Apr. 9. 2018 4: 24 PM

MaL en Law Off ice3 , PC

No. 5187

P. 2/ 1

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ~day of April, 2018, I caused to be served a true

and correct copy of the foregoing by the method jndicated below. and addressed to the following:
Tenance R. Hanis
RAMSDEN, MARFICE, EALY

✓ Via Facsimile to: (208) 664-5884

&HARRIS
Peter J. Smith

✓ Via Facsimile to: (208)

215-2416

SMITH+ MALEK

~QcJ,,,--_
Madsenaw om&s,Pc

DEFENDANTS' EXHIBIT LIST FOR TRIAL - 2
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Ap r.9.2 018 4:24 PM

Madse n La w Off ic e: , PC

No . 5187

P. 3/ 11

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

Exhibit List
Case Name:
JENNIFER PORCELLO,
Plaintiffi'Counter Defend ant

vs.

Plaintiffs Attorney:
Tenance R . Harris (Jennifer Porcello)
Defendant's Attorney:
Henry Madsen (Anthony & Annie Porcello)

ANTHONY J. PORCELLO and ANNIE C. PORCELLO,
Third Party Plaintiffs,

Peter J. Smith (Mark Porcello)

vs.

MARK PORCELLO,
Third Party Defendant.
Docket No .:
CV 2016-7343
Presiding Judge:
Judge Meyer

IApril
Trial Dates:
23, 2018

Couitroom Deputy:
Court Reporter:

Paity Offering Exhibits:
Defendants Anthony & Annie Porcello
Jnstructioni
D Plaintiff a Exhibits are to be numbered and listed numerically, Defendants are to be by alphabet and listed
alphabetically. Place the date of trieil fl11d case number on each exhibit label on each exhibit.

D Complete only the Exhibit Number, Stipulation, Objection, and Description Columns.
□ A stipulation to the admission of the exhibit, should be indicated by marking the Stipulation column with
"ADM". A partial stipulation should be indicated by an abbreviation indicating the nature of the stipulation, e.g.
authenticity (AUTH), foundation (FND), relevance (REL), business record exception (BRE). If no stipulation has
been reached then leave blank.
D Objections should be noted by abbreviation or by reference to Idaho Rules of Evidence, e.g. Relevance (REL or
402).
D Moi·e detailed instructions may be obtained from the Deputy Clerk and are provided with the accompanying
materials.

No.

Date
Offered

Stipulation

Objectlon

Ruling

Description

(for

by
Court

U:!IC

Not~
(for
use by
Court)
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Notes
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Linda Lourey, CPA CV
Recap of costs and cash prepared by Linda
Laurey, CPA
Settlement Statement for Hayden Property
Settlement Statement for Woodenville
Property
Checks to Mark Porcello in the amounts
of'$15,000 and $30,000
Promissory Note dated September 3, 2014
Deed of Trust dated September 3, 2014
Settlement Statements for Via Venita Loan
Chain of Events from Legacy Group
Capital, LLC
Mortgage Interest Statement 201 Son
Woodinville Legacy Loan
Settlement Statement for Woodinville
Property - Seller's side
Mo11gage Interest Statement 2015 on
Woodinville Evergreen Loan
Deposit Slip for Cash to Mark Porcello
from Sale of Woodinville home
Cashier's Check #1031 to Legacy Group
Capital, LLC
2016 Federal Summary Depreciation
Schedule
Basis of Woodinville Prope1ty Rec ap
Settlement Statement for Woodinville
prope1ty
T &M Summaty Invoice
August 7, 2013 correspondence from Key
Bank
Check to Mark Porcello for $18,807.62
Settlement Statement for Woodinville
Property dated May 14, 201.5
Settlement Statement for Woodinville
Property dated July 30, 2015

T

u
V

w
X
y

z
AA

BB

cc
DD
EE

FF
GG

HH
II
JJ
KK

LL
MM

NN
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Description

(for
use by
Court

Notes
(for
use by
Court)

Recap of Rental Prope1ty
Schedule E - Supplemental Income and
Loss 2007
Schedule E - Supplemental Income and
Loss 2008
Schedule E - Supplemental Income and
Loss 2009
Schedule E - Supplemental Income and
Loss 2010
Schedule E - Supplemental Income and
Loss 201 1
Schedule E - Supplemental Income and
Loss 2012
Schedule E - Supplemental Income and
Loss 2013
Schedule E - Supplemental Income and
Loss 2014
Schedule E - Supplemental Income and
Loss 2015
Kootenai Property Taxes Report as of
December 21, 2017 for Hayden Property
Correspondence to Judge Ten:ance Catroll
dated August 7, 2013
Order of Arbitrator dated August 15, 2013
Deposition Transcript of Anthony Porcello

pp

QQ
RR

ss
TI

uu

vv
WW

xx
YY

zz
AAA

BBB
CCC

Video Deposition of Joseph Miiich
Deposition Transcript of Joseph Mijich
Deposition Transcript of Scott Rmucha

DDD
EEE
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HENRY D . MADSEN
MADSEN LAW OFFICES, P .C.
1044 NW Blvd. Suite B
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814
Telephone: (208) 664-8080
Facsimile: (208) 664-6258
ISBN 4428

Attorney for Defendants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO. IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
JENNIFER PORCELLO,

CASENO. CV-2016-7343

Plaintiffi'Counter-Defendant,
vs.

DEFENDANTS' WITNESS LIST FOR
TRIAL

ANTHONY J. PORCELLO and ANNIE C.
PORCELLO, husband and wife,
Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs.
ANTHONY J. PORCELLO and ANNIE C .
PORCELLO, husband and wife,

Third Party Plaintiffs,
V5.

MARK PORCELLO,

Third Party Defendant.
COMES NOW the above-named PetitLoner, by and through his attomey of record,
HENRY D. MADSEN of MADSEN LAW OFFICES, PC, and submits the names of the

following individuals who he may call as witnesses at the trial of this matter:
I.

LAY WITNESSES

1. Anthony Porcello; c/o Henry D. Madsen; 1044 Northwest Blvd, Suite B; Coeur

d'Alene, ID 83814; 208-664-8080

Mr. Porcello will testify as to his knowledge of the present Hayden Lake transaction and
various real estate transactions that Annie and Anthony completed both for Mark and or Mark
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and Jennifer and real estate sales/refinances for the benefit of Mark and/or Mark and Jennifer.
Anthony Porcello will also testify to his .knowledge and may testify as to the problems of both
Mark and Jennifer to Wit: Marital; substance abuse by Mark and manipulation of Anthony and
Annie Porcello by both Mark and Jennifer, if required.
2 . Kim Parker; Law Offtce of Joe Mijich; 601 Union Street, Floor 42; Seattle, WA (206)

295-2567
Kim Parker will testify to the history of business dealings of Anthony and Annie Porcello

and their child Mark Porcello and his wife Jennifer Porcello to jnclude: the purchase of the
Hayden property, the asreement between the paities, how Anthony Porcello intended to finance

the purchase of the prope1ty, how the prope1ty was to be purchased by Mark and Jennifer
Porcello and their financing of the same.

Fmther, she will testify about the multiple

convelsations with Joe Mijich, Anthony and Annie Porcello, Mark and Jennifer Porcello, and

Kayln Porcello as to said transaction and the default of Mark and Jennifer as to said Hayden
Prope1ty before nnd nfter the instant matter was filed.

3. Joe Mijich (by video deposition or in person); Law Office of Joe Mijich; 601 Union
Street, Floor 42; Seattle, WA (206) 295-2567

Joe Mijich is long-time counsel for Anthony and Annie Porcello, will testify to the
history of business dealings of Anthony and Annie Porcello and their child Mark Porcello and
his wife Jennifer Porcello to include: the purchase of the Hayden property, the agreement
between the parties, how Anthony Porcello intended to finance the purchase of the prope1ty, how
the property was to be purchased by Mark and Jennifer Porcello, and their financing of the same.

He will also testify to the multiple conversations with Kim Parker, Anthony and Annie Porcello,
Mark s.nd Jennifer Porcello, and Kayln Porcello as to said transaction and the default of Mark

and Jennifer as to the Hayden Property before and after the instant matter was filed. He may also
testify as to the drus problems of Mark and the marital problems between Mark and Jennifer.
th

4. Kayln Porcello; 10222 NE 8 Sn·eet; Bellevue, WA 98004 (206-3 83-9748)

Kayln is the daughter of Mark Porcello and granddaughter of Anthony and Annie
Porcello and further manages Porcello Jewelers. Kayln will testify to the history of business

dealings of Anthony and Annie Porcello and their child Mark Porcello and his wife Jennifer
Porcello to include: the purchase of the Hayden prope1ty, the agreement between the parties, how

Anthony Porcello intended to finance the purchase of the property, how the property was to be
purchased by Mark and Jennifer Porcello and their financing of the same.

Furth.er, she will
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testify to the multiple conversations with Joe Mijich, Anthony and Annie Porcello, Kim Parker,
Mark and Jennifer Porcello as to said transaction and the default of Mark and Jennifer as to said
Hayden Prope1ty before and after the instant matter was filed. She will further testify that she
helped her grandparents with their funds and payment of their bills; and was intricately involved
with the financing of the Hayden property including short term loans which included other
properties owned by Anthony and Annie Porcello. She may testify as to Mark's drug prnblems
and marital problems with Jennifer and how Mark and Jennifer took advantage of Anthony and
Annie Porcello.
5. Mark Porcello; c/o Peter J. Smith IV and Jillian H. Caires; Smith + Malek. PLLC;
601 East Front Avenue, Suite 304; Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 (208-215-2411)

Mark is the son of Annie and Anthony Porcello and the father of Kayln Porcello. Mark
Porcello will testify to the history of business dealing!! of Anthony and Annie Porcello and
himself and his wife Jennifer Porcello to include: the purchase of the Hayden property, the
asreement between the parties, how Anthony Porcello intended to finance the purchase of the
prope1ty, how the property was to be purchased by Mark and Jennifer Porcello and their
financing of the same. Fuither. Mark Porcello will testify to the multiple conversations with Joe
Mijich, Anthony and Annie Porcello, Jennifer Porcello, and Kayln Porcello as to said transaction
and the default of himself and Jennifer as to said Hayden Property before and after the instant
matter was filed.

Further, he may testify to his drug problems and marital problems with

Jennifer.
6. Jennifer Porcello; c/o Terrance R. Hanis; Ram sden, Mai:fice, Ealy & H1mis; 750
No1thwest Blvd; Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 (208) 664-5818
Jennifer Porcello is the Plaintiff. It is anticipated that she will testify to the history of
business dealings of Anthony and Annie Porcello and Mark Porcello and herself to include: the
purchase of the Hayden property, the agreement between the parties, how Anthony Porcello
intended to finance the purchase of the property, how the propeny was to be purchased by Mark
and Jennifer Porcello and their financing of the same. Further, she may testify to the multiple
conversations with Joe Mijich, Anthony and Annie Porcello, Mark Porcello, and Knyln Porcello
as to said transaction and the default of Mark and herself as to said Hayden Property before and
after the instant matter was filed. She m ay also testify to Mark's drug problems and their m arital
problems.
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7. Scott Rerucha; The Legacy Group Capital, LLC; 400 112th Avenue NE Street, Suite

300; Bellevue, WA 98004 (425-681-3400)
Scott Rerucha will testify to the history of business dealings of Anthony and Annie
Porcello and their child Mark Porcello and his wife Jennifer Porcello to include: the purchase of
the Hayden prope1ty, the agreement between the pru.ties, how Anthony Porcello intended to
finance the purchase of the prope1ty, how the property was to be purchased by Mark and Jennifer
Porcello and their financing of the same. Fmther, he will testify to the multiple conversations
with Joe Mijich, Kim Parkor, Anthony and Annie Porcello, Mark lilld Jennifcx- Porcello, and

Kayln Porcello as to said transaction and the default of Mark and Jennifer as to said Hayden
Property before and after the instant matter was filed . Fu1ther, Mr. Rerucha may testify as to
Mark's drug problems and marital problems.

8. Candy Inbody_: 1450 Northwest Blvd. Suite 301; Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 (208-6672399)

Candy Inbody was Mark and Jennifer Porcello' s realtor when they purchased the Hayden
Lake house. She will te~tify to her knowledge of Mark and Jennifer's purchase of the Hayden
Lake house, that Anthony and Annie provided funding for the purchase and details of the
transaction, including that Jennifer and Mark were constantly late in getting things to her
necessary to complete the transaction.
9. Robert Jones, CPA; 3063 East Warbler Road; Gilbei.t, AZ 85297 (206-948-0308)

Mr. Jones prepared taxes for Anthony and Annie Porcello and may testify as to the
inclusion of Schedule E for tax years of 2007-2014 which identify ownership of properties
owned by Anthony and Annie Porcello.

II.

EXPERT WITNESSES

1. Linda Laurey; 407 East H Street, Deer Park, WA 99006 (509) 389-2379
Ms. Laurey is an expe1t retained by Anthony and Annie Porcello. She will testify to the
opinions previously provided in her report that the Promissory Note signed by Mark Porcello and
Jennifer Porcello dated September 3, 2014 in the amount of $648,500, plus 12% interest on the
note is still payable to Anthony and Annie Porcello. Further, she will testify that the additional
costs incuned by Anthony and Annie Porcello of $473,747 to pay off the Legacy Group Loan
should be reimbm:~ed to them in addition to the costs to collect said note.
Defendants reserve the right to call any and all witnesses listed by the Plaintiff, Jennifer
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Porcello, and or Third-Party Defendant, Mark Porcello, mo.y designate emd or call at the time of
trial.

Defendants reserve the right to amend this list in light of the fact that discovery is
continuing in this case. If, in fact. such amendment is required. Defendants will immediately

notify·the Plaintiff and Third-Paity Defendant and seek to amend and supplement any of the
information contained herein
. . t - -·

DATED this(/_ day of April, 2018.

MADSEN LAW OFFICES, PC
By

~ 9aM
. .

lfum;~adsen

----
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the~ day of April, 2018, I caused to be served a true
and conect copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following :

-Terrance R .- Hunis
RAMSDEN, MARFICE, EALY
&HARRIS

✓ Via Facsimile to: (208) 664-5884

✓ Via Facsimile to: (208) 215-2416

Peter J. Smith
SMITH+ MALEK

Madsen Law Offices, PC
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HENRY D. MADSEN
MADSEN LAW OFFICES, P.C.
1044 Northwest Blvd., Suite B
Coeur d'Alene. ID 83814
Off: (208) 664-8080
f ae5imilc: (208) 664-6258
ISB #4428
Attorney for Defendants/Counter-claimants/Third Party Plaintiffs

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST ruDICIAL DISTRICT

OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
JENNIFER PORCELLO,

Case No. CV-16-7343

Plaintiff,

ORDER RE: APRIL 2, 2018, HEARING

vs.

ANTHONY J. PORCELLO and the
Estate of ANNIE C. PORCELLO,
KALYN M. PORCELLO, Personal
Representative,

Defendants.
ANTiiONY J. PORCELLO and the
Estate of ANNIE C. PORCELLO,
KALYN M. PORCELLO, Personal
Representative,

Counter-Plaintiffs,
vs.

JENNIFER PORCELLO,
Counte1·-Defendant.

ORDER RE: APRIL 2, 2018, HEARING
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ANTHONY J. PORCELLO and the
Estate of ANNIE C. PORCELLO.
KALYN M. PORCELLO. Personal
Representative,
Third Party Plaintiffs 1·

. vs.

MARK PORCELLO,

Thfrd P

Defendant.

On April 2, 2018, Defendants'/Counter-claimants'/fhird Party Plaintiffs' Motion for
Reconsideration, Motion to Amend the Pleadings and Motion for Protective Order came on
for hea1:ing.

Hem-y Madsen, Madsen Law Offices, PC, appeared on behalf of

Dcfcndants/Countcrclaimants/Thinl Pmty Plaintiffs Anthony Porcello and Kalyn Porcello,

Trustee of the Estate of Annie Porcello ("Defendants"). Terrance R. Hm.Tis, Ramsden,

Marf,cB, Ealy & Harris, appeared on behalf of Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant Jennifei·
Porcello. JilJian Ca.ires, Smith+Malsk, appeared on behalf of Third Party Defendant Mark

Porcello.
Based upon the reasoning provided in open court and on the ree-0rd at the Apl'il 2,

2018, hearing and in the Court's discretion, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
l.

Defendants' Motion to Amend the Pleadings is granted and responsive

pleadings to the Amended Counterclaim and Third Party Complaint shall
be served and filed within 14 days from se1vice of the amended pleadings
pursuant to I.R.C.P. 1S(a)(3);

2.

Defend.ants· Motion for Reconsideration is granted and the Court· s March

5, 2018, Memorandum Decision and Order Denying Defendants' Motion
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for Summary Judgment is hereby reconsidered and the Coun' s ruling that
Paragraph 22 of Plnintiff':s complaint being deemed admitted is hereby set
85ide 85 Defendftnts pursurmt to IR.CP S(b)(S) had denied the .same in their

previous AnQwer; and
.. 3..

Defendants' Motion fot a Protective Order regarding the deposition of

Mark Porcello is granted.
Signed: 4/10/2018 01:55 PM

SIGNED this_ day of April, 2018.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on lhe _!Q_ day of April. 2018, I caused to be served a
true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER by the method indicated below, and
addressed. to the following:

Henry Madsen
MADSEN LAW OFFICES, PC

✓

Via Facsimile to: (208) 664-6258

✓

Via Facsimile to: (208) 664-5884

Temmce R. Hanis
RAMSDEN, MARFICE, EALY
&HARRIS
Peter J. Smith
SMITH+ MALEK

✓ Via facsimile: to: (208) 215-2416

DeputyClerk:_ _~ - - - - - - - Jim Bumnon, Clerk of the Court
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HENRY D. MADSEN
MADSEN LAW OFFICES, P.C.
1044 Nmthwcst Blvd., Suite B
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83 814
Off: (208) 664-8080
Facsimile: (208) 664-6258
ISB #4428
Attomey for Defendants/Counter-claimants/Third Party Plaintiffs

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
JENNIFER PORCELLO,
Plaintiff,

vs.

Case No. CV-16-7343

VERIFIED AMENDED ANSWER AND
COUNTERCLAIM AND TIDRD
PARTY COMPLAINT

ANTHONY J. PORCELLO and the
Estate of ANNIE C. PORCELLO,
KALYN M. PORCELLO. Personal
Representative,
Defendants.
ANTHONY J. PORCELLO and the
Estate of ANNIE C. PORCELLO,
KALYN M. PORCELLO, Personal
Representative,

Counter-Plaintiffs,
vs.

JENNIFER PORCELLO,

Counter-Defendant.

VERIFIED AMENDED ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM AND
THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT
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ANTHONY J. PORCELLO and the
Estate of ANNIE C. PORCELLO.
KALYN M. PORCELLO, Personal
Representative,
Third Pai.ty Plaintiffs,

MARK PORCELLO,

Third Party Defendant.
COMES NOW Defendants, Petitioner ANTHONY J. PORCELLO and the Estate of
ANNIE C. PORCELLO, KALYN PORCELLO, Personal Representative ("Defendants
and/or Defendant"), by and through their attorney of record, Henry D. Madsen of Madsen
Law Offices, P.C., and in answer to Plaintiff's Complaint filed on OctobCJ.· 5, 2016, herein
admit, deny and allege as follows:

ADMISSIONS AND DENIALS

1.

Defendant, ANTHONY PORCELLO states that, since the filing of the above

action. ANNIE PORCELLO is deceased and, as to her estate, KALYN PORCELLO.
Personal Representative, as to the Estate of Annie Porcello, makes answer to Plaintiff's
allegations therefore all answers hereinafter are made by ANTHONY PORCELLO and
KALYN PORCELLO as Personal Representative of the Estate of Annie Porcello.
2.

That Defendants deny all allegations not specifically admitted herein.

3.

Defendants admit the allegations contained in Paragraphs, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7,

8, 9, 26, 36, and 37 of Plaintiff's Complaint.
4.

Defendant denies the allegations contained in Paragraphs 31, 32, 33, 34, 38

39, 40, 48, 49, 50, 52, 53, 54, 55, of Plainti:f:rs Complaint.
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Defendants lack sufficient information and belief to admit or deny

Paragraphs 20, 23, 28, and 30 and therefore denies the same.

6.

As to the allegations 41, 47, and 51 to the extent they require

f:l.n

answer,

defendant answers consistent with Defendant's answers above.

7.

As to the allegations commonly referred to as: "Prayer for Relief", to the

extent said allegations require an answer. Defendant denies.
8.

As to Paragraph 10 of the Complaint, Defendant denies that they encow:aged

JENNIFER to stay admit that JENNIFER was allowed to stay at a property Respondent's
owned in King County but deny the remainder of the allegations therein.

9.

As to Paragraph

11 of the Complaint, Defendant admits that JENNIFER

located the Woodenville home and affirmatively alleges that she tried to purchase the same
but could not qualify so Defendant purchased the home and does not have sufficient
information to form a belief as to the remaining allegations therein.
10.

As to Pai:agxaph 12

of Plaintiff's Complaint, Defendant admits that Jenni.for

was not able to secure :financing, and the purchase conti·act was in Ann and Tony's name, but

deny that Mark contributed in the purchase, and affirmatively allege that the agreement was
that the Plaintiffs, Matk and Jennifer would pay rent while living in the home and that if they

wished to keep the home after a few years that they needed to refinance into their name and
reimburse the Defendants all of their investment.
8.

As to Paragtaph 13 of Plaintiffs Complaint Defendants admit that Jennifer

spent time making the home appear in better condition, but affumatively allege that there is
no proof of any financial investment and that all claims were denied by Judge Carroll.
Fmther, the renovations were paid by Ann

and

Mark and that most of what Mark paid out
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was later reimbursed by Ann, including payment to any family members. Once Mark
movc:d out Jc:nnifc:r failed to make rent payments. Defendant doesn't not have sufficient
info1mation to form a belief as to the remaining allegations therefore denies the same.

9.

As for Paragraph 14, Defendant admits that JENNIFER was evicted from the

Woodenville home as the arbitrator found that JENNIFER had no right or interest in and to

said prope1ty and further admit JENNIFER and MARK were having problems with their
relationship but has insufficient information to form a belief as to the remaining allegations
therefor denies the same.

10.

As to Paragraph 15 of Plaintiff's Complaint Defendant admits in pru.t that

Jennifer and Mark remarried in November 2013 and later wanted to purchase the Hayden
home, but denies in part that they would be allowed to use the Woodinville house proceeds
but lacks sufficient information to admit or deny the remaining allegations therefore denies.
11.

As to Paragraph 16 of Plaintiffs Complaint Defendant denies in part that

Annie requested Jennifer to return to Woodinville in June 2014, but admits that Mark and

Jennifer paid for work and materials for :renovations, and affirmatively alleges that most of
all these costs for materials were reimbursed by Defendants.

12.

As for Paragraph 17, Defendant admits to signing Exhibit A which is a true

and correct copy as to the handwritten note but denies the remainder of the allegations
therein.
13.

As for paragraph 18, Defendant admits that they assisted JENNIFER and

MARK in purchasing the Hayden Home by refinancing their other properties to not only
provide the purchase money but to address other financial assistance to JENNIFER and
MARK culminating in JENNIFER and MARK signing the Note and Deed of Trust giving

VERIFIED AMENDED ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM AND
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Defendant a security interest in and to said Hayden Home to insure the repayment thereof
but does not have sufficient information to admit or deny the remaining allegations therefore
denies the same.

14.

As to Paragraph 19, Defendant admits that the Woodenville home was

financed by the Legacy loan and denies that the $48,577.62 went to Defendant but
affirmatively alleges that said proceeds went to MARK and does not have sufficient
information to form an opinion as to the remaining allegations therefore denies the same.

15.

Defendant admits the allegations as to Exhibit D and E being a true and

con:ect copy of the Note and Deed of Trust with regard the Hayden home and that MARK

and JENNIFER signed the same but does not have sufficient info1mation to fo1m an opinion
as to the remaining allegations of paragraph 21 therefore denies the same.
16.

As to paragraph 22 of Plaintiff's Complaint, Defendants admit that Joe

Mijich is the long~time attorney for Anthony and Ann Porcello and who prepared the Note

and Deed ofTl'Ust but denies the remainder of paragraph 22.
17.

As to Paragraph 24 of Plaintiff's Complaint Defendants admit in pa.it that the

Woodinville home was listed for sale and did not sell during the period of July 2014 tlu:ough

December 2014; admits MARK and JENNIFER made all interest only payments on the
Legacy Group Capital, LLC loan but denies that MARK or JENNIFER paid off the loan.

18.

As to Parag.-aph 27 of Plaintiffs Complaint Defendant admits in pru.t that

they received another loan to pay off Legacy Group and for the amounts as stated therein,
but denies that the Indian Wells home is owned by MARK..
19.

As to Paragraph 29 of Plaintiffs Complaint Defendants admit in part that the

Woodinville home sold, but denies in pai1 that they received the proceeds from the sale, and
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affi1matively alleges that the proceeds were paid to MARK.

AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
In asserting the following defenses, Defendant does not assume the burden of
proving any element thereof which any applicable case law. common law, statute, l'ule.

regulation or other authority places upon Plaintiff.
1.

Each and every claim for relief in the Complaint fails to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted against Defendants.
2.

Plaintiffs Complaint fails, in whole or in part, to allege a basis for the relief

claimed.
3.

Plaintiff's claims are barred, in whole or in pai.t, by the applicable statutes of

limitation.
4.

Plaintiff's claims arc barred, in whole or in part, by the doctrine of equitable

estoppel, judicial estoppel, and/or promissory estoppel.

5.

Plaintiffs claims are barred, in whole or in part, by the doctrine of unclean

hands, and in pari delicto.
6.

Plaintiff's claims are ball'ed, in whole or in part, by the docn:ine ofwaivei-.

7.

Plaintiff's claims are barred. in whole or in part. by the doctrine of consent.

8.

Plaintiffs claims are barred by the terms of the contracts at issue.

9.

Plaintiff is not entitled to and are otherwise ban-ed from recovery beyond

actual damages, if any.
11.

Plaintiff has suffered no damages.

12.

Plaintiffs claims fail for a lack of consideration.

13.

Plaintiff's claim for recovery of her damages, in any, are barred, in whole or
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in part, by failing to mitigate said damages.
14.

Plaintiff has failed to join necessary and indispensable parties.

15.

Plaintiff'5 alleged damages, if any, were caused solely by Plaintiff's own

negligence, or by her comparative or contributory negligence or wrongful acts and said
claims should be barred.

16.

Plaintiff's allegations as denied by-Defendants ate without legal grounds and

justification as to be proven in further proceedings accordin2ly herewith.

COUNTERCLAIM/THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT
Counterclaimants/Third Party Plaintiffs, ANTHONY J. PORCELLO and the Estate
of ANNIE C. PORCELLO, by ANTHONY J. PORCELLO and or KALYN M.
PORCELLO, Personal Representative ("Defendants", or "ANTHONY and ANNIE'')

counterclaims against Plaintiff JENNIFER PORCELLO ("Plaintiff', "Counterdefendant" or
"JENNIFER") and against Third Party Defendant MARK PORCELLO ("MARK") in this

matter and complains as follows:

GENERAL ALLEGATIONS
1.

Plaintiffs incorporate all of the previous allegations as previously admitted as

though set forth herein.

2.

Counterclaimant/Third Party Plaintiff ANTHONY PORCELLO is an

individual residing in the State of Washington, King County.
3.

Counterclaimant/Third Party Plaintiff ANNIE PORCELLO is deceased and a

probate has been filed in the State of Washington, King County, Superior Court Probate
Cause No. 17-4~04963-5.
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Counterdefendant JENNIFER PORCELLO is an individual residing in the

State ofldaho, County of Kootenai.

5.

Third Party Defendant MARK PORCELLO is an individual residing in the

State of Califomia.

6.

This Court has jurisdiction and venue is proper in this Court because the Real

Property, a single family residence located at 1663 E. Northwood Drlve, Hayden Lake,
Idaho (hereinafter the Real Property), is located in Kootenai County. Idaho. Said Real
Property is legally described as:
Lot J, Block B, Fairway Glen, according to the plat thereof, filed in Book "F" of
PJats at page(s) 356, 356A and 35613, reco1·ds ofK.ootenai Co\mty, Idaho.
TOGETHER WITH
The South 14 feet of the East 100.S feet of lot I, BlookA, Fait-way Glen, according
to the plat thereof filed in Book ''F" of Plats, at page(s) 356, 356A and 3568, records

of Kootenai County, Idaho.
Commonly known as 1663 East Northwood Drive, Hayden Lake, Idaho 83 83 5.
Tax Parcel No. V.5.50000B003A

7.

ANTHONY and ANNIE (deceased) at all times mentioned herein have been

the pa.rents of MARK.

8.

JENNIFER and MARK first married in 2003, were divorced in 2007,

remarried in 2013 and divorced in 2016. At all pe1tinent times mentioned herein MARK and
JENNIFER were either married or co-habitating.
9.

That ANNIE and ANTHONY assisted MARK and JENNIFER financially

through the refmance of various properties ANNIE and ANTHONY owned.
10.

That ANNIE and ANTHONY incurred many costs associated with the

refinancing of their properties when financially assisting MARK and JENNIFER.
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That said financial assistance became substantial and culminated in the Note

and Deed of Trust as to the Hayden home.
12.

On or a.bout September 3, 2014, JENNIFER and MARK signed a Promissory

Note in the principal sum of Six Hundred Forty Bight Thousand Five Hundred Dollars and
No Cents ($648,500.00) in favor of ANTHONY and ANNIE. A true and correct copy of

said Promissory Note is attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and incorporated by this reference as
thou2h set forth in full hereat.
13.

On or about September 3, 2014, to secure the Promissory Note referred to

herein, JENNIFER and MARK signed a Deed of Trust concerning the Real Property. A true

and correct copy of said Deed of Trust is attached hereto as Exhibit "B" and incorporated by
this reference as though set fo1th in full hereat.
14.

MARK and JENNIFER has failed to pay the interest payments as required by

said Note nor any payment at all and said Note is past due and owing in the full amount of
$648,500.00 plus interest and attorney fees and costs.

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
Against PJRintiff/Counterdefendant JENNIFER PORCELLO,
and against Third Party Defendant MARK PORCELLO

Foreclosure of ReRl Property

15.

The prior allegations of this Counterclaim and Third Party Complaint are

incorporated here as though set forth in full hereat.
16.

The claimed interests in the Real Prope1ty by JENNIFER and/or MARK are

all subsequent to and inferior to the interest of ANTHONY and ANNIE under the Deed of
Trust.
17.

The fair market value of the Real Property is unknown at present and will be
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established at n-ial.
18.

ANTHONY and ANNIE have inCU1Tcd costs and attorneys' fees related to

this action and for the enforcement of the secured obligations, which they a.re entitled to
recover, both under law and pursuant to the terms of the Deed of Trust and Note.

19.

No other suit or action is cu1Tently instituted to foreclose the Deed of Trust

and ANTHONY and ANNIE have no other plain, speedy or adequate remedy at law.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF
FOR THE REASONS STATED ABOVE. ANTHONY and the Estate of ANNIE
PORCELLO pray the Court for judgment and decree as follows:
1.

That JENNIFER'S Complaint be dismissed and she take nothing thereby;

2.

That ANTHONY and the Estate of ANNIE PORCELLO are the holder of

Note and Deed of Trust which are valid and enforceable, and they are entitled to enforce the
same as the real party in interest;
3.

That the usual decree may be made for the sale of the Real Propcaty

according to law and the practice of this Cou1t md that the proceeds of said sale shall be
applied in payment of amounts found due to ANTHONY and or the Estate of ANNIE

PORCELLO and the costs and expenses of this action;
4.

That the Counterdefendant and Third Pm.ty Defendant be required to properly

plead the nature ofthcir claims in and to the Real Property or any part thereof;

5.

For an adjudication that the rights, claims, ownership, liens. titles and

demands of Counterdefendant and Third Party Defendant in the Real Property are
subsequent to and subject to the Deed of Trust;
6.

That ANTHONY and or the Estate of ANNIE PORCELLO recover their
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costs, disbursements and expenses incun-ed in this action;
7.

For post-judgment interest as allowed by law; and

8.

For such other relief as the Court deems just and equitable.

SIGNED this

/b~ of April, 2018.
MADSEN LAW OFFICES, P .C.

~

By:

..

HENRY D
DSEN, Attorney
for ANTHONY J. PORCELLO and the

Estate of ANNIE C. PORCELLO,

KALYN PORCELLO, Trustee.

VERIFICATION

STATE OF WASHINGTON

)

) ss.
County of King

)

I, ANTHONY PORCELLO, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says:
I am a Defendant/Counterclaimant/fhird Party Claimant in the above-captioned
matter; I have read the foregoing AMENDED Answe1·, Counterclaim, and Thh·d-Party

Complaint, know the contents thereof, and believe the same to be true to the best of my
knowledge.

Dated this_ day of April, 2018.
ANTHONY PORCELLO

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this_ day of April, 2018.

NOTARY PUBLIC in and for the State
of Washington, residing at: _ _ __

VERIFIED AMENDED ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM AND
THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT

-11

Page 272

Apr.16. 2018 10:28AM

No. 5224

Madsen Law Offices, PC

P. 12/15

VUIFlCATION'
STA'l'R Of WASHINO-'ION
Co1,nty of Ki~

X, ANTHONY PORCBLLO, beins firit duly sworn on oath, de]>Ol!911 and says:
( am I' Dcfendant/Counterclaimanl/l'bircl Party C~imant in rhe 11bove-oaptioned
malter, I have read lh8 fon,30~ AMENDED Answer, C9unl~claim, ond Third-Party
Coinpl.oi,u, know tbc oontel\lS thereof, a"d belie.vi, ,,he sarut,
1,:oowwlae.
Pited tlii, _ da}' of April, 201$.

lO be

IJUe 1.0 tll,e best of my
.

ANTHONYPORCBLLO

0

~;,,-~

S~CRlaBD ANO SWORN lo b~o mo this _day ofApril, 2018.

nd ror the SWo
NOTARYPUBLI
ofWashingto,,, residl.n~
Ill:

V~RIFICA.TJON
Sl.'A'l1l OF W!>SHlNOTON

/aa. /
County of Kins

I, KAf.,YN .i>OQCJU,LO, To),at~ cif the E1~0 of ANNl.ltC. PORcnto, peing firsl
cMy swom on i,,alb, de_po~s and Jay~:
I 11m n ~r~11nt/C;o\lSl.~rolaimant/Thlrd

r~

Cl,iimant in lba 11t,ove-~ropUoned

mauer; I have Te.ad (he fon,going AMaNDBP ~w11-r, Count~o!aitn, 'P\d 1"hW-Pilrty
my
CoippJainL. know tht con ten\$ ~erCQf, and l,elillVC 1hc s.itic tt, be tIUe to the host

oi

knowlQQBe.
Oat~ tl1ls _._ d11y oCApnl, 20~8.
KAI.\'N J;>Oltom.1-0, Pb T~tCO or lh<;
E!Ullo of ANNlE C. PORCELLO

SUBSCRJBED AND SWORN ro Wo~ me 1his ..,_ da)' of April, lOJ 8.
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A notary publlc or other officer completlng this
certificate verifies only the Identity of th~ Individual
who slgn~d the doc~merit to which this certlftc;t;1te
la atqichedi and not the truthfulness. accuracy, or
valldl · of that document.
Ste1te of Ceillfornie
County .of. R1v4rslde

Subscribed and sworn to (or affirmed) before .me on this 13th
day of Aorll
, 201!, by Anthonv James Porcello
proved to me Qn the bcitsis of satisfactory evidence to be tne
person(s) who appeared before me.

(Seal)

Ia

.

i
l··~·························••i••···~
OOM'-1.~•
P. ~Y8AFl'ZAVA!.A

NQT-,rf P I U > ~

~....,.,...,

1

,,..·•••~mmrnfflllmt'ffl~......,

Page 274

Apr. 16. 2018 10:28AM

Madsen Law Offices, PC

No. 5224

P. 14/15

'VEillFICATION
STATB OF WASHINGJO'N

)-

County ofK.ilig

')

:) ss.

J, .KAl,YN.POltCELLO, ..):)enoiutl ile.-,.r.esent~~ve of the Estate. of.ANNIE C..

PORCELLO, being first duly sworn o~ oath, depo$~$ and s~ys:
Annie C. Porcello js a Defendant/Countercl~irrnmtffhird Party Clahnant fo the
~b.ovc-onpticined rnatter; I have read the foregoing AMENOEO Answer, Cp\intcrcla.im, and
Third-Par~ Complatnt, know the contents thereof, and believe the same to be true to the

best of my knowledge.
bated due ~ y of April, 2018.
KALYN.<:iRCELLO, M Pereonal
Repl'tlsentative of the &tate of ANNIE C.
PORCBLLO
.}Lt

SUBSCRJBED AND SWORN to befol'e me this

1~ day of April, 2018.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the

j.!e_ day of April, 2018, I caused to be served a.

trne and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the
following:
Terrance R. Harris
RAMSDEN, MARFICE, EALY

✓ Via Facsimile to:

(208) 664-5884

&HARRIS

Peter J. Smith

✓ Via Facsimile to: (208) 215-2416

SMITH+ MALEK
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Electronically Filed
4/16/2018 4:59 PM
First Judicial District, Kootenai County
Jim Brannon, Clerk of the Court
By: Dawn Mitchell, Deputy Clerk

HENRY D. MADSEN
MADSEN LAW OFFICES, P.C.
1044 Northwest Blvd., Suite B
Coeur d’Alene, ID 83814
Off: (208) 664-8080
Facsimile: (208) 664-6258
ISB #4428
Attorney for Defendants/Counter-claimants/Third Party Plaintiffs
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
JENNIFER PORCELLO,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV-16-7343
DEFENDANTS’ TRIAL BRIEF

vs.
ANTHONY J. PORCELLO and the
Estate of ANNIE C. PORCELLO,
KALYN M. PORCELLO, Personal
Representative,
Defendants.
ANTHONY J. PORCELLO and the
Estate of ANNIE C. PORCELLO,
KALYN M. PORCELLO, Personal
Representative,
Counter-Plaintiffs,
vs.
JENNIFER PORCELLO,
Counter-Defendant.
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ANTHONY J. PORCELLO and the
Estate of ANNIE C. PORCELLO,
KALYN M. PORCELLO, Personal
Representative,
Third Party Plaintiffs,
vs.
MARK PORCELLO,
Third Party Defendant.
COMES NOW Defendants/Counterclaimants/Third Party Plaintiffs ANTHONY J.
PORCELLO and the Estate of ANNIE C. PORCELLO, KALYN PORCELLO, Personal
Representative (“Defendants and/or Defendant”), by and through their attorney of record,
Henry D. Madsen of Madsen Law Offices, P.C., and submits this trial brief in compliance
with the Court’s Pre-Trial Order.
I. Introduction
A. Factual Summary
Defendants, Anthony Porcello and the Annie Porcello1, husband and wife (hereinafter
PORCELLO) at the beginning of this action lived together at their home at 1817 Jones Ave.,
NE, Renton, Washington 98056 and are the parents of Mark Porcello (hereinafter MARK),
3rd Party Defendant, whom was married to Jennifer Porcello (hereinafter JENNIFER) Plaintiff
in the above matter.
In December 2011, PORCELLO purchased the Woodinville residence by first placing
a $6,000.00 earnest-money deposit and then providing a $93,394.49 down payment and
procuring a loan through Wells Fargo Bank. That said loan was secured via other property
1 Since the filing of this action, Annie Porcello has died. The Court approved the substitution of Kalyn Porcello,
Annie’s daughter and the personal representative/trustee of Annie’s estate.
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owned by ANNIE and ANTHONY, to wit: the Indian Wells, California property.
PORCELLOS purchased the Woodinville home as an investment whereby the property would
be cleaned and repaired then sold for profit. ANNIE allowed JENNIFER to move into the
property and continue to prepare the same for placing on the market but was to pay $1,600.00
per month rent and all utilities while doing so. Further, JENNIFER and MARK were paid an
hourly wage and reimbursed all expenses they incurred as a result of her repairs. See
Declaration of Ann Porcello, Exhibit FFF. Further, there were other contractors, e.g., JC
Enterprises, cabinet installers, plumbers, and deck repair services who were paid by ANNIE
to repair the home and ready it for the market.
It is important to note, that although JENNIFER and MARK lived in the Woodinville
home and made improvements to the same the house remained titled to PORCELLO who also
reimbursed them for the improvements and also made all the tax payments and mortgage
payments. PORCELLO provided the down payment, financing, and supplied the renovation
funds to restore the home to habitable status.
JENNIFER and MARK first married in 2003, were divorced in 2007, remarried in
2013, and another divorce was filed in 2013, Washington Case No. 13-3-07562-1 SEA.
JENIFFER’S and MARK’S marriage has been fraught with their Methamphetamine abuse
causing turmoil throughout their relationship ending in their final Divorce and Judgment of
December 5, 2017.
In the previous Washington divorce, Case No. 13-3-07562-1 SEA, JENNIFER made
a claim for the Woodinville property and ANNIE interplead ANNIE and ANTHONY’S claim
that they owned the Woodinville home and JENNIFER had no interest in and to the same and
further that JENIFFER should be evicted from said property as she had failed to pay the rent
and the utilities. The parties agreed to submit the Woodinville issues to arbitration and retired
DEFENDANTS’ TRIAL BRIEF

-3
Page 279

Judge Terrance Carroll was appointed as arbitrator. Evidence was submitted to Judge Carroll
who, based upon the submissions of the parties, ruled that JENNIFER had no interest as to
the Woodinville property and that she was to vacate the property.
Thereafter, MARK and JENNIFER resolved their differences and the divorce matter
was dismissed. MARK and JENNIFER were required to vacate the Woodinville property as
a result of the arbitration order and they decided to move to Idaho for a new start. MARK and
JENNIFER found a residence in Hayden, Idaho (hereinafter the Hayden property). The
Hayden property had short term closing time requirements and as a result MARK and
JENNIFER again went to PORCELLO for help in purchasing the same.
In order to purchase the HAYDEN property in the time required, ANTHONY and
ANNIE were required to apply for funding through a hard money lender-- Legacy Group
Capital, LLC (hereinafter LEGACY or Scott Rerucha). PORCELLO agreed to finance the
purchase of the Hayden, Idaho, property but MARK and JENNIFER were required to sign a
Note and Deed of Trust in order for them to do so and to secure the costs of financing for the
purchase of the Hayden home. The Note and Deed of Trust as to the Hayden property secured
the purchase price and the costs of financing the same. Based upon the estimated costs of
financing the Hayden home which was relayed to them by Scott Rerucha, the financier, the
parties agreed upon the amount of $648,500.00, which included the purchase amount of the
Hayden property and the amount of refinancing of the Woodinville property. That said sums
to be paid by MARK and JENNIFER were set out in said Note and Deed of Trust.
Closing occurred on the Hayden property on September 3, 2014, and JENNIFER and
MARK both went to the closing together. At the closing JENNIFER got cold feet and refused
to sign because she had questions as to the amount of the Note and wished to speak to her
attorney before continuing further. JENNIFER claims that she was privy to a telephone
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conversation between MARK and JOE MIJICH, ANNIE and ANTHONY’S attorney, and
overheard an individual on speaker phone state to MARK “when the Woodinville property
sells, the Hayden property will be theirs free and clear”. It is JENNIFER’S further claim that
based upon the statement from the individual who she identified as Joseph that she then went
to the title company and signed the Note and Deed of Trust. JOE MIJICH was deposed and
stated that he never told MARK and/or JENNIFER that when the WOODINVILLE property
sold they would have the HAYDEN property free and clear. Deposition of Joseph Mijich, Ex.
DDD. Further, JOE’S testimony at said videoed deposition that he never uses the name
“Joseph” and always refers to himself as “JOE”.
Neither, JENNIFER or MARK paid the Note as agreed and a non-judicial foreclosure
was begun on June 14, 2016. A Notice of Default was recorded and served upon MARK and
JENNIFER according to law, and the sale of the Hayden property was set for October 18,
2016. Neither JENNIFER nor MARK cured the default within one hundred and fifteen (115)
days after having been given notice of the sale date and the above action was filed on October
5, 2016 just 12 days before the sale date of October 18, 2016.
B. Procedural Summary
On October 5, 2016, JENNIFER filed a Complaint. On February 13, 2017, Defendants
filed their Answer, Counterclaim and Third Party Complaint. On March 5, 2018, the Court
entered its Memorandum Decision and Order Denying Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment. On April 10, 2018, the Court granted Defendants’ Motion for Reconsideration and
Motion to Amend the Pleadings.
In her Complaint, JENNIFER seeks injunctive relief; declaratory relief; and certain
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relief as to a violation of the Consumer Protection Act.2 In their Counterclaim and Third Party
Complaint, Defendants seek to foreclose upon the Hayden, Idaho, property.
II. Discussion
Although it may appear that this matter is complex, it is rather simple. PORCELLO
loaned JENNIFER and MARK a substantial amount of money so that the two could purchase
a home in north Idaho. JENNIFER and MARK agreed to repay the loan and they also agreed
that if they did not repay the loan then PORCELLO could foreclose on the property. Having
not repaid their debt, JENNIFER and MARK have asserted various arguments as to why they
should not have to repay the loan and why the home should not be foreclosed. The forthcoming
trial will allow the Court, sitting as the trier-of-fact, to find that JENNIFER’S and MARK’S
allegations and assertions are without merit. The relevant issues that that the Court will need
to address in its decision are discussed below.
A. Community Debt
In Gardner v Gardner, the Idaho Court of Appeals stated,
A debt incurred during marriage is presumed to be a
community debt. Simplot v. Simplot, 96 Idaho 239, 526 P.2d
844 (1974). This is a rebuttable presumption. In the case of
a loan, the nature of the loan proceeds determines the nature
of the debt. Therefore, to rebut the presumption, it must be
proved "with reasonable certainty and particularity that the
proceeds of the loan were . . . separate property." Winn v.
Winn, 105 Idaho 811, 814, 673 P.2d 411, 414 (1983). If the
proceeds of the loan were separate property, the debt is also
2 Jennifer later dismissed the Idaho Consumer Protection Act cause of action. Also, Jennifer’s injunctive relief
claim, requesting that the Court enjoin Defendants from “non-judicially” foreclosing on the home has now been
addressed and a judicial foreclosure is sought by Defendants. Therefore, Jennifer’s sole remaining claim is the
Declaratory Judgment claim. In that claim, Jennifer asserts that she is not in default under the terms of the Note
and Deed of Trust; is entitled to an offset of $150,000 against any amount that she owes to Defendants, and the
Defendants cannot foreclose on the property. Complaint at ¶¶ 43-45. Quite shockingly, Jennifer prayers include
a request that she be given the Hayden home. Complaint at prayers 3-4 (Defendants be ordered to “reconvey the
Deed of Trust to Jennifer” and Defendants are to be “permanently” restrained from selling the home). The facts
that will be shown at trial include that Jennifer has never made a payment to Defendants for the home. Therefore,
it can be said that Jennifer is asking this Court to give her a “free home”.
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separate.
Gardner, 107 Idaho 660, 662, 691 P.2d 1275, 1277 (Ct. App. 1984). In the present
matter the loan was made to JENNIFER and MARK during their marriage. Therefore, the
loan is presumed to be community debt and JENNIFER has the burden to show, under a
reasonable certainty and with particularity that the loan was separate debt, which she cannot
do because the proceeds of the loan—the home—is community property.
B. Misrepresentation and/or Fraud
As discussed, JENNIFER has alleged that she entered into the subject agreement based
upon information that she overheard from an individual who referred to himself as “Joseph”.
JOE has stated, in his deposition that will be entered into evidence at trial, that he never spoke
to JENNIFER and never told her what she claims he was to have said.
As the Court is aware, fraud must be pled with particularity. I.R.C.P. 9(b). Pursuant to
the Complaint, JENNIFER did not plead a fraud or misrepresentation cause of action.
Therefore, she cannot attempt to raise these issues at the trial. As the Idaho Supreme Court
has said, "[w]hen issues are not raised by the pleadings, the evidence raising the legal issue
must be clear enough so that both parties know of the issue and consent to the issue being
tried." Ross v. Coleman Co., Inc., 114 Idaho 817, 827, 761 P.2d 1169, 1179 (1988). Trial of
a claim or defense by consent is not established merely because evidence relevant to that issue
was introduced; rather, it must appear both parties understood that the evidence was aimed at
the unpled issue. Hughes v. Fisher, 142 Idaho 474, 483, 129 P.3d 1223, 1232 (2006). In the
present matter, the Defendants object to any attempt to introduce evidence as to a fraud or
misrepresentation claim and do not consent to a fraud or misrepresentation claim being added
or tried.
C. No Gifts Were Made or Intended
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Because JENNIFER has requested that the Court award her the Hayden home, and the
fact that she has not made any payments as to the home’s debt, it is possible that JENNIFER
is requesting that the Court find that the home was intended as a gift from PORCELLO to
JENNIFER and/or MARK.
The Erb v. Kohnke, 121 Idaho 328, 824 P.2d 903 (Ct. App. 1992), case is somewhat
instructive as to any gifting argument that either JENNIFER OR MARK may raise. In that
case, the Idaho Court of Appeals stated,
In Idaho, "[o]ral gifts of land generally fall within the terms
of the statute of frauds and are invalid, but the conditions of
a particular case can take it out of the operation of the statute,
especially when the donee has taken exclusive possession
under the gift and has made valuable and permanent
improvements to the realty." Suter v. Suter, 97 Idaho 461,
465, 546 P.2d 1169, 1173 (1976). The equities in favor of
the donee must be such that revoking the gift would be
unjust, inequitable, and a fraud on the donee. See generally
73 AM.JUR.2D Statute of Frauds § 484 (1974).
Sarah has argued that, even assuming the conveyance was
not a completed gift, the estate is estopped from using the
statute of frauds to defeat her claim because she quit her job,
gave up her apartment, moved into the house, and made
improvements to the real property, all in reliance on Willis's
promise to give her the property. Citing In re Estate of
Courtright v. Robertson, supra, the district court held that
Sarah had the burden of proof to establish the oral gift of the
real property, and any facts supporting an exception to the
statute of frauds, by clear and convincing evidence.
The district court considered the estoppel issue, made
findings in regard to each of the material factual allegations
and concluded that while Sarah had paid the taxes and
insurance on the property, and had made some
improvements such as painting and carpeting, her
expenditures could be adequately compensated for in
damages. See Reinhardt v. Fleming, 18 Wash.2d 637, 140
P.2d 504 (1943). The court found that none of the
improvements were of a permanent nature. Suter v. Suter,
supra. In addition, it was not shown that the value of the
expenditures exceeded the benefit to Sarah of the use of the
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real property during this time period. Green v. Brown, 37
Cal.2d 391, 232 P.2d 487 (1951). Therefore, the district
court could not say that revoking the gift would be unjust,
inequitable, or fraudulent to the donee. Davenport v. Board
of Education, 204 Okl. 356, 230 P.2d 271 (1951). The court
concluded that Sarah did not sustain her burden of proving
that the transfer of the Spruce Street property was outside the
operation of the statute of frauds. In summary, the court held
that the gift was not complete and the transaction by which
Sarah obtained title to the property did not satisfy the statute
of frauds. The court determined that Sarah held title in trust
for the estate.
The court's factual findings on this issue are supported by
substantial competent evidence, and we find no reason to
disturb them. I.R.C.P. 52(a) ... .
Erb, 121 Idaho at 334, 824 P.2d at 909. If this issue is raised at trial, Defendants have asserted
an estoppel affirmative defense. Verified Amended Answer at p. 6, ¶ 4 (“Plaintiff’s claims are
barred, in whole or in part, by the doctrine of equitable estoppel, judicial estoppel, and/or
promissory estoppel.”) Therefore, Defendants will present evidence to show that the
PORCELLOS never intended that the Hayden home be gifted to either JENNIFER or MARK.
Additionally, because JENNIFER is presumably attempting to argue that the property was to
be a gift, based upon the disputed and alleged JOE MIJICH conversation, JENNIFER has the
burden of proving her assertion by clear and convincing evidence.
Also, JENNIFER has asserted that there was a written agreement between the
PORCELLOS and JENNIFER that supposedly involved the PORCELLOS gifting JENNIFER
$150,000 upon the sale of the Woodinville home in consideration of JENNIFER’S alleged
renovation work on the Woodinville home. Defendants have admitted they signed the
handwritten agreement but have denied that the agreement was entered into as reimbursement
for work and supplies JENNIFER and MARK provided for the Woodinville home. See
Verified Amended Answer at p. 4, ¶¶ 11-12. As to this claim, JENNIFER has the burden of
DEFENDANTS’ TRIAL BRIEF

-9
Page 285

proof that the $150,000 was intended as repayment or as a gift.3
In the alternative, if the Court does find that there was an agreement to gift
JENNIFER and/or MARK $150,000, it is important that the Court find that the $150,000.00
was provided directly to MARK, following the refinancing of the Woodinville home and,
with the Via Venito property income, the total provided to MARK was $157,157.40. MARK
chose to make an investment with Legacy Group Capital Investment on July 21, 2015, and
August 6, 2015, instead of applying it to the Hayden home. Accordingly, it could be said that
any obligation by PORCELLO to pay the $150,000 in accordance with the handwritten note
was honored as to MARK.
Further, any promise to pay JENNIFER the $150,000 was also satisfied because
MARK received the funds while still married to JENNIFER. As the Court is aware, income
obtained during marriage is considered community income.
In Banner Life Ins. Co. v. Mark Wallace Dixson Irrevocable Tr., 147 Idaho 117, 206
P.3d 481 (2009), the Idaho Supreme Court stated,
In Idaho, the characterization of an asset as community or
separate property depends on the date and source of the
property's acquisition. Estate of Hull v. Williams, 126 Idaho
3 Freer v. Freer, No. 42057, 2015 WL 1022150, at *2 (Idaho Ct. App. Mar. 10, 2015) (unpublished) defines the
elements that are prerequisite to a determination that something constitutes a gift under Idaho law:
Under Idaho law, a “gift” is a voluntary transfer of property by one to
another without consideration or compensation therefor. To effectuate a
gift, a donor must deliver property to a donee, or to someone on his or
her behalf, with a manifested intent to make a gift of the property.
Delivery is accomplished when the grantor relinquishes all present and
future dominion over the property. Donative intent may be proven by
direct evidence, including statements of donative intent, or inferences
drawn from the surrounding circumstances, such as the relationship
between the donor and donee. The existence of donative intent is a
factual finding to be made by the trial court. Inter vivos gifts are not
presumed, even in familial relationships, and the burden is on the
beneficiary to establish every element of the gift, including donative
intent.
(emphasis added and internal citations omitted).
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437, 440, 885 P.2d 1153, 1156 (Ct. App. 1994). Property
acquired during the marriage is presumptively regarded as
community property. Stewart v. Stewart, 143 Idaho 673,
677, 152 P.3d 544, 548 (2007). The party seeking to
overcome the presumption has the burden of proving "with
reasonable certainty and particularity" that an asset is his or
her separate property. Williams, 126 Idaho at 441, 885 P.2d
at 1157 (quoting Houska v. Houska, 95 Idaho 568, 570, 512
P.2d 1317, 1319 (1973)); see also Guy v. Guy, 98 Idaho 205,
206, 560 P.2d 876, 877 (1977).
147 Idaho at 124, 206 P.3d at 488. Further, in Parker v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 148
Idaho 842, 846, 230 P.3d 734, 738 (2010) (citing to Suter v. Suter, 97 Idaho 461, 466, 546
P.2d 1169, 1174 (1976)), the Idaho Supreme Court stated, “Idaho Code § 32-906 provides
that property acquired after marriage is community property, subject to exceptions not present
in this case. This includes a spouse's earnings.”
D. The Agreements
JENNIFER’s assertion that the July 1, 2014, handwritten note was a contract is
erroneous because that note is not an enforceable agreement.
Idaho Code §9-505 provides as follows:
In the following cases the agreement is invalid, unless the
same or some note or memorandum thereof, be in writing
and subscribed by the party charged, or by his agent.
Evidence, therefore, of the agreement cannot be received
without the writing or secondary evidence of its contents:
1. An agreement that by its terms is not to be performed
within a year from the making thereof.
2. A special promise to answer for the debt, default or
miscarriage of another, except in the cases provided for in
section 9-506, Idaho Code.
3. An agreement made upon consideration of marriage, other
than a mutual promise to marry.
4. An agreement for the leasing, for a longer period than one
(1) year, or for the sale, of real property, or of an interest
therein, and such agreement, if made by an agent of the party
sought to be charged, is invalid, unless the authority of the
agent be in writing, subscribed by the party sought to be
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charged.
5. A promise or commitment to lend money or to grant or
extend credit in an original principal amount of fifty
thousand dollars ($50,000) or more, made by a person or
entity engaged in the business of lending money or
extending credit.
It is essential to an enforceable contract that the agreement is sufficiently definite and
certain in its terms and requirements so that it can be determined what acts are to be performed
and when performance is complete. Spokane Structures, Inc. v. Equitable Inv., LLC, 148
Idaho 616, 226 P.3d 1263 (2010). Formation of a valid contract requires a meeting of the
minds as evidenced by a manifestation of mutual intent to contract; this manifestation takes
the form of an offer followed by an acceptance. Justad v. Ward, 147 Idaho 509, 211 P.3d 118
(2009). Formation of a valid contract requires that there be a meeting of the minds on the
essential terms of the agreement as evidence by a manifestation of mutual intent to contract.
Lawrence v. Hutchinson, 146 Idaho 892, 204 P.3d 532 (Ct. App. 2009). A contract to convey
land must include certain provisions. The contract must include "the parties to the contract,
the subject matter of the contract, the price or consideration, and a description of the property."
Bear Island Water Ass'n, Inc. v. Brown, 125 Idaho 717, 722, 874 P.2d 528, 533 (1994)
(citation omitted).
Here, the Court can determine that the handwritten note was not a contract because it
does not contain specific information so as to create a contract. Specifically, the contract has
no mention of consideration, only the PORCELLOS are listed in the agreement (no other
parties), and there is no showing of mutual intent to contract and therefore there was no
meeting of the minds. Further, the statute of frauds prevents JENNIFER and MARK from
introducing parol evidence to attempt to manipulate the note into some form of a contract.4

4 Even if the note is determined to be a contract, or if this Court accepts Jennifer’s arguments in an attempt to
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While the July 1, 2014, note was just a note, the Promissory Note and Deed of Trust are valid,
enforceable contracts that unambiguously state that JENNIFER and MARK agreed, jointly
and severally, to pay the PORCELLOS $648,500.00.
Idaho courts look solely to the face of a written agreement to determine whether it is
patently ambiguous. Swanson v. Beco Const. Co., Inc., 145 Idaho 59, 175 P.3d 748 (2007).
If the terms are clear and unambiguous, the meaning and legal effect of the contract are
questions of law which must be determined from the plain meaning of the words used.
Independence Lead Mines v. Hecla Mining Co., 143 Idaho 22, 137 P.3d 409 (2006).
The Note and Deed of Trust are, on their face, unambiguous and the Court can
determine, as a matter of law, that JENNIFER and MARK agreed to the following
unambiguous terms: that they pay PORCELLO $648,500.00; that certain payments were due
on certain dates; that the interest rate was 12% per annum; that late payments (defined as being
15 days past the payment date) would be 5% of the scheduled payment; that if payments were
not made that PORCELLO could accelerate the debt; that the Deed of Trust was security for
the loan; and that if PORCELLO had to retain counsel to collect on the debt that JENNIFER
and MARK agreed to pay the PORCELLOS’ attorney’s fees and costs.
III. Conclusion
Defendants request that the Court, sitting as the trier-of-fact, find in their favor and
determine that Defendants loaned JENNIFER and MARK $680,000 and that the Note is in
default. Defendants also request that the Court determine that because of JENNIFER’S and
MARK’S default, that Defendants are legal entitled to foreclose on the Hayden, Idaho,

modify the Note and Deed of Trust, our Supreme Court has stated that “courts do not possess the roving power
to rewrite contracts in order to make them more equitable.” Losee v. Idaho Co., 148 Idaho 219, 223, 220 P.3d
575, 579 (2009).
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property. Defendants also request that the Court determine that JENNIFER and MARK’s
asserted claims are without merit and deny both JENNIFER and MARK any relief.
SIGNED this16th day of April, 2018.
MADSEN LAW OFFICES, P.C.

By:

/s/
HENRY D. MADSEN, Attorney
for ANTHONY J. PORCELLO and the
Estate of ANNIE C. PORCELLO,
KALYN PORCELLO, Trustee.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 16th day of April, 2018, I caused to be served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the
following:
Terrance R. Harris
RAMSDEN, MARFICE, EALY
& HARRIS

√ Via Facsimile to: (208) 664-5884

Peter J. Smith
SMITH + MALEK

√ Via Facsimile to: (208) 215-2416

Judge Cynthia C.K. Meyer
1st District Court, State of Idaho
(Bench Copy to Judicial Staff Attorney)

√ Via E-Mail: jwatts@kcgov.us

/s/
_______________________________
Madsen Law Offices, PC
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Electronically Filed
4/16/2018 4:19 PM
First Judicial District, Kootenai County
Jim Brannon, Clerk of the Court
By: Krystal Manley, Deputy Clerk

RAivfSDEN, MARFICE, EALY & HARRIS, LLP
700 Northwest Blvd.
P.O. Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336
Telephone:
(208) 664-5818
Facsimile:
(208) 664-5884
Terrance R. Harris, ISB #5484

Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counter Defendant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
JENNIFER PORCELLO,
Plaintiff/Counter Defendant.

CASE NO. CV-2016-7343
PLAINTIFF'S TRIAL BRIEF

vs.

ANTHONY J. PORCELLO and ANNIE C.
PORCELLO, husband and wife,
Defendants/Counter Plaintiffs.
ANTHONY J. PORCELLO and ANNIE C.
PORCELLO, husband and ,:vife,
Third Party Plaintiffs,
vs.
MARK PORCELLO,
Third Party Defendant.

COMES NO'W, the above-named Plaintiff, by and through her counsel of record, and
hereby submits her trial brief.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

This is not your typical debt collection case. It is a convoluted set of financial
transactions that are overlaid by a confusing family dynamic. Jennifer will introduce at trial
evidence which is consistent with the Verified Complaint she filed in this matter. A shortened
summary is as follows:
Jennifer and Mark entered into a Purchase and Sale Agreement for the Hayden Lake
home with the understanding that once the Woodinville home sold they would be able to use
those sale proceeds to complete the purchase of the Hayden Lake home. Jennifer believed those
proceeds would be available to her and Mark because they were the beneficial owners of the
property.
When the Woodinville home did not sell within the expected timeframe, Jennifer and
Mark were under pressure to close the Hayden Lake home or lose their $40,000.00 in
accumulated earnest money. Annie and Anthony agreed to help Mark and Jennifer by getting a
short term bridge loan to provide them the $312,044.32 needed to close on the Hayden Lake
home with the agreement that once the Woodinville home sold the proceeds would be used to
pay-off the short term bridge loan and Jennifer and Mark would own the Hayden Lake home
free and clear.
At the closing on the Hayden Lake home, Jennifer learned for the first time that the Note
and Deed of Trust that Ann and Tony's attorney Joe Mijich drafted was for $648,500.00.
Jennifer initially refused to sign the Note and Mark and Jennifer then had a telephone
conversation with Joe Mijich. In this conversation, Mr. Mijich advised Jennifer and Mark that
the reason the Note was for $648,500.00 was because that was the amount of the new
financing that Anthony and Annie had secured from Legacy Group Capital on the
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Woodinville home. Even though only $312,044.32 of that new financing was being used to
purchase the Hayden Lake home, Mr. Mijich told Jennifer and Mark that Anthony and Annie
wanted the Note for the full amount of the new loan, but that when the Woodinville home
sold, the proceeds from that sale would be used to satisf'.y the $648,500.00 loan, and then
Jennifer and Mark would own the Hayden Lake home free and clear of any obligation to
Anthony and Annie. Based on those representations from Mr. Mijich, Jennifer returned to
Pioneer Title the next day and signed the Note and Deed of Trust.
Jennifer and Mark's maniage deteriorated and they were separated in April 2015.
Jennifer and her children continued to occupy the Hayden Lake home. Unbeknownst to
Jennifer, the Legacy Capital Group loan was refinanced through a couple a different loans
through Evergreen MoneySource Mortgage Company.

Annie and Anthony claim they

provided additional monies to Mark from the second refinancing and after the sale of the
Woodinville home. Jennifer was unaware of any of these activities until after the trustee
foreclosure was instituted against the Hayden Lake home.
After the Woodinville home was sold July 2015, it was Jennifer's understanding that
the obligation to Legacy Capital Group was paid off and the Note was also paid off. It was
not until after June 2016, when a Notice of Default was served and recorded that Jem1ifer
started researching and piecing together the refinancings. This was after she had filed for
divorce from Mark.
Jennifer and Mark's divorce was finalized in December 2017. The Hayden Lake
home was awarded to Jennifer as her sole and separate property. Mark was ordered to pay
all of the community debts.
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II.
a.

LEGAL ARGUMENTS

The agreement that the proceeds from the sale of the Woodinville home would
be used to pay off Legacy Group Capital loan: which would in turn satisfy any
obligation owing by Mark and Jennifer on the Note, became part of the bargain
that underlies the Note.

Jennifer will introduce evidence at trial that initially her and Mark's agreement with
Annie and Anthony, and later as restated by Joseph Mijich, was that the loan from Legacy
Capital Group was a short term loan that would be repaid when the Woodinville house sold, and
that once the Legacy Capital Group loan was repaid, there would be no further obligation owing
to Annie and Anthony by Jennifer and Mark. Based on this evidence, the Note should be
equitably reformed or modified so that it includes this condition and, therefore, since the
Woodinville property has sold and the Legacy Capital Group obligation has been repaid in full,
the obligation underlying the Note is deemed satisfied.
The Note at issue is a negotiable instrument as defined by Idaho Code§ 28-3-104(1).
As such, it is governed by the Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC") § 28-1-101 et seq. and, to
the extent that the UCC does not displace it, principles of common contract law and equity.
Idaho Code § 28-1-103.
Particularly relevant is Idaho Code§ 28-3-117, which provides as follows:
28-3-117. Other agreements affecting instrnment. Subject to applicable law
regarding exclusion of proof of contemporaneous or previous agreements, the
obligation of a party to an instrument to pay the instrument may be modified,
supplemented or nullified by a separate agreement of the obligor and a person
entitled to enforce the instrument, if the instrument is issued or the obligation is
incurred in reliance on the agreement or as part of the same transaction giving rise
to the agreement. To the extent an obligation is moclificcl, supplemented or
nullified by an agreement under this section, the agreement is a defense to
the obligation. (Emphasis Added).
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The official comment to Idaho Code § 28-3-117 clearly illustrates the concept:

1.
The separate agreement might be a security agreement or mortgage or it
might be an agreement that contradicts the terms of the instrument. For example,
a person may be induced to sign an instrument under an agreement that the
signer will not be liable on the instrnmcnt unless certain conditions arc met,
Suppose X requested credit from Creditor who is willing to give the credit only if
an acceptable accommodation pmiy will sign the note ofX as co-maker. Y agrees
to sign as co-maker on the condition that Creditor also obtain the signature of Z as
co-maker. Creditor agrees and Y signs as co-maker with X. Creditor fails to
obtain the signature of Z on the note. Under Sections 3-412 and 3-419(b), Y is
obliged to pay the note, but Section 3-117 applies. In this case, the agreement
modifies the terms of the note by stating a condition to the obligation of Y to
pay the note. This case is essentially similar to a case in which a maker of a
note is induced to sign the note by fraud of the holder, Although the
agreement that Y not be liable on the note unless Z also signs may not have
been fraudulently made, a subsequent attempt by Creditor to require Y to
pay the note in violation of the agreement is a bad faith act . ... (Emphasis
added).
This appears to be a codification of the common law of contracts as illustrated in Thomas

v. Campbell, 107 Idaho 398, 690 P.2d 333 (1984), Mikesell v. Newworld Dev. Co1p., 122
Idaho 868,840 P.2d 1090 (1992). In Thomas, the Court stated:
The dispute is not over the meaning of certain terms in the Thomas-Campbell
agreement, but rather concerns the representations of a seller made to a buyer to
induce the buyer to purchase the land in question. Fraud in the inducement is
always admissible to show that representations by one party were a material part
of the bargain. Glenn Dick Equipment Co. v. Galey Construction, Inc., 97 Idaho
216, 223, 541 P.2d 1184, 1191 (1975); Utilities Engineering Institute v. Criddle,
65 Idaho 201, 141 P.2d 981 (1943); Kloppenburg v. }vfays, 60 Idaho 19, 34, 88
P.2d 513,519 (1939); Wollan v. lvfcKay, 24 Idaho 691, 135 P. 832 (1913). Hence,
the trial court erred in ruling that the parol evidence rule would preclude
admission of evidence which the Thomases offered to establish representations
allegedly made fraudulently with the purpose of inducing them into the
transaction.

Thomas v. Campbell, 107 Idaho 398,402,690 P.2d 333,337 (1984).
Likewise, in Mikesell the Comi stated that:
"When fraud induces a variance between a written contract and the agreement
between the parties, the latter will prevail and the trial court is empowered to
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reform the written instrument to conform to the agreement." Nab v. Hills, 92
Idaho 877, 883, 452 P.2d 981, 987 (1969) (quoting i\lfcKelvie v. Hackney, 58
Wash.2d 23, 360 P.2d 746 (1961)). In this case, the trial court found that the
fraudulent representations of Rockland Judd induced a variance between the
written deed and the agreement of the parties. That finding is supported by
substantial competent evidence and will not be disturbed. Based on that finding
the trial court had authority to reform the deed to conform to the agreement
actually reached between the Burgesses and Judd.
i\lfikesell v. Newworld Dev. Co1p., 122 Idaho 868, 876-77, 840 P.2d 1090, 1098-99 (Ct. App.
1992).

Here it may not have been fraudulent when the agreements were made back in August
and September 2014. Joseph Mijich, Annie and Anthony may have all intended at that time that
when the Woodinville home sold its proceeds would repay the Legacy Group Capital loan and
that would satisfy the Note at issue. However, now that Annie and Anthony are seeking to
enforce the Note in violation of those agreements, it has become fraudulent and a "bad faith act."
The agreement that the Woodinville home would be sold and the proceeds used to pay off
Legacy Group Capital loan; which would satisfy any obligation owing by Mark and Jennifer on
the Note, became pm1 of the bargain that underlies the Note. Accordingly, the Note has been
satisfied.
b.

Jennifer and/or Mark had beneficial or equitable interests in the Woodinville
home in an amount sufficient to satisfy the Legacy Group Capital loan.

Jennifer will introduce evidence at trial that she purchased the Woodinville home with
the assistance of Mark and Annie. Since Jennifer (nor Mark) could qualify for a home loan,
Annie agreed to get the loan. Annie had a course of dealing of helping Mark acquire properties
in the past. Mark and Jennifer made substantial repairs and renovations to the Woodinville
home at their expense and also serviced the mortgage debt by making the house payments
directly to Wells Fargo. This was not under a rental agreement but under an agreement that
Jennifer (with Mark's assistance) would bear all of the expenses for the Woodinville home and
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that Jennifer would as soon as possible get new financing on the Woodinville home to pay off
Annie's loan with Wells Fargo.
Jennifer and Mark were not married during the time that Jennifer acquired the
Woodinville home under this atrnngement.

They did not remarry until November 2013.

Nonetheless, when they acquired the Woodinville home in January 2012, and continuing until
the early part of 2013, they basically lived together in the Woodinville home along with their
children. In early 2013, there was a serious episode of domestic violence which resulted in
Jennifer filing for a no contact order against Mark. Mark violated this order on more than one
occasion that resulted in him going to jail. Jennifer had her father and a male friend who would
take turns staying with her at the Woodinville home to help protect her from Mark. At that time
Jennifer received a call from Annie telling her that she was not going to have that man (her male
friend) living in the house. This was followed by an eviction notice from Annie demanding that
she vacate the Woodinville house.
The protection order case was referred to an arbitration process. Issues dealing with the
Woodinville home were also dealt with in arbitration under an agreement between Jennifer,
Mark and Annie. Jennifer believes that she was treated unfairly in this arbitration and that Mark
and Annie conspired together to defeat her claims to an equitable interest in the Woodinville
house.
Jennifer and Mark are both claiming that they had a beneficial ownership interest in the
Woodinville home and were entitled to an equitable reimbursement with respect to the proceeds
from the sale of the Woodinville home. Since these were the funds that were ultimately used to
pay off the Legacy Group Capital loan, this is an alternative basis for determining that the Note
has been satisfied. A better explanation might be that Annie and Anthony agreed to use the
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Woodinville home sale proceeds to satisfy the Legacy Group Capital loan and any obligation
owing by Mark and Jennifer on the Note because they understood that those monies properly
belonged to Jennifer and/or Mark.
If Jennifer or Mark are entitled to equitable reimbursements to set off against any
monies found owing to Annie and Anthony, then Jennifer can claim those amounts in this
litigation. Mark is claiming that he does not owe his parents any money under the Note and that
their claims are "bogus." If that is true, then the Note is satisfied as to Jennifer as well since it is
a joint and several obligation. While the testimony in this case may be confounding, if you look
at Annie and Anthony's actual conduct, it supports Mark's claim that he was the beneficial
owner of the Woodinville home (and the Via Venito home in California). Consider the
following undisputed evidence:
•

When the Legacy Group Capital loan was closed, Annie and Anthony
received $48,677.62 in cash from the loan proceeds. Annie and Anthony
gave that money to Mark.

•

When Annie and Anthony refinanced the Via Venito home in California,
they received approximately $117,000.00 in cash from the loan proceeds.
Annie and Anthony gave that money to Mark. Annie and Anthony also
had some of their personal obligations paid off out of closing of that loan
totaling $57,382.07. They reimbursed $52,382.07 of that amount to
Mark.

•

When the Woodinville house sold, Annie and Anthony received
$157,157.40 at closing. Annie and Anthony gave that money to Mark.

The most plausible explanation for this conduct is that Annie and Anthony treated both
the Woodinville house and the Via Venita house in California as Mark's properties. The funds
that they received from those properties were promptly turned over to Mark. This is consistent
with Mark's position.
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Likewise, Jennifer is claiming that she is owed reimbursement for payments she made
and services she provided for renovations and repairs before she vacated the Woodinville house
in 2013. Jennifer is also claiming she is entitled to a setoff of $150,000.00 for the renovations
and repairs that she did in the summer of 2014, as evidenced in the handwritten note signed by
Annie and Anthony.
C.

The Note is unenforceable as there was no agreement as to a material term of the
agreement.

If the Comt concludes that the agreement that the Woodinville home would be sold and
the proceeds used to pay off Legacy Group Capital loan which would satisfy any obligation
owing by Mark and Jennifer on the Note did not become a part of the bargain that underlies the
Note, then there is an issue as to whether there was a meeting of minds as to a material term of
the agreement. The patties never agreed on the true amount of the loan. If there was no
meeting of the minds then there is not an enforceable agreement and the Note is unenforceable.
There is no enforceable contract when the patties leave a material term for foture negotiations.

See Syringa Networks, LLC v. Idaho Dep't of Admin., 155 Idaho 55, 63, 305 P.3d 499, 507
(2013).
d.

The Note should be reformed to reflect the amount that was actually loaned to
Jennifer to purchase the Hayden Lake home.

In the alternative, Jennifer is requesting that the Note be equitably reformed to reflect the
actual amount of money that was loaned to her to close on the Hayden Lake home. The
undisputed evidence is that the $648,500 Legacy Group Capital loan was disbursed as follows:
$270,462.56 of the loan proceeds were used to pay off the first mmtgage owing to Wells Fargo,
$312,044.32 of the new loan proceeds were wired to Pioneer Title Company and used by
Jennifer and Mark to close the purchase of the Hayden Lake home, and a balance of$48,577.62
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of new loan proceeds were available after the closing and lending costs were paid and this
amount was paid to Anthony and Annie.
Thus the actual amount loaned to Jennifer and Mark to purchase the Hayden Lake home
was $312,044.32. If you add in the loan and closing fees of $17,315.50 for the Legacy Group
Capital loan, the total amount is increased to $329,359.82. If the comt rules that Annie and
Anthony owned the Woodinville house free and clear of any equitable claims of Mark and
Jennifer, then the $270,462.56 that went to pay off Atmie and At1thonfs obligation to Wells
Fargo together with the cash they received in the amount of $48,577.62, was clearly for their
benefit alone. As such, Jennifer has no legal obligation to repay it and the Note should be
reformed to reflect the actual amount of the loan.
e.

If any amount is found owing on the Note, then Jennifer is entitled to a setoff of
$150,000.00, together with interest on that amount.

Jennifer will introduce evidence at trial that Annie and Jennifer entered into an
agreement whereby Jennifer would return to the Woodinville home in 2014 to prepare it to be
listed for sale. This included installing new kitchen cabinets, granite countertops, a new
driveway, refinishing the hardwood floors, and other items. Mark and Jennifer paid for all of
the work and materials. Jennifer did much of the work herself. In return, Annie agreed that
she would pay Jennifer for her services and reimburse her for the materials used to complete
the projects once the Woodinville house sold. This was a legally binding contract supported
by consideration.
Because of Jennifer's experience in the arbitration when Annie and Mark teamed up
against her, she was unwilling to do this work and pay for the materials unless she received
some written assurances from Anthony and Annie that she would receive the money back
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after the sale of the Woodinville home to be used in purchasing the Hayden Lake home.
Anthony and Annie both signed a handwritten note dated July 1, 2014, acknowledging that
when the Woodinville home sold, Anthony and Annie would transfer $150,000.00 towards
the purchase of the Hayden Lake home. Once the Woodinville home sold, the promise of
payment of the $150,000.00 became due.
This is not the type of agreement that is subject to the statue of frauds, I.C. §§ 9-503
& 9-505. Nonetheless, even if it were the handwritten memorandum would be enough to

satisfy the requirement of a written memorandum signed by the party to be charged.
Moreover, since Jennifer completed the services and work required, this would constitute
part performance on her part which would remove the agreement from the application of the
statute of frauds. See IBM C01p. v. Lawhorn, 106 Idaho 194, 677 P.2d 507 (Ct. App. 1984).
Jennifer is seeking to setoff the $150,000.00 owed by Anthony and Annie against any
amount that is found owing against the Note. Under these circumstances a setoff is clearly
appropriate. In Beard v. George, 135 Idaho 685, 688, 23 P.3d 147, 150 (2001), the Court
stated that "the rule regarding setoffs is that equity allows a defendant to assert a setoff even
where the statute of limitations would bar an affirmative claim. The 'arising out of the same
transaction' language has not been an essential element to the equitable principle allowing
individuals to setoff amounts owed to them by the same person who is attempting to collect
from them." Likewise in this case since Anthony and Annie are seeking to collect money
from Jem1ifer, she is entitled to the setoff.
f.

Defendants' damages cannot exceed what is provided in the Note.

Based on the Defendants' Expert Witness Disclosure, it appears the Defendants' will be
requesting payment of $203,284 as additional costs to Annie and Anthony for various
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refinancing costs and other alleged cash outlays. These amount are not properly chargeable
against Jennifer.
Jennifer contests that there is any amount owing under the Note. The obligation owed by
a maker on a Note is governed by the UCC. Idaho Code § 28-3-412 provides that the obligation
of the issuer of a note is to pay the instrument according to its terms at the time it was issued.
Here, assuming the Note is not deemed satisfied, equitably reformed or modified, the Note
requires repayment of a principal balance of $648,500.00, together with interest at t\velve
percent per annum. There is also specified a 5% late charge if any of the interest only payments
are 15 days or more late. There is no legal basis to charge Jennifer or Mark more than what if
specified in the Note.
DATEDthis

((p

dayofApril,2018.

RAMSDEN, MARFICE, EALY & HARRIS, LLP

B~~
Terrance R. Harris
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I hereby ce11ify that on the _JJL__ day of April, 2018 I served a true and correct copy of
the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Henry D. Madsen
Madsen Law Offices, P.C.
1044 Northwest Blvd., Suite B
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814

US Mail
Overnight Mail
Hand Delivered
__L Facsimile (208) 664-6258
___:!;,,__ !Court Electronic Portal

Peter J. Smith IV
SMITH+ MALEK, PLLC
601 E. Front Avenue
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814

US Mail
_ _ Overnight Mail
Hand Delivered
_x_Facsimile (208) 214-2416
_x_ !Court Electronic Portal

Nicole Vigil
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Peter J. Smith IV, ISBN 6997
Jillian H. Caires, ISBN 9130
SMITH + MALEK, PLLC
601 E. Front Ave., Ste. 304
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814
Tel: 208-215-2411
Fax: 208-215-2416
Email: peter@smithmalek.com
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iillian@smithmalek.com
Attorneys for Mark Porcello

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST RJDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
JENNIFER PORCELLO,

CASE NO. CV-2016-7343
Plaintiff,
TRIAL BRIEF OF THIRD PARTY
DEFENDANT MARK
PORCELLO

vs.
ANTHONY J. PORCELLO and the Estate
ANNIE C. PORCELLO, KALYN M.
PORCELLO, Personal Representative,
Defendants.

ANTIIONY J. PORCELLO and the Estate
ANNIE C. PORCF,,LLO, KALYN M.
PORCELLO, Personal Representative,
Counter-Plaintiffs,

vs.
JENNIFER PORCELLO,

Counter-Defendant.
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ANTHONY J. PORCELLO and the Estate
ANNIE C. PORCELLO, KALYN M.
PORCELLO, Personal Representative,
Third Party Plaintiffs,

vs.
MARK PORCELLO,

Third Party Defendant

THIRD PARTY DEFENDANT MARK PORCELLO ("Mark'') submits this Trial Brief.

ISSUE

Whether Thir(j Party Plaintiffs are entitled to foreclosw-e of the Deed ofTrust? 1
BRIEF ANSWER
No. Third Party Plaintiffs are not entitled to foreclosure of the Deed of Trust.

FACTS

Mark and his late mother, Annie, were business partners. The two of them would do real

estate deals, wherein Annie would finance the purchase of real estate. Mark would do work on
the property and pay for improvements, then the profits would be split. Mar.k's father was a party
to the transactions, but he did not keep up to speed on the details.

In 2011, Made found a house in Woodinville, Washington to buy. As they had done in the

past.

Marie's mother, Annie, agreed to get a loan for the house to buy it and Mark agreed to pay

all the costs of the house while he lived in it and remodeled it It was understood that when the

house was sold, Mark and his mother would split the profits.
The house was purchased for $401,000 on January 4, 2012. Mark paid the earnest money

1

Third Party Plaintiffs are Mark', parents. Anthony is alive. Unfortunately, Annie pused away.
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of $6,000 for the house. The remaining down payment for the house was $93,394.43. Mark
transferred approximately $44,000 of the down payment to Annie; Mark's parents paid the rest
using their funds. See Exhibit No. P-A. Marie's parents got a loan for $300,000 from Wells

Fargo.
As Mark and Annie agreed, while Mark's parents owned the house, Mark made all the

payments to Wells Fargo, paid the property taxes, and put his own money into remodeling the
house. Mark put $260,000 into fixing up the house.
Mark married Jennifer Porcello on Thanksgiving of 2013. At that point in time, Jennifer

lived in Idaho. In 2014, Jennifer and Mark decided to move to a house in Hayden. They found a
house to buy. But, Jennifer and Marlc could not get financing for the house at that time.
Mark worked with Legacy Group Capital, LLC ("LGC") out of Seattle. LGC could not
finance the Hayden house directly. So LOC agreed to finance the purchage by refinancing the
Woodinville house to pay off the Wells Fargo loan and loan Mark's parents enough money to
finance the purchase of the Hayden house by Jennifer and Mark.
The Final Settlement Statement (HUD-I) shows that LGC loaned Mark's parents
$648,500. Exhibit P-C and P-D. These loan proceeds were distributed as follows:
•

$17,315.50 for settlement charges

•

$270,452.56 to Wells Fargo to pay off the first position lien

•

$31~033.32 to purchase the Hayden house

•

$48,677.62 to Mark's parents

LGC's collateral was the Woodinville house and a property in Indian Wells, California owned by
Annie. as her separate property. for the benefit of Mark.
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The Settlement Statement (HUD-1) for the Hayden house shows that Mark and Jennifer
purchased the house for $360,000. Exhibit P-F. After fees, the total amount paid for the house

w~ $361,253.27. The purchase price was paid as follows:
•

$20,000 of earnest money paid by Mark

•

$5.000 of additional earnest money paid by Mark

•

$15,000 of additional earnest money paid by Mark

•

$7,650 for rent credited toward purchase

•

$1,558.95 for property taxes credited to Jennifer and Mark

•

$312,044.32 from the LGC loan

Joe Mijich was the lawyer for Mark's parents. Mr. Mijich prepared a promissory note and

deed of trust to secure the loan from Mark's parents to Jennifer and Mark for the purchase of the
Hayden house. The promissory note that Mr. Mijich prepared bad a principal balance of
$648,500, which exactly matched the new loan from LGC. The loan to Jennifer and Marie to

purchase the Hayden house was only $312,044.32.
Jennifer and Mark asked why the promissory note was for $648,500 before they signed it.
Mr. Mijich stated that he understood that the amount owed would be paid when the LGC loan
was paid in full. The due date on the promissory note was November 29, 2014. This date was
used because Mark and his parents believed the Woodinville house would sell prior to November
29, 2014. When the Woodinville house sold, the debt to LGC would be paid in full Once LGC
was paid, the promissory note for the Hayden house would be deemed paid.
A problem arose when the Woodinville house did not sell quickly. LGC's loan was a
short term loan. In early 2015, Mark went to Evergreen Moneysource Mortgage Company
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("Evergreen") to get a loan to pay LGC back. This loan was $480,000 and it closed in May of
2015. Exhibit P-1. The Evergreen loan paid most of the LGC loan back, but LGC was still owed
about $198,000. Exlu"bit P-J. LGC was put into second position on the Woodinville house behind
Evergreen and LGC still had a lien on the Indian Wells, CA property owned by Annie for the

benefit of Mark.
Mark also had a lease with an option to purchase on a house in Bellevue, WA. Mark
needed to exercise that option to purchase in July of 201S. To complete the purchase in Bellevue,
Mark went to Evergreen for a loan of $417,000. The transaction was very similar to the
Woodinville house. Mark's parents would borrow the $417,000. The loan would be secured by
the Indian Wells, CA property owned by Annie for the benefit of Mark. None of these loan
proceeds were to be used to pay debts of Mark's parents. However, when the loan was disbursed,
the proceeds were distributed as follows:
•

$31,468.51 for settlement charges

•

$49A99.07 to pay off First Savings Bank for the debt owed on Mark's parents
house

•

$7,883 to pay Bank of America credit card (debt owed by Mark's parents)

•

$13,635 to pay Bank of America credit card (debt owed by Mark's parents)

•

$314,514.42 to Mark's parents, which was split as follows:
o

$198,020.17 to LGC

o $116,494.25 to Mark
On July 31, 2015, the Woodinville house sold for $690,000. The sale proceeds were
distributed as follows:
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•

$45,438.74 for settlement charges

•

$483,057 to pay first mortgage to Evergreen

•

$1,050 for escrow fees

•

$1,692.22 for title policy

•

$650.64 for property taxes

•

$157,157.50 to Mark's parents and signed over to Mark at closing

The key fact here is that Mark received all the proceeds from the sale of the Woodinville house.
Why? Because the agreement was that Mark would pay off the LGC loan. When the LGC loan
was paid off, the promissory note was paid and the deed of trust on the Hayden house should
have been reconveyed.
The Evergreen loan for $417,000, which is still outstanding, refinanced the entire debt
owed under the promissory note secured by the deed of trust on the Hayden house. Mark
continues to make the payments to Evergreen on the $417,000 Joan. There is no default. If Mark
were to default on that loan and Mark's father was required to pay it off, there would be claim
against Mark. However, that claim is not ripe. It is not part of this case.

CONCLUSION
There are no complicated questions of law in this case. Mark's parents were paid in full
because the LGC Joan was paid off when the second Evergreen loan was paid. The Third Party
Complaint is without merit and must be dismissed.
DATED this 16th day of April, 2018.

Attorney for Mark Porcello
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Check to Ma.rk Porcello for $15,000
dated September 15, 2014
Check to Mark Porcello for $30,000
dated September 18, 2014
Checks to Wells Far-go fo.- $1,600.00
dated September S, 2013 and October 9,
2013
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Checks to Woodinville Water District
dated August 24, 2014 and October 11,
2014
- Woodinville Water Dtst dated-December
13, 2014 and October 26, 2013
Correspondence to Jennifer Maggard
from Ann Porcello dated March 1, 2013
Proof of Authority of Domicililary
Foreign Personal Representative
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RAMSDEN, MARFICE, EALY & HARRIS, LLP
700 Northwest Blvd.
P.O. Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336
Telephone:
(208) 664-5818
Facsimile:
(208) 664-5884
Terrance R. Harris, ISB #5484

Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
JENNIFER PORCELLO,
Plaintiff,
VS,

CASE NO. CV-2016-7343
COUNTER-DEFENDANT JENNIFER
PORCELLO'S REPLY TO AMENDED
COUNTERCLAIM

ANTHONY J. PORCELLO and the Estate
of ANNIE C. PORCELLO, KALYN M.
PORCELLO, Personal Representative,
Defendants.
ANTHONY J. PORCELLO and the Estate of
ANNIE C. PORCELLO, KALYN M.
PORCELLO, Personal Representative,
Counter Plaintiffs,
vs,

JENNIFER PORCELLO,
Counter-Defendant.
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ANTHONY J. PORCELLO and ANNIE C.
PORCELLO, husband and wife,
Third Party Plaintiffs,
vs.
MARK PORCELLO,
Third Party Defendant.

COMES NOW Counter-Defendant Jennifer Porcello, by and through her counsel of
record, Ramsden, Marfice, Ealy & Harris, LLP, and responds to Counter-Plaintiffs' Amended
Counterclaim as follows:
Counter-Defendant reaffirms the averments made in her original complaint, and denies
each and every averment of the Counter-Plaintiffs' Amended Counterclaim not herein
specifically and expressly admitted.

GENERAL ALLEGATIONS
1.

No responsive pleading required.

2.

Admit.

3.

Admit.

4,

Admit.

5.

Admit.

6.

Admit.

7,

Admit.

8.

Admit that Jennifer and Mark were married and divorced twice during the years

specified in the Amended Counterclaim. The remaining allegations are denied.
COUNTER-DEFENDANT JENNIFER PORCELLO'S REPLY TO AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM
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9.

Admit only that Counter-Plaintiffs assisted financially with the purchase of a

home in Woodinville, WA, and the purchase of the home in Hayden, ID. Counter-Defendant
denies the remainder of the allegations.
10.

Counter-Defendant lacks information sufficient to form a belief about the ttuth of

these allegations and, therefore, denies the same.
11.

Deny.

12.

Deny that Counter-Defendant signed the Note on September 3, 2014, and

affirmatively states that Counter-Defendant signed the Note on September 4, 2014, after
receiving assurances from Counter-Plaintiffs' lawyer that the Note would be deemed satisfied
once the Woodinville home was sold.
13.

Deny that Counter-Defendant signed the Deed of Trust on September 3, 2014,

and affirmatively states that Counter-Defendant signed the Deed of Trust on September 4, 2014,
after receiving assurances from Counter-Plaintiffs' lawyer that the Note and Deed of Trust
would be deemed satisfied once the Woodinville home was sold.
14.

Deny.
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

15.

No responsive pleading required.

16.

Deny.

17.

No responsive pleading required.

18.

Deny.

19.

Deny and affirmatively state that Counter-Plaintiffs' commenced a trnstee sale to

non-judicially foreclose the Deed of Trust and to Counter-Defendant's knowledge and
understanding, said trnstee's sale has been postponed by the title company with no future sale
COUNTER-DEFENDANT JENNIFER PORCELLO'S REPLY TO AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM
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date set but the trnstee's sale has not been completely vacated by the title company.
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

1.

The Counterclaim fails to state a claim against Counter-Defendant upon which

relief can be granted.
2.

Counter-Defendant reasse1is and realleges all of the allegations and claims raised

in her Verified Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, Injunctive Relief and Damages as an
affomative defense to the Counterclaim.
3.

Counter-Plaintiffs' claims are barred, in whole or in pati, by the doctrine of

unclean hands, and in pari delicto.
4.

Counter-Plaintiffs' claims are barred, in whole or in part, by the doctrines of

equitable estoppel, judicial estoppel, and/or promissory estoppel.
5.

Counter-Plaintiffs' claims are barred, in whole or in pati, by the doctrine of

accord and satisfaction.
6.

Counter-Plaintiffs' claims are barred, in whole or in pati, by the doctrines of

waiver and/or consent.
7.

Counter-Plaintiffs' claims fail for a lack of consideration.

8.

Counter-Defendant is entitled to a set-off against any money found owing to

Counter-Plaintiffs' based on the $150,000.00 obligation set fotih in the Verified Complaint.
9.

Counter-Defendant is entitled to a set-off against any money found owing to

Counter-Plaintiffs based on monies that were received by Counter-Plaintiffs that should have
been applied towai·ds payment of the Note at issue, but were instead loaned by CounterPlaintiffs to their son Mark Porcello and/or to other unknown patiies for the benefit of Mark
Porcello without the knowledge or consent of Counter-Defendant.
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WHEREFORE, Jennifer Porcello prays for judgment as follows:

1.

That the counterclaim be dismissed and that Counter-Plaintiffs take nothing

thereby and that Counter-Defendant recover her costs of suit and attorney's fees pursuant to
Idaho Code§ 12-120 and 12-121.
2.

For such further relief the Court deems just and equitable.

DATED this °2&day of April, 2018.
RAMSDEN, MARFICE, EALY & HARRIS, LLP
By:

c::·::=:~~--,,.,erTe1rnnce R. Harris, Of the Firm
Attorneys for Plaintiff1/Counter-Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the )lt,11\iay of April, 2018 I served a trne and correct copy of
the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Henry D. Madsen
Madsen Law Offices, P .C.
1044 Northwest Blvd., Suite B
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814

US Mail
_ _ Overnight Mail
Hand Delivered
_)l_ Facsimile (208) 664-6258
___:LI Court Electronic Portal

Peter J. Smith IV
SMITH+ MALEK, PLLC
601 E. Front A venue
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814

US Mail
_ _ Overnight Mail
Hand Delivered
___x__Facsimile (208) 214-2416
_i_ I Court Electronic Portal

Nicole Vigil
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Peter J. Smith IV, ISBN 6997
Jillian H. Caires, ISBN 9130
SMITH + MALEK, PLLC
601 E. Front Ave., Ste. 304
Coeur d’Alene, ID 83814
Tel: 208-215-2411
Fax: 208-215-2416
Email: peter@smithmalek.com
jillian@smithmalek.com
Attorneys for Mark Porcello
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
JENNIFER PORCELLO,
Plaintiff,
vs.
ANTHONY J. PORCELLO and the Estate
ANNIE C. PORCELLO, KALYN M.
PORCELLO, Personal Representative,

CASE NO. CV-2016-7343
THIRD PARTY DEFENDANT’S
ANSWER TO AMENDED THIRD
PARTY COMPLAINT

Defendants.
ANTHONY J. PORCELLO and the Estate
ANNIE C. PORCELLO, KALYN M.
PORCELLO, Personal Representative,
Counter-Plaintiffs,
vs.
JENNIFER PORCELLO,
Counter-Defendant.
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ANTHONY J. PORCELLO and the Estate
ANNIE C. PORCELLO, KALYN M.
PORCELLO, Personal Representative,
Third Party Plaintiffs,
vs.
MARK PORCELLO,
Third Party Defendant.

COMES NOW, Third Party Defendant MARK PORCELLO (“Mark”), by and through
his attorney of record Peter J. Smith IV of the firm Smith + Malek, PLLC, and hereby responds
to Defendants/Counter-claimants/Third Party Plaintiff’s Amended Third Party Complaint
(“Complaint”) as follows:
ANSWER
Mark denies each and every allegation in the Amended Third Party Complaint not
specifically admitted herein.
1.

Mark is without sufficient information to admit or deny and therefore denies

Paragraph 1 of the Complaint.
2.

Mark admits Paragraph 2 of the Complaint.

3.

Mark admits Paragraph 3 of the Complaint.

4.

Mark admits Paragraph 4 of the Complaint.

5.

Mark admits Paragraph 5 of the Complaint and avers that he also partially resides

in the State of Washington.
6.

Mark admits Paragraph 6 of the Complaint with the exception of the legal
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description which he can neither admit nor deny and therefore denies.
7.

Mark admits Paragraph 7 of the Complaint.

8.

Mark denies Paragraph 8 of the Complaint.

9.

Mark denies Paragraph 9 of the Complaint.

10.

Mark denies Paragraph 10 of the Complaint.

11.

Mark denies Paragraph 11 of the Complaint.

12.

Mark denies Paragraph 12 of the Complaint.

13.

Mark denies Paragraph 13 of the Complaint.

14.

Mark denies Paragraph 14 of the Complaint.

15.

Mark denies Paragraph 15 of the Complaint.

16.

Mark denies Paragraph 16 of the Complaint.

17.

Mark denies Paragraph 17 of the Complaint.

18.

Mark denies Paragraph 18 of the Complaint.

19.

Mark denies Paragraph 19 of the Complaint.
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

1.

No debt is owed by Mark to Third Party Plaintiffs.

2.

Mark paid off the Legacy Capital Group, LLC note that Third Party Plaintiffs

were obligated to pay and this satisfied the debt.
3.

Third Party Plaintiffs’ claims are barred by the doctrine of equitable estoppel,

judicial estoppel, and/or promissory estoppel.
4.

Third Party Plaintiffs’ are barred by the doctrine of waiver.
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PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, having answered, Third Party Defendant Mark Porcello prays for
judgment as follows:
A.

That judgment be entered dismissing Third Party Plaintiff’s claims and they take

nothing thereby;
B.

That Third Party Defendant be award his costs and attorneys’ fees for defending

this action pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 12-120(3) and 12-121.
C.

For such other relief as the Court may deem fair and just.

DATED this 2nd day of May, 2018.
SMITH + MALEK, PLLC
By:_______________________________
PETER J. SMITH IV
Attorney for Third Party Defendant Mark
Porcello
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
On May 2, 2018, I caused copies of the foregoing document to be served by the following
methods on the parties listed below as follows:
TERRANCE R. HARRIS
RAMSDEN, MARFICE, EALY & HARRIS
750 Northwest Blvd
Coeur d’Alene, ID 83814
Facsimile: (208) 664-5884
Attorneys for plaintiffs
HENRY D. MADSEN
MADSEN LAW OFFICES, P.C.
1859 N. Lakewood Drive, Suite 201
Coeur d’Alene, ID 83814
Facsimile: (208) 664-6258

☐ By Hand Delivery
☐ By U.S. Mail
☐ By Overnight Mail
☐ By Facsimile Transmission
☒ iCourt
☐ By Hand Delivery
☐ By U.S. Mail
☐ By Overnight Mail
☐ By Facsimile Transmission
☒ iCourt

Attorneys for Defendants/Third-Party
Plaintiffs

____________________________________
PETER J. SMITH IV
Attorney for Defendant Mark Porcello
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Electronically Filed
5/3/2018 4:48 PM
First Judicial District, Kootenai County
Jim Brannon, Clerk of the Court
By: Debra Leu, Deputy Clerk

HENRY D. MADSEN
MADSEN LAW OFFICES, P.C.
1044 Northwest Blvd., Suite B
Coeur d’Alene, ID 83814
Off: (208) 664-8080
Facsimile: (208) 664-6258
ISB #4428
Attorney for Defendants/Counter-claimants/Third Party Plaintiffs
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
JENNIFER PORCELLO,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV-16-7343
DEFENDANTS’ MEMORANDUM OF
LAW RE: I.R.E. 408 ISSUE

vs.
ANTHONY J. PORCELLO and the
Estate of ANNIE C. PORCELLO,
KALYN M. PORCELLO, Personal
Representative,
Defendants.
ANTHONY J. PORCELLO and the
Estate of ANNIE C. PORCELLO,
KALYN M. PORCELLO, Personal
Representative,
Counter-Plaintiffs,
vs.
JENNIFER PORCELLO,
Counter-Defendant.
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ANTHONY J. PORCELLO and the
Estate of ANNIE C. PORCELLO,
KALYN M. PORCELLO, Personal
Representative,
Third Party Plaintiffs,
vs.
MARK PORCELLO,
Third Party Defendant.
I. Introduction
COMES NOW Defendants/Counterclaimants/Third Party Plaintiffs ANTHONY J.
PORCELLO and the Estate of ANNIE C. PORCELLO, KALYN PORCELLO, Personal
Representative (“Defendants and/or Defendant”), by and through their attorney of record,
Henry D. Madsen of Madsen Law Offices, P.C., and submits this Memorandum of Law
supporting the admissibility of the September 16, 2016, letter (the “Letter”) from Jennifer
Porcello (a/k/a Jennifer Maggard) to Anthony Porcello requesting that the debt owed by
Jennifer and Mark Porcello be restructured. The Letter was not an offer of settlement. The
Letter was also not an attempt on the part of Jennifer to compromise a claim which was
disputed as to either validity or amount. Rather, it is an admission of a party opponent that a
debt was due and owing to Anthony Porcello and or the Estate of Annie Porcello and a
proposal to modify the payment terms of the debt. Accordingly, I.R.E. 408 is not applicable
and does not bar the admissibility of the Letter. Further, the information set forth in the
Letter may properly be elicited from Ms. Porcello on cross examination and admitted into
evidence as impeachment evidence that directly contradicts Jennifer’s and Mark’s trial
testimony that they did not and do not owe Anthony and or the Estate of Annie Porcello any
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amount of money.
In the alternative, if the Court is inclined to not admit the Letter in its entirety by
concluding some portion(s) of the letter is considered to be an offer of compromise, the
Court should allow those portions to be redacted from the Letter and the remainder of the
Letter be admitted into evidence; namely, the last paragraph of the Letter where Ms.
Porcello admits that Anthony and or the Estate of Annie Porcello should have been paid
$648,000 when the Woodinville house was sold.
II. Relevant Law
I.R.E. 408 states:
Evidence of (1) furnishing, offering, or promising to
furnish, or (2) accepting, offering, or promising to accept, a
valuable consideration in compromising or attempting to
compromise a claim which was disputed as to either
validity or amount, is not admissible to prove liability for,
invalidity of, or amount of the claim or any other claim.
Evidence of conduct or statements made in compromise
negotiations is likewise not admissible. This rule does not
require the exclusion of any evidence otherwise
discoverable merely because it is presented in the course of
compromise negotiations. This rule does not require
exclusion if the evidence is offered for another purpose,
such as proving bias or prejudice of a witness, negativing a
contention of undue delay, or proving an effort to obstruct a
criminal investigation or prosecution. Compromise
negotiations encompass mediation.
I.R.E. 408 (emphasis added).
III. Discussion
At trial, Defendants attempted to cross examine Jennifer Magaard as to information
contained in the Letter which included what is set forth in Exhibit 5 to the Deposition of
Jennifer Porcello and admit into evidence her admissions that Jennifer and Mark still owed
Anthony and or the Estate of Annie Porcello amount due under the September 3, 2014,
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Promissory Note executed by both Mark and Jennifer. That at said hearing the Defendant
stated they were not seeking to admit the Letter only to enquire as to the statements therein
and if need be to use the same to refresh her memory as to the content therein if she was
unable to recall the same. However, after further research it is Defendant’s position that
under the above circumstances the whole of the letter should be admitted for impeachment
and or rebuttal purposes.
The Letter is admissible because it is not an offer of compromise that is inadmissible
under I.R.E. 408. Rule 408 only prohibits the admission of an offer to compromise which is
disputed as to the validity or amount. The “rule does not require the exclusion of any
evidence otherwise discoverable merely because it is presented in the course of compromise
negotiations.” The Letter is an admission by Ms. Porcello that “as far as she knew the
$648,000” (the entire amount of the Promissory Note that Defendants now dispute) was
disbursed to Anthony and or the Estate of Annie Porcello. It is indisputable that it was not
and Ms. Porcello claims that Mark Porcello kept her “in the dark” about the Promissory
Note not being paid in full. Upon discovery that Anthony and or the Estate of Annie
Porcello had not been paid by Mark, Ms. Porcello sent the Letter requesting to restructure
the debt and payment terms, not to settle the claim for the amounts owed. Accordingly, the
Letter is admissible and not barred from introduction by I.R.E. 408.
In the alternative, if the Court disagrees as to admission of the letter as a whole,
Defendants seek to question Jennifer as to the content of the letter. Opposing counsel
objected to the letter being admitted and to Defendant’s counsel questioning her as to the
same as protected communications of offer of compromise and or settlement discussions.
Defendants’ counsel provided the Court and opposing counsel with a relevant appellate
opinion that provides Ms. Magaard can be cross examined as to the information as to said
DEFENDANTS’ MEMORANDUM OF LAW RE: I.R.E. 408 ISSUE
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letter and that the letter can be admitted. The Court then requested that the parties submit
briefing on the issue.
The opinion that Defendants’ provided to the Court and counsel was Davidson,
d/b/a D & E Construction v. Beco Corporation, et al., 114 Idaho 107, 753 P.2d 1253 (1987).
In their opinion, the Idaho Supreme Court stated1,
We first consider whether statements made in the
course of settlement negotiations may be admitted to
impeach the testimony of a witness at trial. We have
little difficulty holding that this is a proper use. Almost
all courts who have considered the issue have ruled in
favor of admissibility. See El Paso Electric Company v.
Real Estate Hart, Inc., 98 N.M. 570, 651 P.2d 105
(App.1982), cert. denied, 98 N.M. 590, 651 P.2d 636
(1982); American Family Life Assurance Company v.
Teasdale, 733 F.2d 559 (8th Cir.1984); County of
Hennepin v. A.F.G. Industries, Inc., 726 F.2d 149 (8th
Cir.1984); and Missouri Pacific Railway Company v.
Arkansas Sheriff's Boys' Ranch, 280 Ark. 53, 655 S.W.2d
389 (1983).
In a similar context we have ruled that Rule 408 does
not require the exclusion of evidence relating to
compromises or offers to compromise when the evidence
being introduced is used to show bias or prejudice. See
Soria v. Sierra Pacific Airlines, supra, 111 Idaho at 605,
726 P.2d at 717. We see little difference when the
inconsistent statement is used for impeachment purposes.
The last sentence of the rule states: “[T]his rule does not
require exclusion if the evidence is offered for another
purpose, such as proving, bias or prejudice of a
witness,.....” (Emphasis added.)2 The “such as” language
preceding the allowable uses clearly means that the list is
not exhaustive. As stated by the Arkansas Supreme Court:
“The policy of the Rules of Evidence is ‘to
the end that the truth may be
ascertained.’ Rule 102. The purpose of
Rule 408 is to promote complete candor
between the parties to the settlement
1 At trial, comments were made that Defendants’ counsel had misread or misspoken the holding of the
appellate court. Therefore, the entirety of the relevant section of the appellate opinion is now provided.
2 Emphasis was added in the original opinion.
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negotiations but not to protect false
representations. Thus, when a party has
made a statement at trial which is
inconsistent with a statement made during
settlement negotiations, the inference is that
one of the statements is knowingly false. In
such a situation, we conclude that the
mandate in Rule 102 to interpret the rules so
as to foster the values of ‘fairness' and
‘truth’ requires us to hold that prior
inconsistent statements made in the course
of settlement negotiations should be
admitted for impeachment purposes.”
Missouri Pacific Railway Company v. Arkansas Sheriff's
Boy's Ranch, supra, 655 S.W.2d at 395.
Thus, we hold a trial may allow the use of statements
contained in settlement negotiations for the purpose of
impeaching witnesses who give contrary testimony at
trial. The trial judges have broad discretion in determining
admissibility of impeachment evidence, and their decision
will not be overturned absent a clear showing of abuse.
Quick v. Crane, 111 Idaho 759, 780, 727 P.2d 1187 (1986).
This conclusion was also reached by the Court of Appeals.
However, the Court ran afoul in trying to articulate the
weighing process used in evaluating the admissibility of
impeachment evidence. The competing goals of truth
seeking and settlement encouragement underlie Rule 408.
In an attempt to seek a balance between these competing
goals the appellate court ruled that prior inconsistent
statement “should be admitted only if it strongly suggests
that a witness is perjuring himself at trial or if any unfair
prejudice is likely to be insubstantial.” Davidson v. Beco,
supra, 112 Idaho at 566, 733 P.2d at 787.
This test unduly narrows the balancing test as
contemplated by the drafters of the Rules of Evidence. Rule
403 is an effort to regularize and channel the use of judicial
discretion in the administration of the Rules of Evidence,
and contains the rule of thumb on the trial court weighing
process. C. WRIGHT and K. GRAHAM, 22 FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE § 5212
(1978). Rule 403 provides:
“Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence
on grounds of prejudice, confusion, or waste
of time.—Although relevant, evidence may
DEFENDANTS’ MEMORANDUM OF LAW RE: I.R.E. 408 ISSUE
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be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of
undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence.”
The rule creates a balancing test. On one hand, the trial
judge must measure the probative worth of the proffered
evidence. The trial judge, in determining probative worth,
focuses upon the degree of relevance and materiality of the
evidence and the need for it on the issue on which it is to be
introduced. People v. Mota, 115 Cal.App.3d 227, 171
Cal.Rptr. 212 (1981). At the other end of the equation, the
trial judge must consider whether the evidence amounts to
unfair prejudice. Here, the concern is whether the evidence
will be given undue weight, or where its use results in an
inequity, Sclafani v. Peter S. Cusimano, Inc., 130
Mich.App. 728, 344 N.W.2d 347 (1983), or as several
commentators have suggested, “illegitimate persuasion.”
WRIGHT & GRAHAM, Supra, § 5212. Only after using
this balancing test, may a trial judge use his discretion to
properly admit or exclude the proffered evidence.
The Court of Appeals' test gives due consideration to
only one side of the equation—unfair prejudice. Regardless
of the materiality, relevance, or lack of alternative
measures, the Court of Appeals' test requires exclusion if
the resulting prejudice is anything more than insubstantial.
The concerns expressed by the Court of Appeals are
legitimate. The dangers are high that, even with a limiting
instruction, the jury will substantively consider the
impeachment evidence. However, the trial judge, in
exercising his discretion, will consider the heavy weight of
this factor when applying the Rule 403 balancing test.
Here, the statement in the settlement letter indicated that
the offer of a tractor by Beco to Davidson had previously
been rejected. Of course, this is contrary to Beck's
testimony at trial that Davidson had accepted the tractor in
full satisfaction of the debt. The probative value of the
statement in the settlement letter is great in that it tends to
show Beck's testimony is unreliable. Probative evidence is
always prejudicial to someone. State v. Fenley, 103 Idaho
199, 203, 646 P.2d 441, 445 (Ct.App.1982). However,
Davidson had no other alternative evidence, less
prejudicial, with which to impeach Beck's testimony.
On the other hand, as we noted above, the prejudicial
effect of this evidence is high. However, we cannot say that
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its prejudicial effect so substantially outweighed its
probative value that its admission amounted to clear abuse.
Thus, we conclude the trial court properly admitted the
evidence for impeachment purposes. However, the
judgment of the trial court is reversed pursuant to the Court
of Appeals' rulings with respect to the personal liability of
the corporate debt and attorney fees.
Davidson v. Beco Corp., et al., 114 Idaho at 109-111, 753 P.2d at 1255-1257
(emphasis added).
In the present matter, Defendants seek the admission of the Letter to impeach
Jennifer’s inconsistent statements and false testimony that she did not borrow the funds in
question from Anthony and the Estate of Annie Porcello (i.e., they gifted the $150,000 to be
applied to the $648,000 Promissory Note and the remainder of the Note was paid at the
closing of the Woodinville home) and her statement in the letter that the debt was due and
owing but she thought the debt had been paid. As held by the Davidson court, the trial judge,
“in determining probative worth, focuses upon the degree of relevance and materiality of the
evidence and the need for it on the issue on which it is to be introduced.”
Here, the Letter is relevant and admissible evidence because it directly contradicts
Jennifer’s untruthful testimony and that will assist the trier-of-fact in reaching its verdict.
Because the Court sits as the trier-of-fact, rather than a jury, the Court can rely on its
extensive legal knowledge and experience to minimize prejudice to Jennifer. Therefore, the
Court should allow the cross examination of Jennifer as to the content of the Letter and the
Letter should be admitted in evidence because it is not prohibited by I.R.E. 408 and the
relevance and materiality of the Letter being admitted vastly outweighs any perceived
prejudice to Jennifer. On the other hand, to exclude Jennifer’s admission in the September
16, 2016, letter that she and Mark owed Anthony and or the Estate of Annie Porcello the
amount due under the Promissory Note they executed over two years prior (September 3,
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2014) would be severely prejudicial to Defendants.
In the alternative, if the Court were to find the Letter, or portions thereof,
inadmissible pursuant to I.R.E. 408, a redacted version of the Letter can be provided to the
Court and then non-objectional portions of the Letter be admitted into evidence.
Specifically, the Letter can be construed as a proposed loan modification versus an offer of
compromise. In the Letter, Jennifer does not state that the Letter involves a “claim which
was disputed as to either validity or amount”. I.R.E. 408. Rather, the Letter provides a
calculation of what Jennifer owes to Anthony and Annie Porcello and a proposal regarding
how to refinance the amount due and owing.
More importantly, the portion of the Letter that is most telling is not the offer of
compromise; rather, it is Jennifer’s admission that she and Mark owed Anthony and Annie
Porcello $648,000 and that she thought the debt was repaid when the Woodinville home was
sold. As the letter states, Jennifer was mistaken as to the repayment of what is owed
because, as she states in the letter, Mark “kept her in the dark.”
The relevant portions of the Letter that Defendants would have admitted into
evidence include the calculations of what she owes and further the portion that states,
“Tony, the Woodinville home was sold and as far as I knew
the $648,000 was disbursed to you. Unfortunately, Mark
kept me in the dark about this. Prior to the notification of
foreclosure, I was under the impression you had been paid
in full. (even our divorce judge agreed with this…he has
assigned all marital debt to Mark as well as deny any
visitation rights to Mark because of his drug and child
abuse…. While I believe Mark should pay you this money,
I realize that this will probably not happen.”
September 16, 2016, letter, Defendants’ proposed trial exhibit QQQ (if admitted).
The foregoing statement is not I.R.E. 408 protected as it has nothing to do with the offer she
made to Anthony in her attempt to modify the debt owed and associated payment terms
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Importantly, this statement constitutes and admission by Jennifer that she thought Anthony
and Annie had been repaid the $648,000 and, moreover, is a concession that the debt was
owed to Anthony and Annie. The Court should allow Defendants to continue to cross
examine Jennifer as to the content of the Letter and further allow the Letter in for
impeachment and or rebuttal purposes.
Lastly, the Letter, although not disclosed, should be admitted as impeachment and or
rebuttal evidence. “Impeaching evidence is that which is directed to the credibility of a
witness. The credibility of a witness may be attacked by any party including the party
calling the witness. I.R.E. 607. A witness may not be impeached before he has testified.
Boeck v. Boeck, 29 Idaho 639, 161 P. 576 (1916).” See Van Brunt v. Stoddard, 136 Idaho
681, 685, 39 P.3d 621, 621 (2001). Further, “[r]ebuttal evidence is evidence that explains,
repels, counteracts or disproves evidence which has been introduced by or on behalf of the
adverse party”. State v. Olsen, 103 Idaho 278, 647 P.2d 734 (1982). The standard of review
of a trial court's decision regarding the admission of evidence in rebuttal is one of deference
to the trial court. See State v. Lewis, 126 Idaho 77, 878 P.2d 776 (1994); State v. Smith, 117
Idaho 225, 786 P.2d 1127 (1990); State v. Hewitt, 73 Idaho 452, 254 P.2d 677 (1953).” Van
Brunt v. Stoddard, 136 Idaho at 686, 39 P.3d at 626. “Unless the record discloses an abuse
of such discretion to the prejudice of a party, the trial court's rulings thereon must be
upheld.” Findley v. Woodall, 86 Idaho 439,443, 387 P.2d 594, 596 (1963) (internal citations
omitted).
Here, the Letter is evidence that contradicts the evidence and testimony presented by
Jennifer (“evidence introduced by or on behalf of an adverse party”) and is therefore rebuttal
evidence. Further, the Letter directly contradicts Jennifer’s untruthful testimony thereby
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significantly damaging her credibility. Specifically, Jennifer introduced the Promissory Note
(Exhibit F) and Deed of Trust (Exhibit G) and has asserted that Joe Mijich informed her that
once the Woodinville home closed the Hayden Lake home loan would be satisfied. The
Letter directly contradicts that evidence and testimony.
Further, in the October 5, 2016, Verified Complaint, Jennifer testified that “based on
the representations of Mr. Mijich as the attorney for Anthony and Annie, the receipt of the
sale proceeds from the sale of the Woodinville home satisfied the Note in full.” Verified
Complaint at p. 8, ¶ 31. Jennifer’s Verified Complaint testimony is also counteracted by her
September 16, 2016 letter that specifically states that she and Mark still owed Defendants
amounts due under the September 3, 2014, Promissory Note. If Jennifer believed that the
Note had been repaid, she would not have proposed to pay the additional amounts to
Anthony and Annie set forth in the Letter. Rather, she would have stated that the amount
had been paid in full, which she now knows has not been paid by Mark who “kept her in the
dark.”
Based upon the foregoing, precluding the use of or the admission of the Letter would
be severely prejudicial to Defendants as it “explains, repels, counteracts or disproves”
Jennifer’s evidence. The Letter also provides evidence that Jennifer has provided untruthful
testimony at trial and her credibility is significantly diminished. Additionally, Jennifer had
knowledge of the Letter as it was introduced as Exhibit 5 to the Deposition of Jennifer
Porcello and the Letter was disclosed in discovery responses to Jennifer’s discovery requests
that specifically stated that the Letter would be used at trial3. Consequently, Jennifer cannot

3 Defendants’ Responses to Plaintiff’s First Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents
to Defendants, filed August 2, 2017; Exhibit A, Intra Exhibit G-1(email for Jennifer referencing attached letter)
and G-2 (the attached September 16, 2016, letter).
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now claim surprise or prejudice.
Further, impeachment evidence is not required to be disclosed prior to trial.
Although I.R.C.P. 26 no longer discusses the disclosure requirements of impeachment
evidence (and in fact does not even contain any reference to impeachment evidence),
F.R.C.P. 26(a)(3)(A) does state that impeachment evidence need not be disclosed pre-trial:
In addition to the disclosures required by Rule 26(a)(1) and
(2), a party must provide to the other parties and promptly
file the following information about the evidence that it
may present at trial other than solely for impeachment:
(i) the name and, if not previously provided, the address
and telephone number of each witness—separately
identifying those the party expects to present and those it
may call if the need arises;
(ii) the designation of those witnesses whose testimony the
party expects to present by deposition and, if not taken
stenographically, a transcript of the pertinent parts of the
deposition; and
(iii) an identification of each document or other exhibit,
including summaries of other evidence—separately
identifying those items the party expects to offer and
those it may offer if the need arises.
F.R.C.P. 26(a)(3)(A) (emphasis added). Because I.R.C.P. 26 is silent on the issue the
Court can look to F.R.C.P. 26 for guidance. As such, even if the Court does not accept
Defendants’ disclosure of the Letter in their discovery responses, the Court can rely on Rule
26 to rule that Defendants need not have disclosed the letter as a trial exhibit prior to trial
because the Letter is being offered as impeachment evidence. Also, I.R.E. 613 allows the
use of prior inconsistent out-of-court statements to impeach a witness. These statements are
not hearsay because “they are not offered for the truth of any of the facts asserted, but rather,
solely to impeach the credibility of the witness.” State v. Wood, 126 Idaho 241, 248, 880
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P.2d 771, 778 (Ct.App.1994).
IV. Conclusion
For the aforementioned reasons and to prevent Defendants from being unduly
prejudiced, the Court should allow Defendants to continue to cross examine Jennifer as to
the contents of the Letter and admit the same into evidence as it is relevant evidence that is
material to Defendants’ case, is not prohibited by I.R.E. 408, and directly contradicts the
false testimony presented by Mark and Jennifer to this Court. Alternatively, a redacted
version of the Letter will be provided to the Court and the redacted letter, which would
clearly not violate I.R.E. 408, should be admitted into evidence.
Lastly, the Defendants should be allowed to use the Letter and or admit the Letter as
impeachment and or rebuttal evidence regardless of its disclosure because the Defendants
would suffer prejudice without the use of the Letter and Jennifer has known about the Letter
and its involvement with this litigation since her deposition and the Letter was disclosed in
Anthony and the Estate of Annie Porcello’s discovery responses as being evidence that
would be used at trial.
SIGNED this 3rd day of May, 2018.
MADSEN LAW OFFICES, P.C.
By:

/s/ Henry Madsen

HENRY D. MADSEN, Attorney
for ANTHONY J. PORCELLO and the
Estate of ANNIE C. PORCELLO,
KALYN PORCELLO, Trustee.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 3rd day of May, 2018, I caused to be served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the
following:
Terrance R. Harris
RAMSDEN, MARFICE, EALY
& HARRIS

√ Via iCourt

Peter J. Smith
SMITH + MALEK

√ Via iCourt

Judge Cynthia C.K. Meyer
1st District Court, State of Idaho
(Bench Copy to Judicial Staff Attorney)

√ Via E-Mail: jwatts@kcgov.us

___/s/ BP___________________
Madsen Law Offices, PC
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

JENNIFER PORCELLO,
Plaintiff,

CASE NO. CV-2016-7343

V.

ANTHONY J. PORCELLO and the Estate of
ANNIE C. PORCELLO, KALYN M.
PORCELLO, Personal Representative,
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR ADMISSION OF
LETTER

ANTHONY J. PORCELLO and the Estate of
ANNIE C. PORCELLO, KALYN M.
PORCELLO, Personal Representative,
Counter-Plaintiffs,
V.

JENNIFER PORCELLO,
Counter-Defendant.

ANTHONY J. PORCELLO and the Estate of
ANNIE C. PORCELLO, KALYN M.
PORCELLO, Personal Representative,
Third Party Plaintiffs,
V.

MARK PORCELLO,
Third Party Defendant.

Defendants moved to admit a letter from Plaintiff Jennifer Porcello to Defendant
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Anthony Porcello as impeachment evidence on Day 4 of the Bench Trial that began on April 23,
2018. Plaintiff and Third Party Defendant objected to the admission of the letter on the grounds
that it constituted an offer of compromise under Rule 408; further Plaintiff and Third Party
Defendant argued the letter should be excluded because it was not disclosed prior to trial. The
Court took the motion under advisement to allow the parties to brief the issue. Defendants filed a
Memorandum of Law Re: I.R.E. 408 Issue on May 3, 2018. Third Party Defendant Mark
Porcello filed a Response on May 10, 2018. Defendants' motion came before the Honorable
Judge Cynthia K.C. Meyer on May 16, 2018. For the reasons discussed below, Defendants'
Motion is denied.
STANDARD OF REVIEW

"The trial judge has broad discretion in deciding whether . . . evidence is admissible for
impeachment purposes, and that decision will not be overturned absent a clear showing that the
discretion was abused." Mosell Equities, LLC v. Berryhill & Co., Inc., 154 Idaho 269, 278, 297
P.3d 232, 241 (2013). "To determine whether a trial court has abused its discretion, this Court
considers whether the district court: (1) perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within
the outer boundaries of that discretion consistent with applicable legal standards; and (3) reached
its decision through the exercise of reason." Hansen v. Roberts, 154 Idaho 469, 472, 299 P.3d
781, 784 (2013).
DISCUSSION

Idaho Rule of Evidence 408 bars the admission of offers of compromise, settlement
offers, or agreements "to prove liability for, invalidity of, or amount of the claim or any other
claim." I.R.E. 408; see also Profits Plus Capital Management, LLC v. Podesta, 156 Idaho 873,
888, 332 P.3d 785, 800 (2014). Idaho Courts give "a broad, not narrow, interpretation [of Rule
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408] in order to encourage settlement negotiations." Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. v.
MRI Associates, LLP, 148 Idaho 479, 495, 224 P.3d 1068, 1084 (2009). Further, Rule 408 bars

the introduction of "conduct or statements made in compromise negotiations." I.R.E. 408.
Generally, in order for Rule 408 to apply, there must be an active dispute at the time the offer
was made. A dispute exists for Rule 408 purposes when ''there is 'an actual dispute or difference
of opinion' regarding a party's liability for or the amount of the claim."' Profits Plus Capital
Management, LLC v. Podesta, 156 Idaho 873, 888, 332 P.3d 785, 800 (2014) (quoting Weems v.
Tyson Foods, Inc., 665 F.3d 958,965 (8th Cir. 2011)).

Nevertheless, "[t]his rule does not require the exclusion of any evidence otherwise
discoverable merely because it is presented in the course of compromise negotiations," or "if the
evidence is offered for another purpose, such as proving bias or prejudice of a witness,
negativing a contention of undue delay, or proving an effort to obstruct a criminal investigation
or prosecution." I.R.E. 408. Idaho courts have allowed evidence from a settlement offer to be
admitted in order to impeach a testifying witness who gives "contrary testimony at trial."
See Davidson v. Beco Corp., 114 Idaho 107, 109, 753 P.2d 1253, 1255 (1987).

Defendants herein seek to admit into evidence the letter sent from Jennifer Porcello to
Anthony Porcello on September 16, 2016, because it does not fall within Rule 408, or
alternatively, because it is admissible for impeachment purposes under an exception to Rule 408.
Third Party Defendant argues that the letter is a settlement offer under Rule 408 and warrants
exclusion on that basis. Response Re: IRE 408 Issue, at 2. Further, Third Party Defendant argues
that the letter is not being used for impeachment purposes, but to "prove the Defendants'
position." Id at 3. Each argument is discussed below.
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I.

The letter is an offer of compromise under Rule 408.
The letter from Jennifer Porcello to Anthony Porcello is an offer of compromise under

Rule 408. In the letter, Jennifer asks Anthony to "consider the following" list of expenses related
to the Woodinville home, the purchase price of the Hayden Home, and the loan to her and Mark,
among other things. Deposition of Jennifer Porcello, Trial Ex. 30, at Ex. 5 (attached as
Addendum A). Jennifer states that "While I believe that Mark should pay you this money, I
realize that this will probably not happen. I am willing to pay the $162,000 in order to keep a
stable home for your grandchildren." Id. At the time the letter was sent, on September 16, 2016,
Plaintiff had not yet filed this action, but Defendants had begun foreclosure proceedings against
Plaintiff. The amount owed on the Note for the Hayden home was in dispute. The Court
determines that the letter qualifies as an offer of compromise under Rule 408.
The letter expresses some confusion on Jennifer's part. She stated that she had believed
the loan to be satisfied by the sale of the Woodinville home. It is apparent that the foreclosure
proceedings caused her some uncertainty in that regard. She then offered a compromise,
suggesting that Anthony apply the $150,000 gift obligation and that she finance $162,000 so that
she could keep the home for the children. Clearly, this is an offer of compromise concerning an
obligation that was in dispute.
II.

The letter is not being offered for a permissible "other purpose" under Rule 408.
Generally, Rule 408 bars the introduction of offers of compromise in order to establish

liability or to establish the amount owed. I.R.E. 408. The rule does allow the admission of offers
of compromise for other purposes, "such as proving bias or prejudice of a witness, negativing a
contention of undue delay, or proving an effort to obstruct a criminal investigation or
prosecution." I.R.E. 408. Idaho courts have allowed evidence from a settlement offer to be

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR ADMISSION OF LETTER--4

Page 349

admitted in order to impeach a testifying witness who gives "contrary testimony at trial."
See Davidson v. Beco Corp., 114 Idaho 107, 109, 753 P.2d 1253, 1255 (1987). "[W]hether to

admit such evidence for another purpose is committed to the discretion of the trial court," and
"shall be determined by rules concerning relevancy and possible outweighing prejudice." Soria
v. Sierra Pacific Airlines, Inc., 111 Idaho 594,606, 726 P.2d 706, 718 (1986).

The Idaho Supreme Court upheld the trial court's decision to admit a settlement offer into
evidence for impeachment purposes under Rule 408 when ''the probative value of the statement
in the settlement letter is great," and ''tends to show [the witness'] testimony is unreliable."
Davidson v. Beco Corp., 114 Idaho 107, 111, 753 P.2d 1252, 1257 (1987). At issue in Davidson

was whether Davidson had accepted an offer of "a John Deere 301 tractor in satisfaction of the
outstanding balance," and whether the parties had reached an accord and satisfaction. Davidson,
114 Idaho at 108, 753 P.2d at 1254. At trial, a defense witness testified that "Davidson had
agreed to accept the tractor in full satisfaction of the debt." Id "This testimony was contrary to
the statement in the settlement letter that the offer had been refused." Id "Davidson's attorney
attempted to impeach [the witness'] testimony by offering the statement contained in the
settlement letter that a previous offer had been made but was rejected by Davidson." Id. The
Davidson court explained that using a settlement letter to impeach a testifying witness'

inconsistent statements is similar to ''when the evidence is being introduced is used to show bias
or prejudice." Id at 109, 753 P.2d at 1255. The Davidson court cited favorably to Missouri
Pacific Railway Ranch Company v. Arkansas Sheriff's Boy's Ranch, which held ''when a party

has made a statement at trial which is inconsistent with a statement made during settlement
negotiations, the inference is that one of the statements is knowingly false." Id at 110, 753 P.2d
at 1256 (quoting Missouri Pacific Railway Ranch Company v. Arkansas Sheriff's Boy's Ranch,
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655 S.W.2d 389, 395 (1983)). The Davidson court held that the statement in the letter was
admissible under Rule 408 and Rule 403 because the letter had great probative value: the letter
was "contrary to [the witness'] testimony at trial," and ''tend[ed] to show [the witness']
testimony was unreliable." Id at 111, 753 P.2d at 1257.
The letter at issue in this case is not admissible for impeachment purposes under
Davidson.

Defendants claim that the letter may be used to impeach "Jennifer's inconsistent

statements and false testimony that she did not borrow the funds in question from Anthony and
the Estate of Annie Porcello." Memorandum, at 8. The letter shows Jennifer's position at the
time it was written. Jennifer's initial position, as explained in the letter, was that the loan was
paid in full upon the sale of the Woodinville home. The receipt of a foreclosure notice created
some uncertainty on Jennifer's part; however, as Jennifer learned more about the re-financings of
the Legacy Group loan, her position that the loan had been repaid by the sale of the Woodinville
home solidified. Jennifer's uncertainty about the loan as expressed in the letter does not
contradict her later testimony, or render her later testimony "knowingly false." Specifically, the
letter itself contains statements such as: "Prior to the notification of foreclosure, I was under the
impression you had been paid in full," and that "as far as I knew the $648,000 was disbursed to
you." Deposition of Jennifer Porcello, Trial Ex. 30, at Ex. 5. Jennifer's testimony is consistent
that prior to the foreclosure she believed that the loan on the Hayden Home had been paid in full
upon the sale of the Woodinville home. See Testimony of Jennifer Porcello, Day 3 of Bench
Trial, held on April 23, 2018, at 11:24 -11:28; 11:31-11:35; and 11:39 a.m. The letter does not
have the same probative value as the letter in Davidson because the statements in this letter are
not contrary to Jennifer's trial testimony. Thus, the letter is not admissible for impeachment
purposes under Rule 408.
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Defendants claim to be offering the letter for "another purpose" rather than to establish
liability or the amount due on the Note. Rule 408 allows the admission of such evidence for the
purpose of showing bias, to rebut accusations of delay, to show an effort to obstruct a criminal
investigation, or to impeach a witness' credibility. Rule 408 does not expressly limit the other
purposes for which offers of compromise may be admitted, however the rule clearly states that
this evidence may not be admitted to prove liability. I.R.E. 408. Defendants argue that "[i]f
Jennifer believed that the Note had been repaid, she would not have proposed to pay the
additional amounts to Anthony and Annie set forth in the Letter," as evidence that "Jennifer has
provided untruthful testimony at trial and her credibility is significantly diminished."
Memorandum, at 11. This argument does not support Defendants' contention that the letter is

admissible for impeachment purposes, but instead points toward admitting the letter to establish
liability and/or the amount due. This purpose is not an acceptable "other purpose," and is
expressly excluded under Rule 403. Were the Court to admit the letter for "another purpose"

under these circumstances, it would cause the exception to swallow the rule. Thus, the Court
determines that the letter warrants exclusion under Rule 408.
Alternatively, just as the letter is not a surprise to any party, its usefulness as potential
impeachment evidence could have been fully anticipated by Defendants based on Plaintiff's
filing of this action, and thus listed as a trial exhibit. Defendants, despite knowing of the letter
and attempting to use it in Jennifer Porcello's deposition, chose not to list it as an exhibit.
Jennifer Porcello's trial testimony regarding ongoing liability on the Note could not have been
surprising to Defendants. Thus, even if the letter is admissible as a non-offer of compromise as
suggested by Defendants or parts of the letter can be used as an acceptable "other purpose" under
Rule 408, because it should have been listed as a trial exhibit but was not, Defendants' motion
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will be denied.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the letter warrants exclusion under Rule 408 both because it is
an offer of compromise, and because it is not being offered for a permissible other purpose under
Rule 408, but is being offered to establish liability.

ORDER:
Based on the foregoing and good cause appearing therefore,
IT IS HERBY ORDERED, Defendants' Motion is denied.

,rt--

DATED this

j.I_ day of May, 2018.
BY THE COURT:
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ADDENDUM A
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September 16,2016
Jennifer Porcello
1663 E Northwood Drive
Hayden, ID 83835

Anthony Porcello

1817 Jones Avenue
Renton, WA 98056
Dear Tony,
In respect to the foreclosure/auction of October 18th I ask that you consider the following:

Pur_c;:hase Price of the house in September of 2014

$361,253

Financing

Down payment by Mark and I
Your loan to Mark and I

Your loan above was made of two components
Funds gifted against the purchase of the Northwood Drive home in respect to
getting the Woodinville home ready for sale
Balance after the Woodinville home concession

Comprising the balance of the loan against Northwood

49,209
312,044
$361,253

$150,000
162,000
$312,000

Please allow me to keep the house so Madison, Allison, and Ashton have a decent home. I will mortgage
the home for $162,000 and pay it to you within 90 days.
Tony, the Woodinville home was sold and as far as I knew the $648,000 was disbursed to you.
Unfortunately, Mark kept me in the dark about this. Prior to the notification of foreclosure, I was under
the impression you had been paid in full. (Even our divorce judge agreed with this ... he has assigned all
marital debts to Mark as well as deny any visitation rights to Mark because of his drug and child abuse.
Do you remember our conversation when an uninformed judge allowed Mark to take the kids to
California? -1 told you that when a judge finally hears this case, he will turn over the children to me and
deny him any visitation rights) While I believe that Mark should pay you this money, I realize that this

will probably not happen. I am willing to pay the $162,000 in order to keep a stable home for your
grandchildren.

Jennifer

. ~D,C'L ll o
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
JENNIFER PORCELLO,
Plaintiff,

CASE NO. CV-2016-7343

PLAINTIFF'S WRIITEN CLOSING
ARGUMENT--OPENING BRIEF

vs.
ANTHONY J. PORCELLO and the Estate
of ANNIE C. PORCELLO, KALYN M.
PORCELLO, Personal Representative,
Defendants.
ANTHONY J. PORCELLO and the Estate of
ANNIE C. PORCELLO, KALYN M.
PORCELLO, Personal Representative,
Counter Plaintiffs,
vs.
JENNIFER PORCELLO,
Counter-Defendant.
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ANTHONY J. PORCELLO and ANNIE C.
PORCELLO, husband and wife,
Third Party Plaintiffs,

vs.
MARK PORCELLO,
Third Par

Defendant.

COMES NOW the Plaintiff, Jennifer Maggard ("Jennifee'), and hereby provides her
written closing argument as requested by the Court. This closing argument is based on all of
the testimony and exhibits admitted at trial, together with the following:

i) the entire

videotaped deposition testimony of Joseph Mijich taken on September 29, 2017 (hereafter
"Dep. of Mijich''), and, ii) portions of the deposition of Scott Rerucha taken on September

29, 2017 (hereafter ''Dep, of Rerucha"), which portions are cited to herein.

I.

INTRODUC TION

Jennifer filed a declaratory action asking the Com1 to determine the amount owing on
the Promissory Note at issue (the "Note"), because it is an unliquidated and disputed
obligation, and Jennifer contends that the Note has been satisfied in full. Jennifer asks the
Com1 for a judicial determination of her rights and duties under the Note and Deed of Trust.
Jennifer is also asking the Court for a $150,000 setoff against any obligation determined to
be owing by Jennifer to Defendants Anthony and Annie Porcello ("Tony" and "Annie'J

See generally the Verified Complaint for Declaratory Judgment (See generally Defendants'
Exhibit PPP).
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II.
A.

ARGUMENT

The Note was modified by the agreement that once the Woodinville home
sold, the proceeds would be used to pay off the Legacy Group Captial loan
and the Note would be considered satisfied.

The following testimony and exhibits were produced at trial:
•

Jennifer, Mark Porcello ("Mark") and Kalyn Porcello ("Kalyn") all testified
consistently that the plan for paying off the hard money shott-term Legacy
Group Capital ("LGC") loan was to sell the Woodinville home as soon as
possible and use the proceeds to pay off the LGC loan.

•

Scott Rerncha testified that he talked to Annie, Tony and Mark about the plan to
sell the Woodinville home to pay off the LGC loan. Dep. ofRerucha, p. 110, I.
14-p. lll, I. 5.

•

The only person who apparently did not know the plan for paying off the LGC
loan was Joe Mijich. Dep. ofMijich, p. 116, I. 18 - p. 118, I. 6. Considering that
Mr. Mijich testified that he was concerned about how his clients Tony and Annie
were going to repay the LGC loan, this raises serious questions about the veracity
of Mr. Mijich's testimony. Dep. ofMijich, p. 118, I. 8 -p. 119, I. 11.

•

Kalyn, Kim Parker and Joe Mijich all testified consistently that the Note Joe
Mijich drafted for Mark and Jennifer to sign was the mirror image of the note
that Tony and Annie signed for the LGC loan.

•

Jennifer and Mark went to Pioneer Title late in the afternoon of September 3,
2014, to sign the closing paperwork on the Hayden Lake home. This was the first
time that Jennifer reviewed the Note and Deed ofTrnst prepared by Joe Mijich.
Prior to that, Jennifer thought she and Mark were borrowing the funds to close on
the Hayden Lake home directly from LGC. Jennifer was shocked and upset that
the Note was for $648,500 when all they were bon·owing was $312,044.32.
Jennifer refused to sign the Note and Deed of T!ust and Jennifer and Mark left
Pioneer Title shottly after 5 :00 p.m.

•

The closing agent at Pioneer Title sent an email to Joe Mijich and Kim Parker on
September 3, 2014 at 5:15 p.m. advising them that Jennifer refused to sign the
Note and Deed of Trnst and that Mark would calling Joe Mijich to go over the
Note. Plaintiff's Ex. 8.

•

Jennifer and Mark both testified consistently that after leaving Pioneer Title by
car, they pulled over and made a couple of phone calls. The first call was to
Tony who told them to talk to Joe Mijich with any questions about the Note. The
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second call was to Joe Mijich. When they asked Joe Mijich why the Note was
for $648,500 instead of the amount they were actually borrowing, Mr. Mijich
told them that Tony and Annie wanted it for that amount since that was the
amount of the LGC note, but that it didn't matter because once the Woodinville
home sold the proceeds would pay off the LGC note and Jennifer and Mark
would own the Hayden Lake home free and clear.
•

Mr. Mijich testified that he only spoke with Mark one time on September 3, 2014
at 3:35 p.m., and he knew that because he reviewed a copy of his landline
telephone records from Comcast for phone number 206-621-8691, and those
records only showed the one call. Those records became unusable and Mr.
Mijich has been unable to get additional copies of the Comcast phone records.
Dep. ofMijich, p. 51, I. 7-p. 61, I. 13. No Comcast phone records were offered
at trial.

•

l\1r. Mijich acknowledged that he had a cell phone in September 2014, and that
his cell phone number was 206-412-9400. Dep. ofMijich, p. 125, I. 25 - p. 126,
I. 21. Kim Parker also testified that "tvfr. Mijich had a cell phone with the number
206-412-9400.

•

Mark's cell phone records show that he called 206-412-9400 three times on
September 3, 2014, and that the three calls combined were 25 minutes in
duration. One of the calls was at 5:24 p.m. and lasted IO minutes. This matches
exactly the timeframe when Mark and Jennifer testified they spoke with Mr.
Mijich after leaving Pioneer Title. Plaintiff's Ex's. 20, 21 & 22.

The weight of the credible evidence shows that Jennifer and Mark spoke with Joe Mijich
on September 3, 2104 at 5:24 p.m. by calling him on his cell phone. Jennifer and Mark both
testified clearly that Joe Mijich told them in that conversation that when the Woodinville home
sold, the proceeds would be used to pay off the LGC loan and they would own the Hayden Lake
home free of any fmiher obligation to Tony and Annie. Joe Mijich claims the call never
happened, but he based that testimony on his review of Comcast phone records for his landline.
Joe Mijich never reviewed his cell phone records. The non-patiy documentaty evidence
consisting of the email from Pioneer Title and the Sprint records for Mark's cell phone all
suppoti the testimony of Jennifer and Mark that the call happened when they said it happened.
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The Note at issue is a negotiable instrnment as defined by Idaho Code § 28-3-104(1 ).
As such, it is governed by the Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC") § 28-1-101 et seq. and, to
the extent that the UCC does not displace it, principles of common contract law and equity.
Idaho Code§ 28-1-103.

Particularly relevant is Idaho Code § 28-3-117, which provides as follows:
28-3-117. Other agreements affecting instrument. Subject to applicable law
regarding exclusion of proof of contemporaneous or previous agreements, the
obligation of a party to an instrument to pay the instrument may be modified,
supplemented or nullified by a separate agreement of the obligor and a person
entitled to enforce the instrument, if the instrument is issued or the obligation
is incurred in reliance on the agreement or as part of the same transaction
giving rise to the agreement. To the extent an obligation is modified,
supplemented or nullified by an agreement under this section, the
agreement is a defense to the obligation. (Emphasis Added).
The official comment to Idaho Code § 28-3-117 clearly illustrates the concept:
1.
The separate agreement might be a security agreement or m01igage or it
might be an agreement that contradicts the terms of the instrument. For
example, a person may be induced to sign an instrument under an
agreement that the signer will not be liable on the instrument unless
certain conditions are met. Suppose X requested credit from Creditor who is
willing to give the credit only if an acceptable accommodation paiiy will sign
the note of X as co-maker. Y agrees to sign as co-maker on the condition that
Creditor also obtain the signature of Z as co-maker. Creditor agrees and Y
signs as co-maker with X. Creditor fails to obtain the signature of Z on the
note. Under Sections 3-412 and 3-419(b), Y is obliged to pay the note, but
Section 3-117 applies. In this case, the agreement modifies the terms of the
note by stating a condition to the obligation of Y to pay the note. This case
is essentially similar to a case in which a maker of a note is induced to sign
the note by fraud of the holder. Although the agreement that Y not be
liable on the note unless Z also signs may not have been fraudulently
made, a subsequent attempt by Creditor to require Y to pay the note in
violation of the agreement is a bad faith act . ... (Emphasis added).
This appears to be a codification of the common law of contracts as illustrated in
Thomas v. Campbell, 107 Idaho 398, 690 P.2d 333 (1984), and Mikesell v. Newworld Dev.
Corp., 122 Idaho 868, 840 P.2d 1090 (1992). In Thomas, the Comi stated:
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The dispute is not over the meaning of certain terms in the Thomas-Campbell
agreement, but rather concerns the representations of a seller made to a buyer
to induce the buyer to purchase the land in question. Fraud in the inducement
is always admissible to show that representations by one party were a material
part of the bargain. Glenn Dick Equipment Co. v. Galey Construction, Inc., 97
Idaho 216, 223, 541 P.2d 1184, 1191 (1975); Utilities Engineering Institute v.
Criddle, 65 Idaho 201, 141 P.2d 981 (1943); Kloppenburg v. Mays, 60 Idaho
19, 34, 88 P.2d 513, 519 (1939); Wollan v. McKay, 24 Idaho 691, 135 P. 832
(1913). Hence, the trial court erred in ruling that the parol evidence rule would
preclude admission of evidence which the Thomases offered to establish
representations allegedly made fraudulently with the purpose of inducing them
into the transaction.
Thomas v. Campbell, 107 Idaho 398,402, 690 P.2d 333, 337 (1984).

Likewise, in Mikesell the Court stated that:
"When fraud induces a variance between a written contract and the agreement
between the parties, the latter will prevail and the trial court is empowered to
reform the written instrument to conform to the agreement." Nab v. Hills, 92
Idaho 877, 883, 452 P.2d 981, 987 (1969) (quoting McKelvie v. Hackney, 58
Wash.2d 23, 360 P.2d 746 (1961)). In this case, the trial comi found that the
fraudulent representations of Rockland Judd induced a variance between the
written deed and the agreement of the patties. That finding is supported by
substantial competent evidence and will not be disturbed. Based on that
finding the trial comt had authority to reform the deed to conform to the
agreement actually reached between the Burgesses and Judd.
Mikesell v. Newworld Dev. Co,p., 122 Idaho 868, 876-77, 840 P.2d 1090, 1098-99 (Ct. App.
1992).

The fact that the modification of the Note is based on representations made by Joe
Mijich--instead of representations made directly by Tony and Annie--is of no moment. It is
well-settled in Idaho that a principal can be liable for the contract made by his or her agent.
See Wolford v. Tankersley, 107 Idaho 1062, 1066, 695 P.2d 1201, 1205 (1984), citing
General Motors Acceptance C01p. v. Turner Insurance Agency, Inc., 96 Idaho 691, 535 P.2d

664 (1975). Here, Joe Mijich was clearly acting as the authorized agent of Tony and Annie
when he made the representations to Jennifer and Mark. In fact, Jennifer and Mark called
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and spoke to Joe Mijich after 5:00 p.m. on September 3, 2014, based on Tony telling them to
talk to Joe Mijich with any questions about the Note.
The representations may not have been fraudulent when Joe Mijich prepared the Note
in September 2014. Joe Mijich, Annie and Anthony may have all intended at that time that
when the Woodinville home sold, its proceeds would pay off the LGC loan and that would
satisfy the Note at issue. However, we now know more about what happened at the time the
Woodinville home finally sold in July 2015. Mark needed $400k to complete his contract to
purchase the Bellevue home from Darrel Bohner. Mark convinced Tony and Annie in July
2015 to borrow $417k from Evergreen Moneysource Mortgage Company using the Via
Venito home as collateral, and to provide Mark the loan proceeds for the Bellevue home
transaction. The Woodinville home closing was delayed, which resulted in the $417k loan
from Evergreen closing before the Woodinville home closed. As a result, $198k of the
Evergreen loan proceeds went to pay off the LGC loan. In Mark's words "that should have
never happened." As a result, Mark was short of the $400k he needed to close on the
Bellevue home. Mark then convinced Tony to pay him the $157k proceeds from the sale of
the Woodinville home so he could use that for the Bellevue home.
According to Kalyn and Tony, Mark's agreement with Tony for the $417k loan from
Evergreen and the $157k proceeds from the Woodinville home was that he would pay all of
that back when he sold the Bellevue home. Mark also agreed that he would pay Tony and
Annie back the money they had put into the Woodinville home when he sold the Bellevue
home. Mark sold the Bellevue home for $1.6 million in 2017. Mark allegedly did not repay
Tony or Annie any of the money they loaned him to purchase the Bellevue home or the
money that Tony and Annie put into the Woodinville home. It is simply inexplicable why
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Tony and Annie did nothing to secure the monies they loaned to Mark that he used to
purchase the Bellevue home. Jennifer should not have to bear the brunt of Tony and Annie's
lack of prudence and foresight.
Tony and Annie are now trying to collect all of that money (together with other
money they claim is owing by Mark or Jennifer) by foreclosing on Jennifer's home. They
are claiming that all of these additional loans from Tony and Annie to Mark so that he could
purchase the Bellevue home are somehow linked together with the original Note Jennifer and
Mark signed back in September 2014. This argument is completely meritless as will be
discussed in more detail inji·a. Now that Annie and Tony are seeking to enforce the Note in
violation of the prior agreement that it would be satisfied from the proceeds of the sale of the
Woodinville home, Tony and Annie's actions have become both fi'audulent and a "bad faith
act."

We know that it took longer than anticipated for the Woodinville home to be sold.
We know that Mark was paying all of the interest only payments on the LCG loan while they
were attempting to sell the Woodinville home. We know that $480k was borrowed from
Evergreen Moneysource Mmtgage Company in May 2015, and the net proceeds of $472k
were used to pay down the LGC loan. Kalyn described this as simply transferring pait of the
LGC loan to Evergreen. We know that the $480k Evergreen loan was paid off when the
Woodinville home closed. We know that approximately $198k was used from the second
Evergreen loan to pay off the LGC loan. We know that the LGC loan was paid in full at that
time (July 2015). We know that Mark is paying the monthly payments on the second
Evergreen loan (and living in the Via Venito property which is the collateral for the second
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Evergreen loan), and the purpose of that loan was to provide Mark money for the Bellevue
home.
The agreement that the Woodinville home would be sold and the proceeds used to pay
off the LGC loan; which in turn would satisfy any obligation owing by Mark and Jennifer on
the Note, became part of the bargain that underlies the Note under the operation of Idaho
Code § 28-3-117, and the common law of contracts. Accordingly, since the Woodinville
home has sold and the LGC loan has been paid off, the Note has been satisfied. The
subsequent loans Annie and Tony made to Mark to purchase the Bellevue home have nothing
to do with the Note and are simply not relevant to any of the issues in this case.

B.

The Note is unenforceable as there was no meeting of the minds as to a
material term of the agreement.

If the Coutt determines that the Note was not modified by the agreement that the
Woodinville home proceeds would be used to pay off the LGC loan, which would in turn
satisfy the Note in full, then an issue is raised as to whether there was a meeting of minds as to a
material term of the agreement.
Kalyn alone testified that the agreement between Mark, Tony and Annie in September
2014, was that once the Woodinville home sold and the proceeds were used to pay off (or pay
down) the LGC loan, then the Note would be modified by adjusting the principal amount of the
obligation downward to include only the amounts that Tony and Annie had put into the
Woodinville home (down payment + remodeling costs), together with any remaining balance of
the LGC loan after the Woodinville home proceeds were applied. This, according to Kalyn,
was what Tony and Annie wanted to make them whole.
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Joe Mij ich also testified that there would need to be a downward modification to the
principal balance of the Note that would need to be dete1mined at the time the Note was repaid
by Jennifer and Mark. This modification was necessary to account for the $270k of the LGC
loan that was used to pay off the existing Wells Fargo mortgage, an obligation belonging to
Tony and Annie. There also might be a deduction for the $48,677.62 in cash proceeds that was
paid to Tony and Annie upon the closing of the LGC loan. Dep. ofMijich, p. 98, I. 25 - p. 114,

I. 18.
The gist of Kalyn's testimony was that the principal balance of the Note was set at
$648,500 as a marker to be negotiated at a later date once the Woodinville home had sold and
the amount of the proceeds was determined. Likewise, Joe Mijich's testimony was the same
except it did not anticipate the use of Woodinville home sale proceeds to pay off the LGC loan.
Rather, Mr. Mijich testified that Tony and Annie expected that Mark would pay off the
$648,500 LGC loan within the 90 day period and then there would adjustment downward to the
payoff of the Note, and Tony had great confidence in Mark's ability to perform. Dep. ofMijich,
p. 117, I. 9 - p. 119, I. 11.
This testimony raises the agreement to agree in the future problem. The issue then is
whether there was a meeting of minds as to a material term of the Note--that being the principal
balance of the Note--at the time the Note was executed. The parties never agreed on the hue
amount of the loan. If there was no meeting of the minds then there is not an enforceable
agreement. There is no enforceable contract when the parties leave a material term for future
negotiations. See Syringa Networks, LLC v. Idaho Dep't ofAdmin., 155 Idaho 55, 63,305 P.3d
499, 507 (2013)("It is essential to an enforceable contract that it be sufficiently definite and
certain in its terms and requirements so that it can be determined what acts are to be performed
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and when performance is complete." Dale's Service Co., Inc. v. Jones, 96 Idaho 662, 664, 534
P.2d 1102, 1104 (1975). "No enforceable contract comes into being when parties leave a
material term for future negotiations, creating a mere agreement to agree." Maroun v. Wyreless
Systems, Inc., 141 Idaho 604, 614, 114 P.3d 974, 984 (2005)(quoting from 17A Am.Jur.2d
Contracts§ 181 (2004)).

If the Note is not enforceable, then the Deed of Trust is likewise invalid and
unenforceable. This is so because the Deed of Trust expressly provides that it is "for the
purpose of securing payment of the indebtedness evidenced by a promissory note of even date
herewith, executed by Grantor" ..... See e.g. McCray v. Twitchell, 112 Idaho 787, 735 P.2d
1098 (Ct.App. 1987).

The Note should be equitably reformed to reflect the amount that Tony and
Annie leveraged from the Woodinville home in order to loan money to
Jennifer and Mark to purchase the Hayden Lake home, less Jennifer and
Mark's combined beneficial or equitable interests in the Woodinville home.

C.

In the event the Court determines that the Note is an enforceable obligation and that the
Note is capable of being liquidated, then Jennifer is requesting that the Court equitably reform
the Note to reflect the tlue amount that Tony and Annie leveraged from the Woodinville home
in order to loan money to Jennifer and Mark to purchase the Hayden Lake home. Additionally,
Jennifer is asking that this number be reduced by Jennifer and Mark's combined beneficial or
equitable interests in the Woodinville home. The following testimony and exhibits were
produced at t1·ial:
•

Kalyn repeatedly testified that Tony and Annie "leveraged their equity" in the
Woodinville home in order to loan Jennifer and Mark the money needed to close
on the Hayden Lake home. Kalyn was refen'ing to the down payment that Tony
and Annie made to purchase the Woodinville home and the money they spent for
remodeling expenses for the Woodinville home. Both Kalyn and Tony testified
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that this was the money that Tony and Annie wanted to be repaid to be made
whole.
•

Tony testified that he and Annie paid the $!00k down payment to purchase the
Woodinville home and that they also paid around $100k in remodeling expenses
for the Woodinville home.

•

Kalyn testified that Tony and Annie paid the $100k down payment to purchase
the Woodinville home and that they also paid around $160k-$200k in
remodeling expenses for the Woodinville home.

•

Kalyn testified that Mark corroborated at the arbitration that Annie had paid the
amounts reflected in Defendants' Exhibits JJ ($34,438.10), KK ($30,000) and LL
($18,807.62), towards the remodeling expenses for the Woodinville home. The
total amount Mark con·oborated at the arbitration according to Kalyn was
$83,245.72.

•

Mark testified that he reimbursed Annie around $40k of the $100k she made as a
down payment to purchase the Woodinville home. Mark also testified that the
Woodinville home was a joint venture between he and Annie and they were
going to fix up the Woodinville home and flip it. Mark testified that he paid
roughly equivalent amounts as Annie towards the remodeling expenses for the
Woodinville home in keeping with the joint venture.

•

Jennifer testified that she paid around $40k of her own money towards the
remodeling expenses of the Woodinville home. Jennifer testified that she did a
lot of the remodeling work herself and spent countless hours completing the
work on the landscaping, painting, bathroom remodels, and various other
remodeling projects. This all occurred before she was forced to vacate the
Woodinville home in the late sununer of 2013.

•

The Woodinville home was purchased for $40lk in January 2012. Defendants'
Ex. II. It was sold for $690k in July 2015, and there was approximately $49k in
selling expenses resulting in net selling proceeds of $64 lk. Defendants' Ex. CC.
Thus, the net realized appreciation in the value of the Woodinville home during
the period of time it was owned by Annie and Tony was $240k ($64 lk-$401k).

•

To the extent that Annie, Tony, Mark, and Jennifer combined paid more than
$240k toward remodeling expenses for the Woodinville home, there was a loss
of their investments.

•

Tony and Annie received $157,177.40 in proceeds from the sale of the
Woodinville home. Defendants' Ex's. CC and EE. Mark convinced Tony to
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loan this money to him to use for the purchase of the Bellevue home. Tony was
supposed to be repaid this loan when the Bellevue home was sold.
Based on the testimony of the parties, the following table illustrates the amounts of their
respective claimed investments in the Woodinville home:

Annie& Tony

Mark

Jennifer

Down Payment

$100k

$40k

0

Remodeling
Costs

$1 O0k (per Tony)

Roughly an
equivalent amount to
what Annie & Tony
paid.

$40k plus labor.

Low $ l 23k ($40k +
$83k)
Mid $140k ($40k +
$100k)
High $200-240K
($40k + $160k$200k)

$40k plus labor.

$160k-$200k (per Kalyn)

Totals

$83k (per Kalyn that Mark
corroborated at arbitration)
Low $183k ($100k +
$83k)
Mid $200k ($100k +
$100k)
High $260K-$300k
($100k + $160k-200k)

According to the testimony of the paities, there may have been significantly more than
$240k invested in the remodeling of the Woodinville home. If that is true, then the amount of
the combined investment should be capped at $240k since that is total amount of the realized
appreciation in value of the Woodinville home. The issue then is what propmtion of $240k
should be allocated to each of the pruties. However, it may not be necessary to tackle this issue.
Let's assume for the sake of argument that the Com1 allocates to Tony and Annie their
$100k down payment and another $100k for remodeling costs for a total of $200k. This is the
middle total from the table that is based on Tony's testimony. There is no deduction being
made for any loss on the investment, or a deduction being made based on the combined
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investments made by Mark and Jennifer. If $200k is the amount that Tony and Annie were
owed, they received $157,157.40 of that amount when the Woodinville home was sold. The
fact that Tony loaned that money to Mark to purchase the Bellevue home is ofno moment. This
leaves a balance of approximately $43k owing. However, as will be discussed in more detail
below, Jennifer is entitled to a $150k setoff against any balance owing. This more than offsets
the $43k owing under this scenario.
Even if we assume that Tony and Annie are owed the high number from the table of
$260k to $300k, after you deduct the $157,157.40 they received from the sale of the
Woodinville home, and the $150k they promised to apply towards the purchase of the Hayden
Lake home, there is nothing remaining owing.
If the Court allocates the $240k in realized net appreciation between the parties in some
fashion, this could only result in less than $300k being allocated to Tony and Annie for their
$100k down payment and their allocable pmtion of the net realized appreciation. For example,
if the Comt equally divided the $240k in realized net appreciation between the parties, then
Tony and Annie would be allocated $120k. If you add that amount to the $100k down payment
you get $220k. Clearly under this scenario there is no balance owing on Note.
Annie and Tony may argue that the $198k that was taken to pay off the LGC loan from
the proceeds of the $4 l 7k Evergreen loan, which loan used the Via Venito home as collateral,
should be reimbursed to them in this case. However, that loan was a separate deal Annie and
Tony made with Mark to help him purchase the Bellevue home. The $4 l 7k Evergreen loan was
supposed to be paid when the Bellevue house was sold. Annie and Tony failed to properly
protect themselves in that transaction. Mark is making the payments on that $4 l 7k Evergreen
loan and it is secured by the Via Venito home, which is a home that Mark claims he is the
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beneficial owner of and there is litigation ongoing in California to determine its ownership.
There may be monies owing between Mark and his parents. However, that is not patt of this
litigation.
D.

Tony and Annie's attempt to link all of the loans they made to Mark after
September 4, 2014, back to the Note signed by Jennifer and Mark is without
any legal merit.

Tony and Annie are claiming (for the first time at trial), that all of the additional loans
from Tony and Annie to Mark so that he could acquire the Bellevue home are somehow
linked together with the original Note Jennifer and Mark signed back in September 2014.
This argument is completely meritless. This is the football equivalent of a "Hail Mary" pass
tlu·own at the end of the fomth quarter.
The following testimony and exhibits were produced at trial:
•

Kalyn testified that prior to September 4, 2014, in her meetings with Mark,
Annie, Tony and Scott Rerucha about the LGC loan, there was no discussion
about refinancing the LGC loan.

•

Kalyn testified that prior to September 4, 2014, in her meetings with Mark,
Annie, Tony and Scott Rerucha about the LGC loan, there was no discussion
about loaning Mark additional funds to purchase the Bellevue home.

•

Kalyn testified that Jennifer was not present at any of the meetings she
attended with Mark, Annie, Tony and Scott Rerucha to discuss the LGC loan
and repayment of the same.

•

Joe Mijich testified that there was no discussion about refinancing the LGC
loan during the 90 day maturity period of the Note. Dep. of Mijich, p. 119, I.
13-15.

•

Joe Mijich testified that there was no discussion about Tony and Annie making
future loans to Mark and Jennifer. Dep. ofM/jich, p. 136, I. 14-p. 137, 1.21.

•

The Note by its express terms does not provide for any future advances of loan
funds or any additional loans to be made in the future. Joint Exhibit F.
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It wasn't until July 2015--approximately ten months after the Note was signed and

seven months after the Note matured--that Mark convinced Tony and Annie to borrow funds
from Evergreen using the Via Venita property as collateral, and to loan those funds to Mark
to be used to purchase the Bellevue home. This transaction had nothing to do with the

Hayden Lake home or the Woodinville home. Due to a delay in closing of the Woodinville
home, the Evergreen loan closed first and $ 198k of the loan proceeds were unexpectedly
used to pay off the LGC loan. Mark then convinced Tony to provide him the $157k proceeds
from the sale of the Woodinville home to make up for the missing $198k because he needed
that money to purchase the Bellevue home. These were new loans, completely unrelated to
the Note at issue, for which Mark allegedly promised to repay Tony and Annie from the
proceeds of the sale of the Bellevue home.
Tony and Annie's attempts to link all of these loans together and relate them back to
the Note Jennifer signed on September 4, 2014, and claim that Jennifer is now liable for
repayment of these loans is not based on a bona fide disagreement about contested facts. It is
simply a disingenuous attempt to stick Jennifer with new unforeseen liabilities and to take
her home in payment thereof.
Furthermore, the contract to purchase the Bellevue home was Mark's separate
property asset. Mark testified that he entered into that contract when he was unmarried. The
proceeds from the sale of the Bellevue home were awarded to Mark as his sole and separate
prope1ty in the divorce decree. Plaintiff's Ex. 12. As such the loans Annie and Tony made
to Mark to purchase the Bellevue home are his separate obligations. There is no legal basis
for asse1ting that obligation against Jennifer.
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E.

If any amount is found owing on the Note, then Jennifer is entitled to a
setoff of$150,000.00, together with accrued interest against that amount.

The following testimony and exhibits were produced at trial:
•

Jennifer testified that in the summer of 2014, Annie asked her to return to the
Woodinville home to work on it to get it ready to be sold.

•

Jennifer returned to the Woodinville home and discovered that there was
extensive work still needed to prepare it for sale. In light of what had occurred
in the arbitration proceeding, Jennifer was unwilling to do that work and incur
the expenses without a written agreement from Annie that she would be paid
for her services and reimbursed for her expenses.

•

The work included installing new kitchen cabinets, granite countertops, a new
driveway, refinishing the hardwood floors, and other items. Mark and Jennifer
(who were married at that time) paid for all of the work and materials.
Jennifer did much of the work herself.

•

Annie agreed that she would pay Jennifer for her services and reimburse her
for the materials used to complete the projects once the Woodinville house
sold. Annie wrote out an agreement that she would pay $150k towards the
purchase of the Hayden Lake home once the Woodinville home was sold.
This agreement was signed by Annie and Tony and was dated July I, 2014.
Plaintiff's Ex. 6.

•

Tony acknowledged that the agreement was in Annie's handwriting and that is
was signed by Annie and himself.

•

Tony claimed that the written agreement was not a gift and was not to pay
back Jennifer for any work she did or materials she provided to fix up the
Woodinville home. However, Tony could not state what the agreement was
actually for. Tony testified that Annie asked him to sign it and he signed it
without questioning what it was for.

•

Jennifer completed the work on the Woodinville home and it finally sold in
July 2015.

The foregoing facts amply illustrate that Annie's handwritten note is a legally binding
contract supported by consideration. Because of Jennifer's experience in the arbitration
when Annie and Mark teamed up against her to defeat her equitable reimbursement claim,
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Jennifer was unwilling to do this work and pay for the materials unless she received some
written assurances from Tony and Annie that Jennifer would receive the money back after
the sale of the Woodinville home to be used in purchasing the Hayden Lake home. Tony and
Annie both signed a handwritten note dated July I, 2014, acknowledging that when the
Woodinville home sold, Anthony and Annie would transfer $150,000.00 towards the
purchase of the Hayden Lake home. Once the Woodinville home sold in July 2015, the
promise of payment of the $150,000.00 became due. Since this was a liquidated amount,
interest would accrue at the 12% statutory rate from that date. Idaho Code§ 28-22-104.
This is not the type of agreement that is subject to the statue of frauds, I.C. §§ 9-503
& 9-505. Nonetheless, even if it were the handwritten memorandum would be enough to

satisfy the requirement of a written memorandum signed by the party to be charged.
Moreover, since Jennifer completed the services and work required, this would constitute
part performance on her part which would remove the agreement from the application of the
statute of frauds. See/BM Corp. v. Lawhorn, 106 Idaho 194,677 P.2d 507 (Ct. App. 1984).
Jennifer is seeking to setoff the $150,000.00 owed by Tony and Annie against any
amount that is found owing on the Note. Under these circumstances a setoff is clearly
appropriate. In Beard v. George, 135 Idaho 685, 688, 23 P.3d 147, 150 (2001), the Court
stated that "the rule regarding setoffs is that equity allows a defendant to assert a setoff even
where the statute of limitations would bar an affirmative claim. The 'arising out of the same
transaction' language has not been an essential element to the equitable principle allowing
individuals to setoff amounts owed to them by the same person who is attempting to collect
from them." Likewise in this case since Tony and Annie are seeking to collect money from
Jennifer, she is entitled to the setoff.
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F.

Tony and Annie's attempt to conduct a non-judicial foreclosure of
Jennifer's house was done in bad faith.

Jennifer is seeking in part equitable relief for reformation of the Note, reimbursement
for amounts invested by Mark and Jennifer in the Woodinville home, and a $150k setoff
against any amounts found owing on the Note. Jennifer has also raised equitable defenses to
the judicial foreclosure action based on the doctrines of unclean hands and equitable
estoppel. Since the Court is sitting in equity, it is appropriate for the Court to consider the
relative fairness and equities of the parties' conduct and positions.
Jennifer has already set fo1ih supra events that occurred that were either fraudulent or,
at a minimum, done in bad faith. However, there are a more incidents that Jennifer requests
the Court consider in assessing the relative equities of the parties.
According to the testimony of Joe Mijich and Kim Parker, Mark initially contacted
Joe Mijich in the summer of 2015, and told him that Jennifer had failed to pay the Note and
that Joe Mijich should proceed to foreclose on the Hayden Lake home. This was after
Jennifer and Mark had separated and Jennifer had filed for divorce. The timing of this phone
call clearly implies that Mark wanted his parents to foreclose on and to sell the Hayden Lake
home at the same time when Mark was desperately trying to get the money together to
purchase the Bellevue home.
A non-judicial foreclosure was initiated by Pioneer Title in June 2016. At that time,
Pioneer Title served a Notice of Default and Notice of Trnstee's Sale on Jennifer. Both
notices claimed that the balance owing on the Note was "$648,500.00, together with interest
thereon at 12.000% per annum form 11/29/2014." Defendants" Ex. NNN. This was patently

false. Joe Mijich, Kim Parker and Tony all testified that they did not know (and did nothing
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to verify) what the balance owing was when the non-judicial foreclosure was started. Kalyn
testified that the amount owing should have been modified after the Woodinville home sold
in July 2015. There was never any modification completed and never any attempt to clear up
the amount owing on the Note prior to initiating the non-judicial foreclosure.
Tony and Annie instituted this non-judicial foreclosure, apparently at Mark's urging,
and without taking any steps to clear up the true amount owing on the Note. By claiming the
exorbitant amount of more than $800,000 (including the interest) owing on the Note as of
June 2016, they deprived Jennifer of any opportunity to cure the default as provided by Idaho
law to save her home. Undoubtedly, Tony, Annie and Mark were banking on the belief that
Jennifer would not have the economic ability to hire an attorney to fight this.

Indeed,

Jennifer was not working at that time and was totally reliant on Mark to pay his support
obligations for her and for their children. As reflected in the final Divorce Decree, these
payments were at best sporadic and incomplete resulting in large unpaid arrearages.
Plaintiff's Ex. 12. Indeed, Jennifer did not have the economic ability to pay for an attorney

and, as a result, she has accumulated a large debt of legal fees that are unpaid and
outstanding.
Even after Jennifer brought to Tony and Annie's attention the fact that the amounts
they were claiming were still owing on the Note are completely bogus, Tony and Annie
persisted in pursuing this foreclosure and are now claiming that Jennifer owes them even
more money than the bogus amount stated in the Note. Tony wants Jennifer to pay him the
$80k in attorney's fees he claims were incurred in the 2013 arbitration. Tony and Kalyn
want Jennifer to pay for all of the loans made to Mark in 2015, so that Mark could purchase
the Bellevue home. The loans for the Bellevue home were all included in the accounting
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completed by Linda Laurey.

There is no legal basis for these claims.

The fact that

Defendants are seeking to collect them all from Jennifer in this action is more evidence of
bad faith. This conduct should not be countenanced by the Court

ID.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Jennifer respectfully requests that the Court enter its decision
doing the following:

1.

Granting Jennifer declaratory relief and determining that the Note has been
satisfied in full because the Woodinville home was sold and the LGC loan was
repaid; or

2.

Alternatively, granting Jennifer declaratory relief and determining that the Note
has been repaid from the proceeds from the sale of the Woodinville home and
that any balance remaining is more than offset by the combined equitable
reimbursement claims of Mark and Jennifer, together with the $150k setoff to
which Jennifer is entitled; or

3.

Alternatively, granting Jennifer declaratory relief and determining that the Note
is unenforceable; and

4.

Determining that the Deed of Trust is either satisfied or unenforceable, and that
Tony and Annie are ordered to release and reconvey the Deed of Trust to
Jennifer.

DATED this

4

day of June, 2018.

RAMSDEN, MARFICE, EALY & HARRIS, LLP

By:

c:=== )~=-Terrance R. Harris, Of the Firm
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant
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the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Henry D. Madsen
Madsen Law Offices, P.C.
1044 Northwest Blvd., Suite B
Coeurd'Alene,ID 83814

US Mail
__ Overnight Mail
Hand Delivered
__ Facsimile (208) 664-6258
--1._ ICourt Electronic Portal

Peter J. Smith IV
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Hand Delivered
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HENRY D. MADSEN
MADSEN LAW OFFICES, P.C.
1044 Northwest Blvd., Suite B
Coeur d’Alene, ID 83814
Off: (208) 664-8080
Facsimile: (208) 664-6258
ISB #4428
Attorney for Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs/Third Party Plaintiffs
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
JENNIFER PORCELLO,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV-16-7343
DEFENDANTS/COUNTERPLAINTIFFS’ CLOSING ARGUMENT

vs.
ANTHONY J. PORCELLO and the
Estate of ANNIE C. PORCELLO,
KALYN M. PORCELLO, Personal
Representative,
Defendants.
ANTHONY J. PORCELLO and the
Estate of ANNIE C. PORCELLO,
KALYN M. PORCELLO, Personal
Representative,
Counter-Plaintiffs,
vs.
JENNIFER PORCELLO,
Counter-Defendant.
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ANTHONY J. PORCELLO and the
Estate of ANNIE C. PORCELLO,
KALYN M. PORCELLO, Personal
Representative,
Third Party Plaintiffs,
vs.
MARK PORCELLO,
Third Party Defendant.
I. INTRODUCTION
This case is simple, although Plaintiff and Third Party Defendant have tried to make
it complex over eight days of trial: (1) Annie and Tony Porcello loaned Jennifer and Mark a
substantial amount of money, through Legacy Capital, so the two could purchase the
Hayden property: (2) Jennifer and Mark signed a Promissory Note agreeing to repay the
loan, and secured the loan with a Deed of Trust on the Hayden property; (3) the Promissory
Note or Deed of Trust does not state that the loan is forgiven or satisfied if Legacy Capital is
paid back, or if there is subsequent financing to satisfy Legacy Capital’s loan; and (4) Mark
and Jennifer did not repay the money pursuant to the Promissory Note. Jennifer was aware
of this transaction; she signed the Promissory Note agreeing to the terms of the loan; and she
has continuously benefitted, in her martial community and individually, from the loan and
occupation of the home.
Annie and Tony rightfully and lawfully executed foreclosure proceedings pursuant to
Deed of Trust to recover their money.
Now, Mark and Jennifer are making various excuses for not repaying the loan – all
without any corroborative or substantive evidence. None of these excuses, as discussed
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further below, absolve Mark’s and Jennifer’s lawful duties to repay Tony and Annie. The
Court should follow long-established legal principles and allow Annie’s and Tony’s
foreclosure proceedings to move forward.
A decision in favor of Mark and Jennifer, on the other hand, will dramatically depart
from well-established real estate lending principles. The borrowers (Mark and Jennifer) are
asserting that they don’t have to pay back the bank (Annie and Tony) for a home loan
because the bank’s representative (Joe Mijich) told them over the phone that when a
separate property (“Woodinville property”) used as collateral for the loan is sold, the
borrowers will not owe the bank any money and will own the home free and clear, even
though according to Mark and Jennifer the representation was not reduced to writing. If the
Court allows every borrower to use this excuse, then banks will not be able to execute
foreclosures on their Deed of Trust agreements just because a borrower can make a claim
that a bank representative told them they did not have to pay down the debt, without any
substantive written proof.
Further, Mark and Jennifer attempt to argue that the foregoing is equitable because
Annie and Tony would not suffer any harm because the Legacy Capital loan is paid off. This
argument is flawed on several levels: (1) Mark and Jennifer signed a loan with Tony and
Annie, not Legacy Capital; (2) the Promissory Note did not require Mark and Jennifer to pay
back Legacy Capital; they needed to pay back Annie and Tony; (3) the pay down of the
Legacy Capital loan was only made possible through a debt transfer to another financial
institution; and (4) Tony and Annie are still liable for the debt transfer loan and have
collateralized it with another of their property in California (“Via Venito”). If Tony and
Annie wanted to continue the terms of the loan with Legacy Capital, and just receive the
money from Mark and Jennifer, it was their prerogative. Telling a bank that they have no
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discretion in controlling the terms and payments of their own loan, even as the bank
collateralizes another property to secure the debt, should not be permitted.
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This case began on October 5, 2016, when Jennifer filed a Complaint asserting
causes of action for injunctive relief; declaratory relief; and relief as to a violation of the
Idaho Consumer Protection Act.1 On February 13, 2017, Defendants filed their Answer,
Counterclaim and Third Party Complaint wherein Defendants seek to foreclose upon the
Hayden, Idaho property. On March 5, 2018, the Court entered its Memorandum Decision
and Order Denying Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. On April 10, 2018, the
Court granted Defendants’ Motion for Reconsideration (in part) and Motion to Amend the
Pleadings. An eight (8) day bench trial in this matter was held on April 23, 2018 through
April 26, 2018, and May 21, 2018 through May 24, 2018.
III. UNDISPUTED PERTINENT FACTS
Defendants, Anthony Porcello (hereinafter “Anthony” or “Tony”) and the Annie
Porcello (hereinafter “Annie” or “Ann”), husband and wife (hereinafter the “Porcellos”) at
the beginning of this action lived together at their home at 1817 Jones Ave., NE, Renton,
Washington 98056 and are the parents of Mark Porcello (hereinafter “Mark”), Third-Party
Defendant, who was married to Jennifer Porcello (hereinafter “Jennifer” or “Jennifer
Porcello” or “Jennifer Maggard”) Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant in this matter.
In December 2011, Tony and Annie purchased the Woodinville residence by first
placing a $6,000.00 earnest-money deposit and then providing a $93,394.49 down payment
and procuring a loan through Wells Fargo Bank. They purchased the Woodinville home as

1

Jennifer dismissed her Idaho Consumer Protection Act claim before trial. Further, the injunctive relief claim
was resolved before trial via stipulation of the parties.
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an investment whereby the property would be cleaned and repaired then sold for profit.
Annie allowed Mark and Jennifer to rent the Woodinville property while it was being
prepared for sale. Further, Jennifer and Mark were paid for any work they did on the
Woodinville property, and were reimbursed expenses they incurred as a result of their
repairs.
Jennifer and Mark first married in 2003, divorced in 2007, remarried in 2013, and
filed for another divorce in 2013, Washington Case No. 13-3-07562-1 SEA (“Washington
divorce”) (later reconciled). Jennifer and Mark’s marriage has been fraught with Mark’s
drug abuse causing turmoil throughout their relationship ending in their final Divorce and
Judgment on December 5, 2017 (hereinafter the “Idaho Divorce”).
In the previous Washington divorce, Jennifer made a claim for the Woodinville
property. Annie and Tony interplead and claimed that they owned the Woodinville home
and Jennifer had no interest in the property. Further, Annie claimed in said action that
Jennifer should be evicted from the property as she had failed to pay rent and the utilities.
The Parties agreed to submit the Woodinville issues to arbitration and retired Judge Terrance
Carroll was appointed as arbitrator. Evidence about payment of improvements and down
payment as to the Woodinville property by Annie and Tony were submitted in the
arbitration. Judge Carroll, based upon the submissions of the parties, ruled that Jennifer had
no interest as to the Woodinville property and that she was to vacate the property.
Thereafter, Mark and Jennifer, having been ordered to vacate the Woodinville
property, decided to move to Idaho. They found a residence in Hayden, Idaho (hereinafter
the “Hayden property” or “Hayden Lake property”).
The Hayden property had short term closing time requirements. Mark paid earnest
money to secure the Hayden property. If Mark did not pay the outstanding amount the
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Hayden property would not close and Mark would lose the earnest money. Mark and
Jennifer attempted to finance the purchase of the property but due to their bad credit could
not do so. Because of the situation they put themselves in again as to their spending beyond
their means and desperate for money, and not having any other way to get it, Mark and
Jennifer turned again Annie and Tony for a loan to help them with the Hayden property. A
loan from Tony and Annie was the only way Mark and Jennifer could secure entire
outstanding amount for the Hayden transaction, and Mark would not lose the earnest money.
Mark orchestrated a scheme to buy the Hayden property in the required time through
his long-time financier Scott Rerucha of Legacy Group Capital, LLC (hereinafter “Legacy”
or “Scott Rerucha”). Mark and Scott set up short term financing for the Hayden property and
Mark planned to use Tony’s and Annie’s Woodinville property to accomplish this loan.
Mark’s plan required Annie and Tony to enter into a hard-money loan with a very high
interest rate to be paid back in a very short term. Failure to repay the loan or make timely
payments would result in extremely high penalties. It is undisputed that Jennifer directly
benefited from Mark’s scheme to use Tony and Annie’s property because she is was married
to Mark at the time and would be receiving all benefits associated with getting the Hayden
property.
Annie and Tony had always considered the financing as to the Hayden property to
Mark and Jennifer a loan that they expected to be paid back in short order. Annie and Tony
requested their attorney Joe Mijich (hereinafter “Joseph” or “Joe Mijich”) to assist in
drafting the required documents to protect their property interest and provide the appropriate
security for the loan. (TR. Joe Mijich dated September 29, 2018, pgs. 16, lns. 24-25; 17, lns.
1-25; 18, lns. 1-9; 19, lns. 17-23; 24, lns. 11-25, pge 25, lns 1-6). It is uncontested that the
Promissory Note and the Deed of Trust ensure that Mark and Jennifer would pay back all
DEFENDANTS/COUNTER-PLAINTIFFS’ CLOSING ARGUMENT

-6
Page 384

the monies Tony and Annie put out for the financing, and to protect them if Mark and
Jennifer once again defaulted. (Id, pg. 20, lns. 1-15)
The full amount of the Promissory Note would be unknown until the financing was
complete. Mark through Scott Rerucha instructed Joe Mijich to use the estimated costs of
financing the Hayden property in the amount of $648,500.00. See Transcript of Joe Mijich
page. (Id.) This $648,500.00 amount included the purchase amount of the Hayden property
and the amount of refinancing of the Woodinville property. It is further uncontested that the
Promissory Note and the incorporated Deed of Trust secures Tony’s and Annie’s loan and
all financing costs by attaching the Hayden property as collateral for the loan. Exhibits F
and G. The Note and Deed of Trust contains the clause, “by a promissory note of even date”
that merges the two documents together. Exhibit G page 1, para. 4. Further, the Promissory
Note contains a similar clause, “This Note is secured by a Deed of Trust of even date” which
by said reference, merges the two documents.
Mark’s and Jennifer’s schedule to close on the Hayden property transaction was very
tight, and they needed to immediately prepare documents with closing instructions.
(Testimony of Mark, Jennifer, Joe Mijich; and Kim Patrker) To accomplish this goal, Scott
Rerucha, upon Mark’s instructions and guidance, assisted Joe Mijich and his paralegal Kim
Parker in drafting and timely preparing the Note and Deed of Trust.
At the closing, Jennifer and Mark were presented with all documents for their review
but, upon her return and review of the Note and Deed of Trust, Jennifer refused to sign
because she had questions as to the amount of the Note and wished to speak to her attorney
before continuing further.
At trial Jennifer claimed that she apparently heard Mark talking to someone on the
speaker phone, who identified himself as “Joseph Mijich,” stating that “when the
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Woodinville property sells, the Hayden property will be theirs free and clear”. And without
consulting her own attorney, as she had previously represented, Jennifer went back to the
title company and signed the Note and Deed of Trust.
Joe Mijich, on the other hand, testified in his deposition that he never told Mark
and/or Jennifer that when the Woodinville property sold they would have the Hayden
property free and clear. (Id. at pgs. 70 lns. 7-25; 71, lns 1-25; 72, lns 1-25) Further, Joe’s
video-taped deposition testimony was that he never uses the name “Joseph” and always
refers to himself as “Joe”. (Id. P. 60, lns 10-19). Since Joe knows how he refers to himself
(“Joe” versus “Joseph”), Jennifer’s testimony about representations made over a speaker
phone – and not in person – should be scrutinized.
It is uncontested that the Promissory Note and the Deed of Trust do not state that the
loan is considered satisfied upon payment to Legacy through another financing scheme from
another financing institution. Notably, the Promissory Note and Deed of Trust states that the
loan is to be repaid directly to Annie and Tony and not to Legacy.
Mark and Jennifer benefitted from Tony’s and Annie’s loan. Neither Jennifer nor
Mark repaid the Note. A non-judicial foreclosure was initiated on June 14, 2016. A Notice
of Default was recorded and served upon Mark and Jennifer according to law, and the sale
of the Hayden property was set for October 18, 2016. Neither Jennifer nor Mark cured the
default within one hundred and fifteen (115) days after having been given notice of the sale
date.
IV. ARGUMENT
Despite Jennifer’s and Mark’s claims, this is a simple breach of contract case.
Jennifer and mark breached the terms of the Promissory Note. They incorporated the Deed
of Trust as part of that Promissory Note, acknowledging that Tony and Annie can foreclose
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on the home if Mark and Jennifer do not meet the terms of the Promissory Note. Jennifer
knew about and signed the Promissory Note, and benefitted from it in her individual
capacity and in her martial community.
As discussed further below, Mark’s and Jennifer’s excuses are not supported by any
corroborative or substantive evidence. Mark and Jennifer have made statements with the
sole motivation of benefitting their position, but do not have any actual evidence to support
their claims. If the Court reviews witness testimony, and compares it to corroborating
written and document evidence, it will reach the conclusion that Annie and Tony have the
right to foreclose on the Hayden property.
A. Breach of Contract Claim
Idaho courts look solely to the face of a written agreement to determine whether it is
patently ambiguous. Swanson v. Beco Const. Co., Inc., 145 Idaho 59, 175 P.3d 748 (2007).
If the terms are clear and unambiguous, the meaning and legal effect of the contract are
questions of law which must be determined from the plain meaning of the words used.
Independence Lead Mines v. Hecla Mining Co., 143 Idaho 22, 137 P.3d 409 (2006).
Here, the Note and Deed of Trust are, on their face, unambiguous and the Court can
determine, as a matter of law, that Jennifer and Mark agreed to the following unambiguous
terms: that they pay the Porcellos $648,500.00; that certain payments were due on certain
dates; that the interest rate was 12% per annum; that late payments (defined as being 15 days
past the payment date) would be 5% of the scheduled payment; that if payments were not
made that the Porcellos could accelerate the debt; that the Deed of Trust was security for the
loan; and that if the Porcellos had to retain counsel to collect on the debt that Jennifer and
Mark agreed to pay the Porcellos’ attorney’s fees and costs.
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B. Community Debt
Jennifer cannot absolve herself of her obligations under the Promissory Note and
Deed of Trust because this transaction is a community debt, which benefitted Jennifer
throughout her marriage to Mark (and thereafter). As the Court knows, Idaho and
Washington are community property states where most debts incurred by one spouse during
the marriage are owed by both spouses.
In Gardner v Gardner, the Idaho Court of Appeals stated,
A debt incurred during marriage is presumed to be a
community debt. Simplot v. Simplot, 96 Idaho 239, 526
P.2d 844 (1974). This is a rebuttable presumption. In the
case of a loan, the nature of the loan proceeds determines
the nature of the debt. Therefore, to rebut the presumption,
it must be proved "with reasonable certainty and
particularity that the proceeds of the loan were . . . separate
property." Winn v. Winn, 105 Idaho 811, 814, 673 P.2d
411, 414 (1983). If the proceeds of the loan were separate
property, the debt is also separate.
Gardner, 107 Idaho 660, 662, 691 P.2d 1275, 1277 (Ct. App. 1984). In Twin Falls Bank &
Trust v. Holly, 111 Idaho 349, 723 P.2d 893 (1986), the Idaho Supreme Court stated,
The marital community is not a legal entity such as a
business partnership or corporation (citations omitted) …
To the extent a lending institution enters into a creditordebtor relationship with either member of the marital
community or with both members, it does so on a purely
individual basis. Thus, the lending institution may have a
creditor-debtor relationship with either spouse separately or
with both jointly.
111 Idaho at 352, 723 P.2d at 896. The Holly court held spouses are liable to a creditor
individually or jointly, depending on which spouse or spouses have signed the promissory
note or loan contract. As to the issue of management powers over community assets, the
Holly court stated, “when either member of the community incurs a debt for the benefit of
the community, the property held by the marital community becomes liable for such a debt
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and the creditor may seek satisfaction of his unpaid debt from such property.” 111 Idaho at
352, 723 P.2d at 897 (citations omitted). Further, spouses in Idaho have co-management
powers as to community property and the ability to bind and encumber community personal
property (Idaho Code § 32-912).
Here, the loan was made to Jennifer and Mark during their marriage. Both Mark and
Jennifer signed the Promissory Note, acknowledging and incurring the debt. Therefore, the
loan is a community debt and Jennifer had the burden to show, under a reasonable certainty
and with particularity that the loan was separate debt. Jennifer has failed to meet this
obligation because the proceeds of the loan—the home—is community property and it is
undisputed that the home benefited the community, e.g., provided a home for Jennifer, Mark
and their children. In fact, Jennifer – not Mark – still occupies the home.
At trial, Jennifer testified that she had no idea what Mark was doing with the loans
because she relied upon him to handle all the finances. Regardless, Jennifer and Mark both
signed the Note. Therefore, the debt is community debt and the community is liable for the
debt. The fact that Jennifer was awarded the Hayden property in the recent Divorce
Judgment has no effect upon the Note and Deed of Trust. The Porcellos, pursuant to ---Holly,
may seek satisfaction of the unpaid debt from the property. This applies even if Mark
incurred the debt alone, or Jennifer incurred the debt alone, or both Mark and Jennifer
incurred the debt.
B. Modification of the Note
Jennifer has alleged that she entered into the subject agreement based upon
information that she overheard on a speaker phone from an individual who referred to
himself as “Joseph”. Joe Mijich testified, in his deposition, that he never spoke to Jennifer
and never told her what she claims he was to have said. In fact, he testified that he does not
DEFENDANTS/COUNTER-PLAINTIFFS’ CLOSING ARGUMENT

-11
Page 389

refer to himself as “Joseph,” which puts into questions Jennifer’s representations.
Jennifer claims that Promissory Note was fraudulently presented to her. As the Court
is aware, fraud must be pled with particularity. I.R.C.P. 9(b). Pursuant to the Complaint,
Jennifer did not plead a fraud or misrepresentation cause of action. Therefore, she cannot
now raise this issue (whether labeled as fraud or fraudulent inducement or any other label).
As the Idaho Supreme Court has said, "[w]hen issues are not raised by the pleadings, the
evidence raising the legal issue must be clear enough so that both parties know of the issue
and consent to the issue being tried." Ross v. Coleman Co., Inc., 114 Idaho 817, 827, 761
P.2d 1169, 1179 (1988). Trial of a claim or defense by consent is not established merely
because evidence relevant to that issue was introduced; rather, it must appear both parties
understood that the evidence was aimed at the unpled issue. Hughes v. Fisher, 142 Idaho
474, 483, 129 P.3d 1223, 1232 (2006). Here, Tony and Annie have objected, and continue to
object, Jennifer’s introduction of evidence about fraud or misrepresentation claim and
request that the Court not consider the issue as it was not specifically pled and is not so
understood by the Porcellos.
If the Court does determine that Jennifer pled a fraud claim, the record shows a deep
discrepancy between the evidence presented. Jennifer or Mark testified that a “Joesph
Mijich” over a speaker phone represented they would get the Hayden home. Plaintiff’s
Written Closing Argument—Opening Brief at p. 4. Whereas, the real Joe Mijich testified that
he never made that assertion. The Court, as the trier-of-fact, will have to determine such
conflicting witness testimony.
Mark and Jennifer have everything to gain from making their unfounded and
unsubstantiated representations. They will obtain a house free and clear, and will not be
obligated to pay back any money, even though there is no document or writing that
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memorializes their representations. Which begs the question – why did Mark and Jennifer
(who was so worried about the loan amount) not go back and memorialize their
understanding in writing if the conversation actually occurred? If taken to its logical extent,
Mark’s and Jennifer’s representations would allow any home borrower to not pay back a
bank or financial institution for a loan just by saying that they spoke to someone over the
speaker phone, who represented herself to be the loan officer, and said that the borrower
would own the home free and clear if they paid off a different loan.
Comparatively, Joe Mijich is a long-experienced attorney who testified that he never
made any such statements to Mark and Jennifer. Logically, an attorney would not tell nonclients that they would receive a home free and clear, while his clients would be liable and
responsible for the underlying loan, which would be detrimental only to the attorney’s
clients. Mr. Mijich, as an officer of the Court, has an obligation to testify truthfully. He has
everything to lose by testifying untruthfully – he may lose his bar license and face a possible
malpractice claim for making representations without this client’s authorization and contrary
to his client’s interest. Joe has nothing to gain by the comment attributed to him solely by
Mark and Jennifer.
Further, Mark and Jennifer provided contradictory testimony about the substance of
Mr. Mijich’s representations. Jennifer repeatedly testified that she did not trust Annie and
Tony after the arbitration where she was evicted from the Woodinville property. She said
that she would require a writing of any agreement between she and Annie and Tony
thereafter. Yet, she now conveniently claims that she believed Annie’s and Tony’s alleged
representation, through Mr. Mijich, and agreed to take on a $648,500 loan – and did not
require anything in writing. Jennifer and Mark had plenty of time before returning the next
day, September 4, 2015, to sign the Note and Deed of Trust to require the alleged
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“agreement” be put in writing but they chose not to.
C. Meeting of the Minds
Jennifer’s assertion that the July 1, 2014, handwritten note from Annie was a
contract is erroneous because that handwritten note is not an enforceable agreement.2
Idaho Code §9-505 provides as follows:
In the following cases the agreement is invalid, unless the
same or some note or memorandum thereof, be in writing
and subscribed by the party charged, or by his agent.
Evidence, therefore, of the agreement cannot be received
without the writing or secondary evidence of its contents:
1. An agreement that by its terms is not to be performed
within a year from the making thereof.
2. A special promise to answer for the debt, default or
miscarriage of another, except in the cases provided for in
section 9-506, Idaho Code.
3. An agreement made upon consideration of marriage,
other than a mutual promise to marry.
4. An agreement for the leasing, for a longer period than
one (1) year, or for the sale, of real property, or of an
interest therein, and such agreement, if made by an agent of
the party sought to be charged, is invalid, unless the
authority of the agent be in writing, subscribed by the party
sought to be charged.
5. A promise or commitment to lend money or to grant or
extend credit in an original principal amount of fifty
thousand dollars ($50,000) or more, made by a person or
entity engaged in the business of lending money or
extending credit.
It is essential to an enforceable contract that the agreement is sufficiently definite and
certain in its terms and requirements so that it can be determined what acts are to be
performed and when performance is complete. Spokane Structures, Inc. v. Equitable Inv.,
LLC, 148 Idaho 616, 226 P.3d 1263 (2010).
Formation of a valid contract requires a meeting of the minds as evidenced by a
2

The Handwritten note was admitted as a trial exhibit and should not to be confused with the Promissory Note
that was also admitted. The “notes” are two distinct exhibits.
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manifestation of mutual intent to contract; this manifestation takes the form of an offer
followed by an acceptance. Justad v. Ward, 147 Idaho 509, 211 P.3d 118 (2009). Formation
of a valid contract requires that there be a meeting of the minds on the essential terms of the
agreement as evidence by a manifestation of mutual intent to contract. Lawrence v.
Hutchinson, 146 Idaho 892, 204 P.3d 532 (Ct. App. 2009). A contract to convey land must
include certain provisions. The contract must include "the parties to the contract, the subject
matter of the contract, the price or consideration, and a description of the property." Bear
Island Water Ass'n, Inc. v. Brown, 125 Idaho 717, 722, 874 P.2d 528, 533 (1994) (citation
omitted).
The handwritten note from Annie was not a contract because it does not contain
specific information so as to create a contract. Specifically, the contract does not mention
consideration, only the Porcellos are listed in the agreement (no other parties), and there is
no showing of mutual intent to contract and therefore there was no meeting of the minds. In
fact, Tony – one of the signatories to the note – specifically testified that he and his late wife
Annie did not intend to give $150,000 to Jennifer, they would not have given her gift of the
same (or any) amount.
Further, the statute of frauds prevents Jennifer and Mark from introducing parole
evidence to attempt to manipulate the note into some form of a contract. The July 1, 2014,
handwritten note was just that - a note. The Promissory Note and Deed of Trust are valid, by
contrast, are enforceable contracts that unambiguously state that Jennifer and Mark agreed,
jointly and severally, to pay the Porcellos $648,500.00.
At the very most the Handwritten Note would be an agreement to do something in
the future, i.e agree to enter a further contract for credit toward the purchase of the Hayden
home when the Woodinville property sold, which is unenforceable. Further, the “To whom
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it concerns” on the Handwritten Note would be a generic reference to, possibly, the title
company selling the Woodinville property; however, according to Jennifer she took the
original signed document and did not submit it to the title company so that it could be
included in the closing documents. Additionally, the $157.157.00 was given to Mark and
Jennifer by Tony in order to complete the financing of the Hayden property via the Bellevue
property which became part of the continued line of financing at the agreement of the
Beneficiary of the Deed of Trust--Tony.
D. Equitable Reformation of the Note
Initially, the Complaint does not appear to state a claim for equitable relief. As such,
the Court should disregard this issue because Defendants did not agree to any amendment of
the pleadings to add equitable reformation nor was there any consent at the trial to try this
issue.
However, if the Court disagrees and determines the note is a contract, or if this Court
accepts Jennifer’s arguments in an attempt to modify the Note and Deed of Trust, our
Supreme Court has stated that “courts do not possess the roving power to rewrite contracts
in order to make them more equitable.” Losee v. Idaho Co., 148 Idaho 219, 223, 220 P.3d
575, 579 (2009). Therefore, the Court should decline the invitation to reform the contracts in
this matter.
E. Loan Analysis
Linda Lourey, CPA, the Porcellos’ expert witness (and the only expert witness to
testify at trial) provided insightful testimony as to the loans and properties at issue. Her
testimony was as follows. Linda Lourey provided testimony as to the HUD 1 settlement
statements and the checks from Annie and Tony to Mark to reimburse Mark and Jennifer for
all monies they put out toward the down payment of the Hayden property and other
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financing, e.g, the Evergreen Loan. Further, there was testimony that the Renton house had
to be paid off in the financing so Tony and Annie could get further financing through
Evergreen to pay off the Legacy Loan and which caused further financing on the Via Venito
Property in the amount of over $400,000.00. Linda Lourey’s testimony showed the flow of
the costs of all the financing including the loss of the Woodinville equity and provides the
Court with important evidence that Defendants provided and Jennifer and Mark did not.
In order to address the arguments by Jennifer and Mark Porcello that the Evergreen
loan and the Bellevue transaction were separate loans for which Mark were solely liable and
not part of the Hayden finance, the Court need only take a survey of the transactions leading
up to the final loss of all equity in the Woodinville property and the final encumbrance on
the Via Venito Property.
The exhibits entered into evidence outline the costs to Tony and Annie. Linda
Lourey testified that she had reviewed the Order of Arbitrator dated August 15, 2013, in the
matter relating to the house at 20124 186th PL NE, Woodinville, WA 98077; copies of
depositions including exhibits for Joe Mijich and Scott Rerucha and copies of Income Tax
Returns including Schedule E, Form 1040 for Anthony and Annie Porcello for the years
2007 to 2014; and other tax information.
The evidence was also that 77682 Via Venito, Indian Wells, CA 99210. (herein after
“Via Venito”) was set up per Anthony and Annie Porcello’s Income Tax Returns as a rental
on 2/13/07. 20124 186th PL NE, Woodinville, WA 98077. (herein after “Woodinville”) was
purchased by Anthony and Annie Porcello per closing statement dated 1/4/12. And was set
up per Anthony and Annie Porcello’s Income Tax Returns as a rental on 1/4/12. Further,
1663 East Northwood Drive, Hayden Lake, ID 83835, was purchased 9/4/14 with the cash
from the $648,500 Legacy Group Loan secured by the above two properties. It was
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purchased in the names of Mark Porcello and Jennifer Porcello. There was a Promissory
Note signed by Mark Porcello and Jennifer Porcello dated 9/3/14 in the amount of $648,500,
which was secured by a Deed of Trust, dated 9/3/14 and recorded by Kootenai County
Recorder 9/4/2014 on the property located at: 1663 East Northwood Drive, Hayden Lake, ID
83835.
The evidence also shows that all transactions including the Evergreen loan and the
Bellevue transaction were part and parcel of the Hayden financing including costs incurred,
and cash paid by Anthony and Annie Porcello to pay off Legacy Group Loan and to
purchase Hayden Property which totaled $851,784. There was also evidence put into the
record that showed the basis of the Woodinville Property of $609,240 supported by the
following that were admitted into evidence: HUD 1 settlement statements, invoice from JC,
Letter from Key Bank, copy of Ck#10421 to Mark and the Form 4797, Page 2 of the 2015
Income Tax Return filed by Anthony and Annie Porcello to report the sale of the
Woodinville property.
The evidence shows that the purchase of the Hayden Property was accomplished by
assets owned or provided by Anthony and Annie Porcello. No documentation has been
provided to show any payment or investment in the property by Jennifer Porcello. In fact,
the real property taxes are delinquent and Jennifer provided testimony to support these
findings.
Linda Lourey also found, in her forensic examination, that there are no documents
that show that Mark or Jennifer paid for the Woodinville property. Anthony and Annie
Porcello received rental income from Mark and Jennifer Porcello and reported the same on
their Income Tax Returns for the years 2012 through 2015 in the total amount of $48,700.
The Woodinville property sold 7/29/15 for $690,000.00 and was reported on Anthony and
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Annie Porcello’s income tax return on Form 4797, page 2. The proceeds of the sale were
used to pay a portion of the Legacy Group Loan in the amount of $483,957.00 and the
balance of cash $157,157.40, from the sale after closing and other costs of $49,785.60 was
deposited in a bank account in the name of Mark Porcello Inc. Exhibit L, Scott Rerucha
deposition shows the $157,157 was used by Mark Porcello to make an investment on 8/6/15
in Legacy Capital Investment. Therefore, none of the proceeds from the sale of Anthony and
Annie Porcello’s rental property went to them.
There was also evidence that showed that when the Via Venito property was
refinanced on 7/21/15 in the amount of $417,000, the proceeds were used to pay the balance
of the Legacy Group Loan in the amount of $198,020.17, closing costs of $31,468.51, and
Payoffs to First Savings Bank and Bank of America for a total of $71,017.07. The balance of
$116,494 was used by Mark Porcello to make payment toward the Bellevue property which
was to be sold for $1.6 million and according to Mark, as testified to by Tony and Kayln
Porcello, the subsequent sale of said property would pay them back all the costs associated
with the financing of the Hayden property. Therefore, none of the proceeds from the loan on
Anthony and Annie Porcello’s rental property at Via Venito went to them.
The original loan dated 9/15/14 with Legacy Group and Anthony and Annie Porcello
was paid in full by loans that they had to get on their two rental properties of Woodinville
and Via Venito in 2015. They incurred additional costs and cash outlays of a total of
$203,284 and used their equity on their rental properties to pay off the loan. For a total cost
and cash loss to them of $851,784.
At trial, the Court admitted into evidence Defendants’ Exhibits T; HH; OO, which
are summary charts. Exhibit T shows a recap of costs and cash used to help Mark and
Jennifer purchase the Hayden Property and costs incurred and cash paid by Anthony and
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Annie Porcello to pay off the Legacy Group Loan so that the Hayden Property could be
purchased. In view of the HUD 1 settlement statements and reimbursement checks, this
Court should conclude that the various costs and cash paid by Annie and Tony to help Mark
and Jennifer purchase the Hayden Property was in the amount of $851,784.00. On crossexamination, Linda Lourey testified that the Hayden Property closed on September 4, 2014.
Exhibit HH shows the basis of the Woodinville Property to be $609,240.00. As the
Woodinville property sold for $690,000, Annie and Tony had equity in the same in the
amount of $80,760.00 but none of the documents show that Anthony and Ann Porcello
received any of the proceeds. Defendants’.
To aid the Court’s understanding, the following summaries of the evidence to
include the exhibits that were admitted at the trial.
Recap of costs and cash used to help Mark and Jennifer Porcello purchase Hayden Property
Date
Source of Funds
Purpose
Document
09/15/14 Legacy Group Loan
Purchase of Hayden property
Closing Statement
09/15/14 Legacy Group Loan
Settlement charges on loan
Closing Statement
09/15/14 Legacy Group Loan
Pay off 1st to Wells Fargo on Woodinville
Closing Statement
09/15/14 T & A Porcello/Legacy Loan Reimburse Mark for downpayment on Hayden CK# 10081A
09/18/14 T & A Porcello/Legacy Loan Reimburse Mark for downpayment on Hayden CK# 10081B
09/18/14 T & A Porcello/Legacy Loan Reimburse Mark for downpayment on Hayden Cash
What the Legacy Group Loan was used for

Amount
Exhibit/Evidence
312,044
U
17,316
Joint D or Def. V.
270,463
Joint D or Def. V.
15,000
W
30,000
W
3,678 Linda Lourey Testimony
648,500
F&G

Costs incurred and cash paid by Anthony and Annie Porcello to pay off Legacy Group Loan and to purchase Hayden Property
09/15/14 Legacy Group Loan
Purchase of Hayden property
Closing Statement
09/15/14 Legacy Group Loan
Settlement charges on loan
Closing Statement
09/15/14 T & A Porcello/Legacy Loan Reimburse Mark for downpayment on Hayden CK# 10081A
09/18/14 T & A Porcello/Legacy Loan Reimburse Mark for downpayment on Hayden CK# 10081B
09/18/14 T & A Porcello/Legacy Loan Reimburse Mark for downpayment on Hayden Cash
05/12/15 Evergreen Mortgage
Closing costs on refi to pay down 1st
Closing Statement
05/12/15 Evergreen Mortgage
Reconveyance Fee on refi
Closing Statement
07/21/15 Evergreen Mortgage
Closing costs on Via Venito loan
Closing Statement
07/21/15 Evergreen Mortgage
Mark's Credit Card
Closing Statement
07/21/15 Evergreen Mortgage
Cash to Mark from loan on Via Venito
Legacy summary
07/21/15 Anthony & Ann Porcello
Interest paid on Woodinville Legacy Loan
Form 1098
07/29/15 Anthony & Ann Porcello
Closing costs on sale of Woodinville
Closing Statement
07/30/15 Anthony & Ann Porcello
Interest paid on Woodinville Evergreen Loan Form 1098
07/30/15 Anthony & Ann Porcello
Cash to Mark from sale of Woodinville
Deposit Slip
08/24/15 Anthony Porcell0
Paid to Legacy Group
Cashiers CK# 1031
Total costs incurred and cash paid by Anthony and Annie Porcello to purchase Hayden property
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U
17,316
Joint D or Def. V.
15,000
W
30,000
W
3,678 Linda Lourey Testimony
7,980
15
134
15
31,469
15
13,635
15
116,494
AA
40,116
BB
49,585
CC
4,795
DD
157,157
EE
52,382
FF
851,784
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Basis of Woodinville Property

Date
Source of Funds
Dec 2011 Ann Porcello
01/04/12 Ann Porcello
01/04/12 Academy Mortgage
01/04/12 Academy Mortgage
Wells Fargo became lender
6-4-12 Ann Porcello
1-15-13 Ann Porcello
4-18-13 Ann Porcello
05/12/15 Anthony & Ann Porcello
7/29/2015 Anthony & Ann Porcello
7/29/2015 Anthony & Ann Porcello
Total Basis of Woodinville Property

Amount
6,000
93,394
300,750
15,017
34,438
30,000
18,808
7,980
49,585
53,268

Purpose
Purchase of Woodinville
Purchase of Woodinville
Purchase of Woodinville
Closing costs on purchase
JC Enterprises remodeling
Reimburse Mark for improvements
Reimburse Mark for improvements
Closing costs on refi to pay down 1st
Closing costs on sale
Additional costs of improvements

609,240

First
Document
Closing Statement
Closing Statement
Closing Statement
Closing Statement

Exhibit/Evidence
II
II
II
II

Invoice from JC
Letter from Key Bank
CK# 10421 to Mark
Closing Statement
Closing Statement

Kayln testimony
Kayln testimony
LL
14
NN

Form 4797 Page 2

NN, p.4

Therefore, based upon the evidence produced at trial, the Court should find that the
Promissory Note signed by Mark and Jennifer, dated 9/3/14 in the amount of $648,500, plus
12% interest on the Note along with the Deed of Trust of same date with the language at
page I, paragraph 4 of Exhibit G (“and to secure payment of all such further sums as may
hereinafter…”), is still payable to Anthony and Annie Porcello.
The additional costs incurred by Anthony and Annie Porcello of $203,284 to pay off
the Legacy Group Loan should also be reimbursed to them. Therefore, the Court should find
that the total of costs incurred and cash paid by Anthony and Annie Porcello to purchase the
Hayden Property was $851,784.
Further, the Court should reimburse Annie and Tony the costs to collect said
Promissory Note as paragraph 4 of Exhibit F specifically states; “In case this Note is
collected by an attorney, either with or without suit, the undersigned hereby agree to pay a
reasonable attorney’s fee.”
F. Setoff of $150,000.00
In Erb v. Kohnke, 121 Idaho 328, 824 P.2d 903 (Ct. App. 1992), the Idaho Court of
Appeals stated,
In Idaho, "[o]ral gifts of land generally fall within the terms
of the statute of frauds and are invalid, but the conditions of
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a particular case can take it out of the operation of the
statute, especially when the donee has taken exclusive
possession under the gift and has made valuable and
permanent improvements to the realty." Suter v. Suter, 97
Idaho 461, 465, 546 P.2d 1169, 1173 (1976). The equities
in favor of the donee must be such that revoking the gift
would be unjust, inequitable, and a fraud on the donee. See
generally 73 AM.JUR.2D Statute of Frauds § 484 (1974).
Sarah has argued that, even assuming the conveyance was
not a completed gift, the estate is estopped from using the
statute of frauds to defeat her claim because she quit her
job, gave up her apartment, moved into the house, and
made improvements to the real property, all in reliance on
Willis's promise to give her the property. Citing In re Estate
of Courtright v. Robertson, supra, the district court held
that Sarah had the burden of proof to establish the oral gift
of the real property, and any facts supporting an exception
to the statute of frauds, by clear and convincing evidence.
The district court considered the estoppel issue, made
findings in regard to each of the material factual allegations
and concluded that while Sarah had paid the taxes and
insurance on the property, and had made some
improvements such as painting and carpeting, her
expenditures could be adequately compensated for in
damages. See Reinhardt v. Fleming, 18 Wash.2d 637, 140
P.2d 504 (1943). The court found that none of the
improvements were of a permanent nature. Suter v. Suter,
supra. In addition, it was not shown that the value of the
expenditures exceeded the benefit to Sarah of the use of the
real property during this time period. Green v. Brown, 37
Cal.2d 391, 232 P.2d 487 (1951). Therefore, the district
court could not say that revoking the gift would be unjust,
inequitable, or fraudulent to the donee. Davenport v. Board
of Education, 204 Okl. 356, 230 P.2d 271 (1951). The court
concluded that Sarah did not sustain her burden of proving
that the transfer of the Spruce Street property was outside
the operation of the statute of frauds. In summary, the court
held that the gift was not complete and the transaction by
which Sarah obtained title to the property did not satisfy the
statute of frauds. The court determined that Sarah held title
in trust for the estate.
The court's factual findings on this issue are supported by
substantial competent evidence, and we find no reason to
disturb them. I.R.C.P. 52(a) ... .
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Erb, 121 Idaho at 334, 824 P.2d at 909.
Jennifer’s setoff argument is essentially a gift argument and Defendants have
asserted an estoppel affirmative defense. Verified Amended Answer at p. 6, ¶ 4 (“Plaintiff’s
claims are barred, in whole or in part, by the doctrine of equitable estoppel, judicial estoppel,
and/or promissory estoppel.”) At trial, Defendants presented evidence to show that the
Porcellos never intended that the Hayden home be gifted to either Jennifer or Mark.
Additionally, because Jennifer is presumably attempting to argue that the property was to be
a gift, based upon the disputed and alleged Joe Mijich conversation, Jennifer had the burden
of proving her assertion by clear and convincing evidence and she failed to do so.
Also, Jennifer has asserted that there was a written agreement between the Porcellos
and Jennifer that supposedly involved the Porcellos gifting Jennifer $150,000 upon the sale
of the Woodinville home in consideration of Jennifer’s alleged renovation work on the
Woodinville home. Testimony from several witnesses, however, confirms that the note was
not any sort of reimbursement for work and supplies Jennifer and Mark provided for the
Woodinville home. See Verified Amended Answer at p. 4, ¶¶ 11-12. This testimony is
further corroborated by Jennifer because she conceded that the arbitration already
determined that she did not have any interest in the Woodinville home, after reviewing
Jennifer’s “renovation work.” As to this claim, Jennifer had the burden of proof that the
$150,000 was intended as repayment or as a gift.3

3

Freer v. Freer, No. 42057, 2015 WL 1022150, at *2 (Idaho Ct. App. Mar. 10, 2015) (unpublished) defines the
elements that are prerequisite to a determination that something constitutes a gift under Idaho law:
Under Idaho law, a “gift” is a voluntary transfer of property by one to
another without consideration or compensation therefor. To effectuate a
gift, a donor must deliver property to a donee, or to someone on his or
her behalf, with a manifested intent to make a gift of the property.
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Even if the Court determines that there was an agreement to gift/reimburse Jennifer
and/or Mark $150,000, this amount was provided to Jennifer and/or Mark because all funds
form the Woodinville sale in the amount of $157,157.00 were provided to Mark with
whom she was married at the time. It was clear from the testimony of Mark, Tony, and
Kalyn that these funds from the sale of the Woodinville property were further used as to
the Bellevue transaction to further help Jennifer and Mark with financing the underlying
purchase of the Hayden property.
The transfer of all proceeds from the sale of Woodinville either satisfied the July 1,
handwritten note or based upon Jennifer and Mark receiving all the funds from said sale,
even if it was determined that the proceeds did not go to the purchase of the Hayden
property, it should be held by this Court that there was nothing from the sale to satisfy the
handwritten note and Jennifer and Mark should not be given credit.
In Banner Life Ins. Co. v. Mark Wallace Dixson Irrevocable Tr., 147 Idaho 117, 206
P.3d 481 (2009), the Idaho Supreme Court stated,
In Idaho, the characterization of an asset as community or
separate property depends on the date and source of the
property's acquisition. Estate of Hull v. Williams, 126
Idaho 437, 440, 885 P.2d 1153, 1156 (Ct. App. 1994).
Property acquired during the marriage is presumptively
regarded as community property. Stewart v. Stewart, 143
Idaho 673, 677, 152 P.3d 544, 548 (2007). The party
seeking to overcome the presumption has the burden of
proving "with reasonable certainty and particularity" that
Delivery is accomplished when the grantor relinquishes all present and
future dominion over the property. Donative intent may be proven by
direct evidence, including statements of donative intent, or inferences
drawn from the surrounding circumstances, such as the relationship
between the donor and donee. The existence of donative intent is a
factual finding to be made by the trial court. Inter vivos gifts are not
presumed, even in familial relationships, and the burden is on the
beneficiary to establish every element of the gift, including donative
intent.
(emphasis added and internal citations omitted).
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an asset is his or her separate property. Williams, 126 Idaho
at 441, 885 P.2d at 1157 (quoting Houska v. Houska, 95
Idaho 568, 570, 512 P.2d 1317, 1319 (1973)); see also Guy
v. Guy, 98 Idaho 205, 206, 560 P.2d 876, 877 (1977).
147 Idaho at 124, 206 P.3d at 488.
Further, in Parker v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 148 Idaho 842, 846, 230 P.3d 734,
738 (2010) (citing to Suter v. Suter, 97 Idaho 461, 466, 546 P.2d 1169, 1174 (1976)), the
Idaho Supreme Court stated, “Idaho Code § 32-906 provides that property acquired after
marriage is community property, subject to exceptions not present in this case. This includes
a spouse's earnings.”
As such, the Court should determine that the Porcellos did not agree to gift or
reimburse Jennifer or Mark $150,000.00. However, if the Court concluded otherwise the
Court should hold that as all monies from the Woodinville property were distributed to Mark
during the marriage said July 1 note was satisfied
G. Non-Judicial Foreclosure and Bad Faith
This claim was not alleged in the Complaint. Also, it was not raised at trial.
Therefore, the Court should not address this issue.
VI. CONCLUSION
Defendants request that the Court, sitting as the trier-of-fact, find in their favor and
determine that Defendants loaned Jennifer and Mark $680,000.00 and that the Note is in
default. Further, the Court should find that the Promissory Note signed by Mark and Jennifer
is still payable to Anthony and Annie Porcello. The additional costs incurred by Anthony
and Annie Porcello of $203,284 to pay off the Legacy Group Loan should also be
reimbursed to them. Therefore, the Court should find that the total of costs incurred and cash
paid by Anthony and Annie Porcello to purchase the Hayden Property was $851,784.
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Defendants also request that the Court determine that because of Jennifer’s and
Mark’s default, Defendants are legal entitled to foreclose on the Hayden, Idaho, property.
Defendants also request that the Court determine that Jennifer’s and Mark’s asserted claims
are without merit and deny both Jennifer and Mark any relief.
SIGNED this 11th day of June, 2018.
MADSEN LAW OFFICES, P.C.

By:

/s/ Henry Madsen
HENRY D. MADSEN, Attorney
for ANTHONY J. PORCELLO and the
Estate of ANNIE C. PORCELLO,
KALYN PORCELLO, Trustee.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 11th day of June, 2018, I caused to be served a
true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the
following:
Terrance R. Harris
RAMSDEN, MARFICE, EALY
& HARRIS

√ Via iCourt

Peter J. Smith
SMITH + MALEK

√ Via iCourt

Judge Cynthia C.K. Meyer
1st District Court, State of Idaho
(Bench Copy to Judicial Staff Attorney)

√ Via E-Mail: jwatts@kcgov.us

/s/ Jan Madsen
_______________________________
Madsen Law Offices, PC
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Electronically Filed
6/18/2018 1:30 PM
First Judicial District, Kootenai County
Jim Brannon, Clerk of the Court
By: Tiffany Wade, Deputy Clerk

RAMSDEN, MARFICE, EALY & HARRIS, LLP
700 Northwest Blvd.
P.O. Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336
Telephone:
(208) 664-5818
Facsimile:
(208) 664-5884
thatTis@rmehlaw.com
Terrance R. Harris, ISB #5484

Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
JENNIFER PORCELLO,
Plaintiff,
vs.

CASE NO. CV-2016-7343

PLAINTIFF'S WRITTEN CLOSING
ARGUMEN T-RESPON SE AND
REPLY BRIEF

ANTHONY J. PORCELLO and the Estate
of ANNIE C. PORCELLO, KALYN M.
PORCELLO, Personal Representative,
Defendants.
ANTHONY J. PORCELLO and the Estate of
ANNIE C. PORCELLO, KALYN M.
PORCELLO, Personal Representative,
Counter Plaintiffs,
vs.
JENNIFER PORCELLO,
Counter-Defendant.
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ANTHONY J. PORCELLO and the Estate of
ANNIE C. PORCELLO, KALYN M.
PORCELLO, Personal Representative,
Third Party Plaintiffs,
vs.
MARK PORCELLO,
Third Party Defendant.

COMES NOW the Plaintiff, Jennifer Maggard, and hereby provides her response and
reply to the written closing argument filed by Tony and Annie.

I.

INTRODUCTION

Tony and Annie start out by telling the Court that this is a simple breach of contract
case and that Jennifer and Mark have not repaid any of the loan that Tony and Annie
provided to purchase the Hayden Lake home. Tony and Annie then proceed to make the
preposterous assertion that the total amount of that loan (including costs) is $851,784. This
is the total amount of money that Tony and Annie claim to have incurred in order to loan
Jennifer and Mark the $312,044 needed to close on the Hayden Lake home. 1
No doubt Tony and Annie understand that the optics of this position are untenable.
As a result, they double down on their position by concocting an even more outrageous
argument that additional monies they loaned to their son Mark to help him purchase the
Bellevue home in July 2015, were all somehow necessary and incident to the financing for
the Hayden Lake home that was completed in September 2014. See Defendants' Closing
1 The

total purchase price of the Hayden Lake home was $360,000.00. Defendants' Ex. U,
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Argument at p. 18 ("The evidence also shows that all transactions including the Evergreen
loan and the Bellevue transactions were part and parcel of the Hayden financing including
costs incurred, and cash paid by Anthony and Annie Porcello to pay off Legacy Group Loan
and to purchase Hayden Property which totaled $851,784.") (Emphasis Added).
Neither of these positions is supported by any rational legal argument and neither
should withstand judicial scrutiny.
II.
A.

ARGUMENT

Defendants' statement of undisputed facts contains several inaccuracies.

Tony and Annie purport to set fo1ih a number of "undisputed pertinent facts." These
alleged facts are simply incorrect in a number of instances.

The following are a few

examples of the more egregious mistakes and are not intended to be an exhaustive list:
•

Annie did not rent the Woodinville home to Jennifer and Mark and Annie did
not reimburse Jennifer and Mark for all of the work and expenses they
completed on the Woodinville prope1iy. Mark and Jennifer both testified at
length about the deal under which the Woodinville home was acquired and the
work that they did and paid for without any reimbursement.

•

Jennifer and Mark did not file for divorce in Washington in 2013. They were
unmarried at the time the arbitration occurred. The Washington case was a
petition dealing with child custody and suppmi issues that was referred to
arbitration. The eviction of Jennifer from the Woodinville home and her
related claim for equitable reimbursement were joined in that arbitration by
consent of the parties.

•

Jennifer testified that Mark and Annie joined together to defeat her equitable
reimbursement claim in the arbitration and that she felt it was an incomplete
and unfair process. Kalyn's testimony supported that the arbitration lacked
many basic due process protections such as the ability to examine and crossexamine witnesses under oath. Some of the exhibits relied upon at arbitration
were determined not to be admissible in this case. See e.g. Defendants'
Exhibits JJ & KK. Mark explained that he knew Annie was claiming amounts
that he had paid towards the Woodinville home as her own at the arbitration
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but described it as a joint venture and whether she paid or he paid it was "all
the same money."

B.

•

According to the testimony from Mark, Kalyn and Scott Rerucha, Tony and
Annie expected the financing for the Hayden Lake property to be paid back in
short order upon the sale of the Woodinville property.

•

Joe Mijich, with the assistance of his paralegal Kim Parker, drafted the Note
and Deed of Trust and they drafted the Note to match the LGC loan note.
There was no evidence that Scott Rerucha, acting "upon Mark's instructions
and guidance," assisted Joe Mijich with such preparation.

•

What Jennifer testified to at trial was that after 5:00 p.m. on September 3,
2014, she and Mark first called Tony to discuss the Note. Tony told them to
talk to Joe Mijich, so Mark then called Joe Mijich and she could hear the
conversation because it was on speakerphone.
Defendants' arguments for application of the parol evidence rule and the
statute of frauds have already been considered and rejected by the Court.

The Court in its Memorandum Decision and Order Denying Defendants' Motion/or
Summa,y Judgment analyzed the Defendants' arguments for application of the Paro!
Evidence Rule to the Note and Deed of Trust, and the Defendants' arguments for application
of the Statute of Frauds to the $150,000 handwritten note supporting the setoff requested by
Jennifer. Id. at pp. 10-16. There was no evidence introduced at the eight days of trial that
would disturb or alter that analysis.

Jennifer incorporates the Court's reasoned analysis

herein by this reference and requests that the Court reject those arguments once again.
C.

Tony and Annie were in the best position to protect themselves in their
dealings with Mark after September 4, 2014, and failed to do so.

Tony and Annie argue that Mark was the conductor driving the train and they were
merely rubes upon whom Mark took advantage. This is contradicted by the evidence in this
case. Nonetheless, even if it were true it does not support a legal claim against Jennifer for
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amounts loaned to Mark so that he purchase Bellevue property, which was his separate
property asset.
Tony and Annie claim that none of the proceeds from the sale of the Woodinville
property went to them. See Defendants' Closing Argument at p. 19. This clearly contradicts
the undisputed evidence in this case. Tony and Annie received a check disbursement made
payable to them in the amount of $157,157.40 from Chicago Title Company. Defendants'

Ex. EE. Tony and Kalyn both testified that Mark convinced Tony to loan him that money for
the purchase of the Bellevue home, and Tony reluctantly indorsed that check and delivered it
to Mark. The agreement was that Mark would repay that amount upon the sale of the
Bellevue home. The undisputed facts that Tony and Annie received those proceeds and used
them to loan additional money to Mark disproves their argument that they never received any
proceeds.
Tony and Annie also claim that none of the proceeds from the $417k loan on the Via
Venito property went to them. See Defendants' Closing Argument at p. 19. Again, another
fallacious argument. Tony and Annie necessarily authorized and consented to the loan since
the Via Venito property was titled in Annie's name. In the loan closing process--as Kalyn
acknowledged--Tony and Annie directed where all of the proceeds from that loan would be
paid. See Plaintiff's Ex. 15. The bottom line is they authorized the loan and alone controlled
how the loan proceeds were used. Tony and Kalyn both testified that the purpose of that loan
was to reloan the proceeds to Mark for the purchase of the Bellevue home, and that Mark
would repay the loan when the Bellevue home was sold. The undisputed facts that Tony and
Annie secured those loan proceeds and provided them to Mark disproves their argument that
they never received any proceeds.
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At the trial it was clear that Tony-notwithstanding his advanced age-was
competent and fully capable of sticking up for himself. Tony and Annie's ability to stand up
to Mark is exemplified by the 4 separate litigation cases (including this one) they presently
have pending with Mark. Likewise, Kalyn, who was helping Tony and Annie with financial
transactions from and after 2014, is clearly an intelligent and assertive advocate for her
grandparents.
Tony and Annie had every opportunity to tell Mark "no," or to adequately protect
themselves when they decided to loan Mark additional monies to purchase the Bellevue
home. The fact that Tony and Annie did not do that is not Jennifer's fault, and there is no
legal basis for assessing any liability against Jennifer for the loans they made to Mark after
September 4, 2014.
D.

Linda Lourey's report is not particularly helpful to answering the
relevant legal questions in this case.

Linda Laurey, as Defendants point out, was the only expert that testified in this case.
Frankly, that was one more expert than necessary. What Linda Laurey did was review the
various HUD 1 settlement statements and to tabulate the amounts set forth therein. She also
reviewed some checks, tax returns and supporting tax documents. She then summarized
those amounts into a table which was admitted as Defendants' Ex. T to suppott the notion
that Tony and Annie are somehow owed $851,784. The other tables prepared by Ms. Laurey
regarding the tax basis in the Woodinville property (Defendants' Ex. HH), and the tax losses
claimed on the Via Venita prope1ty and the Woodinville property (Defendants' Ex. 00) are
simply not relevant.

PLAINTIFF'S WRITTEN CLOSING ARGUMENT-- RESPONSE AND REPLY BRIEF- 6

Page 410

To the extent that Ms. Lourey is offering an opinion that the Note signed by Jennifer
and Mark in September 2014, includes all of the amounts set forth in Ex. T, then that opinion
is invading the province of the Court. It is for the Court to determine the following: 1)
whether the Note has been satisfied based on the representations that were made to induce
Jennifer to sign the Note; 2) if the Note is not deemed satisfied, then whether the Note is
enforceable; and 3) if the Note is enforceable, then the liquidated amount of the Note after
considering the actual amounts that were involved in the purchase of the Hayden Lake home
less the equitable reimbursements claimed by all of the parties and the $150k setoff.
Ms. Lourey's analysis may aid the Court to some degree in determining the actual
amounts that were involved in purchasing the Hayden Lake home. The problem with Ms.
Lourey's Ex. Tis that it contains all of the amounts that Tony and Annie loaned to Mark to
purchase the Bellevue home, as well as other amounts that were clearly not involved in the
purchase of the Hayden Lake home. For example, Ex. T includes the following:
•

It includes the 2 checks that Annie made payable to Mark Porcello, Inc. dated
September 18, 2014 ($30k) and September 15, 2014 ($15k). See Defendants'
Ex. W. The testimony of Mark and Kalyn was conflicting as to what these

checks were for. Mark claimed they were reimbursement for shared business
expenses and/or inventory transfers from MPI to TPI. When Annie had
reimbursed Mark for personal expenses in the past, she had made the check
payable to Mark personally. See Defendants' Ex. LL. Ms. Lourey (who has no
personal knowledge about what these checks were for) claimed they were to
reimburse Mark for the down payment he and Jennifer made on the Hayden
Lake home. Ms. Lourey also included an amount of $3,678 in cash that Annie
allegedly paid to Mark as additional reimbursement. This neatly balances the
combined amounts ($30k + $15k + $3,678) against the amount that Tony and
Annie received in cash from the LGC loan proceeds, but there is absolutely no
evidence to support this claimed $3,678 cash payment.
•

It includes closing costs, credit card payments the proceeds from the $4 l 7k

loan using the Via Venito home as collateral. This was a loan from Tony and
Annie to Mark for the purchase of the Bellevue home. The total amount
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included by Ms. Laurey for this loan on Ex. Twas $213,980. This includes
the $52,382 cashier's check from Tony to LGC to reimburse Mark for the
funds used to pay Tony and Annie's mortgage on the Renton property and
credit card bill. See Defendants' Ex. FF and Joint Ex. 0.
•

It includes $40,116 for interest paid on the LGC loan. The majority of these
interest payments were made directly to LGC by Mark and Jennifer. See
Plaintiff's Ex. 18. The balance of the payments were made at closings of the
Evergreen loans. None of this was paid by Tony and Annie.

•

It includes the $49,484 in closing costs paid at closing of the Woodinville
property. There is no legal basis for assessing this amount against Mark and
Jennifer.

•

It includes the $157,157.40 proceeds from the sale of the Woodinville home
that Tony and Annie loaned to Mark for the purchase of the Bellevue home.
This had nothing to do with the purchase of the Hayden Lake home.

•

It includes $4,795 in interest paid on the Woodinville Evergreen Loan. This
was paid out of the closing costs paid at closing of the Woodinville property
and is an attempt to double dip for an expense that should not be counted at
all.

If you deduct all of the foregoing amounts from Ms. Lourey's Ex. T, you are left with
the $312,044 that was actually loaned to Mark and Jennifer to purchase the Hayden Lake
home together with closing costs for the LGC loan and the $480k Evergreen loan used to
refinance the LGC loan. That is a closer approximation of the real amounts that Tony and
Annie loaned to Mark and Jennifer to purchase the Hayden Lake home, but it does not credit
Mark and Jennifer for any of the amounts they directly contributed to the Woodinville home
or the increase in the value of the Woodinville home due to their work and renovations.
Jennifer respectfully submits that the analysis and amounts she set forth in subsection C of
her Opening Brief is a more reasonable approach based on the evidence presented at trial.
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It is for the Court to determine if there is any amount still owing on the Note in

question. This is not a "forensic accounting" issue. Rather it is a legal issue based on what
is a proper legal obligation owing on the Note, if any.
E.

The Deed of Trust does not expand the obligation set forth in the Note it
secures.

Tony and Annie argue that the Note and Deed of Trust were merged together and the
boilerplate language in the standard form of Idaho deed of trust that provides in part that it
secures payment of the $648,500 promissory note of even date herewith "and to secure
payment of all such further sums as may hereafter be loaned or advanced" operates to save
the day.

Defendants' argue that this boilerplate language supp01is their claim for the

amounts incurred in additional loan expenses after September 4, 2104, and for the money
Tony and Annie loaned to Mark for the purchase of the Bellevue home.
This is a clear misunderstanding ofldaho law. Idaho law provides that a deed of trust
is the equivalent of a mortgage with a power of sale. What it secures is the underlying
obligation, which in this case is the Note.
Under the rule at common law, a deed of trust places legal title to the property
in the trustee. Brown v. B1J1an, 6 Idaho !, 51 P. 995 (1898); see also G.
OSBORNE, G. NELSON, & D. WHITMAN, Real Estate Finance Law 11-13
(1979). See generally, D. DOBBS, Handbook on the Law of Remedies, 38-40
(1973). Under Idaho law, a deed of trust is a mortgage with a power of sale;
the legal title is conveyed to the trustee solely for the purpose of security. The
deed of trust leaves in the grantor a legal estate which entitles the grantor to
possession of the property and all incidents of ownership; the exception to this
is the trustee's power to sell the property in the event of the grantor's default on
the underlying obligation. See Long v. Williams, 105 Idaho 585, 587, 671 P.2d
1048, 1050 (1983); I.C. § 45-1506.
Willis v. Realty Counfly, 121 Idaho 312, 824 P.2d 887, hn. 1 (Ct.App. 1991)(Emphasis
added).

PLAINTIFF'S WRITTEN CLOSING ARGUMENT-- RESPONSE AND REPLY BRIEF- 9

Page 413

The Deed of Trust expressly states that it is "for the purpose of securing payment of
the indebtedness evidenced by a promissory note, of even date herewith, executed by Grantor
in the sum of Six Hundred Forty-Eight Thousand Five Hundred Dollars and No Cents
($648,500.00)."

There is nothing in the Note that provides for future loans or future

advances to become part of the obligation. Defendants' attempt to broaden the obligation as
expressly set forth in the Note by applying this boilerplate language in the Deed of Trust has
no legal support and should be rejected by the Court.
DATED this

JtJ day ofJune, 2018.
RAMSDEN, MARFICE, EALY & HARRIS, LLP
e::::::::=

-=
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By: ..........,"- .; :::)
Ten·ance R. Harris, Of the Firm
Attomeys for Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on t h e ~ of June, 2018 I served a true and correct copy of
the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Henry D. Madsen
Madsen Law Offices, P.C.
1044 Northwest Blvd., Suite B
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814

US Mail
__ Ovemight Mail
Hand Delivered
__ Facsimile (208) 664-6258
_y;,___ !Court Electronic P01tal

Peter J. Smith IV
SMITH+ MALEK, PLLC
601 E. Front Avenue
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83 814

US Mail
__ Overnight Mail
Hand Delivered
Facsimile (208) 214-2416
X.., IComt Electronic Portal

Nicole Vigil
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Electronically Filed
6/18/2018 4:18 PM
First Judicial District, Kootenai County
Jim Brannon, Clerk of the Court
By: Tiffany Wade, Deputy Clerk

Peter J. Smith IV, ISBN 6997
Jillian H. Caires, ISBN 9130
SMITH + MALEK, PLLC
601 E. Front Ave., Ste. 304
Coeur d’Alene, ID 83814
Tel: 208-215-2411
Fax: 208-215-2416
Email: peter@smithmalek.com
jillian@smithmalek.com
Attorneys for Mark Porcello
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
JENNIFER PORCELLO,
CASE NO. CV-2016-7343
Plaintiff,
CLOSING ARGUMENT OF
THIRD PARTY DEFENDANT
MARK PORCELLO

vs.
ANTHONY J. PORCELLO and the Estate
ANNIE C. PORCELLO, KALYN M.
PORCELLO, Personal Representative,
Defendants.
ANTHONY J. PORCELLO and the Estate
ANNIE C. PORCELLO, KALYN M.
PORCELLO, Personal Representative,
Counter-Plaintiffs,
vs.
JENNIFER PORCELLO,
Counter-Defendant.
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ANTHONY J. PORCELLO and the Estate
ANNIE C. PORCELLO, KALYN M.
PORCELLO, Personal Representative,
Third Party Plaintiffs,
vs.
MARK PORCELLO,
Third Party Defendant.
THIRD PARTY DEFENDANT MARK PORCELLO (“Mark”) submits this Closing
Argument.
ARGUMENT
Mark and Annie were business partners in real estate investments. Testimony of Mark
Porcello. Because Mark was not credit worthy, Annie would get loans for the purchase of real
estate. Id. Mark would make the payments on the debt. Id. Mark and Annie would pay to
remodel the property. Id. The property would be sold. Id. Mark and Annie would split the profits
after accounting for their individual investments. Id. Mark’s father was a party to the
transactions, but he did not keep up to speed on the details because he was basically retired and
living in California for most of the year. Id. Annie worked with Mark on a daily basis and lived
in Renton, Washington. Testimony of Kalyn Porcello.
In 2011, Mark found a house in Woodinville, Washington to buy, remodel and flip.
Testimony of Mark Porcello. The house was purchased for $401,000 on January 4, 2012. Exhibit
II. Mark paid the earnest money of $6,000 for the house. Testimony of Mark Porcello. The
remaining down payment for the house was $93,394.43. Exhibit II. Mark transferred
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approximately $40,000 of the down payment to Annie. Testimony of Mark Porcello. Annie paid
the rest of the down payment of approximately $46,500 from her money. Testimony of Mark
Porcello. The down payment was paid by check from Annie Porcello. Testimony of Mark
Porcello. The remaining portion of the purchase price was paid with a loan from Wells Fargo
Bank, N.A. Exhibit II. At this point, Mark, Tony and Annie had put in approximately the same
amount of money to the Woodinville house: $46,000. Testimony of Mark Porcello.
This house was a real estate investment for Tony and Annie. Testimony of Linda Lourey.
As a real estate investment, Tony and Annie depreciated the house and deducted the expenses on
their personal tax returns. Id. Mark made all the payments to Wells Fargo. Testimony of Mark
Porcello. Because these payments were made for the benefit of Tony and Annie, they were
accounted for as rent on their tax returns. Testimony of Linda Lourey. This allowed Tony and
Annie to receive the tax benefits of the real estate investment. Id. This was the same as had been
done for other properties purchased by Annie and Tony in a joint venture with Mark. Testimony
of Mark Porcello.
In 2012 - 2014, Mark and Jennifer’s marriage was rocky. Testimony of Jennifer Porcello.
Mark and Jennifer split up. Id. Jennifer obtained a protective order against Mark. Id. Jennifer
claimed she owned an interest in the house. Id. Because Mark and Jennifer were split, Annie
wanted to evict Jennifer from the Woodinville house. Id. An arbitration took place. Id. At that
arbitration, Annie and Mark combined their investments into the Woodinville house to prove that
Jennifer had not put any of her own money into it and she did not have any equitable interest in
it. Id. In short, Mark and Annie were partners and the payment of one was considered the
payment of the other. Testimony of Mark Porcello. The arbitrator ruled against Jennifer.
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Testimony of Jennifer Porcello. Jennifer was evicted. Id.
Jennifer and Mark reconciled after the arbitration. Testimony of Mark Porcello and
Jennifer Porcello. But, they never moved back into the Woodinville house. Id. Rather, they
decided to move to Hayden in 2014. Id. The Woodinville house was completely remodeled and
put on the market. Id.
In the remodeling, Jennifer contributed “sweat equity”. Testimony of Mark Porcello and
Jennifer Porcello. Mark and Annie contributed money. Testimony of Mark Porcello. No one
could testify as to the exact amount of money that Mark and Annie each put into the house.
Testimony of Mark Porcello, Jennifer Porcello, Tony Porcello and Kalyn Porcello. But, the
investment of both Mark and Annie was approximately equal. Testimony of Mark Porcello. Mark
testified that he contributed a total of approximately $240,000 to the house. Id. This included the
down payment of $46,000, mortgage payments to Wells Fargo, and remodel costs. Id. This was
more than anticipated. Id. The house required way more work than Mark and Annie planned on
putting into it. Id. For example, it needed a new roof and driveway. Testimony of Mark Porcello
and Jennifer Porcello (also Kalyn Porcello testified about the roof).
In the summer of 2014, Mark and Jennifer found a house in Hayden. Testimony of Mark
Porcello and Jennifer Porcello. Mark made earnest money deposits on the house. Id. It had to
close quickly and there was no time to get conventional financing. Testimony of Kalyn Porcello.
If everything would have gone according to plan, the Woodinville house would have sold
sometime in early 2014. Testimony of Mark Porcello. The sale would have paid off the Wells
Fargo loan and the gain or loss of Mark and Annie would have been realized. Id. However, the
sale of the Woodinville house took longer than expected. Id.
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To purchase the Hayden house, Mark and Jennifer had to get approximately $312,000.
Testimony of Jennifer Porcello. Mark came up with a plan. Testimony of Mark Porcello. He
worked with Legacy Group Capital, LLC (“LGC”) to get a loan to:


Pay off Wells Fargo – approximately $270,000



Pull some of the equity out of the Woodinville house – approximately $378,500 1

This would allow Mark and Jennifer to purchase the Hayden house before the Woodinville
property sold. Testimony of Mark Porcello. The LGC loan was secured by Woodinville and a
property on Via Venito in Indian Wells, California. Id. The Via Venito property is a property that
Mark acquired after his first divorce. Id. Because of Mark’s experience in the divorce and
alleged substance issues, the property was put into Annie’s name as her separate property.
Testimony of Mark Porcello (as to the divorce) and Kalyn Porcello (as to substance issues).
Mark has asserted in litigation in California that the Via Venito property was always held by
Annie for his benefit. Id. While this litigation was going forward, Mark received a phone call
from an unknown person about this case and the Via Venito property. Testimony of Mark
Porcello. The person stated that if Mark fought the foreclosure of the Hayden house, the case in
California would go badly for him. Id. Essentially, Mark understood this to be an effort to tamper
with his testimony in Idaho so this foreclosure could move forward more easily. Id. Clearly
Mark has a lot to lose in California because the Via Venito house is worth about $2 million. Id.
The only debt against it is the $417,000 Evergreen Moneysource Mortgage Company
(“Evergreen”) loan that originated in 2015. Id.
Again, the plan that Mark came up with to buy the Hayden house was to secure the LGC
loan with the Woodinville house and the Via Venito property. Testimony of Mark Porcello.
1

Total of $648,500.
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Annie and Tony agreed and the Woodinville house and the Via Venito property were to be put
up as collateral. Id. Mark made all the interest payments and loan fees charged by LGC.
Testimony of Mark Porcello and Kalyn Porcello. It was understood that the Woodinville house
would sell quickly and LGC would be paid. Id. Mark and Annie would hopefully recover their
initial investments and make a profit and an accounting would be done to figure out who owed
who money. Testimony of Kalyn Porcello and Mark Porcello.
Jennifer was not aware of all these details related to the purchase of the Hayden house.
Testimony of Jennifer Porcello. When she showed up at the closing for the Hayden house on
September 3, 2014, she was shocked and dismayed to see the promissory note was in the amount
of $648,500. Id. She refused to sign the loan documents. Id. Jennifer believed the loan should
have been about $312,000 because this was the amount that was needed to complete the sale. Id.
At that point, she learned how the deal was structured by Mark, Annie, Tony and Joe
Mijich (Tony and Annie’s lawyer). Testimony of Jennifer Porcello. On the side of the road, Mark
and Jennifer called Tony. Id. Tony told Mark and Jennifer to call Joe Mijich because he was
handling the transaction. Id. Mark and Jennifer got ahold of Joe Mijich at approximate 5:24 PM
and talked to him on his cell phone for about 10 minutes. Testimony of Mark Porcello, Jennifer
Porcello; Exhibit 20 and 21. Joe Mijich explained that the note between Mark, Jennifer, Tony,
and Annie was identical to the loan from LGC. Testimony of Mark Porcello and Jennifer
Porcello; Kim Parker testified the terms matched as well. The LGC loan was $648,500. Exhibit
V. Joe Mijich explained that the LGC loan would be paid off when Woodinville sold. Testimony
of Mark Porcello and Jennifer Porcello. The equity in the Woodinville house was sufficient to
pay off Wells Fargo loan ($270,000) and pay off the $312,000 that Mark and Jennifer needed for
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the Hayden house. Testimony of Mark Porcello. Upon the sale of the Woodinville house, LGC
would be paid and Annie would get her investment back as well. Id. At that point, everyone
believed the Woodinville house would sell for somewhere above $900,000. Id. Annie would be
paid approximately $300,000 from the sale. Id. The Hayden house would be free and clear. Id.
This understanding was confirmed by Joe Mijich in the conference call on September 3, 2014.
Testimony of Mark Porcello and Jennifer Porcello.
The LGC loan had to be paid back by November of 2014. Testimony of Mark Porcello.
Everyone expected the Woodinville house to sell before then for more than enough money to pay
off the LGC loan. Id. Unfortunately, the Woodinville house did not sell. Id. Mark was growing
frustrated with the high interest payments he had to make to LGC every month. Testimony of
Kalyn Porcello. He needed to reduce the monthly payments, so he approached Evergreen for a
conventional loan. Id. With this loan, the LGC debt was paid down to about $200,000. Id. This
reduced Mark’s monthly payments because the Evergreen loan was a lower interest rate. Id.
Mark made all the payments to Evergreen and LGC. Testimony of Mark Porcello and Kalyn
Porcello.
The Woodinville house remained on the market until July of 2015 when it finally sold.
Testimony of Mark Porcello, Jennifer Porcello, Tony Porcello and Kalyn Porcello. However,
another wrinkle cropped up. Testimony of Mark Porcello and Kalyn Porcello. Mark had an
option to purchase real property from Daryl Bonner that was scheduled to close in July 2015.
Testimony of Mark Porcello and Kalyn Porcello. Mark needed approximately $500,000 to
complete the purchase. Testimony of Mark Porcello, Kalyn Porcello and Tony Porcello.
Again, Mark came up with a plan. Id. He got Tony and Annie a $417,000 loan from
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Evergreen secured by the Via Venito property that they owned in trust for him. Id. Mark fully
expected all the proceeds from this loan to come to him so he could close the Bellevue property
on time. Id. The problem was the loan required that other debts owed by Tony and Annie be paid
first. Id. The closing statement for this loan shows how the money was distributed:
● $31,468.51 for settlement charges
● $49,499.07 to pay off First Savings Bank for the debt owed on Mark’s parents’
house
● $7,883 to pay Bank of America credit card (debt owed by Mark’s parents)
● $13,635 to pay Bank of America credit card
● $314,514.42 to Mark’s parents, which was split as follows:
○ $198,020.17 to LGC
○ $116,494.25 to Mark
Exhibit 15. Mark only got $116,500 of the $417,000. Id. He was furious and desperate.
Testimony of Kalyn Porcello. He could not close the deal with Daryl Bonner without more
money. Id. Within 2 weeks, the Woodinville house sold. Id. Tony received a check for
$157,157.40 from the title company. Id. Mark told Tony over the phone that the check needed to
be turned over to him because the Evergreen loan paid off LGC instead of being used in the
Bonner deal. Testimony of Mark Porcello. Tony was reluctant to turn over the check. Testimony
of Kalyn Porcello. But he did. Id. Mark immediately took the money and deposited it with LGC
to fund the Bonner deal. Id.
The loss on the Woodinville house was now set. Mark and Annie invested approximately
$100,000 in the down payment on the Woodinville house. Testimony of Mark Porcello and Tony
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Porcello. Mark and Jennifer invested approximately $150,000 more into the house to remodel it.
Testimony of Mark Porcello and Annie Porcello; Exhibit 16. Annie did the same. Id. When the
Hayden house was purchased, Mark and Jennifer pulled out their share of the equity in the
Woodinville house, which was estimated to be at least $312,000. Id.
When the Woodinville house sold for $690,000, the gain was less than $400,000.
Testimony of Mark Porcello. After all the costs were taken into account, Mark and Annie lost
about $40,000. Id. At trial, Mark explained that he and Annie would have had to come up with
approximately $40,000 at closing if the Evergreen loan had not paid off LGC. Id. This is
confirmed by the payoff. In July of 2015, $193,398 was paid to LGC with the Evergreen loan.
Exhibit L. The proceeds from the sale were $157,157.40. Testimony of Mark Porcello and Tony
Porcello. The difference is approximately $36,000.
The $417,000 Evergreen loan covered the loss on the Woodinville house for Mark,
Annie, and Tony. It also refinanced the $312,000 borrowed for the Hayden house. Though that
loan is in Annie and Tony’s name, it is undisputed that Mark makes all the payments on that
loan. Testimony of Mark Porcello, Kalyn Porcello, and Tony Porcello. Tony and Annie are
whole. Tony’s actions confirm this understanding. This was the reason he signed over the
$157,157.40 check from the Woodinville sale to Mark. He knew that Mark refinanced the entire
debt and assumed the responsibility to make sure it was paid.
There are two other key facts that are undisputed. First, Jennifer, who was a party to the
original promissory note, had no idea any of this happened until she received the foreclosure
notice. Testimony of Jennifer Porcello. Tony never informed her that she was responsible for
anything Mark did after the sale of the Woodinville house. The reason is Tony didn’t believe he
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was owed anything from Jennifer. Second, if Tony believed he was owed more money, he could
have had a lien recorded against the Bellevue house. He didn’t. The reason he didn’t is he knew
then as he knows now that he was paid in full when the second Evergreen loan was taken out. 2
CONCLUSION
Tony and Annie were paid in full when the LGC loan was paid off with the second
Evergreen loan. The Third-Party Complaint is without merit and must be dismissed.
DATED this 18th day of June, 2018.
SMITH + MALEK, PLLC
/s/ Peter J. Smith IV_______________
PETER J. SMITH IV
Attorney for Mark Porcello

2

If Mark defaults on the $417,000 Evergreen loan, the Via Venito property is worth over $2 million. Testimony of
Mark Porcello. There is more than enough equity to satisfy the debt. Id. Since it is Mark’s position this property is
being held in trust for him, a default will be a loss for him and for him only. Id. Of course, whether this property is
held in trust for Mark is being litigated in California. Id. If the litigation goes against Mark, the beneficiaries of Tony
and Annie’s trust stand to gain over $1.5 million in equity. Id. These beneficiaries are Mark’s children, including
Kalyn. Id.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
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PORCELLO AND JENNIFER
PORCELLO
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C. PORCELLO, husband and wife,
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vs.
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I.

Introduction and Relief Requested

Mark and his on-again off-again wife Jennifer used Annie and Tony Porcello’s money
and property as their personal piggy bank. And now that their scheme has been exposed, they use
circular arguments designed to mislead the Court into believing Tony and Annie did this all to
themselves. Mark and Jennifer are the only two individuals who benefited, as a marital
community, from the scheme they devised to buy the Hayden Property, and further indebt Annie
and Tony. To this day, Tony and Annie have not been paid back anything from any of the loans,
debt transfers, or loan extensions that Mark and Jennifer have orchestrated on their behalf.
Jennifer is now looking to have this Court award her the Hayden Property even as she
admits she has not paid Tony and Annie anything on the loan that made purchase of the Hayden
Property possible. Mark, at the same time, is misleading the Court into believing that Tony and
Annie somehow benefitted from being indebted further on their other properties. And, Mark was
the victim for taking all of their money by threatening, bullying, and abusing them.
All parties agree that the Promissory Note and the Deed of Trust at issue is enforceable.
Here, Mark and Jennifer borrowed money from Tony and Annie, used the money to purchase the
Haydon Property for their benefit and pledged that Hayden Property to Tony and Annie as a
security for the repayment of the loan. Mark and Jennifer did not pay back the Promissory Note.
Instead, Mark and Jennifer forced Tony and Annie to transfer the debt on the money Mark and
Jennifer borrowed, and they are still refusing to pay back Tony and Annie. On top of it, Mark
and Jennifer expect the Court to give them a house for free, and force Tony and Annie to still be
liable for incredible debt, fees, and costs of loans. The Idaho Supreme Court recently rejected
this type of scheme, and this court should follow suit. See Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. v.
Sheets, 160 Idaho 268, 31 P.3d 322 (2016).
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To avoid being so unjustly enriched, Mark and Jennifer made several excuses to avoid
paying the loan: Joe Mijich made representations to them over the phone induced them to sign
the Promissory Note; Tony and Annie have been repaid the amount of the loan; or that the loan
should be reduced by an indeterminate amount because of an ambiguous hand-written note.
None of these excuses are supported by evidence, exhibits, or common sense. Instead, these
excuses are asserted by the two people (Mark and Jennifer) who stand to benefit from their
unsupported declarations. Applying the law to the evidence, however, as further discussed below
supports Tony’s and Annie’s position.
II.

Argument

A. Idaho Supreme Court Supports Tony’s and Annie’s Enforcement of the Promissory
Note and Deed of Trust.
As the Court is aware, a Promissory Note secured by a Deed of Trust, such as the one in
this case, is generally enforceable. See I.C. 6-101(2) (“The provisions of this section must be
construed in order to permit a secured creditor to realize upon collateral for a debt or other
obligation agreed upon by the debtor and creditor.”) The Idaho Supreme Court recently decided
a case similar to this one in the Bank’s favor. See Countrywide, supra. In that case, The Borrower
initially borrowed money in 2004 from the Bank to buy a home, which he secured with a Deed
of Trust. In 2008, he received a letter from Bank stating that he may qualify for a lower interest
rate on refinancing the initial loan. In 2009, Borrower applied for a new loan on one set of terms,
but the Borrower claimed that he was promised better terms in a subsequent telephone call with
the Bank’s loan officer. At closing, Borrower refused to execute the new loan documents
because they were “bad” and incomplete.
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For unknown reasons, there was a mistaken reconveyance of Deed of Trust back to the
Borrower. The Borrower claimed that the Bank had an ulterior motive, but could not explain it.
The Borrower claimed that he tried to make loan payments, but the Bank sent Borrower notice of
its intent to accelerate the Borrower’s obligation and foreclose the Deed of Trust if Borrower did
not bring his account current and pay late fees. The Bank filed a complaint to reinstate the Deed
of Trust, and sent Borrower notice of intent to commence foreclosure proceedings. The Borrower
contested the Bank’s position and filed counterclaims similar to the ones filed by Jennifer in this
case. The district court granted the Bank’s summary judgment motion to reinstate the Deed of
Trust, and concluded that Borrower was not entitled to a reconveyance until he fully paid the
underling note upon which the trust deed was secured. The court also dismissed the Borrower’s
counterclaims. The Supreme Court affirmed.
The Supreme Court reasoned that to allow the Borrower to obtain reconveyance of the
deed (get the property) would cause unjust enrichment. The Court noted, “[t]he substance of an
action for unjust enrichment lies in a promise, implied by law, that a party will render to the
person entitled thereto that which in equity and good conscience belongs to the latter.”
Countrywide, 160 Idaho at 272 (quoting Smith v. Smith, 95 Idaho 477, 484, 511 P.2d 294, 301
(1973)). The Court recognized that the elements of unjust enrichment -- (1) a benefit is conferred
on the Borrower by the Bank; (2) the Borrower appreciates the benefit; and (3) it would be
inequitable for the Borrower to accept the benefit without payment of the value of the benefit –
applied in this case. Id. (citing Teton Peaks Inv. Co., LLC v. Ohme, 146 Idaho 394, 398, 195 P.3d
1207, 1211 (2008)). The Court ruled, “Here, [Borrower] borrowed money from Bank [], used the
money to purchase property for his own benefit and pledged that property to Bank []as security
for repayment of the loan. It would be inequitable for [Borrower] retain that property without
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requiring that he fulfill his promise to repay the loan. Therefore, the district court correctly
determined that [Borrower] would be unjustly enriched if the reconveyance was not rescinded.”
Id. at 272-273.
The Court noted its decision is consistent with the equitable decisions of other courts.
See, e.g., Holiday Hospitality Franchising, Inc. v. States Res., Inc., 232 S.W.3d 41, 52–54
(Tenn.Ct.App.2006) (reinstating a mistakenly released deed of trust on summary judgment under
the “equitable lien” theory); Cameron State Bank v. Sloan, 559 S.W.2d 564, 568
(Mo.Ct.App.1977) (deciding that “negligence on the part of the bank” in mistakenly releasing a
deed of trust did “not permit appellants to gain an unconscionable advantage”). Id. at fn. 4.
In the present case, The Promissory note states that the entire balance of $648,500.00 was
payable by November 29, 2014. Exhibit F. And, the Note was secured by a Deed of Trust
securing the Hayden Property. Exhibit F. The Deed of Trust also states that Mark and Jennifer
must make the final payment on November 29, 2014, and “to secure payment of all such further
sums as may hereafter be loaned or advanced by the Beneficiary [Tony and Annie] here to the
Grantor [Mark and Jennifer] herein, or any of either of them, while record owner of present
interest, for any purpose, and of any notes, drafts or other Instruments representing such further
loans, advances or expenditure other with interest on all such sums at the rate therein provided.”
Exhibit G. And, “the making of such further loans, advances or expenditures shall be optional
with the Beneficiary, and provided, further, that is the express intention of the parties to this
Deed of Trust that it shall stand as continuing security until paid for all such advances together
with interest thereon.” Exhibit G. “Upon default by Grantor in payment of any indebtedness
secured hereby or in performance of any agreement hereunder, all sums secured hereby shall
immediately become due and payable at the option of the Beneficiary.” Exhibit G.
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Mark and Jennifer cannot deny that they failed to meet the terms of the Promissory Note
or the Deed of Trust. Similarly, they cannot deny this was an enforceable contract. See
Wandering Trails, LLC v. Big Bite Excavation, Inc., 156 Idaho 586, 592, 329 P.3d 368, 374
(2014). They did not pay Tony and Annie back the money owed by the due date -- November 29,
2014. Mark’s and Jennifer’s failure to repay the funds, according to the Promissory, results in
foreclosure proceedings on the Hayden Property
Mark and Jennifer’s excuse is that the loan was “paid off” to Tony and Annie personally
when Tony and Annie refinanced their Woodinville home; refinanced their Via Venito home;
and sold their Woodinville home. Even more, the Court has to believe that Mark and Jennifer
paid off Tony and Annie because Tony and Annie gave $157,157.40 from the Woodinville sale
to Mark and Jennifer. This rationale simply defies logic – a Bank does not get repaid on a loan to
a borrower by the Bank refinancing its own properties and paying itself back.
Further, the Promissory Note was between Tony/Annie and Mark/Jennifer, and the
Legacy Capitol Group was not a party to this agreement. The Promissory Note and the Deed of
Trust did not outline that the note will be satisfied when the Legacy Group is paid off. Or, when
Tony/Annie refinance their other properties to pay off the Legacy Group loan. To believe Mark’s
and Jennifer’s excuse, the Court would have to suspend logic and believe that a Bank pays down
its own loan to a borrower by refinancing and leveraging its other properties – and the Bank
allows the borrower walks away with a house for nothing.
Finally, paying down the Legacy Group loan was Tony’s and Annie’s decision to make –
and Mark and Jennifer had no privity of contract with Legacy Capital Group. Tony and Annie
took out the money, leveraging the property they owned, and loaned it to Mark and Jennifer. It
should have been Tony’s and Annie’s decision on what they wanted to with the money once it
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was returned to them. They could have decided to keep the money, stay with the Legacy Group
loan, and pay for their expenses in elder care for Tony or palliative care for Annie. They were
denied these types of decisions because Mark/Jennifer used Tony’s and Annie’s money and
property as their own personal piggy bank.
B. Mark and Jennifer’s Excuses to Avoid Being Unjustly Enriched are Unfounded.
The Idaho Supreme Court supports Tony’s and Annie’s position that they have the right
to foreclose on the trust deed, and a contrary ruling will unjustly enrich Jennifer and Mark. Yet,
Jennifer’s and Mark’s excuses are not supported by evidence and have been rejected by the
Idaho Supreme Court.
1. The Evidence Disproves Mark’s and Jennifer’s Claim that They Would Not
Have Executed the Promissory Note But For Joe Mijich’s Representations.
Mark’s and Jennifer’s first excuse is that they were somehow fooled into signing the loan
by a purported conversation with Joe Mijich that caused them to believe the loan would be paid
off when Tony’s and Annie’s Woodinville home was sold. Jennifer claims that “after 5:00 p.m.
on September 3, 2014, she and Mark first called Tony to discuss the Note. Tony told them to talk
to Joe Mijich, so Mark then called Joe Mijich and she could hear the conversation because it was
on speakerphone.” Jennifer’s Written Closing Argument, pg. 4. This assertion is completely
disproven by the evidence in this case.
Tony has had the following phone numbers for over ten years: (425) 269-7117 (cellular
phone); (760)-345-1416 (California residence); (425) 226-6655 (Renton, WA residence). Mark
submitted phone records to prove the phone call he made on September 3, 2014. Exhibit P-H. A
review of these phone records shows that no phone calls were made to Tony on September
3, 2014, as Jennifer now claims.
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Mark and Jennifer also claim that they signed the Promissory Note based upon Joe’s
representation, and somehow, they would not have signed the agreement without this
representation. Testimony of Jennifer Porcello and Mark Porcello. These assertions are untrue
for several reasons.
Mark had signed the Promissory Note and Deed of Trust before he had the phone
conversation with Joe Mijich. Mark and Jennifer testified that, on September 3, 2014, they spoke
with Joe after hours, when the title company had closed. Testimony of Jennifer Porcello and
Mark Porcello. The notary certification on the Deed of Trust shows that Mark Porcello signed
the Deed of Trust and Promissory Note on September 3, 2015 before the title company had
closed. The documentary evidence shows that Mark signed the agreement before he spoke to
Joe. Regardless of whether Joe made any representations to Mark in that phone conversation,
Mark had already agreed to the terms of the Promissory Note – thereby encumbering the marital
community.
Joe emphatically denies that he made any such representations, as alleged by Mark and
Jennifer, during the 3-minute conversation. As a seasoned attorney, he explained that it would
be foolish to tell Mark and Jennifer that, upon the sale of the Woodinville property, the Hayden
property would be paid off and that they would receive the Hayden property free and clear:
It would be foolish for me. First of all, the Woodinville property was security for
a debt that was owed by Tony and Ann. Why would -- would the -- the debt that
was owed by Mark and Jennifer on their note, how would they expect their debt to
be paid with property that belonged to the creditor, which was Tony and Ann? I
mean it just didn't make sense that -- that I would ever say that you could -- that
they could go ahead and pay off their debt with property that belonged to the -their creditor, Tony and Ann.
Mijich Deposition, pgs. 79-80.
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Mark’s and Jennifer’s motivation to take a loan to buy the Hayden Property was a
completely independent decision from the sale of the Woodinville Property. Mark testified, and
Kalyn confirmed because she made the actual payments, that Mark had already made an earnest
money payment on the Hayden Property, and he would lose that money if he did not secure
financing for the remaining amount of the purchase. Mark and Jennifer were driven to close the
purchase of the property as soon as possible because they would lose the earnest money and they
could not get a loan on their own because they had extremely bad credit. They were willing to
take the terms of the loan outlined in the Promissory Note and secure the Note with a Deed of
Trust. None of these considerations had anything to do with the sale of the Woodinville property.
Mark’s and Jennifer’s claim that they would not have signed the agreement but for Joe’s
representation is simply not true because they had another more compelling reason – to not lose
the earnest money. Jennifer relied upon Mark, in their marital capacity, to secure the financing to
purchase the property.
Jennifer also misstates the testimony when she claims that according to Scott Rerucha,
“Tony and Annie expected the financing for Hayden Lake property to be paid back in short order
upon the sale of the Woodinville property.” Jennifer’s Written Closing Argument, pg. 4. Scott
Rerucha, in his deposition testimony, however did not testify that Tony and Annie expected to
be paid back upon sale of the Woodinville property:
[Mr. Harris]: When did you have that conversation?
[Rerucha]: When I sat at their home with them before we did the loan at Legacy
Group Capital, the original loan that would have been on the Woodinville
property and the Via Venito property, for the 648,000.
Q: Tell me everything you can remember about that conversation.
A: The conversation was that they were -[MR. MADSEN]: Objection. Time and place. Foundation.
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[Rerucha] : The -- the conversation was, is that they -- they -- at one point they
sat down and they told me that they wanted to help Mark finish up these matters
and -- and borrow -- and help him borrow the money to do this, but they didn't
want to be -- they were concerned about the level of risk that they were taking by
putting out this kind of money. They wanted to be sure that they were going to get
paid back from these transactions. Our conversation was based around that. In that
conversation, you know, both Annie and Tony -- especially Tony, stated to me
that -- you know, that he -- he was willing to help Mark because of the situation
they were in, but he wasn't willing to, you know, lose any or risk any money in -in -- you know, in the situation. He wanted to be sure that whatever they did, there
was a clear path to getting the money back.
Q: What did you discuss with Annie and Anthony about Legacy Group
Capital funding a loan to them for $648,500?
A: They wanted to know what the amount was going to be on the loan and over
what period of time it would need to be paid back. And also because they were
signing on the loan, they understood that, you know, they had an obligation, and
they were concerned that, you know, Mark wouldn't make the payments on that
loan, and what happened if he didn't, and, you know, how would they insure that,
you know, they get paid back, especially when he bought the Idaho house, the
Idaho property. And, you know, they had asked me about, Can we record
something so that that property can't be sold, or nothing could be done with it
without us getting paid back. And the conversation was around those kinds of 1
things, in which I told them they are going to need to talk to their attorney about
filing notes, or, you know, cross-collateralizing properties, that's one way they
could do it, but I'm not an attorney, so they need to -- that's -- they need do that to
protect themselves.
Rerucha Dep., pgs. 97-101. Mr. Rerucha’s sworn testimony directly contradicts Mark’s and
Jennifer’s claim that Tony and Annie somehow understood that they would get their money back
from the sale of the Woodinville Property. The conversation did not discuss the Woodinville
Property, instead it focused on ensuring that Tony and Annie would be paid back their loan by
securing it with a Deed of Trust.
Further, testimony from Mark, Kalyn, Scott, and other witnesses revealed that Scott and
Mark were friends for approximately 25 years. Mark and Scott had worked together on
numerous deals where Scott would serve as a “hard money” lender, and Mark was required to
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pay all costs, interest, and penalties until the loan was paid off. Scott testified that he discussed
and worked with Mark on the Hayden Property loan. There is no dispute that Scott
communicated to Joe the terms of the loan to purchase the Hayden Property. Joe testified that he
obtained the information from the Legacy Capitol Group about the amount of the loan for the
Promissory Note, and its primary reason was to ensure that Tony and Annie would be paid back
that amount. Mark’s and Jennifer’s claim that they were surprised or unaware of the amount of
the loan is disingenuous because it was their own close friend (Scott), working closely with Mark
to come up with this loan amount for the Hayden Property, who instructing to Joe on the loan
amount.
The Court would have to ignore general rules of contract construction and common sense
to believe Mark’s and Jennifer’s assertion that a provision forgiving the entire loan should
somehow be added to the four corners of the Promissory Note and Deed of Trust because an oral
representation, specifically disputed, as supposedly made by Tony’s and Annie’s attorney. If this
was true, a provision forgiving the entirety of the Promissory Note is so significant that it would
certainly have been included in the note and trust deed, especially be an experienced attorney
like Joe Mijich. Yet, this provision is not reflected anywhere in the Promissory Note, Deed of
Trust, or in any other written instrument. In fact, except for Mark and Jennifer (who stand to
benefit from receiving a house for free), the other witnesses who were actually involved in
negotiating and drafting the agreement (Tony, Annie [through Kalyn], and Joe and Kim Parker)
have no memory of this term. This is because it simply did not happen.
Even if the Court is inclined to believe that Joe made such a representation over the
phone, Tony testified that he did not and would not have instructed Joe to make this
representation. Similar to the mistaken misrepresentation made in Countrywide, where the
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Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s decision that the Bank’s representations were not
willful, intentional, inequitable, unfair and dishonest, or fraudulent and deceitful, this Court
should conclude that Joe’s representation, even if made, were not fraudulent and deceitful
conduct.
Finally, if Jennifer is going to now claim she entered the agreement based upon a
fraudulent inducement from Joe over the telephone, this assertion cannot be true. Jennifer has not
pled fraud with particularity as is required by Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). And, Jennifer
fails to establish the elements of fraud. See Glaze v. Deffenbaugh, 144 Idaho 829, 833, 172 P.3d
1104, 1108 (2007) (quoting Mannos v. Moss, 143 Idaho 927, 931, 155 P.3d 1166, 1170 (2007)
(A party must establish nine elements to prove fraud: “1) a statement or a representation of fact;
2) its falsity; 3) its materiality; 4) the speaker's knowledge of its falsity; 5) the speaker's intent
that there be reliance; 6) the hearer's ignorance of the falsity of the statement; 7) reliance by the
hearer; 8) justifiable reliance; and 9) resultant injury.).
The Idaho Supreme Court rejected similar excuses. In Countrywide, the Borrower argued
that the Bank had unclean hands because the Bank created documents that were false. The
Supreme Court reviewed the Borrower’s excuse in light of the proposition that the Bank may be
denied relief by a court of equity on the ground that its conduct has been inequitable, unfair and
dishonest, or fraudulent and deceitful as to the controversy in issue. Countrywide, 160 Idaho at
273 (citing); Ada Cnty. Highway Dist. v. Total Success Investments, LLC, 145 Idaho 360, 370,
179 P.3d 323, 333 (2008). The Bank’s conduct must be intentional or willful, rather than merely
negligent. Id., (citing Grazer v. Jones, 154 Idaho 58, 68, 294 P.3d 184, 194 (2013)). The district
court has discretion to evaluate the relative conduct of both parties and to determine whether the
conduct of the party seeking an equitable remedy should, in the light of all the circumstances,
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preclude such relief. Ada Cnty. Highway Dist., 145 Idaho at 371, 179 P.3d at 334. The district
court reasoned that, although the documents demonstrated the Bank’s “corporate failings” and
lack of oversight, they did not evidence “inequitable, unfair and dishonest, or fraudulent and
deceitful conduct.” Countrywide, 160 Idaho at 274. And, the Supreme Court agreed. Under Idaho
law, regardless of what Joe did or did not say, Jennifer and Mark should not be allowed to get a
home without paying Tony and Annie back on the loan they gave her.
2. Jennifer Failed to Prove Her Claims that Tony and Annie Received the Funds
from the Legacy Capital Loan.
According to the trial testimony and the claim in her complaint, Jennifer’s other excuse is
that she does not owe Tony and Annie money because they received total cash proceeds of
$48,577.62, $314,514.42, and $157.157.40 from other financing and sale transactions, which she
claims should be credited towards $648,500 Legacy Group loan. Complaint, para 32. Jennifer
conceded that if this claim in her complaint is untrue, then the basis for her claim for declaratory
relief would not be valid because she would owe money on the loan. Testimony of Jennifer
Porcello.
The HUD Statements, trial exhibits, and testimony from Kalyn, Tony, Scott Rerucha, and
even Mark, show that Annie and Tony did not receive any of the “total cash proceeds” noted
above. Tony testified that he did not receive any of this money. Kalyn testified that all of the
money went directly to Mark – through direct payments from Annie to Mark; and, from Tony
when Mark bullied him into endorsing the $157,157.40 check. The documentary evidence
supports Kalyn’s testimony.
Jennifer claims that Tony and Annie received $48,577.62 from the Legacy Group loan
that was secured by the Woodinville home and used to purchase the Hayden property. Kalyn
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testified that the two checks for $30,000 and $15,000 were to pay back Mark for the $48,577.62
they had supposedly received from the Hud Settlement. Exhibit W. These checks are dated
approximately two weeks after the Legacy Group loan had closed. Mark conceded that he had
paid approximately $45,000 as earnest money to secure the Hayden home. Kalyn, who is the
only one that was intimately familiar with Mark’s finances – even more familiar than Mark
– and Annie’s finances, testified that Mark expected to be reimbursed this earnest money from
the proceeds of the Legacy Group loan. Linda Lowery testified and accounted this $45,000
payment as reimbursement to Mark for down payment on the Hayden Property. Exhibit T. Mark
and Jennifer presented no witnesses to contradict Ms. Lowery’s testimony and analysis. Further,
they have not presented any evidence to contradict Kalyn’s testimony or the exhibits.
Jennifer further claims that Tony and Annie somehow received $314,514.12 from the
refinance of the Via Venito home (to the Evergreen Mortgage Company), and that amount
should be an offset to the Promissory Note. The evidence, however, disproves this claim. Tony
and Annie took out a loan to pay down second half of the Legacy Group loan, and gave the rest
to Mark – and somehow Jennifer should get the benefit of Tony and Annie getting further in
debt. According to Scott Rerucha, approximately $193,398 was used to pay down the Legacy
Group loan. Meaning, Annie and Tony borrowed money, secured by Via Venito property, to pay
down a loan that Annie and Tony had with the Legacy Group on the Woodinville home. Jennifer
wants to have the benefit for Annie and Tony carrying more debt.
Mark forced Annie and Tony to give the Legacy Group the remaining approximately
$116,494 so Legacy could hold it for Mark for the Bellevue transaction (discussed further
below). Jennifer is asking the Court to offset money that Mark (and her through the marital
community) received from Tony and Annie. This rational defies logic because an offset would
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only happen if Mark and Jennifer paid back Tony and Annie, not the other way around. For the
Court to give Jennifer an offset for receiving even more money from Tony and Annie is the type
of unjust enrichment the Idaho Supreme Court has roundly rejected.
Finally, Jennifer argues that she should get an offset for Mark bullying Tony into
endorsing the $157,157.40 check to Mark. As the Court heard with great interest, Mark screamed
and yelled at Tony to not cash Tony’s own money. Tony felt threatened by Mark’s verbal and
emotional abuse. Thereafter, Tony brought the endorsed check to Kalyn, and Mark endorsed his
name on the check and told Kalyn to deposit it. Mark and Kalyn testified that he used the money
for the Bellevue deal. The uncontested evidence clearly proves that Tony and Annie did not
receive the cash proceeds from this check.
All the while, Jennifer benefitted from living in a house that she got for free – and Tony
and Annie were forced to indebt themselves for Jennifer’s benefit. The substantial evidence
shows that Jennifer’s key claim that supports her declaratory judgment cannot be proven. Hence,
the basis of her complaint fails.
3. The Hand-Written Note is Neither a Gift or Contract.
Jennifer wants to claim that she should receive an offset because of a hand-written note
from Annie and Tony to “To Whom it May Concern.” The Note does not specifically mention
Jennifer or Mark, except to say that she and Tony want $150,000 from the sale proceeds of the
Woodinville property to go to pay down their (Annie’s and Tony’s) loan on the Hayden
Property. Jennifer began the trial by asserting that this note was a contract whereby Annie was
“reimbursing” Jennifer for the work she had done on the Woodinville property. As discussed
previously, this note does not rise to the level of legal contract under Idaho law.
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Now, it seems like Jennifer is claiming that this note should be considered a gift from
Annie and Tony to Jennifer and Mark. This claim is also barred by Idaho law. A “gift” is a
voluntary transfer of property by one to another without consideration or compensation therefor.
Banner Life Ins. Co. v. Mark Wallace Dixson Irrevocable Trust, 147 Idaho 117, 126, 206 P.3d
481, 490 (2009); Stanger v. Stanger, 98 Idaho 725, 728, 571 P.2d 1126, 1129 (1977). To
effectuate a gift, a donor must deliver property to a donee, or to someone on his or her behalf,
with a manifested intent to make a gift of the property. In re Estate of Lewis, 97 Idaho 299, 302,
543 P.2d 852, 855 (1975); Boston Ins. Co. v. Beckett, 91 Idaho 220, 222, 419 P.2d 475, 477
(1966). Delivery is accomplished when the grantor relinquishes all present and future dominion
over the property. Banner Life Ins. Co., 147 Idaho at 126, 206 P.3d at 490; see also Boston Ins.
Co., 91 Idaho at 222, 419 P.2d at 477. Donative intent may be proven by direct evidence,
including statements of donative intent, or inferences drawn from the surrounding circumstances,
such as the relationship between the donor and donee. Banner Life Ins. Co., 147 Idaho at 126,
206 P.3d at 490; Estate of Hull, 126 Idaho at 443–44, 885 P.2d at 1159–60. The existence of
donative intent is a factual finding to be made by the trial court. See Nielson v. Davis, 96 Idaho
314, 315, 528 P.2d 196, 197 (1974). Inter vivos gifts are not presumed, even in familial
relationships, and the burden is on the beneficiary to establish every element of the gift,
including donative intent. See Claunch v. Whyte, 73 Idaho 243, 248, 249 P.2d 915, 917 (1952).
The party asserting the gift must prove all the elements of a gift, excepting irrevocable
delivery, by clear and convincing evidence. Idaho First Nat. Bank v. First Nat. Bank of Caldwell,
340 P.2d 1094, 1100, 81 Idaho 285, 295 (Idaho 1959). The question of intent of decedent having
been raised, defendants were required to assume the burden of proof and to establish by clear and
convincing evidence such elements of a gift. Claunch v. Whyte, 73 Idaho 243, 249 P.2d 915; In
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re Estate of Randall, 64 Idaho 629, 132 P.2d 763, 135 P.2d 299; McNabb v. Brewster, 75 Idaho
313, 272 P.2d 298.
Here, Jennifer has failed to show, by clear and convincing evidence, that this note is a gift
to her or Mark. One of the surviving donors, Tony specifically testified that he did not intend the
note to be a gift to Jennifer and Mark, and Annie would not have intended it either. It is clear that
the relationship between Annie/Tony and Mark/Jennifer is such that such a gift would not be
feasible. And, this supposed gift is revocable, and is being revoked, by Tony.
Annie’s and Tony’s handwritten note is not a gift, and it is not a contract. It then simply a
note without any direct purpose, and Jennifer cannot claim any interest or offset because of the
note.
4. Jennifer and Mark Have Consistently Misled the Court Regarding the
Woodinville and Via Venito Properties.
All parties concede that Kalyn was the one person who was the most aware of all
transactions that occurred between Tony/Annie and Mark because she at the time of the
transactions managed Mark’s finances. Kalyn also helped Annie with her finances when she her
health was deteriorating, and has since reviewed her finances as executor of Annie’s estate. Mark
is simply lying when he claims that he worked with Annie on a daily basis because it was Kalyn
who worked with Annie on a daily basis, and Mark interacted with her on a frequent basis.
Hence, Kalyn’s and documentary evidence is the most reliable version of the events that
occurred with the following properties.
a. Woodinville Property.
It is undisputed, through the HUD statement and Kalyn’s testimony, that Annie made the
approximately $100,000 down payment when she and Tony bought the Woodinville property.
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Exhibit P-A. Mark claims that he “reimbursed” Annie approximately $50,000 through either
check or cash, but fails to provide any proof of such payment. Mark and Jennifer had through
trial to provide documentary proof of such payments. If the payment was by check, Mark has
access to MPI’s cancelled checks for this time, but failed to provide any proof. If it was by cash,
Mark failed to provide any notes or other proof that he paid such a large sum to Annie. Kalyn, on
the other hand, managed all of Mark’s personal and business finances at the time of this
supposed payment. She testified that she did not see, hear, or note any payments from Mark to
Annie to “reimburse” for the down payment on the Woodinville home. The documentary
evidence shows that Annie alone made the down payment.
Next, Mark and Jennifer claim that they made a substantial amount of improvements to
the house and they paid for them. Documentary evidence, however, does not support their
assertions. Mark was able to produce only one exhibit to support that he made payments towards
the Woodinville property. Exhibit 19. Again, after over one year of discovery neither Jennifer
and Mark have been able to produce any other documentary evidence – no credit card state,
receipts, declarations from contractors, etc. As Kalyn pointed out in her testimony, she
supervised the QuickBooks entries, such as the one Mark presented in Exhibit 19. “Street
purchases” were transactions that Mark made when he bought items from some to resell; it was
not an improvement to the Woodinville property. Similarly, property taxes, rent, telephone bills,
should not be counted as improvements to the Woodinville property. At the most, Mark provided
evidence that he contributed $5,679.32 towards the Woodinville property. Exhibit 19.
Jennifer conceded that she did not contribute any money towards the Woodinville
property. The arbitration order confirmed that Jennifer had no interest in the Woodinville
property. This arbitration was to resolve whether Jennifer should be evicted from the
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Woodinville home because she and Mark had to pay rent. In that dispute, she made the same
claim that she makes here – she is owed an offset for the work she and Mark did on the
Woodinville property. Mark stated in the arbitration that Annie had paid him back for costs of all
improvements in the Woodinville property. Mark did not make any claims for reimbursements or
amounts owed on the Woodinville property. Judge Carroll reviewed all documents and other
evidence, including Mark’s statements that Annie covered all of the costs of the remodel.
Jennifer was represented by a lawyer for this arbitration, who helped her prepare and submit her
position to Judge Carroll. After reviewing all of the evidence, Judge Carroll concluded that
Jennifer did not have any interest in the Woodinville property. Even after that Jennifer claims
that Mark paid approximately $40,000 in further improvement, but again Mark and Jennifer have
failed to produce any proof to support this claim.
If Mark’s assertion that the Woodinville property was a joint venture between Annie and
Mark, then there would not have been a need for an arbitration. Annie purchased the
Woodinville property when Mark was married to Jennifer, making the “joint venture” part of
their community interest. Mark was forced to leave the Woodinville home because of a
protection order retraining him from contacting Jennifer. This separation did not affect their
marital community interests, especially when it came to property owned in the community.
Therefore, Annie could not have started eviction proceedings against Jennifer because Jennifer
would have owned one-half of the Woodinville property as part of Mark’s marital community
property. Retired Superior Court Judge Carroll would certainly have recognized long standing
community property law in Washington, and allowed Jennifer to claim her interests in the
property. None of this, however, took place because Jennifer did not have an interest in the
Woodinville property, and Mark was not engaged in a “join venture” with Annie.
DEFENDANTS’ RESPONSE TO CLOSING ARGUMENTS BY MARK PORCELLO
AND JENNIFER PORCELLO- 19

Page 444

Further, Mark claims that “Mark and Jennifer pulled out their share of the equity in the
Woodinville house, which was estimated to be at least $312,00.” Mark’s Closing Argument, pg.
9. If Mark is to be believed that he and Annie were partners in the Woodinville venture, then
Annie’s had an equal or greater interest his equity share. By Mark’s own words, at the very least,
Annie has not been paid this amount of equity from the Woodinville sale.
A common sense approach further shows that their claims have no merit. Mark and
Jennifer claim that they paid $240,000 towards the improvements of the house. Kalyn stated that
her review of Annie’s finances shows that she paid at least $200,000 towards the improvements
of the house, which included reimbursements to Mark. If both claims are to be believed, it means
that the Woodinville property (which was purchased for $401,000) was renovated for $440,00.
This means that Annie and Mark over-improved the house. And if this was true, then the house
would have sold right away, which all parties agree did not happen in this case.
The Court may be inclined to believe that the final sale price for the Woodinville
property for $690,000 was primarily because of the improvements Mark and Jennifer made to
the property. Therefore, they should somehow get credit for the difference between the purchase
and sale price. This is not, however, true and does not make sense. As the Court can appreciate
and take judicial notice, home prices in the Metro Seattle area have increased exponentially, as
has been the case in Kootenai County. This was the primary factor in the increased value of the
property. Also, if parties did in fact contribute $240,000 to improve a home purchased for
$401,000 (total of $640,000), a $50,000 return on this investment is not unreasonable. Mark now
for the first time claims that “everyone” believed that the Woodinville home would sell for
$900,000. Mark’s Closing Argument, pg. 7. This outlandish claim is not supported by the
evidence because the house was never listed anywhere close this amount.
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The fact is Mark came up with the plan to buy the Hayden house and secure with two the
properties he did not own – Woodinville and Via Venito. Mark’s Closing Argument, pg. 5.
Jennifer was married to mark and enjoyed it benefits of this plan. Mark forced Annie and Tony
to leverage their properties, which they wanted to make sure was secured by a trust deed. Now,
Annie and Tony are simply looking to exercise their rights to recover pursuant to the excocted
agreements.
b. Via Venito Property
Contrary to Mark’s assertions, the Via Venito property does not belong to Mark and is
not owned by Mark. The title is and has always been held by Tony and Annie. Mark somehow
claims that the property was put into trust for his benefit. If this is in fact true, Mark would not
have to sue his own mother as she was dying to claim a property that was put into trust for his
benefit. The truth is more obvious. Mark has known that he is not going to receive anything in
Annie’s and Tony’s will when they pass on. This is primarily because Mark has tormented Annie
and Tony by taking advantage of them to support his drug habit.
Mark knew that when Annie passed, the trust would him prohibit from claiming any
interest in the Via Venito property. He initiated a lawsuit immediately after Annie’s death to
embroil the trust in litigation in the hopes that he can somehow assert a claim to an
approximately $2 million property that he knows he will not receive in Annie’s and Tony’s will.
Mark also knew that he did not have any interest in the Via Venito property, and that this
is why he felt comfortable putting it as part of the plan to buy the Hayden Property. Mark’s
Closing Argument, pg. 5-6. Mark’s plan was to encumber Tony’s and Annie’s properties that he
could not get when they passed, so he could take the money from those properties to buy him
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and Jennifer the Hayden Property. Mark could not have done that after they passed because he
would have lost his ability to bully and threaten them into doing what he wanted.
5. Tony and Annie were not paid anything from Mark’s Scheme to the Bellevue
home, which started when Jennifer and Mark were Married.
All parties concede that Jennifer knew that Mark had plans to purchase the Bellevue
property. Even the District Court of Kootenai County, in the Divorce Decree, concluded that the
proceeds from the sale of the Bellevue home was “Community Personal Property.” Exhibit 12,
Exhibit E. This scheme was devised and discussed while Jennifer and Mark were married. Mark
consistently siphoned all of Tony’s and Annie’s money and used it to pay off the Bellevue home.
Mark concedes, and Jennifer agrees, that all loans from Tony and Annie, including the debt
transfers that financed the Hayden property, would be paid off when the Bellevue house was
sold.
Jennifer admits that she helped Mark sell the Bellevue home, and went along with his
plans. Jennifer helped secure permits, coordinated landscaping, and help Mark prepare to sell the
property. And, once the property sold – Mark took all of the money; Tony and Annie did not
receive a penny; and, Jennifer is asking the Court to give her their house for free. If this result is
allowed to stand, the Court will be unjustly enriching Jennifer, which is contrary to Idaho law.
6. Jennifer Benefitted and will Continue to Benefit from Tony’s and Annie’s Loss
of Money.
Jennifer will continue to claim that she did not know about Mark’s schemes to bully
Tony and Annie and force them to take on debt, refinance their homes, and give all of the money
to Mark – and this money paid for the Hayden Property. All of this directly benefitted Jennifer.
Under Idaho's community property system, all property owned by a spouse before
marriage is that spouse's separate property. I.C. § 32–903. In addition, all property acquired after
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marriage with the proceeds of the separate property is that spouse's separate property. Id. All
other property acquired after marriage is community property, including income on separate
property. I.C. § 32–906. Moreover, all property acquired during marriage is presumed to be
community property. Baruch v. Clark, 154 Idaho 732, 737, 302 P.3d 357, 362 (2013).
Generally, expenditures and indebtedness that occur during the marriage are presumed to
be for the benefit of the community. See Simplot v. Simplot, 96 Idaho 239, 246, 526 P.2d 844,
851 (1974). A debt incurred during marriage is presumed to be a community debt. Id.
Further, a fiduciary relationship exists between the spouses throughout the marriage. In
Idaho the relationship continues even after the spouses have separated or one has filed a
complaint for divorce. Only when the marriage is dissolved does the fiduciary relationship cease.
Compton v. Compton, 101 Idaho 328, 612 P.2d 1175 (1980); McDonald v. Barlow, 109 Idaho
101, 705 P.2d 1056 (Ct.App.1985). In Compton our Supreme Court said:
This fiduciary duty extends to the parties' negotiations leading to the formation of
the property settlement agreement during marriage, and requires, at least, a
disclosure by both parties of all information within their knowledge regarding the
existence of community property and of pertinent facts necessary to arrive at a
reasonable valuation of the property. Like a business partner, each spouse is free
to adopt a position favorable to himself or herself regarding the property's
valuation, its inclusion in the community, or other such issues. They are not free,
however, to resolve such issues unilaterally by concealing the very existence of
particular items or amounts of property.
101 Idaho at 336, 612 P.2d at 1183. After Compton two things are clear. A spouse may,
consistent with his or her fiduciary duty, take a position as to the value of the various items of
community property..
Here, substantial evidence shows that Jennifer and Mark were married and benefitted
from Tony’s and Annie’s purchase of the Woodinville property. This was a community benefit.
Tony and Annie then leveraged the Woodinville property for Mark and Jennifer to buy the
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Hayden Property. This is a community benefit. Mark and Jennifer signed a Promissory Note and
secured the debt with a Deed of Trust on the Hayden property. This is a community debt.
Jennifer knew about Mark’s scheme regarding the Bellevue home while they were
married. In fact, Mark had agreed to purchase the Bellevue house while they were married. The
purchase was made for the community’s benefit, and Jennifer and Mark were fiduciaries
regarding this scheme. During their marriage and separation, Mark continued to bully, threaten,
and siphon Tony’s and Annie’s money to buy the Hayden property and gather money for the
Bellevue transaction. Jennifer was, by law, a fiduciary to Mark during this time. She knew about
the Bellevue sale and help facilitate it. Mark and Jennifer as fiduciaries to one another benefited
as a marital community from the elaborate scheme outlined above. Jennifer benefited from
swindling Tony and Annie and she should not be unjustly enriched.
C. The Court Cannot Allow Jennifer to be Unjustly Enriched from Tony’s and Annie’s
Loss of Money.
If Mark and Jennifer had not come up with a plan to indebt Tony and Annie on the
Woodinville home, and start the trail of refinances from Legacy Group to Evergreen Mortgage –
encumbering other properties -- Annie and Tony would have been in a great financial position.
They would have sold the Woodinville home $690,000 and paid off the $270,000 mortgage to
Wells Fargo. Subtracting approximately $45,000 for fees, Tony and Annie would have profited
approximately $375,000. Additionally, they would not have had a loan on the Via Venito
property, and would have owned that property free and clear.
Instead, they don’t have any money; there is a substantial loan on the Via Venito
property; and, Jennifer and Mark are now teaming up to make sure they get the Hayden property
for free. They have failed to provide any evidence that Mark and Jennifer personally paid
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anything to pay down the Promissory Note. Common sense, logic, and simple loan transaction
dictate that the debtor pays the creditor the money borrowed. Here, Mark and Jennifer want the
Court to believe that they (lenders) paid back Tony and Annie (creditors) the money borrowed
by having Tony and Annie (creditors) borrow more money to pay themselves back. This
rationale is intellectually dishonest. Defense counsel for both Mark and Jennifer are aware of this
disingenuous position.
This is why Jennifer is hedging her bets by asking the Court to rewrite the Promissory
Note. Even then, Jennifer and Mark have not produced a contrary witness or any other contrary
evidence to dispute Ms. Lowery’s testimony and exhibits that show Tony and Annie has suffered
over $800,000 in loss, which includes fees and costs, because Mark and Jennifer were greedy.
They did not care for their elder parents and were completely content with using Tony’s and
Annie’s hard-earned assets as their personal piggy bank. Mark and Jennifer have shown
complete disregard for Tony and Annie, and continue express no remorse for stealing their
money. The Court should not embolden Mark and Jennifer to continue to abuse Tony, their sole
remaining elder parent.
Jennifer wants the court to believe that “Tony and Annie had every opportunity to tell
Mark ‘no,’ to adequately protect themselves when they decided to loan Mark additional monies.”
Jennifer’s Written Closing Argument, pg. 6. The evidence, however, showed the exact opposite.
Jennifer had successfully obtained a protection order because of Mark’s abusive behavior. Tony
testified that he felt bullied and threatened by Mark. Kalyn testified that Mark had screamed,
yelled, and threatened Tony and Annie. In fact, Mark had told Annie and Kalyn that he was
going to “put Annie six feet under ground.” Tony and Annie had no choice to go along with
Mark because to do otherwise would bring certain verbal and emotional abuse, and possibly
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physical harm. This is why they repeatedly told Scott and Joe to make sure their interests were
protected and they would receive their money. Alas, Tony and Annie were not able to protect
themselves.
III. Conclusion
This Court will decide this case and move on. The lawyers will move on. But, Tony will
still have Mark as a son and Jennifer will still have him as an ex father-in-law and Grandfather to
her children. Kalyn will still have Mark as her father, and Jennifer as her ex step-mother. They
will all still have to deal with each other. The Court got a glimpse of Mark’s and Jennifer’s
duplicitous personalities. Should the Court decide in Jennifer’s favor, it will give Mark and
Jennifer free reign to continue to abuse Tony because the Court will have confirmed for Mark
that it is okay to bully Tony into giving Mark all of his remaining money. And, Jennifer will
continue to benefit from destroying this family.
DATED this 25th day of June, 2018.
MADSEN LAW OFFICES, PC
Attorney for Defendants
By:_/s/ Henry D. Madsen
HENRY D. MADSEN
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 25th day of June, 2018, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:

Terrance R. Harris
RAMSDEN, MARFICE, EALY
& HARRIS

√ Via iCourt Service

Peter J. Smith
SMITH + MALEK

√ Via iCourt Service

Honorable Cynthia C.K. Meyer
District Court

Emailed Bench Copy to Chambers
Jane Watts, Judicial Staff Attorney

/s/ S.A. “Buck” Pennington
Madsen Law Offices, PC
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First Judicial District, Kootenai County
Jim Brannon, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk - Larsen, Denice

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

JENNIFER PORCELLO,
Plaintiff,

CASE NO. CV-2016-7343

V.

ANTHONY J. PORCELLO and the Estate of
ANNIE C. PORCELLO, KALYN M.
PORCELLO, Personal Representative,
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER ON COURT TRIAL

ANTHONY J. PORCELLO and the Estate of
ANNIE C. PORCELLO, KALYN M.
PORCELLO, Personal Representative,
Counter-Plaintiffs,
V.

JENNIFER PORCELLO,
Counter-Defendant.

ANTHONY J. PORCELLO and the Estate of
ANNIE C. PORCELLO, KALYN M.
PORCELLO, Personal Representative,
Third Party Plaintiffs,
V.

MARK PORCELLO,
Third Party Defendant.

This case was tried to the Court over a period of eight days in April and May 2018: April
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rd

23 to April 26th and May 21 st to May 24th • Terrance R. Harris represented Plaintiff Jennifer
Porcello, whose name is now Jennifer Maggard. Defendants Anthony (Tony), the Estate of
Annie Porcello, and Kaylyn Porcello, Personal Representative for the Estate of Annie Porcello,
were represented by Henry D. Madsen during April and by Mr. Madsen and Sumeer Singla in
May. Mr. Singla, an attorney from Seattle, Washington, was admitted pro hac vice.

Mark

Porcello was represented by Peter J. Smith. Because so many Porcello family members are
involved in this litigation, they will be referred to by their first names.

I.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In June 2016, Tony and Annie Porcello commenced non-judicial foreclosure proceedings
against a house located at 1663 E. Northwood Drive, Hayden, Idaho (the "Hayden home").
Complaint,

11 15, 35-36. Jennifer resided in the home with her five daughters. Jennifer

commenced this action on October 5, 2016, against Tony and Annie, seeking a preliminary
injunction to stop the Trustee's Sale and to litigate ownership of the property. Jennifer claims
that the Hayden home belongs to her "free and clear" based on the representations of Joe Mijich,
the attorney for Annie and Tony. Complaint,

11 22, 31. The parties agreed to proceed with a

judicial foreclosure action. Tony and Annie filed a counterclaim against Jennifer and a thirdparty complaint against Mark. Defendants claim that Mark and Jennifer "failed to pay the
interest payments as required" by the Note and Deed of Trust and that the Note "is past due and
owing in the full amount of $648,500 plus interest." Answer and Third Party Complaint,

1 14.

Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment which was heard in late January 2018. It was
denied in March 2018. The parties thereafter stipulated to the filing of an amended counterclaim
and third party complaint substituting Kaylyn Porcello as personal representative of the Estate of
Annie Porcello and the Estate of Annie Porcello for Annie Porcello, individually. The amended
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pleadings contained other mmor changes. Jennifer and Mark responded to the amended
counterclaim and third party complaint. The case was originally scheduled for a four-day court
trial. During the progress of the trial in April 2018, it became apparent that significantly more
time was needed for trial. An additional four days for trial were scheduled in May 2018.
The parties submitted their closing arguments in writing and the case was taken under
advisement.
I.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

"Review of a trial court's decision is limited to ascertaining whether the evidence
supports the findings of fact, and whether the fmdings of fact support the conclusions of law."
Akers v. Mortensen, 147 Idaho 39, 43, 205 P.3d 1175, 1179 (2009). "A trial court's findings of

fact will not be set aside on appeal unless the findings are clearly erroneous." Id. (citations
omitted). The reviewing court ''will liberally construe the trial court's findings of fact in favor of
the judgment entered." Id. (citations omitted). "If the fmdings of fact are based upon substantial
evidence, even if the evidence is conflicting, they will not be overturned on appeal." Id.
This court has carefully reviewed and considered the pleadings, evidence, and briefing,
and now enters its Memorandum Decision and Order, which shall constitute findings of fact and
conclusions of law pursuant to I.R.C.P. 52(a). Any of the findings of fact that should be
denominated as a conclusion of law shall be deemed to be a conclusion of law. Any of the
conclusions of law that should be denominated a finding of fact shall be deemed a finding of
fact.
II.

FINDINGS OF FACT
A. INTRODUCTION OF PARTIES AND PROPERTIES

This case involves a disputed and complex series of transactions between and among
various Porcello family members and Jennifer. By way of introduction, the parties and other
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major players are listed here.
Parties:
•

Anthony Porcello, often referred to as Tony, is the father of Mark Porcello. He was

married to Annie Porcello for over sixty years prior to her passing in February 2017.
Tony was about

during the trial of this matter. He is Kalyn Porcello's

paternal grandfather. Tony lives in Renton, Washington, part year and in Indian Wells,
California, part year.
•

Annie Porcello was married to Tony, is Mark's mother, and Kalyn's paternal

grandmother. Annie was a named defendant when this litigation began.
•

Mark Porcello is the only child of Tony and Annie. He was about

during

the trial of this matter. He is the father of Jason, Kalyn, and Aaron with his former wife,
Cindy. He is the father of Austin and Dawson with his former wife, Laurie. He is the
father of Madison, Allison, and Ashton, school-aged daughters with his former wife,
Jennifer. Mark currently resides in Indian Wells, California.
•

Jennifer Porcello (Maggard) was married to Mark from about 2003 to 2007, and then

again from November 2013 to December 2017. Jennifer resides in Hayden, Idaho.
•

Kalyn Porcello was about

during the trial.

She is the personal

representative of the Estate of Annie Porcello. Kalyn resides in Snohomish, Washington.
Non-Parties involved in underlying transactions:
•

Joe Mijich (pronounced "meech,,) is an attorney in the Seattle, Washington, area who

was

when his deposition in this case was taken. He has represented Annie

and Tony in various matters since about 2007. He did not appear at trial, but the parties
stipulated that his entire deposition be used in trial.
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•

Scott Rerucha is associated with Legacy Capital Group. He did not appear at trial, but

the parties stipulated that portions of his deposition would be presented through written
closing arguments subject to the Court's ruling on any preserved objections.
•

Kim Parker is a paralegal who has worked for Joe Mijich since 1988.

This case involves several different properties that were typically referred to by their location.
They are briefly described here.
•

Woodinville home. In early 2012, a home in Woodinville, Washington, was purchased

and titled in Annie's and Tony's names. Mark and Jennifer (and children) lived in the
home.
•

Hayden home. In September 2014, a home in Hayden, Idaho, was purchased and titled

in Mark's and Jennifer's names. Mark and Jennifer (and children) lived in the home.
Jennifer and her children still reside in the home.
•

Via Venito home. A home titled in Annie's name was purchased many years ago. It is

located in Indian Wells, California, but has been referred to by the parties in this
litigation as the Via Venito house. Mark claims the equitable interest in this home.
•

Bellevue home. Many years ago, Mark entered into a lease-to-own or lease with option

to purchase arrangement with Darrell Bohner concerning a home located in Bellevue,
Washington.
The Porcello family has been in the jewelry business for many years.

There was

considerable evidence concerning the following businesses:
•

Tony Porcello, Inc. is the legal name of a retail jewelry store located in Bellevue,

Washington (Porcello Jewelers). It was founded by Tony and Annie and is operated by
Kalyn and her brothers.
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•

Mark Porcello, Inc. is (or was) the legal name of a jewelry estate buying and selling
business (Porcello Estate Buyers) that is or was owned by Mark. It will be referred to as
MPI.

The Court notes that the Porcellos are parties to on-going litigation not only in Idaho, but
in California and in Washington related to the above properties. As a result, the parties have
become entrenched in their respective positions. That is reflected in their testimony. The Court
views with varying degrees of skepticism the testimony of virtually all of the witnesses.
Certainly the family members - Mark, Jennifer, Tony, and Kaylyn - each have their own
interests and goals at play and their testimony reflects these biases. The Court takes these biases
into account in assessing the credibility of the witnesses and their testimony. Because Joe Mijich
and Scott Rerucha did not present live testimony, the Court could not assess their credibility as
testifying witnesses. Kim Parker, Joe Mijich's long-time paralegal testified, and the Court found
her manner while testifying to be exceedingly defensive and protective of Mr. Mijich, which
affected her credibility negatively.
The Court's findings on the witnesses' credibility were not influenced by the witnesses'
character or lifestyles. However, Mark's and Jennifer's version of events makes sense to the
Court. Their stories have remained consistent, and while they have not produced documentation
of all expenditures they claim to have made, their recounting of what happened when, and what
the parties' intent was with respect to the various transactions, is consistent with each other,
internally consistent, and makes logical sense. They were the parties directly involved with the
transactions. The Court notes that Mark and Jennifer are finally divorced after a long, often
acrimonious relationship.
Tony, an old-fashioned gentlemen and successful businessman, freely admits that Annie
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was more involved in the dealings with Mark than he was, that he signed documents when she
told him to, and that he was in Indian Wells for many months of the year for the last many years.
He did not have specific information regarding the Hayden home purchase or regarding previous
and subsequent transactions, and he often responded to questions with absolutes such as, "Annie
would never" do something or "Annie would always" do something else. Although he loves his
son, his anger with Mark and Jennifer were palpable and colored his testimony. Kaylyn was
tangentially involved with the Hayden home purchase. She seemed to the Court to be a very nice,
professional, smart person, with the laudable purpose of protecting and helping her grandparents,
but her testimony was perhaps over-prepared. Her answers were too often filtered through and
prefaced with her view of how the case should ultimately turn out. Her disdain for Mark and
Jennifer seemed to color her testimony.
Overall, the Court takes all the family members' testimony with a grain of salt, but the
Court found on balance Mark and Jennifer to be more credible and Tony and Kaylyn to be less
credible.
B. WOODINVILLE TRANSACTION

In 2011, Mark and Annie decided to buy a home located in Woodinville, Washington.
Annie and Tony borrowed money to purchase the home and it was titled in their names. The
agreement between Mark and Annie was that Annie would pay the down payment on the
Woodinville home, and Mark and Jennifer would live in the home. Mark would then make the
monthly payments to Wells Fargo. The purchase price was $401,000 and $93,000 was paid as a
down payment. Annie paid the down payment, but Mark claims that he repaid Annie about
$40,000 in cash and jewelry. Other than Mark's testimony, there was no evidence that supported
his claim that he repaid Annie a portion of the down payment. Mark testified that the home was
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purchased as an investment and that he and his mother were going to roughly split expenses to
renovate the home, Mark was going to pay the mortgage payments to Wells Fargo, and he,
Jennifer and the girls (Jennifer's two older daughters and Mark's and Jennifer's three younger
daughters) would live in the house. The purchase of the home closed in early 2012, some
renovations were completed and Mark, Jennifer and the girls moved in.
Jennifer and Mark hired contractors to help with the renovations on the Woodinville
home before they moved in. The renovations included replacing the carpet, the floor trim, and
the cabinets; remodeling the bathrooms, repainting the house, installing a new roof, and
landscaping. Jennifer testified that she contributed approximately $40,000 toward the renovation
of the Woodinville home, while Mark paid for the carpet, roofing, and remodeling two of the
three bathrooms.

Other than Jennifer's testimony, there was no evidence that Jennifer

contributed $40,000 to the cost of the renovations. Jennifer contributed to the renovations in
sweat equity. Mark was reimbursed by Annie for some of the cost of renovating the Woodinville
home. Mark, Jennifer, and the girls moved into the Woodinville house in February of 2012.
Mark's and Jennifer's relationship deteriorated. While Mark was living in the
Woodinville home he made monthly payments to Wells Fargo. Jennifer obtained a restraining or
no contact order against Mark in 2013 and Mark moved out of the house. At that time, he
stopped making payments to Wells Fargo Bank on the mortgage. He resumed making payments
in November 2013. By the end of November 2013, Mark and Jennifer remarried.
Before they reconciled, Mark and Jennifer were involved in family law issues in court in
Washington. Annie commenced eviction proceedings against Jennifer. Some kind of alternative
dispute resolution proceeding was held over a period of at least three sessions with retired
Washington State Judge Terrance Carroll acting as arbitrator. The parties referred to this
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proceeding as an arbitration. The ADR proceeding dealt with Mark's and Jennifer's child
custody/child support issues, but Annie intervened and it ultimately also involved issues
concerning whether Jennifer had an equitable interest in the Woodinville home. Judge Carroll
ruled against Jennifer. Mark, Jennifer, Annie, and Kalyn were present during some or all of the
sessions, some of which were conducted telephonically.
Mark and Jennifer determined that they would like to live in Idaho and located a home in
Hayden. They agreed to purchase the home for $360,000 and moved in before the closing.
Mark and Jennifer put down $20,000 in earnest money on the home, but were unable to secure
financing to complete the purchase. The closing date for the purchase was extended from July
31, 2014, to September of 2014 to allow Mark and Jennifer to find financing to complete the
purchase. Mark and Jennifer were required to pay an additional $20,000 in earnest money. Mark
and Jennifer paid approximately $5,000 in rent on the property which was later credited against
the purchase price. Unable to obtain a traditional loan, Mark asked Annie for help in order to
complete the purchase.
C. HAYDEN TRANSACTION

Annie and Tony obtained a loan from Legacy Group Capital for $648,500 (Legacy Loan)
in order to provide Mark and Jennifer the money they needed to purchase the Hayden home. The
Legacy Loan was a short term "hard money" loan meant to be paid off within 90 days. The
Woodinville home and the Via Venito home were used as collateral on the Legacy Loan because
there was insufficient equity in the Woodinville home by itself to secure the loan; the Hayden
home did not collateralize the Legacy Loan because Legacy Group Capital does not conduct
business in Idaho. The proceeds of the Legacy Loan were distributed as follows: $17,315.50 in
settlement charges on the loan; $270,462 to pay off the Wells Fargo mortgage on the
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Woodinville home; $312,044.32 toward the purchase of the Hayden home (which reflected the
purchase price less the earnest money and rent paid by Mark and Jennifer); and $48,677.62 was
designated as cash to borrower, which was disbursed to Annie and Tony.
Joe Mijich, Annie's and Tony's attorney, drafted the Note and Deed of Trust for the
closing of the Hayden home. It was decided that the Note and Deed of Trust on the Hayden
home would be drafted to mirror the Legacy Loan's Deed of Trust for $648,500. Although Joe
Mijich expressed reservations about the Legacy Loan, Tony was confident that Mark could pay
off the loan within 90 days.
On September 3, 2014, Mark and Jennifer went to Pioneer Title Company to sign the
closing paperwork for the Hayden home. They arrived at Pioneer Title Company at around 4 or
4:30 p.m. They were presented with the Note and Deed of Trust prepared by Joe Mijich. Jennifer
had not reviewed the Note and Deed of Trust prior to closing. When she saw that the principal
amount of the Note was $648,500 she was shocked and became upset, to the point that she
refused to sign the closing documents without speaking to an attorney. The purchase price of the
Hayden home was $360,000, and Mark and Jennifer only needed $312,044 to close. Mark signed
the Note and Deed of Trust before he left with Jennifer. After Jennifer and Mark left the Pioneer
Title Company, a representative from Pioneer Title emailed Joe Mijich to advise him that
Jennifer refused to sign the closing documents and that Mark would call Mr. Mijich to discuss
the Note.
After leaving the Pioneer Title Company, Mark and Jennifer pulled to the side of the road
to make a series of phone calls. Mark called Tony and asked about the Note and Deed of Trust.
Tony told Mark to speak with Joe Mijich. At approximately 5:24 p.m., Mark called Joe Mijich to
discuss the Note and Deed of Trust. He made the call on speakerphone so that Jennifer could
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hear. Mark and Jennifer testified that Joe Mijich told them the Note and Deed of Trust needed to
match the amount on the Legacy Loan because part of the Legacy Loan was being used to
purchase the Hayden home and the Via Venito home and Woodinville home were being used as
collateral. Joe Mijich explained that once the Woodinville home sold and the Legacy Loan was
paid in full, the Hayden home would belong to Mark and Jennifer ''free and clear."
Joe Mijich denies that he spoke to Mark or Jennifer after 5 p.m. on September 3, 2014.
Mr. Mijich claims that Mark and Jennifer must have spoken to someone else claiming to be him
because he never goes by "Joseph." Kim Parker testified that Joe Mijich barely knows how to
use a cell phone and that a review of Mr. Mijich's billable hours failed to show that the
conversation took place. Mr. Mijich did not conduct a review of his cell phone records because
he was unable to obtain a copy. Mark's cell phone records were admitted into evidence as
Exhibits 20-22. His records show a call from his cell phone to Joe Mijich's cell phone number at
5:24 p.m. lasting ten minutes. The Court finds that the phone call took place based on Mark's
phone records and the consistency between Mark's and Jennifer's testimony.
Following the phone call with Mr. Mijich, Jennifer returned to Pioneer Title Company
the following day and signed the Note and Deed of Trust. Jennifer signed the closing documents
because they made sense to her: Mark and Jennifer would complete the remodel of the
Woodinville home, the Woodinville home would sell and the Legacy Loan would be paid in full.
On September 4, 2014, Pioneer Title received $312,044.32 on behalf of Mark and Jennifer and
the purchase of the Hayden home closed.
D. PREPARING THE WOODINVILLE HOME FOR SALE

In the summer of 2014, Annie asked Jennifer and Mark to return to the Woodinville
home to prepare the home for sale. The planned remodel of the Woodinville home included
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replacing the driveway, cabinets and counters in the kitchen, replacing the flooring inside the
home, repainting certain rooms inside the home, repairing the swimming pool, and landscaping.
Jennifer and Mark testified that Mark paid for most of the contractors and materials, while
Jennifer hired a relative to replace the flooring, and Jennifer worked on the yard. Mark and
Jennifer testified that Tony and Annie did not contribute financially or otherwise to the remodel.
Mark claims he invested approximately $240,000 total in the Woodinville home, $200,000 of
which was put toward remodeling costs. Kaylyn and Tony claim that Tony and Annie
contributed approximately $160,000 to $200,000 toward remodeling costs. The parties'
testimony regarding their respective contributions to the costs of the second remodel of the
Woodinville home was largely unsupported and conflicting. The Court determines that the
amounts Mark and Annie invested in the Woodinville home during the summer of 2014 were
roughly equal, and that Jennifer's contribution toward the cost of the 2014 renovation was in
sweat equity.
E. ANNIE'S NOTE

At some point during the second renovation of the Woodinville home, Annie drafted the
following note:
To Whom It May Concern:
I, Ann Porcello agree to the following: When the house in
Woodinville sells .... I will have $150,000.00 transferred for the
purchase of the home at 1663 Northwood Dr., Hayden, Idaho
83835. Please advise me if there is any specific way that this needs
to be handled.
Ex. 6. The note was signed and dated by Annie and Tony. Jennifer, Mark, and Tony testified
regarding the note. Jennifer was present when Annie drafted the note. Jennifer claims the note
was her "security" that Annie would compensate Jennifer for her efforts on the second
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renovation of the Woodinville home. Jennifer's efforts toward the renovation of the home in
2011-2012 were not recognized as equity in the Washington arbitration and she was determined
that she would not find herself in that position again. Tony testified that he signed the note
because Annie asked him to sign it. Tony did not know why Annie wrote the note. Tony was
adamant that the note was not intended to be a gift to Mark or Jennifer and that the note was not
intended as repayment to Jennifer for the 2014 renovations to the Woodinville home. Mark
testified that Annie wrote the note as repayment to Mark for his part of the investment in the
Woodinville home. Mark explained that the $150,000 in the note was Annie's estimate of what
Mark had invested in the home because she believed they had invested "50/50" in the
Woodinville home. The Court finds that Annie wrote the note intending to repay Mark and
Jennifer for their equity in the Woodinville home and designating that the $150,000 go toward
payment of the Hayden home.

F. THEEVERGREENLOANS
The Woodinville home did not sell within 90 days as the parties had anticipated and the
Legacy Loan was extended. Mark made interest payments on the Legacy Loan of between
$6,000 and $7,000 per month while waiting for the home to sell. However, the high payments
were causing Mark financial strain. As a result, Annie and Tony obtained a conventional loan on
the Woodinville home through Evergreen Mortgage Company for $480,000 (First Evergreen
Loan) to reduce the monthly payments on the Legacy Loan. Annie and Tony used the First
Evergreen Loan to pay down the Legacy Loan by approximately $470,000. The remaining
obligation on the Legacy Loan was $193,398.13.
Annie and Tony took out a second Evergreen loan for $417,000 and used the Via Venito
home as collateral (Second Evergreen Loan). Mark testified that the Second Evergreen Loan was

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON COURT TRIAL--13

Page 465

not related to the Hayden transaction or the sale of the Woodinville home. Mark explained that
the Second Evergreen Loan was obtained so that Mark could purchase the Bellevue home in
Washington. The plan was that the Woodinville home would sell two to three days before the
Second Evergreen Loan would be disbursed. Mark explained that if everything had gone
according to plan, he and Annie would have had to repay the remainder of the Legacy Loan, but
Mark would have been able to put $408,000 toward the purchase of the Bellevue home. The
Second Evergreen Loan disbursed before the Woodinville home closed. As a result, the Second
Evergreen Loan paid the remainder of the Legacy Loan, Annie and Tony's mortgage on their
property in Renton, Washington, and other expenses. Mark was left with a little over $116,000 to
put toward the purchase of the Bellevue home.
The Woodinville home sold for $690,000 on July 29, 2015. The proceeds from the
Woodinville home sale disbursed on July 30, 2015, and were used to pay off the First Evergreen
Loan. Approximately $157,157.40 remained from the sale. At this point, the Legacy Loan and
the First Evergreen Loan were paid in full. Mark receiv~d a check from Tony for $157,157.40
that he put toward the purchase of the Bellevue home.
Mark purchased the Bellevue home, which eventually sold for 1.6 million.
Jennifer and Mark separated in 2015 and Jennifer filed for divorce in April 2015.
Jennifer's divorce was not finalized until 2017. Jennifer was awarded ownership of the Hayden
home. Mark was ordered to pay all community debts.
Jennifer was not included in Mark's discussions with Annie and Tony regarding the First
and Second Evergreen Loans. Jennifer did not learn of the refinancing of the Legacy Loan or of
the refinancing on Via Venito home until after Annie and Tony initiated foreclosure proceedings.
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G. THE LINDA LOUREY REPORT
At trial, Defendants claimed that the total amount due on the Note and Deed of Trust was
$851,784. This amount was based on Linda Lourey's expert report.

Ms. Lourey has been

licensed as a CPA since 1979. She prepared the report on December 28, 2017. Ms. Lourey's
report includes accounting summaries and her expert opinion regarding the amount of money
Annie and Tony spent on the Hayden home as well as the amounts they invested in the
Woodinville home.
Ms. Lourey explained that she relied on the Kootenai County Treasurer website to obtain
current property tax information for the Hayden property. She based her opinion on copies of
checks written by Annie and Tony; Annie and Tony's previous 1098 tax forms; HUD-1
statements for the First and Second Evergreen Loans; HUD-1 statement for the Legacy Loan;
interest payments on the Legacy Loan and the First and Second Evergreen Loans; as well as
responses to interrogatories in the present case; letters from Judge Caroll; the arbitration order; a
declaration from Tony; and a "summary of indebtedness" put together by Annie before she died.
Ms. Lourey also spoke with Kaylyn and Robert Jones, the Porcellos' accountant. Ms. Lourey
reviewed Mark's discovery responses after she wrote the report. Ms. Lourey testified that the
documents she reviewed after preparing the report did not change the conclusions in her report.
Ms. Lourey's report included a series of checks Annie wrote to Mark as "reimburse Mark
for down payment on Hayden." Ms. Lourey and Kaylyn testified that two checks from
September 2014 from Annie to MPI were issued to Mark as reimbursement for the down
payment on the Hayden home (Check #714 and Check #1012). The total amount of the two
checks is $45,000. It appears to the Court that Ms. Lourey based her opinion that the checks were
reimbursements to Mark on the timing of when the checks were written as well as on a note from

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON COURT TRIAL--15

Page 467

Annie that Ms. Lourey testified stated the checks were meant to reimburse Mark. On crossexamination, Mr. Harris asked Ms. Lourey if the note she relied on was a declaration that was
prepared by Annie as part of an arbitration proceeding. Ms. Lourey was not sure. To the extent
that Ms. Lourey relied on a document that was prepared by Annie for the arbitration, the Court
notes that the arbitration preceded the purchase of the Hayden home and Annie's two checks to
MPI. The arbitration preceded Annie's issuing Check #714 and Check #1012 by about one year.
Thus, even assuming Annie did reimburse Mark certain amounts which was discussed during the
arbitration, those amounts could not have been for the down payment made by Mark on the
Hayden home. Kaylyn testified that Check #714 and Check #1012 were written by Annie to
reimburse Mark for his investment in the Hayden home. Mark denies that these checks were a
reimbursement for the down payment on the Hayden home.
Check #1012 and Check #714 are made payable to MPI. Check #714 listed "deposit" on
the memo line. These checks are different from another check Annie wrote to Mark to reimburse
Mark related to the Woodinville property. Annie wrote another check to Mark on April 17, 2013
(Check #10421). Check #10421 was made payable to Mark Porcello for $18,807.62. The memo
line on the check reads "Woodinville Property." Mark testified that he was not sure if this check
was reimbursement for the first remodel of Woodinville in 2013. The evidence at trial
established that when Annie reimbursed Mark for a business expense, such as purchasing an item
from Mark's inventory, she would make the check payable to MPI or she would reimburse Mark
in cash. Tony and Kaylyn testified that Annie was meticulous and organized with respect to her
professional and personal finances. Based on Check #10421, if Annie had intended to reimburse
Mark for the Hayden down payment, it is likely that she would have made the check out to Mark
Porcello, not to MPI, and that she would have made a reference to the Hayden property on the
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memo line of the check. A comparison of the three checks leads the Court to find that the two
September 2014 checks made out to MPI were not reimbursements to Mark Porcello for the
down payment on the Hayden home.
The Court notes that portions of Ms. Lourey's report were based on inadmissible hearsay,
specifically the conclusions based on the arbitration proceedings. Ms. Lourey also included
amounts in her report from exhibits that the Court deemed were inadmissible: an invoice from JC
Enterprises (Ex. JJ), to show part of the renovation costs on the Woodinville home, and a Letter
from Key Bank (Ex. KK), to show that Annie and Tony reimbursed Mark $30,000 on the
Woodinville home. See Ex. HH. Ms. Lourey's inclusion of a $3,678 cash payment to Mark,
listed in Exhibit T, was not supported by documentation. Further, Ms. Lourey testified that she
assigned approximately $53,268 as "additional costs of improvements" when she was uncertain
of the origin of the costs because that the amount would fall within that category "logically" as it
was not part of the closing costs.
Linda Lourey's opinions are of limited utility in resolving the legal issues in this case.
While her figures seem to add up, Ms. Lourey did not consider the context in which the various
transactions were taking place or the parties' intent with respect to legal or equitable ownership
of the properties. Ms. Lourey exclusively based her opinions on information provided by Annie
and Tony and did not capture interest only payments by Mark and Jennifer on the Legacy Loan
because those payments were not made payable to Annie or Tony, but to Legacy Group Capital
directly. Further, Ms. Lourey derived some of her estimates for the cost of improvements to the
Woodinville property based on portions of Annie and Tony's tax returns without other
supporting documentation.
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H. OTHER TESTIMONY REGARDING THE NOTE
The Court found that Tony's testimony was of limited utility regarding the amounts, if
any, that are due on the Note and Deed of Trust. At various points during his testimony, Tony's
anger over his relationship with Mark and resentment of Jennifer affected his credibility. Tony's
assessment that Mark owes him upwards of one million dollars was not supported by admissible
evidence. No other testimony supported Tony's contention that Jennifer owed him $80,000 in
attorney fees, $150,000, and "completely" for the Hayden home. The Court finds that Tony's
testimony regarding the amounts owed to him and Annie by Jennifer and Mark is unsupported by
the evidence in the record.
Kaylyn's testimony regarding the Note and Deed of Trust was in line with Tony's and
Linda Lourey's. Kaylyn testified that the Note and Deed of Trust were not paid off when the
Legacy loan was paid in full. Kaylyn testified there was supposed to be a modification of the
Note and Deed of Trust following the Woodinville sale so that the documents expressly included
both Evergreen loans. No other testimony showed that the Note and Deed of Trust were to be
modified. Kaylyn's testimony mirrored Tony's in terms of their explanation that the Evergreen
loans and the original amount on the Note were to be paid in full once the Bellevue home sold.
Kaylyn testified that she managed Mark's personal and business finances as well as Annie and
Tony's at the time the Hayden transaction and the sale of the Woodinville home took place.
However, Kaylyn was unable to testify to specific details of the transactions in a straightforward
manner; during cross-examination Kaylyn's answers to questions were often prefaced by a
restatement of her belief that Mark and Jennifer still owed Tony money. Kaylyn's credibility was
also at issue given her dual role managing both Mark's and Tony's finances. The Court found
that Kaylyn's testimony regarding the Hayden transaction, Evergreen loans, and the sale of
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Woodinville home was not supported by the evidence introduced at trial.

III.

LEGAL ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS

1. The Note and Deed of Trust are ambiguous and parol evidence is admissible to

determine the parties' intent.
"Whether a deed is ambiguous is a question oflaw, over which we exercise free review."
Baker v. KAL, LLC, 163 Idaho 530, 415 P.3d 939, 943 (2018) (quoting Ida-Therm, LLC v.
Bedrock Geothermal, LLC, 154 Idaho 6, 8, 293 P.3d 630, 632 (2012)). When the trial court

interprets a deed, ''the primary purpose is to seek and give effect to the real intentions of the
parties." Id (quoting Machado v. Ryan, 153 Idaho 212, 218, 280 P.3d 715, 721 (2012)). "If the
language of a deed is plain and unambiguous, the intention of the parties must be ascertained
from the deed itself and extrinsic evidence is not admissible." Id (citations omitted). If "a court
finds a document to be ambiguous, the court may consider parol evidence to discover the
drafter's intent." Id. (citing Porter v. Bassett, 146 Idaho 399, 404-05, 195 P.3d 1212, 1217-18
(2008)). "To determine whether a deed is ambiguous, it must be reviewed as a whole." Id
(citation omitted). "Uncertainties should be treated as ambiguities; such ambiguities are subject
to be cleared up by resort to the intention of the parties as gathered from the deed, from the
circumstances attending and leading up to its execution, from the subject matter, and from the
situation of the parties at the time." Id (quoting Benninger v. Derifield, 142 Idaho 486, 489, 129
P.3d 1235, 1238 (2006)). Generally, there are two types of ambiguities in a legal document:
patent and latent. Knipe Land Co. v. Robertson, 151 Idaho 449, 455, 259 P.3d 595, 601 (2011).
"A patent ambiguity is an ambiguity clear from the face of the instrument in question/' while a
"latent ambiguity exists where an instrument is clear on its face, but loses that clarity when
applied to the facts as they exist." Id (citing Cool v. Mountainview Landowners Coop. Ass 'n,
139 Idaho 770, 772-73, 86 P.3d 484, 486-87 (2004)).
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The Court determines the Note and Deed of Trust on the Hayden home contain a latent
ambiguity because the principal amount due under the Note is more than double the amount
Mark and Jennifer needed to purchase the subject property. The purchase price for the Hayden
home was $360,000, and $312,044 was needed to close on the home. The principal amount on
the Note is $648,500. It is clear that the Note and Deed of Trust do not reflect the entire
agreement of the parties because the Note and Deed of Trust, on their face, do not make sense.
Thus, it is appropriate for the Court to consider extrinsic evidence to determine the parties' intent
at the time the Note and Deed of Trust were signed. All of the parties in this litigation presented
extrinsic evidence of the parties' intent.
Further, the Note is a negotiable instrument under Idaho Code § 28-3-104(1) and is
governed by the Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC"), and, to the extent that the UCC does not
displace it, principles of the common law of contracts and equity still apply. In certain
circumstances, the UCC provides that other agreements may be considered when interpreting a
negotiable instrument. Idaho Code § 28-3-117, entitled "Other agreements affecting instrument,"
states, in pertinent part:
[T]he obligation of a party to an instrument to pay the instrument
may be modified, supplemented or nullified by a separate
agreement of the obligor and the person entitled to enforce the
instrument, if the instrument is issued or the obligation is incurred
in reliance on the agreement or as part of the same transaction
giving rise to the agreement. To the extent an obligation is
modified, supplemented or nullified by an agreement under this
section, the agreement is a defense to the obligation.
I.C. § 28-3-117. The official comment to Idaho Code § 28-3-117 explains that "[t]he separate
agreement might be a security agreement or mortgage or it might be an agreement that
contradicts the terms of the instrument." Id. "For example, a person may be induced to sign an
instrument under an agreement that the signer will not be liable on the instrument unless certain
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conditions are met." Id The comment explains that ''the agreement modifies the terms of the
note by stating a condition to the obligation ... to pay the note." Id It is appropriate for the
Court to consider extrinsic evidence to interpret the Note and Deed of Trust based on the
significant difference between the purchase price and amount needed to close the purchase on the
one hand and the Note and Deed of Trust on the other hand.

2. The Court determines that the parties' intent was for Mark's and Jennifer's
obligation under the Note and Deed of Trust to terminate once the Woodinville
home sold and the Legacy Loan was paid in full.
The parol evidence in this case supports Mark's and Jennifer's explanation for why the
principal amount in the Note and Deed of Trust were more than double the amount needed to
purchase the Hayden home. Kim Parker testified that the Note and Deed of Trust were drafted to
mirror the Legacy Loan. Mark and Jennifer were consistent in their account of the conversation
with Joe Mijich. Specifically, the Note and Deed of Trust needed to match the Legacy Loan
because the Legacy Loan was cross-collateralized by two other properties and the proceeds were
being used to purchase the Hayden home. The proceeds were also used to pay off the mortgage
on the Woodinville home which put Legacy Capital in a priority secured position on the
Woodinville home.
Jennifer and Mark testified that Joe Mijich's explanation of the Note and Deed of Trust
"made sense," and Jennifer and Mark signed the Note and Deed of Trust with the understanding
that the Hayden home would be "free and clear" when the Woodinville home sold and the
Legacy Loan was repaid. Despite Joe Mijich's statement that he never spoke to Mark after 5 p.m.
on September 3, 2014, Mark's phone records show a call from Mark's cell phone to Joe Mijich's
cell phone that lasted for ten minutes. The call was placed after the time Mark and Jennifer left
Pioneer Title Company. Further, Jennifer testified that she returned to Pioneer Title Company
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and signed the Note and Deed of Trust based on Joe Mijich's representations during a phone call
after she left Pioneer Title Company on September 3rd. Mark and Jennifer also testified that they
believed they did not owe money on the Note and Deed of Trust because the Legacy Loan had
been paid in full.
With respect to Joe Mijich's representations to Mark and Jennifer, it is well established
that "[t]he relationship between an attorney and client is one of agency,' in which the client is the
principal and the attorney is the agent." Caballero v. Wikse, 140 Idaho 329, 332, 92 P.3d 1076,
1079 (2004) (quoting Muncey v. Children's Home Finding and Aid Society ofLewiston, 84 Idaho
147, 151, 369 P.2d 586, 588 (1962)). "There is a presumption that an attorney-at-law, as an
officer of the court is, in general, duly authorized to act for a client whom he professes to
represent." Stout v. McNary, 75 Idaho 99, 104, 267 P.2d 625, 628 (1954); see also Storey v.

United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 32 Idaho 388, 183 P. 990, 991 (1919) ("[A]n attorney
has authority, by virtue of his employment as such, to do in behalf of his clients all acts, in or out
of court, necessary or incidental to the prosecution or management of the suit."). As the attorney
for Annie and Tony, Mr. Mijich was presumptively authorized to act on their behalf. Mr. Mijich
was acting as Annie's and Tony's agent during the Hayden transaction. Further, Tony told Mark
and Jennifer to speak with Mr. Mijich regarding the Note and Deed of Trust. As far as Mark and
Jennifer were concerned, Mr. Mijich was the attorney who was responsible for the Hayden
transaction. Thus, it was reasonable for Mark and Jennifer to rely on Mr. Mijich's
representations.
In contrast, Defendants' contention that Mark and Jennifer owe $851,784 on the Note
and Deed of Trust does not make sense. Defendants argue the advancement clause of the Deed of
Trust includes both Evergreen loans, interest payments, and other unrelated expenses. Idaho
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courts will only enforce a future advancement clause if the parties intended the mortgage to
cover future advancements. See Biersdorjf v. Brumfield, 93 Idaho 569, 572, 468 P.2d 301, 304
(1970). In Biersdorjf, the Idaho Supreme Court held that there was an agreement between the
parties that the mortgage would act "as security for debts owed and anticipated," and that the
mortgage would act as "a stop-gap to be delivered if Brumfield was unable to pay off his
indebtedness." Id at 570,468 P.2d at 302. The Biersdorjf court explained that the general rule is
"if the parties intended that there should be future advances secured by the mortgage, that
agreement protected the security of the lien for the subsequent advances." Id. at 572, 468 P .2d at
303. Thus, even though the mortgage itself "makes no reference to securing any subsequent
indebtedness," the Biersdorff court held that there was sufficient testimonial and documentary
evidence that the mortgage and note ''was given as security for monies owed to the plaintiff and
for payment of services to be advanced by plaintiff to said defendants." Id. at 571-72, 468 P.2d at
303-04.
In contrast to Biersdorjf, there is no credible evidence that the parties agreed that the
Hayden home would be used to secure subsequent refinances of the Via Venito or Woodinville
properties. The only testimony that remotely supports this theory is Kaylyn's and Tony's
testimony that the Note and Deed of Trust would be repaid when the Bellevue home sold.
However, no testimony or documentary evidence was produced that Mark and Jennifer and Tony
and Annie discussed future advancements or that the Hayden home could be used as collateral, at
the time the agreement was entered into, or subsequently. Further, there were no discussions
regarding refinancing the Legacy Loan prior to the closing on the Hayden home. There were no
discussions of refinancing the Legacy Loan until after the 90 day repayment period had expired
and Mark had made $6,000 to $7,000 interest payments for many months. Thus, even if the Deed

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON COURT TRIAL--23

Page 475

of Trust contains boilerplate language that includes an advancement clause, there is no evidence
that the parties intended the advancements clause to include the refinancing of the Legacy Loan
or the refinancing of other properties. The evidence introduced at trial shows that the parties'
intention was that the Hayden home would be "free and clear" once the Legacy Loan was paid in
full. Further, Defendants did not fully develop the advancements argument at trial or in closing
arguments, other than to make the conclusory statement that Mark and Jennifer failed to satisfy
the terms of the Note and Deed of Trust. Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs' Response to Closing
Arguments by Mark Porcello and Jennifer Porcello, at 5-6.

Defendants' reliance on Countrywide is misplaced. See Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs'
Closing Argument, at 12-13. In Countrywide, Bank of America reconveyed the Deed of Trust to

the borrower by mistake when a refinancing of the mortgage fell through. Countrywide Home
Loans, Inc. v. Sheets, 160 Idaho 268, 272, 371 P.3d 322, 327 (2016). The 2009 Refinancing at

issue did not close because the borrower claimed he had been offered different terms over the
phone by a loan officer, and thus refused to sign the refinancing paperwork when it arrived. The
Countrywide court held that the borrower would be unjustly enriched if he were to retain title to

the property due to an "erroneous reconveyance." Id. at 272, 371 P.3d at 327. The Countrywide
court held that "Sheets borrowed money from Bank of America, used the money to purchase
property for his own benefit and pledged that property to Bank of America as security for
repayment on the loan. It would be inequitable for Sheets to retain that property without
requiring that he fulfill his requirement to repay the loan." Id. The Countrywide court held it was
proper to reinstate the original deed and ordered the borrower to reconvey the deed back to Bank
of America. Id.
In contrast to Countrywide, the mortgage on the Hayden home was not refinanced. The
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Note and Deed of Trust matched the amount due on the Legacy Loan, which was paid in full. In
addition, Mark and Jennifer have met their obligation under the Note and Deed of Trust because
the Legacy Loan has been repaid. Jennifer and Mark signed the Note and Deed of Trust with the
understanding that their obligation under Note and Deed of Trust would be extinguished when
the Legacy Loan was paid in full. Thus, Jennifer would not be unjustly enriched by receiving the
deed to the Hayden home when the Note and Deed of Trust have been satisfied. The Court notes
that Annie and Tony were not out-of-pocket on the Hayden transaction but borrowed money to
allow Jennifer and Mark to purchase the Hayden home. Once the loan Annie and Tony obtained
was paid, Jennifer's and Mark's obligation to Annie and Tony was satisfied.
The Court determines that the parol evidence supports Mark and Jennifer's explanation
for the Note and Deed of Trust, and that the parties intended that Mark and Jennifer's obligation
under the Note and Deed of Trust would be satisfied when the Legacy Loan was paid in full.
Thus, Mark and Jennifer's obligation under the Legacy Loan was extinguished at the earliest
when the Legacy Loan was paid in full through the Second Evergreen Loan. At the latest, Mark
and Jennifer's obligation under the Note and Deed of Trust was extinguished when the
Woodinville home sold for $690,000 on July 29, 2015.

3. Defendants/Counter-Claimants are not entitled to judicial foreclosure on the Note
and Deed of Trust.
In order to foreclose on a promissory note or deed of trust, the grantor must have
defaulted on an obligation which is secured by the trust. See generally, Idaho Code §§ 451503(1) & 45-1505(2); Frazier v. Neilsen & Co., 115 Idaho 739, 741-42, 769 P.2d 1111, 111314 (1989).
In the present case, Mark and Jennifer satisfied their obligation under the Note and Deed
of Trust. Thus, Defendants/Counter-Claimants are not entitled to foreclosure.
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IV.

CONCLUSION

The Court found that the parties intended that once the Legacy Loan was paid, the Note
on the Hayden home would be satisfied. It is unnecessary for the Court to determine a precise
amount that Mark or Mark and Jennifer "owe" Tony and Annie based on investments, amounts
borrowed, closing expenses, renovation expenses, sweat equity, and other considerations. This is
not a business or marital dissolution. It may be that Mark and Jennifer ultimately got a better deal
than Tony and Annie. It is not the Court's duty to balance the books between the parties, but to
enforce the parties' agreement. Based on the Court's finding of the parties' intent, the Legacy
Loan was repaid in full, which in turn satisfied the Note on the Hayden home.

V.

ORDER

Plaintiff's/Counter-Defendant's request for declaratory judgment is GRANTED. The
Court declares that Plaintiff's obligation under the Note and Deed of Trust on the Hayden home
was satisfied when the Legacy Group Capital loan was paid in full when the Second Evergreen
Loan disbursed on July 21, 2015, and the proceeds from the sale of the Woodinville home
disbursed on July 30, 2015.
Defendants'/Counter-Claimants' request for a judicial foreclosure is DENIED.
Third-Party Defendant's request for a dismissal of Third-Party Plaintiffs' claims 1s
GRANTED.
DATED this

D!Ji;; of August, 2018.
BY THE COURT:
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following in the manner indicated on the _ _ day of August, 2018/
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JIM BRANNON
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Filed: 09/06/2018 16:32:43
First Judicial District, Kootenai County
Jim Brannon, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk - McCoy, Susan

Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
JENNIFER PORCELLO,
Plaintiff,

CASE NO. CV-2016-7343

JUDGMENT

vs.
ANTHONY J. PORCELLO and the Estate
of ANNIE C. PORCELLO, KALYN M.
PORCELLO, Personal Representative,
Defendants.
ANTHONY J. PORCELLO and the Estate of
ANNIE C. PORCELLO, KALYN M.
PORCELLO, Personal Representative,
Counter-Plaintiffs,
vs.
JENNIFER PORCELLO,
Counter-Defendant.
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ANTI-IONY J. PORCELLO and the Estate of
ANNIE C. PORCELLO, KALYN M.
PORCELLO, Personal Representative,
Third Party Plaintiffs,
vs.
MARK PORCELLO,
Third Party Defendant.

JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS:
1.

Plaintiffs Jennifer Porcello n/k/a Jem1ifer Maggard request for declaratory

judgment is GRANTED. The Court declares the following:
a.

That Plaintiffs obligation under the Promissory Note dated September 3,
2014, in the principal amount of $648,500.00, wherein Jennifer Porcello and
Mark Porcello were the makers and Anthony J. Porcello and Annie C. Porcello
were the holders, has been paid in full and is satisfied.

b.

That Plaintiff's obligation under the Deed of Trust securing the performance
of the above-described Promissory Note, which Deed of Trust was recorded on
September 4, 2014, as Instrument No. 2469098000, records of Kootenai
County, Idaho, has been satisfied and the real property encumbered by the
Deed of Trust is hereby released and reconveyed to Jennifer Porcello n/k/a
Jennifer Maggard as her sole and separate property.
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2.

Defendants'/Counter-Plain tiffs' request for a judicial foreclosure is DENIED.

Defendants'/Counter-Plain tiffs' claims against Plaintiff/Counter-Defenda nt arc dismissed
with prejudice.
3.

Third Party Defendant's request for a dismissal of Third-Party Plaintiffs' claim

is GRANTED. Third Party Plaintiffs' claims against Third Party Defendant are dismissed
with prejudice.
Signed: 9/5/2018 08:49 AM

DATED this _ _ day of _ _ _ __ _ _ _, 2018.

BY THE COURT:
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_ _ Facsimile (208) 664-6258
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info@madsenlawoffices.com
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_ _ Overnight Mail
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Facsimile
x
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Peter J. Smith IV
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_ _ Overnight Mail
Hand Delivered
_ _ Facsimile (208) 214-2416
x !Court Electronic Portal
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Te1rnnce R. Harris
Ramsden, Marfice,
Ealy & Harris, LLP
700 Northwest Blvd.
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814

US Mail
_ _ Overnight Mail
Hand Delivered
Facsimile (208) 664-5884
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nvigil@rmchlaw.com

to:
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CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT

Deputy Clerk
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Electronically Filed
10/12/2018 4:50 PM
First Judicial District, Kootenai County
Jim Brannon, Clerk of the Court
By: Debra Leu, Deputy Clerk

HENRY D. MADSEN
MADSEN LAW OFFICES, P.C.
1044 Northwest Blvd., Suite B
Coeur d’Alene, ID 83814
Telephone: (208) 664-8080
Facsimile: (208) 664-6258
Email: madsenlawcda@outlook.com
ISBN 4428
Attorney for Appellants Anthony J. Porcello
And the Estate of Annie C. Porcello, Kalyn M. Porcello,
Personal Representative
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
JENNIFER PORCELLO,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV-16-7343
NOTICE OF APPEAL

vs.
ANTHONY J. PORCELLO and the
Estate of ANNIE C. PORCELLO,
KALYN M. PORCELLO, Personal
Representative,
Defendants.
ANTHONY J. PORCELLO and the
Estate of ANNIE C. PORCELLO,
KALYN M. PORCELLO, Personal
Representative,
Counter-Plaintiffs,
vs.
JENNIFER PORCELLO,
Counter-Defendant.
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ANTHONY J. PORCELLO and the
Estate of ANNIE C. PORCELLO,
KALYN M. PORCELLO, Personal
Representative,
Third Party Plaintiffs,
vs.
MARK PORCELLO,
Third Party Defendant.
COMES NOW, Appellants ANTHONY J. PORCELLO and KALYN M. PORCELLO, as
personal representative of the Estate of ANNIE C. PORCELLO and the Estate of ANTHONY J.
PORCELLO (hereinafter “Anthony” and/or “Kalyn”), by and through their attorney of record,
Henry D. Madsen of the law firm of MADSEN LAW OFFICES, PC, and
TO:

THE
ABOVE
NAMED
RESPONDENT/PLAINTIFF/COUNTERCLAIM
DEFENDANT JENNIFER PORCELLO AND HER ATTORNEY OF RECORD
TERRANCE HARRIS, AND THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENT/THIRD
PARTY DEFENDANT, MARK PORCELLO AND HIS ATTORNEYS OF
RECORD JILLIAN H. CAIRES AND PETER J. SMITH, IV, AND THE CLERK
OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT:

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1.

The above named Appellants/Defendants/Counterclaim Defendants/Third Party

Plaintiffs, ANTHONY J. PORCELLO and KALYN M. PORCELLO, as personal
representative of the Estate of ANNIE C. PORCELLO and ANTHIONY J. PORCELLO,
by and through their attorney of record, HENRY D. MADSEN of the law firm of
MADSEN LAW OFFICES, PC,, appeals to the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho
pursuant to I.A.R. 11 against the above named Respondent/Plaintiff/Counterclaim
Defendant

JENNIFER

PORCELLO

and

the

above

named

Third

Party

Defendant/Respondent MARK PORCELLO, from the FINAL JUDGMENT entered on
September 6, 2018.
2.

That this appeal is taken upon matters of law and fact.

3.

That the proceedings from which appellant hereby appeals were recorded by the
court clerk.
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4. ISSUES ON APPEAL: A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal that the
Appellants intend to assert in the appeal is set forth below; provided, any such list of
issues on appeal shall not prevent the Appellants from asserting other issues on appeal:
a. Did

the

District

Judge

err

in

entering

Judgment

in

favor

of

Respondent/Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant JENNIFER PORCELLO and
Respondent/Third Party Defendant MARK PORCELLO and entering Judgment
against Appellants/Defendants/Counterclaim Defendants/Third Party Plaintiffs,
ANTHONY J. PORCELLO and KALYN M. PORCELLO, as personal
representative of the Estate of ANNIE C. PORCELLO?;
b. Did the District Judge, sitting as the trier-of-fact, abuse her discretion and or err in
application of the law as to the evidence in the above matter?;
c. Did the District Judge err by denying ANTHONY and KAYLN PORCELLO’s
Motion for Disqualification made during trial?;
d. Did the District Judge err by denying ANTHONY AND KALYN’s Motion for a
Mistrial?
5. No order has been entered sealing all or any portion of the record.
6. The entire reporter's standard transcript of all hearings is requested in both hard copy and
electronic format pursuant to Rule 25(a), I.A.R. Said hearings are listed below in
SECTION 8: TRANSCRIPTS.
7. DOCUMENTS: The Appellant requests the following documents to be included in the
clerk's record, in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, I.A.R.:
a.

10/5/2016

b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
i.
j.

11/14/2016
12/06/2016
12/06/2016
12/07/2016
12/06/2016
2/13/2017
2/14/2017
3/3/2017
5/16/2017

k.

12/29/2017

l.

12/29/2017

Verified Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, Injunctive Relief and
Damages
Declaration of Henry D. Madsen
Declaration of Kalyn Porcello
Declaration of Joe T. Mijich
Affidavit of Henry D. Madsen
Declaration of Judge Terrance A. Carroll
Answer, Counterclaim and Third Party Complaint
Errata (exhibits for Counterclaim and Third Party Complaint)
Counter-Defendant Jennifer Porcello’s Answer to Counterclaim
Mark Porcello’s Answer to Third Party Complaint
Memorandum in Support of Petitioner’s Defendants Motion for Summary
Judgment
Affidavit in Support of Motion

NOTICE OF APPEAL

-3

Page 486

m. 12/29/2017
n.

12/29/2017

o.

12/29/2017

p.

12/29/2017

q.

03/05/2018

r.

03/19/2018

s.

03/20/2018

t.
u.
v.
w.
x.
y.
z.
aa.
bb.

4/9/2018
4/9/2018
4/9/2018
4/16/2018
4/16/2018
4/17/2018
4/26/2018
5/2/2018
5/3/2018

cc.

5/17/2018

dd.
ee.

5/17/2018
6/11/2018

ff.

6/25/2018

gg.
hh.
ii.

8/17/2018

Affidavit of Linda Lourey, CPA, in Support of Defendant’s Motion for
Summary Judgment
Affidavit of Henry D. Madsen in Support of Defendant’s Motion for
Summary Judgment
Affidavit of Robert Jones, CPA, in support of Defendant’s Motion for
Summary Judgment
Statement of Undisputed Facts
Memorandum Decision and Order Denying Defendant’s Motion for
Summary Judgment
Defendant’s Motion for Reconsideration/Clarification
Defendant’s Memorandum in Support of Motions:
Reconsideration/Clarification; and Motion to Amend the Pleadings
Stipulated Joint Exhibit List
Defendants’ Trial Exhibit List
Defendants’ Trial Witness List
Verified Amended Answer, Counterclaim and Third Party Complaint
Defendants’ Pre-Trial Brief
Defendants’ Amended Trial Exhibit List
Jennifer Porcello’s Reply to Amended Counterclaim
Mark Porcello’s Answer to Amended Third Party Complaint
Defendants’ Memorandum of Law Re: IRE 408 Issue
Memorandum Decision and Order on Defendants’ Motion for Admission
of Letter
Defendants’ Memorandum of Law Re: Linda Lourey
Defendants’ Post-Trial Closing Argument Brief
Defendants’ Post-Trial Response to Mark Porcello’s Post-Trial Closing
Brief
Memorandum Decision and Order on Court Trial
Deposition Transcript of Scott Rerucha
Depositon Transcript of Joseph Mijich

8. TRANSCRIPTS: The following transcripts pertaining to this appeal have been requested
from Official Court Reporter Diane Bolan, Official Court Reporter for Judge Meyer
(Phone: 208-446-1135/Fax: 208-446-1188). Appellant is presently waiting for
information from the Official Court Reporter (amount due and estimated pages).
Additional Court Reporters may be added at a later date once those reporters are
discovered.

A
B
C

Hearing
Date
4/23/2018
4/24/2018
4/25/2018
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Hearing Information
Court Trial (D. Bolan)
Court Trial (D. Bolan)
Court Trial (D. Bolan)
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D
E
F
G
H
9.

4/26/2018
5/21/2018
5/22/2018
5/23/2018
5/24/2018

Court Trial (D. Bolan)
Court Trial (Emergency Declared—No Reporter only Audio Recorded)
Court Trial (Emergency Declared—No Reporter only Audio Recorded)
Court Trial (Emergency Declared—No Reporter only Audio Recorded)
Court Trial (Emergency Declared—No Reporter only Audio Recorded)

I certify:
a. That a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on the reporter.
b. That the Clerk of the District Court estimated fee for preparation of the
reporter's transcript but as a result of the amendment herein there will be further
estimate.
c. That there has been an estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record which
has been paid but there may be further fees required as a result of this amendment.
Pursuant to instructions provided to the Appellant, the Court will notify Appellant
of estimated fee and said fee will be immediately paid.
d. That the appellate filing fee has been paid.
e. That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to
Rule 83, of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.

DATED this 12th day of October, 2018.

MADSEN LAW OFFICES, P.C.
Attorney for Appellants
By:/s/Henry D. Madsen
HENRY D. MADSEN
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 12th day of October, 2018, I caused to be served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF APPEAL by the method indicated below, and
addressed to the following:
Terrance R. Harris
RAMSDEN, MARFICE,
EALY & HARRIS
NOTICE OF APPEAL

√ Via iCourt Electronic Service
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Attorney for Jennifer Porcello (Maggard)
Jillian H. Caires
Peter J. Smith IV
Smith + Malek, PLLC
Attorneys for Mark Porcello

√ Via iCourt Electronic Service

MADSEN LAW OFFICES, P.C.
/s/JM
Jan Madsen, Paralegal
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Filed: 12/10/2018 17:31:03
First Judicial District, Kootenai County
Jim Brannon, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk - Larsen, Denice

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
JENNIFER PORCELLO,
Plaintiff,

CASE NO. CV-2016-7343

V.

ANTHONY J. PORCELLO and the Estate of
ANNIE C. PORCELLO, KALYN M.
PORCELLO, Personal Representative
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR ATTORNEY'S
FEES AND COSTS

ANTHONY J. PORCELLO and the Estate of
ANNIE C. PORCELLO, KALYN M.
PORCELLO, Personal Representative,
Counter-Plaintiffs,
V.

JENNIFER PORCELLO,
Counter-Defendant.

ANTHONY J. PORCELLO and the Estate of
ANNIE C. PORCELLO, KALYN M.
PORCELLO, Personal Representative,
Third Party Plaintiffs,
V.

MARK PORCELLO,
Third Party Defendant

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES AND
COSTS --1

Page 490

INTRODUCTION
On September 6, 2018, Plaintiff Jennifer Porcello filed a Motion for Attorney's Fees and
Costs supported by a Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees and the Affidavit of Terrance R.
Harris. On October 24, 2018, Plaintiffs motion came on for hearing before the Honorable Judge
Cynthia K.C. Meyer. Plaintiff was represented by Terrance R. Harris of RAMSDEN, MARFICE,
EALY & HARRIS, LLP. Defendants Anthony Porcello, the Estate of Anne Porcello, and
Personal Representative Kalyn Porcello were represented by Henry D. Madsen of MADSEN
LAW OFFICES, P.C. For the reasons discussed below, and subject to the adjustments noted
herein, Plaintiffs request for attorney fees and costs is granted pursuant to Idaho Code § 12120(3) and Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The factual and procedural history of this case is discussed at length in the Court's
August 17, 2018 order. See Memorandum Decision and Order on Court Trial. On September 6,
2018, a judgment was entered that declared that Plaintiffs obligation under the note "has been
paid in full and is satisfied." Judgment. The judgment also dismissed Defendants' counterclaim
against Plaintiff with prejudice. On October 12, 2018, Defendants filed a Notice of Appeal of the
Court's August 17, 2018 order regarding Plaintiffs case, Defendants' counterclaim and third
party claim.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
"The district court's determination of prevailing party status for the purpose of awarding
attorney fees and costs is within the trial court's sound discretion, and will not be disturbed on
appeal unless there is an abuse of discretion." Thornton v. Pandrea, 161 Idaho 301, 315, 385
P.3d 856, 870 (2016) (quoting Hobson Fabricating Corp. v. SEIZ Const., LLC, 154 Idaho 45, 49,
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES AND
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294 P.3d 171, 175 (2012)). To determine whether the district court abused its discretion, the
reviewing court evaluates whether the district court: "(I) correctly perceived the issue as one of
discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with
relevant legal standards; and (4) reached its decision by an exercise of reason." Safaris
Unlimited, LLC v. Von Jones, 163 Idaho 874, 421 P.3d 205, 210 (2018) (citing Lunneborg v. My
Fun Life, 168 Idaho 856,421 P.3d 187, 194 (2018)).

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff seeks an award of costs as a matter of right pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil
Procedure 54(d)(l)(C) and an award of attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 12-120(3) and
12-121. Defendants argue that Plaintiff is not entitled to an award of attorney fees under Idaho
Code §§ 12-120(3) because the note is not a negotiable instrument; or that it is not a negotiable
instrument related to the purchase or sale of goods, wares, or merchandise. Defendants argue that
Plaintiff is not entitled to an award of attorney fees under Idaho Code § 12-121 because
Defendants claims were not defended, or pursued frivolously, unreasonably or without
foundation. Each argument is discussed in turn.
I.

Plaintiff is one of the prevailing parties in this action under Rule 54(d)(l)(B)
and is entitled to costs as a matter of right in the amount of $2,252.17.

"Except when otherwise limited by these rules, costs are allowed as a matter of right to
the prevailing party or parties, unless otherwise ordered by the court." I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(A). "In
determining which party to an action is a prevailing party and entitled to costs, the trial court
must, in its sound discretion, consider the final judgment or result of the action in relation to the
relief sought by the respective parties." I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(B). "In any civil action the court may
award reasonable attorney fees, including paralegal fees, to the prevailing party or parties as
defined in Rule 54(d)(l)(B), when provided for by any statute or contract." I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l). "In
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determining which party to an action is a prevailing party . . . the trial court must, in its sound
discretion, consider the final judgment or result of the action in relation to the relief sought by
the respective parties." I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(B). Generally, "there are three principal factors to
consider in the prevailing party analysis: (1) the final or result obtained in relation to the relief
sought; (2) whether there were multiple claims or issues between the parties; and (3) the extent to
which each of the parties prevailed on each of the claims or issues." City of Middleton v.
Coleman Homes, LLC, 163 Idaho 716,418 P.3d 1225, 1231 (2018) (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted). The prevailing party determination is takes into account the action as a whole
and "is not to be examined claim-by-claim." Id (citing Eighteen Mile Ranch, LLC v. Nord
Excavating & Paving, Inc., 141 Idaho 716, 719, 117 P.3d 130, 133 (2005)).

Plaintiff was one of the prevailing parties in this case under Rule 54(d)(l)(B) because the
court trial resulted in a declaratory judgment that the note at issue in this case was paid in full
and in the dismissal of Defendants' counterclaim against Plaintiff. Defendants did not prevail on
any of their claims against Plaintiff. Further, the relief sought by Defendants - judicial
foreclosure - was not obtained. Plaintiff successfully obtained the relief she sought: a declaration
that no amount was due and owing on the note and the dismissal of Defendants' counterclaim
against her. Thus, Plaintiff is a prevailing party for the purposes of Rule 54(d)(l)(B). Further,
Defendants do not dispute that Plaintiff is a prevailing party, subject to appeal. Objection to
Jennifer Porcello 's Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs, at 3.

"The award of costs as a matter of right and discretionary costs is subject to the trial
court's discretion." Great Plains Equipment, Inc. v. Northwest Pipeline Corp., 136 Idaho 466,
474, 36 P.3d 218, 226 (2001). Generally, the prevailing party is entitled to certain costs as a
matter of right, including the cost of "court filing fees;" "actual fees for service of any pleading
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or document in the action;" "charges for reporting and transcribing of a deposition taken in
preparation for trial of an action, whether or not read into evidence in the trial of an action;" and
"charges for one (1) copy of any deposition taken by any parties to the action in preparation for
trial of the action." I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(C); see generally Valiant Idaho, LLC v. North Idaho

Resorts, LLC, 164 Idaho 222,428 P.3d 800, 807-808 (2018).
Plaintiff requests costs as a matter of right in the amount of $2,252.17. This amount
includes court filing fees, service fees, and charges related to the cost of recording and
transcribing the depositions of Jennifer Porcello, Joseph Mijich, Anthony Porcello, and Scott
Rerucha, and the cost of obtaining one copy of each deposition. Plaintiffs' Memorandum of

Costs and Attorney's Fees, at 5-6. Plaintiffs are entitled to these costs as a matter of right under
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(l)(C)(i)-(ii) and subsections (x)-(xi). Further, Defendants do
not dispute the costs claimed by Plaintiff. Objection, at 3. Plaintiff did not seek an award of
discretionary costs under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(l)(D).
II.

Plaintiff is entitled to an award of attorney fees under Idaho Code § 12120(3) because the gravamen of Defendants' counterclaim was to recover on
a promissory note.

Plaintiff seeks an award of attorney fees under Idaho Code § 12-120(3 ). Idaho Code § 12120(3) provides for an award of attorney fees to the prevailing party:
In any civil action to recover on an open account, account stated,
note, bill, negotiable instrument, guaranty, or contract relating to
the purchase or sale of goods, wares, merchandise, or services and
in any commercial transaction unless otherwise provided by law,
the prevailing party shall be allowed a reasonable attorney's fee to
be set by the court, to be taxed and collected as costs.
The term 'commercial transaction' is defined to mean all
transactions except transactions for personal or household
purposes. The term 'party' is defined to mean any person,
partnership, corporation, association, private organization, the state
of Idaho or political subdivision thereof.
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LC.§ 12-120(3).
"Boise Truck governs the construction of LC. § 12-120(2). Although Boise Truck

involved an action to recover on an open account, rather than an action on a promissory note, the
analysis remains the same." Cheney v. Smith, 108 Idaho 209, 210, 697 P.2d 1223, 1224 (Ct. App.
1985) overruled on other grounds by BECO Construction Co., Inc. v. J-U-B Engineers, Inc., 149
Idaho 294,233 P.3d 1216 (2010) (LC. § 12-120(2) was later renumbered as LC. § 12-120(3)). In
Boise Truck, the Idaho Court of Appeals adopted a "'plain meaning' view of the statute," and

determined that "[t]he words 'relating to the purchase or sale of goods, wares, or merchandise'
plainly modify only the words 'or contract' which immediately precede that phrase and which
are separated from the remainder of the sentence by a comma not otherwise required by modem
English usage." Boise Truck & Equipment, Inc. v. Hafer Logging, Inc., 107 Idaho 824, 825, 693
P.2d 470, 471 (Ct. App. 1984). Thus, "the phrase does not modify the other types of action
identified by the statute-actions on open account, account stated, note, bill or negotiable
instrument." Id
Subsequent decisions by the Idaho Court of Appeals and the Idaho Supreme Court have
interpreted Idaho Code§ 12-120(3) to mandate "an award of reasonable attorney fees, set by the
court, to the prevailing party in a civil action brought to recover on a note." Spidell v. Jenkins,
111 Idaho 857, 860, 727 P.2d 1285, 1288 (Ct. App. 1986) overruled on other grounds by BECO
Construction Co., Inc. v. J-U-B Engineers, Inc., 149 Idaho 294, 233 P.3d 1216 (2010)

(discussing prior version of LC. § 12-120(3), numbered as LC. § 12-120(2)); Bream v.
Benscoter, 139 Idaho 364, 369, 79 P.3d 723, 728 (2003). When the gravamen of the present

action is the right to recover on a promissory note then an award of attorney fees under Idaho
Code§ 12-120(3) is appropriate. Zener v. Ve/de, 135 Idaho 352, 357, 17 P.3d 296, 301 (Ct. App.
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2000). Further, "[a]ttorney fees are awardable under Idaho Code § 12-120(3) for successfully
defending against an action to recover on a note." Bream v. Benscoter, 139 Idaho 364, 369, 79
P.3d 723, 728 (2003).
In Bream v. Benscoter, the Idaho Supreme Court distinguished between an award of
attorney fees under Idaho Code § 12-120(3) for defending against an action to recover in a
commercial transaction and defending against an action to recover on a note. 139 Idaho 364, 369,
79 P.3d 723, 728 (2003). The district court in Bream found that the defendants were entitled to
an award of attorney fees under Idaho Code§ 12-120(3) because "the core issue in this case was
Bream's claim to collect on a promissory note," and because the complaint "was an action to
recover in a commercial transaction and because it was an action to recover on a note." Id. The
plaintiff in Bream alleged that "the district court erred because there was no commercial
transaction between him and the Benscoters," but did not challenge the district court's finding
that the case was an action to recover on a note. Id. The Bream court concluded that "the district
court's alternative holding that this was an action to recover on a note" meant that it need not
"consider whether the district court erred in holding that this was an action on a commercial
transaction." Id.
Defendants argue Plaintiff is not entitled to an award of attorney fees under Idaho Code §
12-120(3) because the note at issue in this case is not part of a commercial transaction. This
argument is unavailing. As the Bream case makes clear, an action to recover on a note and
whether the note was part of a commercial transaction form two separate bases for an award of
attorney fees under Idaho Code§ 12-120(3). Thus, the Court need not consider whether the note
was part of a commercial transaction in order to award attorney fees under Idaho Code § 12-
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120(3). Plaintiff is entitled to an award of reasonable attorney fees under Bream because she
successfully defended against Defendants' attempt to recover on a note.
Defendants also argue that the note at issue in this case is not a negotiable instrument
under Idaho Code § 28-3-104 and that Plaintiff cannot be awarded attorney fees under Idaho
Code § 12-120(3) unless the note is a negotiable instrument that is related "to the purchase or
sale of goods, wares, merchandise, or services." Objection to Mark Porcello 's Motion for
Attorney Fees and Costs, at 5-6. The Court determined that the note was a negotiable instrument

pursuant to Idaho Code§ 28-3-104(1) as part of its order following the court trial in this case and
sees no reason to revise that ruling now. Memorandum Decision and Order on Court Trial, at 20.
Further, Defendants' interpretation of Idaho Code § 12-120(3) is incorrect because a negotiable
instrument need not be related to the purchase or sale of goods, wares, merchandise, or services
for the purposes of awarding attorney fees under this section. See Boise Truck & Equipment, Inc.
v. Hafer Logging, Inc., 107 Idaho 824,825,693 P.2d 470,471 (Ct. App. 1984). Thus, Plaintiff is

entitled to an award of attorney fees under Idaho Code § 12-120(3) because the note is a
negotiable instrument. Alternatively, even if the note at issue is not a negotiable instrument,
because the gravamen of the lawsuit concerned a note, Plaintiff is entitled to an award of
reasonable attorney fees under Idaho Code§ 12-120(3).

III.

Plaintiff is entitled to a reasonable award of attorney fees in the amount of
$69,244.50 under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e) and Idaho Code§ 12120(3).

Under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e), "the court may award reasonable attorney
fees, including paralegal fees, to the prevailing party or parties as defined in Rule 54(d)(l)(B),
when provided for by any statute or contract." I.R.C.P. 54(e). "[F]ees may only be awarded for
costs associated with attorney and paralegal work, distinguishing such costs from those incurred
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for clerical work." P.O. Ventures, Inc. v. Loucks Family Irrevocable Trust, 144 Idaho 233, 239,
159 P.3d 870, 876 (2007). "[T]he calculation of a reasonable attorney fee is within the trial
court's discretion." H20 Environmental, Inc. v. Farm Supply Distributors, Inc., 429 P.3d 183,
187 (2018) (quoting Bailey v. Bailey, 153 Idaho 526,529,284 P.3d 970,973 (2012)).
When awarding attorney fees, the district court must consider the following factors:
(A) the time and labor required;
(B) the novelty and difficulty of the questions;
(C) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly and the
experience and ability of the attorney in the particular field of law;
(D) the prevailing charges for like work;
(E) whether the fee is fixed or contingent;
(F) the time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances
of the case;
(G) the amount involved and the results obtained;
(H) the undesirability of the case;
(I) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the

client;
(J) awards in similar cases;

(K) the reasonable cost of automated legal research, if the court
finds it was reasonably necessary in preparing a party's case; and
(L) any other factor which the court deems appropriate in the
particular case.
See I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3). "[T]he law is clearly settled that when awarding attorney fees in a civil
action, the district court must consider the I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3) factors, but need not make specific
written findings on the various factors." Poole v. Davis, 153 Idaho 604, 606, 288 P.3d 821, 823
(2012) (quoting Lee v. Nickerson, 146 Idaho 5, 11, 189 P.3d 467, 473 (2008)). Further, "a court
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need not blindly accept the figures advanced by the attorney and may disallow fees that were
unnecessarily and unreasonably incurred." Action Collection Services, Inc., v. Bingham, 146
Idaho 286, 290, 192 P .3d 1110, 1114 (Ct. App. 2008).
Plaintiff seeks an award of attorney fees in the amount of $70,277. The hourly rate,
approximate hours, and total fees charged to Plaintiff are as follows:
Timekeeper
Terrance R. Harris
Partner
Nathan Ohler,
Associate
Alice Rickett,
Paralegal
Jan Johnson,
Paralegal
Nicole Vigil,
Paralegal

Hourly Rate Time (hours)
$250
266.4

Cost
$66,600

$200

4.8

$960

$95

5.0

$475

$95

0.1

$9.50

$95

23.5

$2,232.5

Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Costs and Attorney's Fees, at 6.
Defendants argue that the total amount of attorney fees requested is "exorbitant" or
unreasonable for various reasons. On the whole, the Court found the vast majority of
Defendants' objections to be without merit. Defendants' comparison of Plaintiffs' attorney fees
to Third Party Defendant's attorney fees is unavailing given that Third Party Defendant came
late to the case and Plaintiffs attorney stated that he "took the laboring oar" in this case. The
Court agrees that counsel for Plaintiff did so in this case, based on the Court's observations at
trial and throughout the case.
Further, Defendants object to several time entries as a "Not related to Anthony and
Annie" and "duplicative" without further explanation. See Ex. A. Some of the entries involved
communication between Plaintiffs counsel and counsel for Third Party Defendant. It appears to
the Court that Defendants are objecting to these entries because there is the possibility that both
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attorneys for the Plaintiff and the Third Party Defendant are billing for conversations they had.
The Court is not persuaded that these time entries should be struck merely because they relate to
multiple parties, given that the work done by counsel for Plaintiff and counsel for Third Party
Defendant was a necessary part of this litigation. Plaintiffs counsel spent a minimal amount of
time reviewing documents related to the third party claim, and it was reasonable for Plaintiffs
counsel to be cognizant of developments in Third Party Defendant's case. Defendants' argument
that those fees "should be brought against Mark" is wholly without merit. Id at 11.
Defendants object to an award of attorney fees for work related to the "non-judicial
foreclosure" or "stipulated injunction." See Ex. A. The parties stipulated to terminate the nonjudicial foreclosure on December 14, 2016. However, Defendants object to time entries ranging
from October 5, 2016 to January 5, 2017. The first hearing in this case was not held until
October 14, 2016, and the stipulated injunction referenced by Defendants was not signed by both
parties until December 14, 2016. Thus several of Defendants' objections for time related to the
"stipulated injunction" are unavailing because they involve work by Plaintiffs counsel that
ultimately led to the stipulation being entered into in the first place. However, the Court did
reduce the amount of attorney fees for work related to the non-judicial foreclosure after the
stipulation was entered.
Defendants object to several time entries as constituting "clerical" or "secretarial work."
Objection, at 11. After an examination of the time entries, the Court did reduce the amount of

attorney fees to eliminate certain time entries that appeared to the court to constitute "clerical
work."
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The Court reduced the total award of attorney fees as follows:

Harris

Hourly
Rate
10/11/2016 250

Original
Time
0.8

Adjusted
Time
0.6

Original Adjusted
Amount Amount
200
150

Harris
Harris
Harris
Ohler
Ohler
Ohler
Ohler
Ohler
Rickett
Rickett
Rickett
Rickett
Rickett
Rickett
Rickett
Vigil
Vigil
Vigil

10/24/2016
10/25/2016
12/15/2016
6/28/2016
7/27/2016
8/05/2016
8/26/2016
8/29/2016
10/05/2016
10/7/2016
11/21/2016
11/28/2016
12/07/2016
2/22/2017
3/03/3017
1/02/2018
3/19/2018
3/27/2018

250
250
250
200
200
200
200
200
95
95
95
95
95
95
95
95
95
95

0.4
0.2
0.3
0.2
0.1
0.3
0.1
0.3
1.2
0.5
0.6
0.8
0.2
0.5
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.9

0.2
0
0
0.1
0
0.1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.3

100
50
75
40
20
60
20
60
114
47.5
57
76
19
47.5
47.5
38
28.5
85.5

50
0
0
20
0
20
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
28.5

Vigil
Vigil
Vigil

4/02/2018
4/04/2018
4/09/2018

95
95
95

0.2
0.3
4.0

0
0
3.6

19
28.5
380

0
0
342

Timekeeper

Date

Reason for
reduction
Partially
related to
divorce
Divorce
Divorce
Stipulation
Divorce
Divorce
Divorce
Collections
Collections
Clerical
Clerical
Clerical
Clerical
Clerical
Clerical
Clerical
Clerical
Clerical
Partially
clerical
Clerical
Clerical
Partially
clerical

The total award of attorney fees was reduced by $1,002.50. The attorney fees were adjusted to
account for fees incurred related to collections or clerical work and to work done after the
stipulation to terminate the non-judicial foreclosure was entered. After the adjustment, the total
amount of attorney fees is $69,274.50.
The Court determines that the above amount of attorney fees is reasonable based on the
Rule 54(e) factors. The time and labor spent on Plaintiff's case was reasonable, taking into
account Plaintiff's pursuit of the original claim and defense against a counterclaim, the pretrial
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process, and the eight-day court trial. The attorney fees accrued on an hourly basis and were not
subject to a fixed fee or fixed rate. Although this case did not necessarily present novel legal
questions, it raised difficult factual questions that involved untangling a web of complex familial
relationships and agreements. Of note is the amount at issue and the results obtained. As the case
progressed, the amount allegedly owed by Plaintiff increased from $648,500 to approximately
$851,784. Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs' Closing Argument, at 25.

Ultimately, Plaintiff

obtained a declaratory judgment that stated no amount was due and owing on the note, as well as
the dismissal of Defendants' counterclaim against her. Counsel for Plaintiff was admitted to the
bar in Idaho in 1991 and has experience in the area of civil litigation. Affidavit of Terrance R.
Harris in Support of Plaintiff's Motion/or Attorney's Fees and Costs, at 3.

The attorney and paralegal fees charged by Plaintiff is consistent with the prevailing rate
for like work. Id at 4. Counsel for Plaintiff did work under a time constraint in the beginning of
the case due to the need to obtain a preliminary injunction to stop the non-judicial foreclosure.
Id However, the parties eventually stipulated to terminate the non-judicial foreclosure, and

Plaintiff did not impose any other time constraints on counsel. Counsel for Plaintiff explained
that the case could be considered undesirable based on Plaintiffs "limited financial resources"
and inability to pay a retainer. Id at 5. The factors related to attorney fee awards in similar cases
and to computer assisted legal research were not determinative. Thus, after taking into account
the Rule 54(e) factors, the Court determines that Plaintiff is entitled to an award of attorney fees
in the amount of $69,274.50.
The Court need not reach Plaintiffs alternative argument for an award of attorney fees
under Idaho Code § 12-121 because it has awarded attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 12120(3).
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CONCLUSION

For the above stated reasons, Plaintiff is entitled to an award of costs as a matter of right
in the amount of $2,252.17 under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(l)(C), and an award of
reasonable attorney fees in the amount of $69,244.50 under Idaho Code § 12-120(3) and Idaho
Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e).

ORDER:

Based on the foregoing and good cause appearing therefore,
IT IS HERBY ORDERED, that:
Plaintiffs Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs is granted pursuant to Idaho Code§ 12120(3) and Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(l)(B), (d)(l)(C), and (e).
Plaintiff is entitled to an award of costs as a matter of right in the amount of $2,252.17.
Plaintiff is entitled to an award of attorney fees in the amount of $69,274.50.

DATED t h i s ~ of December, 2018.
BY THE COURT:
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was placed in the
courthouse mailing system, postage prepaid, inter office mail, or by facsimile on the __ day of
December, 2018, to:
Signed: 12/10/2018 05:31 PM
Terrance R. Harris
RAMSDEN, MARFICE, EALY & HARRIS
Attorney for Plaintiff
rharri s(ii;nnehla \V. com
Peter Smith
SMITH + MALEK, PLLC
Attorney for Third Party Defendant
peter<~1)smithmalek.com

William Christopher Pooser
STOEL RIVES LLP
Attorney for Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs/Third Party Plaintiffs
christopher.pooser(<i1stoel.com

Anna E. Courtney
STOEL RIVES LLP
Attorney for Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs/Third Party Plaintiffs
anna.courtnev(~i~stoel .com
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Filed: 12/10/2018 17:32:15
First Judicial District, Kootenai County
Jim Brannon, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk - Larsen, Denice

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
JENNIFER PORCELLO,
Plaintiffe,

CASE NO. CV-2016-7343

V.

ANTHONY J. PORCELLO and the Estate of
ANNIE C. PORCELLO, KALYN M.
PORCELLO, Personal Representative
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER ON THIRD PARTY
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR
COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES

ANTHONY J. PORCELLO and the Estate of
ANNIE C. PORCELLO, KALYN M.
PORCELLO, Personal Representative,
Counter-Plaintiffe,
V.

JENNIFER PORCELLO,
Counter-Defendant.

ANTHONY J. PORCELLO and the Estate of
ANNIE C. PORCELLO, KALYN M.
PORCELLO, Personal Representative,
Third Party Plaintiffe,
V.

MARK PORCELLO,
Third Party Defendant
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INTRODUCTION

On August 31, 2018, Third Party Defendant Mark Porcello filed a Motion for Costs and
Attorney fees supported by Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees and the Declaration of
Peter J. Smith IV. On October 24, 2018, Third Party Defendant's motion came on for hearing
before the Honorable Judge Cynthia K.C. Meyer. Third Party Defendant was represented by
Jillian Caires of SMITH + MALEK, PLLC. Third Party Plaintiffs Anthony Porcello, the Estate
of Anne Porcello, and Personal Representative Kalyn Porcello were represented by Henry D.
Madsen of MADSEN LAW OFFICES, P.C. For the reasons discussed below, and subject to the
adjustments noted herein, Third Party Defendant's request for attorney fees is granted pursuant
to Idaho Code§ 12-120(3).
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The factual and procedural history of this case is discussed at length in the Court's
August 17, 2018 order. See Memorandum Decision and Order on Court Trial. On September 6,
2018, a judgment was entered which dismissed Third Party Plaintiffs' claims against Third Party
Defendant. On October 12, 2018, Third Party Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Appeal of the Court's
August 17, 2018 order regarding Plaintiffs case, Defendants' counterclaim and third party
claim.
STANDARD OF REVIEW

"The district court's determination of prevailing party status for the purpose of awarding
attorney fees and costs is within the trial court's sound discretion, and will not be disturbed on
appeal unless there is an abuse of discretion." Thornton v. Pandrea, 161 Idaho 301, 315, 385
P.3d 856, 870 (2016) (quoting Hobson Fabricating Corp. v. SEIZ Const., LLC, 154 Idaho 45, 49,
294 P.3d 171, 175 (2012)). To determine whether the district court abused its discretion, the
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reviewing court evaluates whether the district court: "(1) correctly perceived the issue as one of
discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with
relevant legal standards; and (4) reached its decision by an exercise of reason." Safaris
Unlimited, LLC v. Von Jones, 163 Idaho 874,421 P.3d 205,210 (2018) (citing Lunneborg v. My
Fun Life, 168 Idaho 856,421 P.3d 187, 194 (2018)).
DISCUSSION

Third Party Defendant seeks an award of attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 12120(3 ), 12-121, and 12-123. Third Party Plaintiffs argue that Third Party Defendant is not
entitled to an award of attorney fees under Idaho Code §§ 12-120(3) because the note is not a
negotiable instrument; or that it is not a negotiable instrument related to the purchase or sale of
goods, wares, or merchandise. Third Party Plaintiffs argue that Third Party Defendant is not
entitled to an award of attorney fees under Idaho Code§§ 12-121 or 12-123 because Third Party
Plaintiffs' claims were not pursued frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation. Further,
with respect to Idaho Code§ 12-123, Third Party Plaintiffs also argue that Third Party Defendant
failed to cite to any argument or authority in support of an award under that section. Each
argument is discussed in turn.
I.

Third Party Defendant Mark Porcello is one of the prevailing parties in this
action under Rule 54(d)(l)(B).

"In any civil action the court may award reasonable attorney fees, including paralegal
fees, to the prevailing party or parties as defined in Rule 54(d)(l)(B), when provided for by any
statute or contract." I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l). "In determining which party to an action is a prevailing
party . . . the trial court must, in its sound discretion, consider the final judgment or result of the
action in relation to the relief sought by the respective parties." I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(B). Generally,
"there are three principal factors to consider in the prevailing party analysis: (1) the final or result
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obtained in relation to the relief sought; (2) whether there were multiple claims or issues between
the parties; and (3) the extent to which each of the parties prevailed on each of the claims or
issues." City of Middleton v. Coleman Homes, LLC, 163 Idaho 716,418 P.3d 1225, 1231 (2018)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The prevailing party determination is takes into
account the action as a whole and "is not to be examined claim-by-claim." Id. (citing Eighteen
Mile Ranch, LLC v. Nord Excavating & Paving, Inc., 141 Idaho 716, 719, 117 P.3d 130, 133

(2005)).
Third Party Defendant was one of the prevailing parties m this case under Rule
54(d)(l)(B) because the court trial resulted in the dismissal of Third Party Plaintiffs' claims
against Third Party Defendant. Third Party Plaintiffs did not prevail on any of their claims
against Third Party Defendant. Third Party Defendant successfully obtained the relief he sought,
which was a dismissal of the third party claim against him. Thus, Third Party Plaintiff is a
prevailing party. Further, Third Party Plaintiffs do not dispute that Third Party Defendant is a
prevailing party, subject to appeal. Objection to Mark Porcello 's Motion for Attorney Fees and
Costs, at 3.
II.

Third Party Defendant is entitled to an award of attorney fees under Idaho
Code§ 12-120(3) because the gravamen of Third Party Plaintiffs' claim was
to recover on a promissory note.

Third Party Defendant seeks an award of attorney fees under Idaho Code § 12-120(3).
Idaho Code§ 12-120(3) provides for an award of attorney fees to the prevailing party:
In any civil action to recover on an open account, account stated,
note, bill, negotiable instrument, guaranty, or contract relating to
the purchase or sale of goods, wares, merchandise, or services and
in any commercial transaction unless otherwise provided by law,
the prevailing party shall be allowed a reasonable attorney's fee to
be set by the court, to be taxed and collected as costs.
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The term 'commercial transaction' is defined to mean all
transactions except transactions for personal or household
purposes. The term 'party' is defined to mean any person,
partnership, corporation, association, private organization, the state
of Idaho or political subdivision thereof.
I.C. § 12-120(3).
"Boise Truck governs the construction of I.C. § 12-120(2). Although Boise Truck

involved an action to recover on an open account, rather than an action on a promissory note, the
analysis remains the same." Cheney v. Smith, 108 Idaho 209,210, 697 P.2d 1223, 1224 (Ct. App.
1985) overruled on other grounds by BECO Construction Co., Inc. v. J-U-B Engineers, Inc., 149
Idaho 294, 233 P.3d 1216 (2010) (I.C. § 12-120(2) was later renumbered as I.C. § 12-120(3)). In
Boise Truck, the Idaho Court of Appeals adopted a "'plain meaning' view of the statute," and

determined that "[t]he words 'relating to the purchase or sale of goods, wares, or merchandise'
plainly modify only the words 'or contract' which immediately precede that phrase and which
are separated from the remainder of the sentence by a comma not otherwise required by modem
English usage." Boise Truck & Equipment, Inc. v. Hafer Logging, Inc., 107 Idaho 824, 825, 693
P.2d 470, 471 (Ct. App. 1984). Thus, "the phrase does not modify the other types of action
identified by the statute-actions on open account, account stated, note, bill or negotiable
instrument." Id
Subsequent decisions by the Idaho Court of Appeals and the Idaho Supreme Court have
interpreted Idaho Code§ 12-120(3) to mandate "an award of reasonable attorney fees, set by the
court, to the prevailing party in a civil action brought to recover on a note." Spidell v. Jenkins,
111 Idaho 857, 860, 727 P.2d 1285, 1288 (Ct. App. 1986) overruled on other grounds by BECO
Construction Co., Inc. v. J-U-B Engineers, Inc., 149 Idaho 294, 233 P.3d 1216 (2010)

(discussing prior version of I.C. § 12-120(3), numbered as I.C. § 12-120(2)); Bream v.
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Benscoter, 139 Idaho 364, 369, 79 P.3d 723, 728 (2003). When the gravamen of the present

action is the right to recover on a promissory note then an award of attorney fees under Idaho
Code§ 12-120(3) is appropriate. Zener v. Ve/de, 135 Idaho 352, 357, 17 P.3d 296, 301 (Ct. App.
2000). Further, "[a]ttorney fees are awardable under Idaho Code § 12-120(3) for successfully
defending against an action to recover on a note." Bream v. Benscoter, 139 Idaho 364, 369, 79
P.3d 723, 728 (2003).
In Bream v. Benscoter, the Idaho Supreme Court distinguished between an award of
attorney fees under Idaho Code § 12-120(3) for defending against an action to recover in a
commercial transaction and defending against an action to recover on a note. 139 Idaho 364, 369,
79 P.3d 723, 728 (2003). The district court in Bream found that the defendants were entitled to
an award of attorney fees under Idaho Code§ 12-120(3) because "the core issue in this case was
Bream's claim to collect on a promissory note," and because the complaint "was an action to
recover in a commercial transaction and because it was an action to recover on a note." Id The
plaintiff in Bream alleged that "the district court erred because there was no commercial
transaction between him and the Benscoters," but did not challenge the district court's finding
that the case was an action to recover on a note. Id The Bream court concluded that "the district
court's alternative holding that this was an action to recover on a note" meant that it need not
"consider whether the district court erred in holding that this was an action on a commercial
transaction." Id
Third Party Plaintiffs argue that Third Party Defendant is not entitled to an award of
attorney fees under Idaho Code§ 12-120(3) because the note at issue in this case is not part of a
commercial transaction. This argument is unavailing. As the Bream case makes clear, an action
to recover on a note and whether the note was part of a commercial transaction form two
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separate bases for an award of attorney fees under Idaho Code § 12-120(3 ). Thus, the Court need
not consider whether the note was part of a commercial transaction in order to award attorney
fees under Idaho Code§ 12-120(3). Third Party Defendant is entitled to an award of reasonable
attorney fees under Bream because he successfully defended against Third Party Plaintiffs'
attempt to recover on a note.
Third Party Plaintiffs also argue that the note at issue in this case is not a negotiable
instrument under Idaho Code § 28-3-104 and that Third Party Defendant cannot be awarded
attorney fees under Idaho Code § 12-120(3) unless the note is a negotiable instrument that is
related "to the purchase or sale of goods, wares, merchandise, or services." Objection to Mark
Porcello 's Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs, at 5-6. The Court determined that the note was a

negotiable instrument pursuant to Idaho Code § 28-3-104(1) as part of its order following the
court trial in this case and sees no reason to revise that ruling now. Memorandum Decision and
Order on Court Trial, at 20. Further, Third Party Plaintiffs' interpretation of Idaho Code § 12-

120(3) is incorrect; under Boise Truck a negotiable instrument need not be related to the
purchase or sale of goods, wares, merchandise, or services. See Boise Truck & Equipment, Inc. v.
Hafer Logging, Inc., 107 Idaho 824,825,693 P.2d 470,471 (Ct. App. 1984). Thus, Third Party

Defendant is entitled to an award of attorney fees under Idaho Code§ 12-120(3) because the note
is a negotiable instrument.
The Court need not reach Third Party Defendant's arguments regarding an award of
attorney fees under Idaho Code§§ 12-121 or 12-123 because the Court is awarding attorney fees
based on Idaho Code§ 12-120(3).
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III.

Third Party Defendant is entitled to a reasonable award of attorney fees in
the amount of $37,932.50 under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e) and
Idaho Code § 12-120(3).

Under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e), "the court may award reasonable attorney
fees, including paralegal fees, to the prevailing party or parties as defined in Rule 54(d)(l)(B),
when provided for by any statute or contract." I.R.C.P. 54(e). "[F]ees may only be awarded for
costs associated with attorney and paralegal work, distinguishing such costs from those incurred
for clerical work." P.O. Ventures, Inc. v. Loucks Family Irrevocable Trust, 144 Idaho 233,239,
159 P.3d 870, 876 (2007). "[T]he calculation of a reasonable attorney fee is within the trial
court's discretion." H20 Environmental, Inc. v. Farm Supply Distributors, Inc., 429 P.3d 183,
187 (2018) (quoting Bailey v. Bailey, 153 Idaho 526,529,284 P.3d 970,973 (2012)).
When awarding attorney fees, the district court must consider the following factors:
(A) the time and labor required;
(B) the novelty and difficulty of the questions;
(C) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly and the
experience and ability of the attorney in the particular field of law;
(D) the prevailing charges for like work;
(E) whether the fee is fixed or contingent;
(F) the time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances
of the case;
(G) the amount involved and the results obtained;
(H) the undesirability of the case;
(I) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the
client;
(J) awards in similar cases;
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(K) the reasonable cost of automated legal research, if the court
finds it was reasonably necessary in preparing a party's case; and
(L) any other factor which the court deems appropriate in the
particular case.

See I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3). "[T]he law is clearly settled that when awarding attorney fees in a civil
action, the district court must consider the I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3) factors, but need not make specific
written findings on the various factors." Poole v. Davis, 153 Idaho 604, 606, 288 P.3d 821, 823
(2012) (quoting Lee v. Nickerson, 146 Idaho 5, 11, 189 P.3d 467, 473 (2008)). Further, "a court
need not blindly accept the figures advanced by the attorney and may disallow fees that were
unnecessarily and unreasonably incurred." Action Collection Services, Inc., v. Bingham, 146
Idaho 286, 290, 192 P .3d 1110, 1114 (Ct. App. 2008).
Third Party Defendant seeks an award of attorney fees in the amount of $39,827.50. The
hourly rate, approximate hours, and total fees charged to Third Party Defendant are as follows:
Timekeeper
Peter J. Smith IV,
Partner (lead attorney)
Jillian H. Caires,
Associate
Matthew A. Widmyer,
Associate
Caitlin O'Brien,
Associate
Tara Malek, Partner
Briana Stockdale,
Paralegal

Hourly Rate
$250

Time (approximate)
141.68

Cost
$35,420

$200

18.2

$3,640

$200

0.8

$160

$200

2.1

$420

$200
$75 to $100

0.45
4.1

$110
$397.50

See generally Declaration of Peter Smith IV in Support of Mark Porcello 's Memorandum of
Costs and Attorney Fees, at 3; Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees, at 3.
Third Party Plaintiffs argue that the total amount of attorney fees requested is
unreasonable for various reasons. On the whole, the Court found the majority of Third Party
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Plaintiffs' objections to be without merit. Further, several objections lacked justification or
support. For example, Third Party Plaintiffs objected to several time entries as being
"duplicative" without explanation, including telephone calls between attorneys, attorneys
drafting email correspondence related to this case, and attorneys reviewing email correspondence
that was related to this case. See Ex. A. Upon closer examination, the Court determined that
these entries were not duplicative.
Third Party Plaintiffs also objected to several time entries as a "Mark and Jennifer issue"
without further explanation. See Ex. A. It appears to the Court that Third Party Plaintiffs are
objecting to these entries on the basis that they are duplicative. The Court is not persuaded that
these time entries are truly "duplicative" or that these entries should be struck merely because
they relate to multiple parties, given that the work done by counsel for Third Party Defendant
and counsel for Plaintiff was a necessary part of this litigation.
Third Party Plaintiffs also objected to several time entries as constituting "clerical work."

Objection to Mark Porcello 's Motion for Award of Attorney's Fees and Costs, at 9-10. After a
review of the entries, the majority of the entries were not clerical work. For example, Third Party
Plaintiffs objected to emails between Mr. Smith and Plaintiffs attorney Mr. Harris as "clerical
work," as well as emails between Mr. Smith and his paralegal regarding various pleadings that
the Court determined were not "clerical work." However, as discussed below, the Court did
reduce the amount of attorney fees to eliminate the time entries that appear to the court to
constitute "clerical work."
Third Party Plaintiffs also object to an award of attorney fees for work related to Third
Party Defendant's effort to set aside the default judgment. The default judgment was set aside on
July 26, 201 7. It appears to the Court that Third Party Plaintiffs should not be responsible for
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attorney fees related to efforts to set aside the default judgment. Third Party Defendant's delay in
responding to Third Party Plaintiffs' Complaint resulted in the accrual of several hours' worth of
attorney fees, and is not attributable to any actions on the part of the Third Party Plaintiffs. Thus,
the total amount of attorney fees are adjusted to account for the time entries that were related to
setting aside the default judgment up to the point the default judgment was set aside on July 26,
2017. However, the time entries beyond that date that Third Party Plaintiffs still attribute to
"Setting Aside Default" do not warrant reduction on that basis.
The Court reduced the total award of attorney fees as follows:
Timekeeper

Date

Caires
Smith
Caires
Smith
Caires
Smith
Stockdale
Stockdale
Smith
Smith
Caires
Caires
Caires
Smith
Smith
Smith

Hourly
Rate
6/7/2017
200
6/7/2017
250
6/7/2017
200
6/8/2017
250
6/8/2017
200
6/9/2017
250
6/12/2017 75
6/13/2017 75
6/13/2017 250
7/17/2017 250
7/20/2017 200
7/24/2017 200
7/25/2017 200
10/31/2017 250
11/7/2017 250
12/2/2017 250

Smith
Smith
Stockdale

12/28/2017 250
2/26/2018 250
4/6/2018
100

Original
Time
0.1
0.1
1.4
2
0.1
0.5
0.1
0.1
0.2
0.1
0.6
1.8
0.4
0.4
0.4

Adjusted
Time
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.1

Original
Amount
20
25
280
500
20
125
7.50
7.50
25
50
20
120
360
100
100
100

Adjusted
Amount
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
25

0.1
0.1
0.1

0
0
0

25
25
10

0
0
0

0.1

Reason for
reduction
Default

Default
Default
Default
Default
Default
Default
Default
Default
Default
Default
Default
Default
Collections
Unrelated
Partial
Collections
Collections
Collections
Clerical

The total award of attorney fees has been reduced by $1,895. The attorney fees were adjusted to
account for fees incurred related to setting aside the default judgment and fees related to

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON THIRD PARTY DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR COSTS AND
ATTORNEY FEES--! I

Page 515

collections or clerical work. After the adjustment, the total amount of attorney fees 1s
$37,932.50.
The Court determines that this amount of attorney fees is a reasonable attorney fee,
taking into account the Rule 54(e) factors. The time and labor spent on Third Party Defendant's
case was reasonable, taking into account the pretrial proceedings and eight-day court trial. The
attorney fees accrued on an hourly basis and were not subject to a fixed fee or fixed rate.
Although this case did not necessarily present novel legal questions, it raised difficult factual
questions that involved untangling a web of complex familial relationships and agreements. Of
note is the amount at issue and the results obtained. As the case progressed, the amount allegedly
owed by Third Party Defendant increased from $648,500 to approximately $851,784.
Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs' Closing Argument, at 25; Defendants' Response to Closing
Arguments by Mark Porcello and Jennifer Porcello, at 25. Ultimately, counsel for Third Party

Defendant obtained the dismissal of Third Party Plaintiffs' claims against Third Party Defendant.
Further, counsel for Third Party Defendant possessed the requisite skill and experience in
the areas of civil litigation, commercial litigation, and real property law to provide a proper
defense to the third party claim. Declaration of Peter J. Smith IV in Support of Mark Porcello 's
Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees, at 3. Peter Smith IV, the lead attorney in Third Party

Defendant's case, was admitted to the bar in Idaho in 2004, and has significant experience in
civil litigation and real property law. Jillian H. Caires, an associate attorney who assisted in this
case, was admitted to the bar in Idaho in 2013. She has maintained a commercial litigation
practice since 2016 and is a former clerk for the Honorable Judge Simpson. Attorneys Matthew
A. Widmyer, Caitlin E. O'Brian, and Tara Malek also assisted in the case. Id at 4. Briana D.
Stockdale, a paralegal with Smith+ Malek, has worked in the area of civil litigation since 2010.
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The length of the professional relationship between defense counsel, the undesirability of
the case, awards in similar cases, and the reasonable cost of automated legal research were not
determinative factors in this case. Counsel's professional relationship with Third Party
Defendant was limited to this case and counsel did not bill the cost oflegal research separately.
Taking all of the Rule 54(e) factors into account, the Court determines that Third Party
Defendant is entitled to a reasonable award of attorney fees in the amount of$37,932.50.
CONCLUSION

For the above stated reasons, Third Party Defendant is not entitled to an award of
attorney fees under Idaho Code §§ 12-121 or 12-123, but is entitled to an award of reasonable
attorney fees under Idaho Code§ 12-120(3) in the amount of $37,932.50.

ORDER:

Based on the foregoing and good cause appearing therefore,
IT IS HERBY ORDERED, that:
Third Party Defendant's Motion for Costs and Attorney Fees is granted pursuant to Idaho
Code§ 12-120(3).
Third Party Defendant is entitled to an award of reasonable attorney fees in the amount of
$37,932.50.

DATED this i.D!)f;y of December, 2018.
BY THE COURT:
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was placed in the
courthouse mailing system, postage prepaid, inter office mail, or by facsimile on the _ _ day of
Signed: 12/10/2018 05:32 PM
December, 2018, to:
Peter Smith
SMITH + MALEK, PLLC
Attorney for Third Party Defendant
peter(dlsmithmalek. com

Terrance R. Harris
RAMSDEN, MARFICE, EALY & HARRIS
Attorney for Plaintiff
rharris((z1rmehla\v .com

William Christopher Pooser
STOEL RIVES LLP
Attorney for Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs/Third Party Plaintiffs
christopher.pooser@stoel.com
Anna E. Courtney
STOEL RIVES LLP
Attorney for Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs/Third Party Plaintiffs
anna.courtnevfristoel.com

JIM BRANNON

C ~ R I C T COURT
Deputy Clerk
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RAMSDEN, MARFICE, EALY & HARRIS, LLP
700 Northwest Blvd.
P.O. Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336
Telephone: (208) 664-5818
Facsimile:
(208) 664-5884
Terrance R. Harris, ISB #5484
rharris@rmehlaw.com

Filed: 12/19/2018 13:21:10
First Judicial District, Kootenai County
Jim Brannon, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk - McCoy, Susan

Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counter Defendant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
JENNIFER PORCELLO,

CASE NO. CV-2016-7343

Plaintiff,
vs.
ANTHONY J. PORCELLO and the Estate
of ANNIE C. PORCELLO, KALYN M.
PORCELLO, Personal Representative,

AMENDED JUDGMENT

Defendants.
ANTHONY J. PORCELLO and the Estate of
ANNIE C. PORCELLO, KALYN M.
PORCELLO, Personal Representative,
Counter-Plaintiffs,
vs.
JENNIFER PORCELLO,
Counter-Plaintiffs,
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ANTHONY J. PORCELLO and the Estate of
ANNIE C. PORCELLO, KALYN M.
PORCELLO, Personal Representative,
Third Party Plaintiffs,
vs.
MARK PORCELLO,
Third Party Defendant.
JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS:
1.

Plaintiff’s Jennifer Porcello n/k/a Jennifer Maggard request for declaratory

judgment is GRANTED. The Court declares the following:
a.

That Plaintiff’s obligation under the Promissory Note dated September 3, 2014,
in the principal amount of $648,500.00, wherein Jennifer Porcello and Mark
Porcello were the makers and Anthony J. Porcello and Annie C. Porcello were
the holders, has been paid in full and is satisfied.

b.

That Plaintiff’s obligation under the Deed of Trust securing the performance of
the above-described Promissory Note, which Deed of Trust was recorded on
September 4, 2014, as Instrument No. 2469098000, records of Kootenai County,
Idaho, has been satisfied and the real property encumbered by the Deed of Trust
is hereby released and reconveyed to Jennifer Porcello n/k/a Jennifer Maggard as
her sole and separate property.

2.

Defendants’/Counter-Plaintiffs’ request for a judicial foreclosure is DENIED.

Defendants’/Counter-Plaintiffs’ claims against Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant are dismissed with
prejudice.
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3.

Third Party Defendant’s request for a dismissal of Third-Party Plaintiffs’ claim is

GRANTED. Third Party’s Plaintiffs’ claims against Third Party Defendant are dismissed with
prejudice.
4.

Plaintiff is awarded costs as a matter of right in the amount of $2,252.17, and

attorney’s fees in the amount of $69,274.50, for a total award of $71,526.67, from and against
Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs, together with interest at the judgment rate of 7.375% from the
date of entry of this Amended Judgment until satisfied in full.
5.

Third Party Defendant is awarded attorney’s fees in the amount of $37,932.50

from and against Third Party Plaintiffs, together with interest at the judgment rate of 7.375%
from the date of entry of this Amended Judgment until satisfied in full.
Signed: 12/18/2018 01:59 PM

DATED this ___ day of December, 2018.
BY THE COURT:

~

Cynthia K.C. Meyer
District Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
19_ day of December, 2018 I served a true and correct copy
I hereby certify that on the _
of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
W. Christopher Pooser
Anna E. Courtney
Stoel Rives, LLP
101 S. Capitol Blvd., Ste. 1900
Boise, Idaho 83 702-7705

US Mail
_ _ Overnight Mail
Hand Delivered
_ _ Facsimile (208) 389-9040
x Via Email to:
christopher.pooser@stoel.com
anna.courtney@stoel.com

Peter J. Smith IV
SMITH+ MALEK, PLLC
601 E. Front A venue
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83 814

US Mail
_ _ Overnight Mail
Hand Delivered
_ _ Facsimile (208) 214-2416
x Via Email to:
peter@smithmalek.com

Terrance R. Harris
RAMSDEN, MARFICE, EALY &
HARRIS, LLP
700 Northwest Boulevard
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83 814

US Mail
_ _ Overnight Mail
Hand Delivered
_ _ Facsimile (208) 664-5884
x Via Email to:
tharris@rmehlaw.com and
nvigil@rmehlaw.conm

JIM BRANNON
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT
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RAMSDEN, NIARFICE, EALY & HARRIS, LLP
700 Nm1hwest Blvd.
P.O. Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336
Telephone: (208) 664-5818
Facsimile:
(208) 664-5884
Terrance R. Harris, ISB #5484
rharris@rmehlaw.com

Filed: 12/21/2018 14:57:08
First Judicial District, Kootenai County
Jim Brannon, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk - McCoy, Susan

Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counter Defendant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
JENNIFER PORCELLO,

CASE NO. CV-2016-7343

Plaintiff,
vs.

ANTHONY J. PORCELLO and the Estate
of ANNIE C. PORCELLO, KALYN M.
PORCELLO, Personal Representative,

CORRECTED AMENDED
JUDGMENT

Defendants.

ANTHONY J. PORCELLO and the Estate of
ANNIE C. PORCELLO, KALYN M.
PORCELLO, Personal Representative,
Counter-Plaintiffs,
vs.
JENNIFER PORCELLO,
Counter-Defendant.
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ANTHONY J. PORCELLO and the Estate of
ANNIE C. PORCELLO, KALYN M.
PORCELLO, Personal Representative,
Third Party Plaintiffs,
vs.
MARK PORCELLO,
Third Par

Defendant.

JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS:

This Corrected Amended Judgment is being filed to correct a scrivener's error in the
caption of the original Amended Judgment, and is being entered by the Court mmc pro tune to
the filing date of the original Amended Judgment which was December 19, 2018.

1.

Plaintiff's Jennifer Porcello n/k/a Jennifer Maggard request for declaratory

judgment is GRANTED. The Court declares the following:
a.

That Plaintiff's obligation under the Promissory Note dated September 3, 2014,
in the principal amount of $648,500.00, wherein Jennifer Porcello and Mark
Porcello were the makers and Anthony J. Porcello and Annie C. Porcello were
the holders, has been paid in foll and is satisfied.

b.

Timt Plaintiffs obligation under the Deed of Trust securing the perf01mance of
the above-described Promissory Note, which Deed of Trust was recorded on
September 4, 2014, as Instrument No. 2469098000, records of Kootenai County,
Idaho, has been satisfied and the real prope1fy encumbered by the Deed of Trust
is hereby released and reconveyed to Jennifer Porcello n/k/a Jennifer Maggard as
her sole and separate prope1fy.
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2.

Defendants'/Counter-Plaintiffs' request for a judicial foreclosure is DENIED.

Defendants'/Counter-Plaintiffs' claims against Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant are dismissed ,vith
prejudice.
3.

Third Party Defendant's request for a dismissal of Third-Party Plaintiffs' claim is

GRANTED. Third Party's Plaintiffs' claims against Third Party Defendant are dismissed with
prejudice.
4.

Plaintiff is awarded costs as a matter of right in the amount of $2,252.17, and

attorney's fees in the amount of $69,274.50, for a total award of $71,526.67, from and against
Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs, together ,,,ith interest at the judgment rate of 7.375% from the
date of entry of this Amended Judgment until satisfied in full.
5.

Third Party Defendant is awarded attorney's fees in the amount of $37,932.50

from and against Third Party Plaintiffs, together with interest at the judgment rate of 7.375%
from the date of entty of this Amended Judgment until satisfied in full.
Signed: 12/21/2018 10:48 AM

DATED this_ day of December, 2018.
BY THE COURT:

District Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the _
21_ day of December, 2018 I served a true and con-ect copy
of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
W. Christopher Pooser
Anna E. Courtney
Stoel Rives, LLP
101 S. Capitol Blvd., Ste. 1900
Boise, Idaho 83702-7705

US Mail
_ _ Overnight Mail
Hand Delivered
_ _ Facsimile (208) 389-9040
x Via Email to:
christopher. pooser@stoel.com
anna.comtney@stoel.com

Peter J. Smith N
SN.1ITH + MALEK, PLLC
601 E. Front Avenue
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814

US Mail
_ _ Overnight Mail
Hand Delivered
Facsimile (208) 214-2416
x Via Email to:
peter@smithmalek.com

Terrance R. Harris
RAMSDEN, MARFICE, EALY &
HARRIS,LLP
700 Nortln:vest Boulevard
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814

US Mail
_ _ Overnight Mail
Hand Delivered
_ _ Facsimile (208) 664-5884
x Via Email to:
rharris@nnehlaw.com and
nvigil@rmehlaw.conm

TIM BRANNON
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT
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Electronically Filed
12/31/2018 12:05 PM
First Judicial District, Kootenai County
Jim Brannon, Clerk of the Court
By: Katherine Hayden, Deputy Clerk

W. Christopher Pooser, ISB No. 5525
Email: christopher.pooser@stoel.com
Anna E. Courtney, ISB No. 9279
Email: anna.courtney@stoel.com
STOEL RIVES LLP
101 S. Capitol Boulevard, Suite 1900
Boise, ID 83702-7705
Telephone:
(208) 389-9000
Facsimile:
(208) 389-9040
Attorneys for Defendants, Counter Plaintiffs, and
Third Party Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
JENNIFER PORCELLO,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

Case No. CV-16-7343
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL

ANTHONY J. PORCELLO and the Estate
of ANNIE C. PORCELLO, KALYN M.
PORCELLO, Personal Representative,
Defendants-Appellants.
ANTHONY J. PORCELLO and the Estate
of ANNIE C. PORCELLO, KALYN M.
PORCELLO, Personal Representative,

vs.

Counter-PlaintiffsAppellants,

JENNIFER PORCELLO,
Counter-DefendantRespondent.
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ANTHONY J. PORCELLO and the Estate
of ANNIE C. PORCELLO, KALYN M.
PORCELLO, Personal Representative,
Third Party PlaintiffsAppellants,

vs.

MARK PORCELLO,
Third Party DefendantRespondent.

TO:

THE ABOVE NAMED PLAINTIFF/COUNTER-DEFENDANT/
RESPONDENT JENNIFER PORCELLO AND HER ATTORNEY OF
RECORD (TERRANCE HARRIS), AND THE ABOVE NAMED THIRD
PARTY DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT MARK PORCELLO AND HIS
ATTORNEYS OF RECORD (JILLIAN H. CAIRES AND PETER J. SMITH,
IV), AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT:

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1.

The above named Appellants Anthony J. Porcello, the Estate of Annie C.

Porcello, and Kalyn M. Porcello as Personal Representative (“Appellants”) appeal against the
above named Respondents Jennifer Porcello and Mark Porcello (“Respondents”) to the Idaho
Supreme Court from the Judgment entered on September 6, 2018, Honorable Judge Cynthia K.C.
Meyer presiding. A copy of the Judgment being appealed is attached to this notice as Exhibit A.
2.

Appellants also appeal from the Amended Judgment entered on December 19,

2018, and the Corrected Amended Judgment entered on December 21, 2018. Copies of the
Amended Judgment and the Corrected Amended Judgment are attached as Exhibit B and
Exhibit C, respectively.
3.

Appellants have a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the Judgment

and Corrected Amended Judgment are appealable pursuant to I.A.R. 11(a)(1).
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4.

Without waiving their right to assert other issues, Appellants intend to assert the

following issues on appeal:
a.

Whether the trial court’s finding of fact are supported by substantial and
competent evidence;

b.

Whether the trial court erred in finding Respondent Jennifer Porcello’s
obligation under the Promissory Note was paid in full and satisfied;

c.

Whether the trial court erred in finding Respondent Jennifer Porcello’s
obligation under the Deed of Trust securing the performance of the
Promissory Note was satisfied and the real property encumbered by the
Deed of Trust was released and reconveyed to Respondent Jennifer
Porcello;

d.

Whether the trial court erred in dismissing Appellants’ request for a
judicial foreclosure against Respondents; and

e.

Whether the trial court erred in finding Respondents were entitled to
attorney fees and costs.

5.

No order has been entered sealing any portion of the record.

6.

Appellants note that they received the Clerk’s Record on December 17, 2018, and

along with this Amended Notice of Appeal are also filing Appellants’ Objection to the Record on
Appeal and Request to Add to and Delete from the Record on Appeal (“Appellants’ Objection”).
7.

This Amended Notice of Appeal incorporates transcripts and documents that are

subject to Appellants’ Objection and the district court’s determination of Appellants’ requests to
add to and delete from the record on appeal. To indicate which transcripts and documents are
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subject to Appellants’ Objection and the district court’s determination, Appellants have
identified those transcripts and documents, as follows:
a. transcripts that are not part of the record on appeal and that Appellants
request be added are double underlined;
b. documents that are not part of the Clerk’s Record and that Appellants
request be added are double underlined; and
c. documents that are part of the Clerk’s Record and that Appellants request
be deleted are struck through.
8.

Appellants request the preparation of the reporter’s transcript in electronic format,

specifically:
a.

the court trial before the Honorable Judge Meyer held on April 23, 2018;

b.

the court trial before the Honorable Judge Meyer held on April 24, 2018;

c.

the court trial before the Honorable Judge Meyer held on April 25, 2018;

d.

the court trial before the Honorable Judge Meyer held on April 26, 2018;

e.

the court trial before the Honorable Judge Meyer held on May 21, 2018;

f.

the court trial before the Honorable Judge Meyer held on May 22, 2018;

g.

the court trial before the Honorable Judge Meyer held on May 23, 2018;

h.

the court trial before the Honorable Judge Meyer held on May 24, 2018;
and

i.

the hearing on Respondents’ motions for attorney fees and costs held on
October 24, 2018, at 3:00 p.m. (50 estimated pages).

The court reporter responsible for the reporter’s transcript is Diane Bolan. Appellants have made
arrangements to pay the estimated cost of the transcripts from the April and May 2018 court trial,
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which will be held pending a decision on Appellants’ Objection. Appellants have also made
arrangements to pay the estimated cost of the transcript of the October 24, 2018 hearing.
9.

Appellants request the following documents be included in the clerk’s record in

addition to those automatically included under I.A.R. 28(b)(1) 1:
a.

Verified Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, Injunctive Relief and
Damages, filed October 5, 2016;

b.

Order Postponing Trustee’s Sale, filed October 17, 2016;

c.

Declaration of Henry D. Madsen, filed November 14, 2016;

d.

Declaration of Kalyn Porcello, filed December 6, 2016;

e.

Declaration of Joe T. Mijich, filed December 6, 2016;

f.

Declaration of Judge Terrance A. Carroll, filed December 6, 2016;

g.

Affidavit of Henry D. Madsen, filed December 7, 2016;

h.

Order of Dismissal (preliminary injunction), filed December 19, 2016;

i.

Answer, Counterclaim and Third Party Complaint, filed February 13,
2017;

j.

Errata (exhibits for Counterclaim and Third Party Complaint), filed
February 14, 2017;

k.

Counter-Defendant Jennifer Porcello’s Answer to Counterclaim, filed
March 3, 2017;

l.

Order of Entry of Default, filed May 10, 2017;

m.

Mark Porcello’s Answer to Third Party Complaint, filed May 16, 2017;

1

In the original Notice of Appeal, Appellants listed pleadings and documents
automatically included in the clerk’s record. For consistency, in this Amended Notice of Appeal,
Appellants do the same.
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n.

Order Granting Third Party Defendant’s Motion to Set Aside Entry of
Default, filed July 27, 2017;

o.

Order Granting Third Party Defendant Mark Porcello’s Motion for
Continuance and Extension of Pre-Trial Deadlines, filed September 21,
2017;

p.

Notice of Trial and Pretrial Conference Setting and Pretrial Order, filed
November 1, 2017;

q.

Memorandum in Support of Petitioner’s Defendants Motion for Summary
Judgment, filed December 29, 2017;

r.

Affidavit of Linda Lourey, CPA, in Support of Defendant’s Motion for
Summary Judgment, filed December 29, 2017;

s.

Affidavit of Henry D. Madsen in Support of Defendant’s Motion for
Summary Judgment, filed December 29, 2017;

t.

Affidavit of Robert Jones, CPA, in support of Defendant’s Motion for
Summary Judgment, filed December 29, 2017;

u.

Statement of Undisputed Facts, filed December 29, 2017;

v.

Memorandum Decision and Order Denying Defendant’s Motion for
Summary Judgment, filed March 5, 2018;

w.

Defendant’s Motion for Reconsideration/Clarification, filed March 19,
2018;

x.

Defendant’s Memorandum in Support of Motions: Reconsideration /
Clarification; and Motion to Amend the Pleadings, filed March 20, 2018;

y.

Plaintiff’s Witness List, filed April 9, 2018;
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z.

Plaintiff’s Exhibit List, filed April 9, 2018;

aa.

Third Party Defendant’s Exhibit List, filed April 9, 2018;

bb.

Third Party Defendant’s Witness List, filed April 9, 2018;

cc.

Stipulated Joint Exhibit List, filed April 9, 2018;

dd.

Defendants’ Trial Exhibit List, filed April 9, 2018;

ee.

Defendants’ Trial Witness List, filed April 9, 2018;

ff.

Order re April 2, 2018 Hearing, filed April 10, 2018;

gg.

Verified Amended Answer, Counterclaim and Third Party Complaint,
filed April 16, 2018;

hh.

Defendants’ Trial Brief, filed April 16, 2018;

ii.

Plaintiff’s Trial Brief, filed April 16, 2018;

jj.

Trial Brief of Third Party Defendant Mark Porcello, filed April 16, 2018;

kk.

Defendants’ Amended Trial Exhibit List, filed April 17, 2018;

ll.

Defendants’ Amended Trial Exhibit List, filed April 17, 2018;

mm.

Jennifer Porcello’s Reply to Amended Counterclaim, filed April 26, 2018;

nn.

Mark Porcello’s Answer to Amended Third Party Complaint, filed May 2,
2018;

oo.

Defendants’ Memorandum of Law Re: IRE 408 Issue, filed May 3, 2018;

pp.

Memorandum Decision and Order on Defendants’ Motion for Admission
of Letter, filed May 17, 2018;

qq.

Defendants’ Memorandum of Law Re: Linda Lourey, filed May 17, 2018;

rr.

Plaintiff’s Written Closing Argument – Opening Brief, filed June 4, 2018;

ss.

Defendants’ Post-Trial Closing Argument, filed June 11, 2018;
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tt.

Plaintiff’s Written Closing Argument – Response and Reply Brief, filed
June 18, 2018;

uu.

Closing Argument of Third Party Defendant Mark Porcello, filed June 18,
2018;

vv.

Defendants’ Response to Closing Argument by Mark Porcello and
Jennifer Porcello, filed June 25, 2018;

ww.

Memorandum Decision and Order on Court Trial, filed August 17, 2018;

xx.

Judgment, filed September 6, 2018;

yy.

Memorandum Decision and Order on Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney’s
Fees and Costs, filed December 10, 2018;

zz.

Memorandum Decision and Order on Third Party Defendant’s Motion for
Costs and Attorney Fees, filed December 10, 2018;

10.

aaa.

Amended Judgment, filed December 19, 2018;

bbb.

Corrected Amended Judgment, filed December 21, 2018;

ccc.

Deposition Transcript of Scott Rerucha; and

ddd.

Deposition Transcript of Joseph Mijich.

Appellants request all exhibits offered or admitted be copied and sent to the

Supreme Court.
11.

I certify:
a.

That a copy of this Amended Notice of Appeal has been served on the
court reporter, Diane Bolan, at realtimereporter@hotmail.com.
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b.

That Appellants have made arrangements with Ms. Bolan to pay the
estimated fee for preparation of the reporter’s transcript on or about
January 2, 2019.

c.

That the fee for preparation of the clerk’s record has been paid.

d.

That the appellate filing fee has been paid.

e.

That service has been made on all parties required to be served pursuant to
I.A.R. 20.

DATED: December 31, 2018.

STOEL RIVES LLP
/s/ W. Christopher Pooser
W. Christopher Pooser
Anna E. Courtney
Attorneys for Estate of Anthony and Annie
Porcello
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on December 31, 2018, I caused a true and correct copy of the
foregoing AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL to be served by the method indicated below, and
addressed to the following:
Terrance R. Harris
RAMSDEN, MARFICE, EALY &
HARRIS
tharris@rmehlaw.com

[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[X]

Via U.S. Mail
Via Facsimile
Via Overnight Mail
Via Hand Delivery
Via Email
Via iCourt Service

Peter J. Smith
Smith & Malek

[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[X]

Via U.S. Mail
Via Facsimile
Via Overnight Mail
Via Hand Delivery
Via Email
Via iCourt Service

Honorable Cynthia C.K. Meyer
District Court

Emailed Bench Copy to Chambers
Jane Watts, Judicial Staff Attorney

Diane Bolan
Official Court Reporter
c/o Judge Cynthia K.C. Meyer
Kootenai County District Court
324 W. Garden Avenue
Coeur d’Alene, Idaho 83814
realtimereporter@hotmail.com

[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[X]
[ ]

Via U.S. Mail
Via Facsimile
Via Overnight Mail
Via Hand Delivery
Via Email
Via iCourt Service

/s/ W. Christopher Pooser
W. Christopher Pooser

AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL - 10
99524434.1 0073831-00001

Page 536

EXHIBI T A

Page 537

RAMSDEN, MARFICE, EALY & BARRIS, LLP
700 Northwest Blvd,
P.O. Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83 816-1336
(208) 664-5818
Telephone:
(208) 664-5884
Facsimile:
rharris@rmehlaw.com
Terrance R. Harris, ISB #5484

Filed: 09/06/2018 16:32:43
First Judicial District, Kootenai County
Jim Brannon, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk - McCoy, Susan

Attorneys for Plaint(lf/Counter-Defendant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE rm.ST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
JENNIFER PORCELLO,
Plaintiff,

CASE NO. CV-2016-7343
JUDGMENT

vs.
ANTHONY J. PORCELLO and the Estate
of ANNIE C. PORCELLO, KALYN M.
PORCELLO, Personal Representative,
Defendants.
ANTHONY J. PORCELLO and the Estate of
ANNIE C. PORCELLO, KALYN M.
PORCELLO, Personal Representative,
Counter-Plaintiffs,
vs.
JENNIFER PORCELLO,
Counter-Defendant,
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Page 538

ANTHONY J. PORCELLO and the Estate of
ANNIE C. PORCELLO, KALYN M.
PORCELLO, Personal Representative,
Third Party Plaintiffs,
vs.
MARK PORCELLO,
Third Party Defendant.

JUDGlVIENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS:

1.

Plaintiffs Jennifer Porcello n/k/a Jennifer Maggard request for declaratory

judgment is GRANTED. The Court declares the follmving:
a.

That Plaintiffs obligation under the Promissory Note dated September 3,
2014, in the principal amount of $648,500.00, wherein Jennifer Porcello and
Mark Porcello were the makers and Anthony J. Porcello and Annie C. Porcello
were the holders, has been paid in foll and is satisfied.

b.

That Plaintiff's obligation under the Deed of Trust securing the performance
of the above-described Promissory Note, which Deed of Trust was recorded on
September 4, 2014, as Instrument No. 2469098000, records of Kootenai
County, Idaho, has been satisfied and the real property encumbered by the
Deed of Trust is hereby released and reconveyed to Jennifer Porcello n/k/a
Jennifer Maggard as her sole and separate property.
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2.

Defendants'/Counter-Plaintiffs' request for a judicial foreclosure is DENIED.

Defendants'/Counter-Plaintiffs' claims against Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant are dismissed
with prejudice.

3.

Third Party Defendant's request for a dismissal of Third-Party Plaintiffs' claim

is GRANTED. Third Party Plaintiffs' claims against Third Party Defendant are dismissed

with prejudice.
Signed: 9/5/2018 08:49 AM

DATED this _ _ clay o f ~ - - - - - - - - ' 2018 .
BY THE COURT:

~J.~,L!_!_~""""";,-.,,__,_________,,,.__ _

.

~~

'Cl'
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the _6_ day of
Sept.
, 2018 I served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Henry D. Madsen
Madsen Lmv Offices, P.C.
I 044 Northwest Blvd., Suite B
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814

US Mail
~ - Overnight Mail
Hand Delivered
~ - Facsimile (208) 664-6258
x ICourt Electronic Portal
info@madsenlawoffices.com

Surnecr Singla

US Mail
- · - Overnight Mail
Hanel Delivered
Facsimile
X
Via
Email
sumeer@i111pactlawgroup.com

Peter J. Smith IV
SMITH+ 11ALEK, PLLC
601 E. Front Avenue
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814

US Mail
___ Overnight Mail
Hand Delivered
~ - Facsimile (208) 214-2416
x ICourt Electronic Portal
petcr@srnithmalek.com

Tenance R. Harris
Ramsden, Marfice,
Ealy & Harris, LLP
700 Northwest Blvd.
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814

US Mail
__ Overnight Mail
Hand Delivered
~-- Facsimile (208) 664-5884
___x___ ICourt Electronic Portal
rharris@nnehlaw.com,
nvlgil@rmchlaw.com

to:

JIM BRANNON
CLERK OF THE DISIRICT COURT

Deputy Clerk
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RAMSDEN, MARFICE, EALY & HARRIS, LLP
700 Northwest Blvd.
P.O. Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336
Telephone: (208) 664-5818
Facsimile:
(208) 664-5884
Terrance R. Harris, ISB #5484
rharris@rmehlaw.com

Filed: 12/19/2018 13:21:10
First Judicial District, Kootenai County
Jim Brannon, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk - McCoy, Susan

Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counter Defendant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
JENNIFER PORCELLO,

CASE NO. CV-2016-7343

Plaintiff,
vs.
ANTHONY J. PORCELLO and the Estate
of ANNIE C. PORCELLO, KALYN M.
PORCELLO, Personal Representative,

AMENDED JUDGMENT

Defendants.
ANTHONY J. PORCELLO and the Estate of
ANNIE C. PORCELLO, KALYN M.
PORCELLO, Personal Representative,
Counter-Plaintiffs,
vs.
JENNIFER PORCELLO,
Counter-Plaintiffs,
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ANTHONY J. PORCELLO and the Estate of
ANNIE C. PORCELLO, KALYN M.
PORCELLO, Personal Representative,
Third Party Plaintiffs,
vs.
MARK PORCELLO,
Third Party Defendant.
JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS:
1.

Plaintiff’s Jennifer Porcello n/k/a Jennifer Maggard request for declaratory

judgment is GRANTED. The Court declares the following:
a.

That Plaintiff’s obligation under the Promissory Note dated September 3, 2014,
in the principal amount of $648,500.00, wherein Jennifer Porcello and Mark
Porcello were the makers and Anthony J. Porcello and Annie C. Porcello were
the holders, has been paid in full and is satisfied.

b.

That Plaintiff’s obligation under the Deed of Trust securing the performance of
the above-described Promissory Note, which Deed of Trust was recorded on
September 4, 2014, as Instrument No. 2469098000, records of Kootenai County,
Idaho, has been satisfied and the real property encumbered by the Deed of Trust
is hereby released and reconveyed to Jennifer Porcello n/k/a Jennifer Maggard as
her sole and separate property.

2.

Defendants’/Counter-Plaintiffs’ request for a judicial foreclosure is DENIED.

Defendants’/Counter-Plaintiffs’ claims against Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant are dismissed with
prejudice.
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3.

Third Party Defendant’s request for a dismissal of Third-Party Plaintiffs’ claim is

GRANTED. Third Party’s Plaintiffs’ claims against Third Party Defendant are dismissed with
prejudice.
4.

Plaintiff is awarded costs as a matter of right in the amount of $2,252.17, and

attorney’s fees in the amount of $69,274.50, for a total award of $71,526.67, from and against
Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs, together with interest at the judgment rate of 7.375% from the
date of entry of this Amended Judgment until satisfied in full.
5.

Third Party Defendant is awarded attorney’s fees in the amount of $37,932.50

from and against Third Party Plaintiffs, together with interest at the judgment rate of 7.375%
from the date of entry of this Amended Judgment until satisfied in full.
Signed: 12/18/2018 01:59 PM

DATED this ___ day of December, 2018.
BY THE COURT:

~

Cynthia K.C. Meyer
District Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
19_ day of December, 2018 I served a true and correct copy
I hereby certify that on the _
of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
W. Christopher Pooser
Anna E. Courtney
Stoel Rives, LLP
101 S. Capitol Blvd., Ste. 1900
Boise, Idaho 83 702-7705

US Mail
_ _ Overnight Mail
Hand Delivered
_ _ Facsimile (208) 389-9040
x Via Email to:
christopher.pooser@stoel.com
anna.courtney@stoel.com

Peter J. Smith IV
SMITH+ MALEK, PLLC
601 E. Front A venue
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83 814

US Mail
_ _ Overnight Mail
Hand Delivered
_ _ Facsimile (208) 214-2416
x Via Email to:
peter@smithmalek.com

Terrance R. Harris
RAMSDEN, MARFICE, EALY &
HARRIS, LLP
700 Northwest Boulevard
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83 814

US Mail
_ _ Overnight Mail
Hand Delivered
_ _ Facsimile (208) 664-5884
x Via Email to:
tharris@rmehlaw.com and
nvigil@rmehlaw.conm

JIM BRANNON
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT
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RAMSDEN, NIARFICE, EALY & HARRIS, LLP
700 Nm1hwest Blvd.
P.O. Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336
Telephone: (208) 664-5818
Facsimile:
(208) 664-5884
Terrance R. Harris, ISB #5484
rharris@rmehlaw.com

Filed: 12/21/2018 14:57:08
First Judicial District, Kootenai County
Jim Brannon, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk - McCoy, Susan

Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counter Defendant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
JENNIFER PORCELLO,

CASE NO. CV-2016-7343

Plaintiff,
vs.

ANTHONY J. PORCELLO and the Estate
of ANNIE C. PORCELLO, KALYN M.
PORCELLO, Personal Representative,

CORRECTED AMENDED
JUDGMENT

Defendants.

ANTHONY J. PORCELLO and the Estate of
ANNIE C. PORCELLO, KALYN M.
PORCELLO, Personal Representative,
Counter-Plaintiffs,
vs.
JENNIFER PORCELLO,
Counter-Defendant.
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ANTHONY J. PORCELLO and the Estate of
ANNIE C. PORCELLO, KALYN M.
PORCELLO, Personal Representative,
Third Party Plaintiffs,
vs.
MARK PORCELLO,
Third Par

Defendant.

JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS:

This Corrected Amended Judgment is being filed to correct a scrivener's error in the
caption of the original Amended Judgment, and is being entered by the Court mmc pro tune to
the filing date of the original Amended Judgment which was December 19, 2018.

1.

Plaintiff's Jennifer Porcello n/k/a Jennifer Maggard request for declaratory

judgment is GRANTED. The Court declares the following:
a.

That Plaintiff's obligation under the Promissory Note dated September 3, 2014,
in the principal amount of $648,500.00, wherein Jennifer Porcello and Mark
Porcello were the makers and Anthony J. Porcello and Annie C. Porcello were
the holders, has been paid in foll and is satisfied.

b.

Timt Plaintiffs obligation under the Deed of Trust securing the perf01mance of
the above-described Promissory Note, which Deed of Trust was recorded on
September 4, 2014, as Instrument No. 2469098000, records of Kootenai County,
Idaho, has been satisfied and the real prope1fy encumbered by the Deed of Trust
is hereby released and reconveyed to Jennifer Porcello n/k/a Jennifer Maggard as
her sole and separate prope1fy.
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2.

Defendants'/Counter-Plaintiffs' request for a judicial foreclosure is DENIED.

Defendants'/Counter-Plaintiffs' claims against Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant are dismissed ,vith
prejudice.
3.

Third Party Defendant's request for a dismissal of Third-Party Plaintiffs' claim is

GRANTED. Third Party's Plaintiffs' claims against Third Party Defendant are dismissed with
prejudice.
4.

Plaintiff is awarded costs as a matter of right in the amount of $2,252.17, and

attorney's fees in the amount of $69,274.50, for a total award of $71,526.67, from and against
Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs, together ,,,ith interest at the judgment rate of 7.375% from the
date of entry of this Amended Judgment until satisfied in full.
5.

Third Party Defendant is awarded attorney's fees in the amount of $37,932.50

from and against Third Party Plaintiffs, together with interest at the judgment rate of 7.375%
from the date of entty of this Amended Judgment until satisfied in full.
Signed: 12/21/2018 10:48 AM

DATED this_ day of December, 2018.
BY THE COURT:

District Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the _
21_ day of December, 2018 I served a true and con-ect copy
of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
W. Christopher Pooser
Anna E. Courtney
Stoel Rives, LLP
101 S. Capitol Blvd., Ste. 1900
Boise, Idaho 83702-7705

US Mail
_ _ Overnight Mail
Hand Delivered
_ _ Facsimile (208) 389-9040
x Via Email to:
christopher. pooser@stoel.com
anna.comtney@stoel.com

Peter J. Smith N
SN.1ITH + MALEK, PLLC
601 E. Front Avenue
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814

US Mail
_ _ Overnight Mail
Hand Delivered
Facsimile (208) 214-2416
x Via Email to:
peter@smithmalek.com

Terrance R. Harris
RAMSDEN, MARFICE, EALY &
HARRIS,LLP
700 Nortln:vest Boulevard
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814

US Mail
_ _ Overnight Mail
Hand Delivered
_ _ Facsimile (208) 664-5884
x Via Email to:
rharris@nnehlaw.com and
nvigil@rmehlaw.conm

TIM BRANNON
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT
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Filed: 02/19/2019 09:02:04
First Judicial District, Kootenai County
Jim Brannon, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk - Hayden, Katherine

W. Christopher Pooser, ISB No. 5525
Email: christopher.pooser@stoel.com
Anna E. Courtney, ISB No. 9279
Email: anna. courtney@stoel.com
STOEL RIVES LLP
101 S. Capitol Boulevard, Suite 1900
Boise, ID 83 702-7705
Telephone:
(208) 389-9000
Facsimile:
(208) 389-9040
Attorneys for Defendants, Counter Plaintiffs, and
Third Party Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
JENNIFER PORCELLO,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
ANTHONY J. PORCELLO and the Estate
of ANNIE C. PORCELLO, KALYN M.
PORCELLO, Personal Representative

Case No. CV-2016-7343

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND
DENYING IN PART APPELLANTS'
REQUEST TO ADD TO AND DELETE
FROM THE RECORD ON APPEAL

Defendants-Appellants.
ANTHONY J. PORCELLO and the Estate
of ANNIE C. PORCELLO, KALYN M.
PORCELLO, Personal Representative,
Counter-PlaintiffsAppellants,
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Counter-DefendantRespondent.
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ANTHONY J. PORCELLO and the Estate
of ANNIE C. PORCELLO, KALYN M.
PORCELLO, Personal Representative,
Third Party PlaintiffsAppellants,
vs.
MARK PORCELLO,
Third Party DefendantRes ondent.
Before this Court is Appellants' Objection to the Record on Appeal and Request to Add
to and Delete from the Record on Appeal (filed Dec. 31, 2018). Appellants request the addition
of selected documents to the Clerk's Record, as well as the deletion of selected documents.
Appellants also request the addition of the reporter's transcript from the court trial. Appellants'
requests are made pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 29(a) and came before the Court for hearing
on February 6, 2019. Respondents Jennifer Porcello and Mark Porcello joined in Appellants'
request to add and delete selected documents from the Clerk's Record. Respondents opposed the
request to add the reporter's transcript from the court trial.
For good cause shown, and being fully advised of the premises, Appellants' request to
add to and delete from the Clerk's Record is GRANTED. Appellants' request to add the
reporter's transcript from the court trial is DENIED.
ACCORDINGLY, IT IS ORDERED THAT:
A.

The Clerk of the Court is directed to add the following documents to the Clerk's

Record:
1.

Order Postponing Trustee's Sale, filed October 17, 2016;

2.

Order of Dismissal (preliminary injunction), filed December 19, 2016;
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3.

Order of Entry of Default, filed May 10, 2017;

4.

Order Granting Third Party Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Entry of
Default, filed July 27, 2017;

5.

Order Granting Third Party Defendant Mark Porcello's Motion for
Continuance and Extension of Pre-Trial Deadlines, filed September 21,
2017;

6.

Notice of Trial and Pretrial Conference Setting and Pretrial Order, filed
November 1, 2017;

7.

Plaintiff's Witness List, filed April 9, 2018;

8.

Plaintiff's Exhibit List, filed April 9, 2018;

9.

Third Party Defendant's Exhibit List, filed April 9, 2018;

10.

Third Party Defendant's Witness List, filed April 9, 2018;

11.

Order re April 2, 2018 Hearing, filed April 10, 2018;

12.

Plaintiff's Trial Brief, filed April 16, 2018;

13.

Trial Brief of Third Party Defendant Mark Porcello, filed April 16, 2018;

14.

· Plaintiff's Written Closing Argument-Opening Brief, filed June 4, 2018;

15.

Plaintiff's Written Closing Argument-Response and Reply Brief, filed
June 18, 2018; and

16.

Closing Argument of Third Party Defendant Mark Porcello, filed June 18,
2018.

B.

The Clerk of the Court is directed to delete the following documents from the

Clerk's Record:
1.

Declaration of Henry D. Madsen, filed November 14, 2016;
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2.

Declaration of Kalyn Porcello, filed December 6, 2016;

3.

Declaration of Joe T. Mijich, filed December 6, 2016;

4.

Affidavit of Henry D. Madsen, filed December 7, 2016;

5.

Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment,
filed December 29, 2017;

6.

Affidavit of Linda Lourey, CPA, in Support of Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment, filed December 29, 2017;

7.

Affidavit of Henry D. Madsen in Support of Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment, filed December 29, 2017;

8.

Affidavit of Robert Jones, CPA, in support of Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment, filed December 29, 2010;

9.
10.

11.

Statement of Undisputed Facts, filed December 29, 2017;
. Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration/Clarification, filed March 19,
2018;
Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motions:
Reconsideration/Clarification; and Motion to Amend the Pleadings, filed
March 20, 2018; and

12.

Defendants' Memorandum of Law Re: Linda Lourey, filed May 17, 2018.

II
II
II
II
II
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C.

The Appellant's request to add the reporter's transcript from the court trial is

denied. The Court does not have the authority to add the reporter's transcript based on the Idaho
Supreme Court's Order to Proceed on the Clerk's Record Only, filed October 29, 2018. In
addition, Idaho Appellate Rule 29(a) requires the completion of the reporter's transcript before
the Court can consider requests for additions to the transcript. The Clerk of the Court is directed
to not add any of the reporter's transcripts from the court trial to the record on appeal.

f'!;_y of February, 2019.

SIGNED this 1.3_

ourtJudge
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
19
19 20t8-, I caused a true and correct copy of the
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on February_,
foregoing ORDER GRANTING IN PART APPELLANTS' REQUEST TO ADD TO
AND DELETE FROM THE RECORD ON APPEAL to be served by the method indicated
below, and addressed to the following:
W. Christopher Pooser
Stoel Rives LLP

christopher.pooser@stoel.com

[
[
[
[

Via U.S. Mail
Via Facsimile
Via Overnight Mail
Via Hand Delivery
_✓ J Via Email
[ ] Via iCourt Service

Terrance R. Harris
RAMSDEN, MARFICE, EALY &

[
[
[
[

Via U.S. Mail
Via Facsimile
Via Overnight Mail
Via Hand Delivery
~✓ J Via Email
[ ] Via iCourt Service

HARRIS
rharris@rmehlaw.com

Peter J. Smith
Smith & Malek

peter@smithmalek com

]
]
]
]

[
[
[
[

]
]
]
]

]
]
]
]

Via U.S. Mail
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Via Overnight Mail
Via Hand Delivery
[ ✓] Via Email
[ ] Via iCourt Service

Clerk
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

Jennifer Porcello
Plaintiff/CounterDefendant/Respondent,
vs.
Anthony Porcello, Annie Porcello, Kalyn
Porcello
Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs/Third
Party Plaintiffs/Appellants
vs.
Mark Porcello
Third Party Defendant/Respondent

Supreme Court No. 46443
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS

I, Katherine Hayden, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the First Judicial District of
the State of Idaho in and for the County of Kootenai, do hereby certify that the following
documents will be submitted as exhibits to the Record:

Court Exhibits
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Exhibit 1, Electronic Media, Admitted April 23, 2018
Exhibit 2, Document, Admitted April 23, 2018
Exhibit 3, Document, Admitted April 23, 2018
Exhibit 4, Document, Admitted April 23, 2018
Exhibit 5, Document, Admitted April 23, 2018

Plaintiff’s Trial Exhibits
1. Exhibit 1, Document, Admitted April 23, 2018
2. Exhibit 2, Document, Admitted April 23, 2018
3. Exhibit 3, Document, Admitted April 23, 2018
4. Exhibit 4, Document, Admitted April 23, 2018
5. Exhibit 5, Document, Admitted April 23, 2018
6. Exhibit 6, Document, Admitted April 23, 2018
7. Exhibit 8, Document, Admitted April 23, 2018
8. Exhibit 10, Document, Admitted April 25, 2018
9. Exhibit 12, Document, Admitted April 25, 2018
10. Exhibit 14, Document, Admitted April 23, 2018
11. Exhibit 15, Document, Admitted April 23, 2018
12. Exhibit 17, Document, Admitted April 23, 2018
13. Exhibit 18, Document, Admitted April 23, 2018
14. Exhibit 19, Document, Admitted April 24, 2018
15. Exhibit 20, Document, Admitted April 23, 2018
16. Exhibit 21, Document, Admitted April 23, 2018
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17. Exhibit 22, Document, Admitted April 23, 2018
18. Exhibit 26, Document, Admitted April 24, 2018
Defendant’s Trial Exhibits
1. Exhibit D, Document, Admitted April 23, 2018
2. Exhibit E, Document, Admitted April 23, 2018
3. Exhibit F, Document, Admitted April 23, 2018
4. Exhibit G, Document, Admitted April 23, 2018
5. Exhibit N, Document, Admitted April 23, 2018
6. Exhibit O, Document, Admitted April 23, 2018
7. Exhibit P, Document, Admitted April 23, 2018
8. Exhibit R, Document, Refused May 24, 2018
9. Exhibit S, Document, Admitted April 23, 2018
10. Exhibit T, Document, Admitted May 24, 2018
11. Exhibit U, Document, Admitted April 23, 2018
12. Exhibit V, Document, Admitted April 23, 2018
13. Exhibit W, Document, Admitted May 23, 2018
14. Exhibit X, Document, Admitted April 23, 2018
15. Exhibit Y, Document, Admitted April 23, 2018
16. Exhibit Z, Document, Admitted April 23, 2018
17. Exhibit AA, Document, Admitted April 23, 2018
18. Exhibit BB, Document, Admitted May 21, 2018
19. Exhibit CC, Document, Admitted April 23, 2018
20. Exhibit DD, Document, Admitted May 21, 2018
21. Exhibit EE, Document, Admitted April 23, 2018
22. Exhibit FF, Document, Admitted April 23, 2018
23. Exhibit GG, Document, Admitted May 21, 2018
24. Exhibit HH, Document, Admitted May 24, 2018
25. Exhibit II, Document, Admitted April 23, 2018
26. Exhibit JJ, Document, Refused May 23, 2018
27. Exhibit KK, Document, Refused May 23, 2018
28. Exhibit LL, Document, Admitted May 23, 2018
29. Exhibit MM, Document, Admitted April 23, 2018
30. Exhibit NN, Document, Admitted April 23, 2018
31. Exhibit OO, Document, Admitted May 23, 2018
32. Exhibit PP, Document, Admitted May 21, 2018
33. Exhibit QQ, Document, Admitted May 21, 2018
34. Exhibit RR, Document, Admitted May 21, 2018
35. Exhibit SS, Document, Admitted May 21, 2018
36. Exhibit TT, Document, Admitted May 21, 2018
37. Exhibit UU, Document, Admitted May 21, 2018
38. Exhibit VV, Document, Admitted May 21, 2018
39. Exhibit WW, Document, Admitted May 21, 2018
40. Exhibit XX, Document, Admitted May 21, 2018
41. Exhibit AAA, Document, Admitted April 25, 2018
42. Exhibit NNN, Document, Admitted May 22, 2018
43. Exhibit PPP, Document, Admitted May 21, 2018
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the
February
2019. 2018.
said Court on this the 28th
day
of November,
4th of
December
JIM BRANNON Signed: 12/4/2018 07:23 AM
Clerk of the Court
Seal
By:
Deputy Clerk

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on this date, I served a copy of the attached to:
Terrance R. Harris
William Christopher Pooser
Anna Elizabeth Courtney
Peter John Smith

rharris@rmehlaw.com
christopher.pooser@stoel.com
anna.courtney@stoel.com
peter@smithmalek.com

[X] By E-mail
[X] By E-mail
[X] By E-mail
[X] By E-mail

Jim Brannon
Clerk of the Court
Dated: 2/28/19
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Deputy Clerk
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

Jennifer Porcello
Plaintiff/CounterDefendant/Respondent,
vs.
Anthony Porcello, Annie Porcello, Kalyn
Porcello
Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs/Third
Party Plaintiffs/Appellants
vs.
Mark Porcello
Third Party Defendant/Respondent.

Supreme Court No. 46443
CLERK’S CERTIFICATE TO THE RECORD

I, Jim Brannon, Clerk of the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in
and for the County of Kootenai, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing record in the
above-entitled cause was compiled under my direction and is a true, full and correct record of,
the pleadings and documents under Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate Rules.

I do further certify that copies of all documents, charts and pictures offered or admitted as
exhibits in a trial or hearing in the above-entitled cause will be duly lodged with the Clerk of the
Supreme Court, along with the Court Reporter's Transcript and Clerk's Record, except that
pictures or depictions of child pornography shall not be copied and sent to the parties or the
Supreme Court unless specifically ordered by the court. Documentary exhibits in pdf format
may be sent to the Supreme Court on a CD that includes an index. All other exhibits shall be
retained by the clerk of the district court as required by Rule 31 of the Idaho Appellate Rules.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said
Court on this the 4th
of December
November,
28thday
of February
2019.2018.
JIM BRANNON
Clerk of the Court
Seal
By: Katherine Hayden
Deputy Clerk
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

Jennifer Porcello
Case No. CV-2016-7343
Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant/Respondent,
vs.
Clerk’s Certificate of Service
Anthony Porcello, Annie Porcello, Kalyn
Porcello
Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs/Third Party
Plaintiffs/Appellants
vs.
Mark Porcello,
Third Party Defendant/Respondent.

I, Katherine Hayden, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the First Judicial District, of the State
of Idaho, in and for the County of Kootenai, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing
Record in the above entitled cause was electronically compiled at my direction, and is a true, full
and correct Record of the pleadings and documents as requested by the parties.
I further certify that I have caused to be served the Clerk's Record and Reporter's Transcript (if
requested), along with copies of

□ Pre-sentence Investigation, or

□ No Exhibits submitted;
Other Confidential Documents; or
□ Confidential Exhibits

all Exhibits offered or admitted;

(if applicable) to each of the Attorneys of Record or Parties in this case as follows:
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on December
November
, 2018, I served a copy of the attached to:
4th 2019
Febraury 28,
Terrance R. Harris
William Christopher
Pooser
Anna Elizabeth
Courtney
Peter John Smith

Dated:12/4/18

rharris@rmehlaw.com
700 NW
Blvd CdA, ID 83814
101 Schristopher.pooser@stoel.com
Capitol Blvd., Ste 1900 Boise, ID 83702

[X] By E-mail
Certified Mail
[X] By E-mail
Certified Mail

101 Sanna.courtney@stoel.com
Capitol Blvd., Ste 1900 Boise, ID 83702

[X] By E-mail
Certified Mail

601 Epeter@smithmalek.com
Front Ave., Ste 304 CdA, ID 83814

[X] By E-mail
Certified Mail

Jim Brannon
Clerk of the Court
By: Katherine
Deputy Clerk
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